



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

VENONA

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PART # 1 OF 1

PAGES AVAILABLE THIS PART 74

# VENONA

FBI DOCUMENTS OF HISTORIC INTEREST  
RE VENONA THAT ARE REFERENCED IN  
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN'S BOOK "SECRECY"



~~TOP SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd  
FROM : Mr. Belmont  
SUBJECT: [redacted] ESPIONAGE - R [redacted] (u)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE  
DATE: May 15, 1950

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to briefly summarize the important investigative developments in this case and individuals closely related thereto, based on [redacted] information.

INTRODUCTION:

[redacted] (s) has been able to furnish to us certain fairly detailed information regarding MEB (Soviet Intelligence) activities in the United States in the period April, 1944, through March, 1945. The [redacted] information indicates the extensive use of cover names by the MEB which often makes identifications difficult where we have little information available from the source. In the following material an effort has been made to break down the information from [redacted] into individual networks, particularly in those instances where we previously had investigated certain ramifications of the Soviet espionage activity in this country.

THE SILVERMASTER NETWORK (u)

The [redacted] (s) information deals in part with the operations of the MEB in their recruitment and use of personnel in various Government agencies previously known to us through our investigation in the Nathan Gregory Silvermaster case. The individuals positively or tentatively identified from [redacted] include Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Helen Silvermaster, Ludwig Ullman, Bela Gold, Sonia Gold, Victor Parlo, Elizabeth Bentley, Jacob Golos, Harry Magdoff, Peter Rhodes, Allen Rosenberg, Harold Glasser, Anatoli B. Gromov, Joseph Katz, and Vladimir S. Pravdin, all of whom were implicated in the information furnished to us by Elizabeth Bentley.

In addition to the foregoing, we have a considerable number of individuals attached to the same network, identified only through cover names, whom we are attempting by investigation to identify. The most important of these is an individual by the cover name of Albert, who, from the [redacted] information, operated

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Declassify on: OADR  
3/12/8

Special Agent in Charge

5268 SLD/CLL  
(106)  
(Per NSA LTR DTD 7/9/51)

R.L. Ladd (u)

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INDEXED

JUN 8 1950

CLASS. & EXT. BY [redacted]  
DATE OF REVIEW [redacted]

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above Silvermaster and was in contact with MGB officials of the New York Soviet Consulate. We have an active investigation in progress to identify Albert, and he will undoubtedly prove to be one of the unidentified principals of Bentley, whom we have not been able to identify based on the information provided by her. (S)

THE ALTSCHULER NETWORK (S)(u)

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You will recall that we have conducted an extensive investigation in the Lydia Altschuler, was., etal, Internal Security - R case concerning an espionage network involving cipher messages in secret ink exchanged between persons in the New York City area and persons in Mexico City and South America. The secret ink messages dealt primarily with the efforts of the espionage parallel to free Frank Jacson, Trotsky's killer, who was imprisoned in Mexico City. You may recall that there were eight messages in the Altschuler traffic which we were never able to decipher because we could not find the book used in the encipherment. From ~~the~~ information we identified this book as "Una Excursione a los Indios Ranqueles," a paper-bound edition published in Argentina. Through this identification our Cryptographic Laboratory has just finished the decipherment of seven of the eight remaining messages intercepted in the Altschuler case. These messages extend the ramifications of the espionage parallel we knew in the Altschuler case and one message shows the network was, in 1943, setting up a radio station in Argentina. One of the messages sets forth that the same code was to be used by the station as in the Altschuler case, and gives the frequency to be used and the time of intended operations. We are attempting to develop whether there is in existence traffic intercepted from such a station. There is some indication that such traffic will be in existence available through either the Armed Forces Security Agency or the FCC. (S)

It is also of considerable interest to note that the radio stations set up at the Soviet Consulates in New York City and San Francisco transmitted messages in code, and among the intercepts available in connection with these two transmitters there have been found intercepts of a station operating on at least one of the frequencies and using one of the call letters set forth in the secret ink messages. A preliminary examination by our Cryptographic Laboratory indicates that we will be able to decipher at least one of these messages, but it is not possible to accurately predict whether we will be able to tie this in with the South American station. As soon as the Cryptographic Laboratory finishes their work this entire matter will be reviewed and analyzed for you and submitted to the Field for further investigation. (S)(u)

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5

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(S) In addition to the foregoing, we have identified through [redacted] two individuals, Floyd C. Miller and Robert Menaker, who were Soviet espionage agents used in the infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyites). Miller was used in connection with the continued infiltration by the Soviets of Mrs. Natalia Trotsky's household in Mexico City. Menaker had been in South America as a representative of the Midland Export Company, a firm operated by Michael Burd. Through a review of the Bureau's files on Burd we developed the identities of two persons, Nicholas and Maria Fisher, who were, in 1944, attempting to enter the United States in transit to Mexico from the Soviet Union. These two persons are undoubtedly identical with persons named by [redacted] as "The Pair" (Cheta). It might be noted that their application to pass in transit through the United States was denied by the Interdepartmental Visa Committee. Further investigation is being actively conducted to determine if these persons did succeed in entering the Western Hemisphere at some other time. We also are investigating to determine the ramifications of the possible use of the Midland Export Company as a Soviet espionage cover. It might be noted that the Midland Export Company did come to our attention in connection with our investigation in the Altschuler case. We are actively investigating this matter to develop its full potentialities.

THE MOCASE (S) (u)

Through [redacted] information we determined that Boris Morros' cover name was Frost (which is the English equivalent of Moroz in Russian, although the Soviets used the name as Frost). Alfred K. Stern, according to [redacted] was designated under the cover name of Louis, and a memorandum prepared by him obtained by us through investigative efforts in February, 1945, was summarized in the [redacted] information and sent by the MGB in New York City to Moscow. While the above has not assisted materially our efforts in investigating the Mocese, it does furnish corroborative information to that furnished by our informant, Morros.

(S) In addition to the foregoing, there is information from [redacted] regarding a person designated by the cover name of Aida who was working in 1944 for the United Palestine Appeal and the MGB desired to place her with the Committee of Jewish Writers and Artists in New York City where they thought she would be of greater use to them. A tentative identification of this individual has been made as Esther Trebach Rand, who has been implicated in the espionage network in the Mocese and she is a contact of Jack Soble. We are conducting investigation in an attempt to verify the tentative identification of Rand.

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[KALIBR] (S) (u)

We are currently attempting, through investigation, to identify an employee of MEB at Los Alamos in 1944, designated by the cover names of Kalibr and Schmel. The known facts regarding this individual, from [redacted] are that he was to be contacted near Los Alamos in the latter part of November, 1944, by one Osa. It was later reported that he had been contacted and was willing to assist the MEB. It was also reported that he arrived in New York City on leave in early January, 1945. We originally thought he might be Luis W. Alvarez, a prominent physician now employed at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, California, but upon the receipt of the information from the source that the individual had arrived in New York City in early January, 1945, we determined that Alvarez was not there at that time. We are conducting an intensive investigation to develop this individual's identity, hampered by the fact that certain leave records at Los Alamos have been destroyed. We are also, through investigation, attempting to identify Osa. (S) (u)

A [THEODORE ALVIN HALL and SAVILLE SAX] (S) (u)

Recent information from [redacted] (S) reflects that Theodore Hall, in November, 1944, was in New York City, where he was in contact with Saville Sax. Hall, at that time, was employed by MEB at Los Alamos. At the recommendation of Sax, Hall agreed to supply to Soviet Intelligence information concerning work being done at Los Alamos. Hall delivered to Beck (unidentified) certain information, and Sax contacted an official at the Soviet Consulate and delivered to him certain information. Based on the foregoing, an intensive investigation has been instituted. (S) (u)

Theodore Alvin Hall, who is identical with the Hall mentioned in the [redacted] information, presently is employed at the University of Chicago (at the Institute of Nuclear Physics). (S) (u)

Sax also is residing in Chicago, where he is operating a mimeographing business. (S) (u)

Further investigation is being conducted to determine the current activities of these individuals and to identify Beck. (S) (u)

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7

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JUDITH COPLON (S)(u)

As you know, the [redacted] (S) information enabled our identification of Coplon as a Soviet espionage agent. Two other individuals were involved with Coplon in her espionage activity in 1944, one being Marian Davis, now Marian D. Berdecio, who is married and living in Mexico City. She formerly was employed by OWI and by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. We have a pending investigation on Berdecio. The second individual who actually recruited Coplon was Flora Don Wovschin, who presently is married and is believed to be in the Soviet Union. She formerly was employed by OWI and by the State Department. Her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Knos Wicher, are presently in the United States and we are investigating them not only to determine whether they have any connections with Soviet espionage, but also in order that we may learn if Wovschin returns to the United States.

PAUL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS (S)(u)

Our investigation of Fuchs was initiated on information from [redacted] (S) We are currently attempting to identify Fuchs' American espionage contact, "Goose," who not only apparently operated Fuchs while Fuchs was in the United States, but also apparently was to operate Abraham Brotzman, designated by the MCB under the cover name of "Constructor. Brotzman presently is operating a consulting engineering firm in New York City, and instructions have been issued to interview him and various of his associates in an effort to identify "Goose. You will recall that Brotzman was named by Bentley as having furnished information to her in 1940 -- a fact admitted in interview by Brotzman. A brief fully detailing the various aspects of this investigation has been submitted for your information.

AMADEO SABATINI (S)(u)

The [redacted] (S) information sets forth the attempts by the MCB to reactivate a person designated by the name of Mik in Los Angeles in June, 1944. The information sets forth that Mik had ceased operations in behalf of a Soviet espionage contact because he was under surveillance by the FBI. He was being recontacted by a Soviet agent designated under the cover names of Douglas and Ike. Mik has been positively identified as Amadeo Sabatini, who has been interviewed and is, to a certain extent, cooperative with us, although he is not willing to furnish us any information.

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which he does not think we know. Sabatini admits espionage in behalf of Gregori Kheifets, a former official at the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. However, Sabatini claims that his recontact in June, 1944, was by Kheifets, while we know definitely that it was not Kheifets and was the individual Douglas. Sabatini also was the cutout between Kheifets and Jones Orin York, an aircraft employee, in 1943, whom we have tentatively identified in the [redacted] information under the cover name of Iglu. York recently admitted his espionage activities (on 4/10/50) in an interview with our agents, and has admitted that he was active from 1937 until 1943. You will recall that he was named as one of his earlier espionage contacts William Wolf Weisband, a present employee of the Armed Forces Security Agency.

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We are attempting, through investigation to identify Douglas, and we have issued instructions to the New York Office to interview [redacted] a Czechoslovakian whom we believe to be identical with Mariya mentioned in the information provided by [redacted] (S) She was being operated by Douglas. If the interview with her is successful we hope to learn the identity of Douglas.

ANDREI IVANOVICH SCHEVCHENKO (S)(u)

You will recall that we conducted an extensive investigation regarding the espionage activities of Andrei Ivanovich Schevchenko, who, in 1943, was attached to the Bell Aircraft Plant at Niagara Falls, New York, as the head Soviet Inspector of that plant. Schevchenko later became Vice President of the Amtorg Trading Corporation. The information from [redacted] reflects that Schevchenko was designated under the cover name of Arseniy and he apparently occupied an important position in the MGB apparatus operating in the United States. It is also of interest to note that both of our double-agent informants, Loren G. Haas and Leona Franey, are mentioned in the information furnished to us by [redacted] and it appears that the MGB believed them to be reliable. (S)

Another individual in this particular network who is mentioned is Vladimir M. Masurin, who also was attached to the Soviet Inspector's Office at the Bell Aircraft Plant in Niagara Falls, and who apparently was recruited by the MGB after he arrived at the plant. It might be noted that we did develop information in the Schevchenko case which indicated that Masurin was operating as a sub-agent for Schevchenko. (S)(u)

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Another individual that we investigated to some extent in connection with the Schevchenko case was Vladimir Morkovin, who was employed at the Ball Aircraft Corporation, Niagara Falls, New York, as a Research Aerodynamicist. Our investigation showed he was in contact with Schevchenko. He was designated in the information from [redacted] under the cover name of Author. Morkovin left his employment at Ball Aircraft in August, 1946, and in January, 1947, took employment at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he presently is working in the Aeronautical Engineering Department, this department having had contracts with the Navy and with the Air Force. We presently are conducting an active investigation concerning Morkovin.

Another individual who was associated with Schevchenko, according to our investigation of him, and who is also mentioned in [redacted] information, is William Pinsky. Pinsky was employed by the Curtis Wright Corporation in Williamsville, New York, on December 22, 1942, in the Aeronautical Engineering Department. He held this position through 1944 and was noted to be in contact with Schevchenko on several occasions. He was designated by the NSB under the cover name of Cork. Instructions have been issued for a current investigation of Pinsky.

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VIKTOR ANDREEVICH KRAVCHENKO (u)

You will recall that in the Spring of 1944 Kravchenko defected from his position with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C. The information from [redacted] reflects that thereafter he was designated by the cover name of Komar by the NSB and they were active in determining his activities and associates. They had a woman designated by the cover name of Oia who was to travel from Washington, D. C., to New York City to establish contact with Lydia Estrin, the mistress of David Dallin, both of whom were active in Russian Social Democratic circles and were assisting Kravchenko. We have not been successful in identifying Oia to date, although we have conducted an extensive investigation in this respect. It also was reported that Oia was acquainted with Laura Peabody Cunningham and the Soviets knew that she was employed by the Naval Communications. We have interviewed Cunningham who is now married to a man by the name of Testoules, and she is still employed by Naval Communications. There is no definite information to the effect that she was ever used by the NSB. We also have interviewed Alexei Stoopsanov who apparently was acquainted with

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10

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both Cunningham and Ols. Stoopanov has furnished us certain information which has assisted us in our investigation, but has not definitely enabled us to identify Ols. Stoopanov presently is a State Department employee, working as a guard attached to the American Embassy in Ottawa, Canada.

Another individual who was infiltrating the Russian Social Democratic group which was assisting Kravchenko, was a person designated by the cover name of Tulip. It also appears that he was active in Trotskyite circles. Because of the lack of identifying information concerning him, we have not been successful in identifying him to date, although an active investigation is being carried out.

HENRY A. WALLACE (u)

The information from [redacted] (S) reflects that the Soviets were using two individuals who apparently held positions high in the United States Government and were close acquaintances of Henry A. Wallace in 1944. One of these individuals was designated under the cover name of Jurist and we have not succeeded in identifying him to date. He apparently was in a position to furnish high level information to the Soviets involving such persons as President Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace, Cordell Hull, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Jurist, on April 29, 1944, furnished to the Soviets the information that Vice President Wallace was to go to China, and it is noted that Wallace actually left for China on May 20, 1944. Jurist apparently was a little afraid of his position in the Government because of his cooperation with the MGB, and stated that an exposure of his connections would lead to a political scandal and might have an effect on the coming elections.

One suspect who has been considered for Jurist is Samuel Irving Rosenman, who was an assistant to President Roosevelt in 1944. However, it might be noted that Rosenman is mentioned by the MGB, according to [redacted] by his real name on one occasion and it has been noted that the MGB, once it designates a man by a cover name, thereafter uses the cover name to the exclusion of the individual's real name at all times.

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Another individual who apparently was close to Wallace, and who is mentioned in the information from [redacted] was an individual designated by the cover name of Frank. Frank was reported to be considering resigning from the State Department as of July 22, 1944, for "personal reasons." The identity of Frank has not been developed to date in view of the fact that the only available information is to the effect that he was well acquainted with Wallace and was to resign as of that date. However, it is interesting to note that Laurence Duggan (deceased), mentioned by Whittaker Chambers and Keda Massing, did resign from the State Department in the latter part of July, 1944. We have investigations in progress to identify both Jurist and Frank.

ALGER HISS (S) (u)

According to [redacted] (S) on March 30, 1945, Anatoli B. Gromov, First Secretary and MGB representative at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., informed his Moscow headquarters that Ales had, for some years, been the leader of a little group working for Soviet Military Intelligence. It was stated that this group was composed mainly of Ales' relatives and that the group, which apparently was centered in the State Department, was working mainly on developing military information only and the information from the State Department interested them very little. It was stated that Ales, after the Yalta conference, had been in touch with a high Soviet official whom Ales implied was Comrade Vishinsky who thanked Ales on behalf of Soviet Military Intelligence. It would appear likely that this individual is Alger Hiss in view of the fact that he was in the State Department and the information from Chambers indicated that his wife, Priscilla, was active in Soviet espionage and he also had a brother, Donald, in the State Department. It also is to be noted that Hiss did attend the Yalta conference as a special adviser to President Roosevelt, and he would, of course, have conferred with high officials of other nations attending the conference. An attempt is being made by analysis of the available information to verify this identification.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY (S) (u)

The [redacted] (S) information reflects that the Soviets were able to make extensive use of the Communist Party, USA, both for recruitment and for checking on various individuals regarding whom the MGB wanted information. Earl Browder was known by the MGB under the cover name [redacted]

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12

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of Bulavoy, and Browder was cognizant of the Soviet activity in the infiltration of various United States Government agencies. There is also some indication in [redacted] information that he knew of other activity on the part of the MGB. We are attempting, through investigation, to identify an individual designated by the cover name of Echo who appears, according to [redacted] to have occupied a responsible position in the Communist Party and to have been used in various ways by the MGB.

MGB SOVIET OFFICIALS (u)

It is not possible, in a memorandum of this length, to detail the information available from [redacted] regarding MGB officials attached to official and semi-official Soviet establishments in the United States. However, certain interesting observations can be made on the basis of [redacted] material. An individual by the name of May was directing the MGB espionage activity which was stemming from the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He undoubtedly was the Legal Resident Agent for the MGB at that Consulate. However, he directed activities which are outside the New York area, reaching to the West Coast, to Los Alamos, and even to Washington, D. C. He has not been identified, and it appears possible that the cover name of May is for the position of Legal Resident Agent rather than for one individual. If this is true, then Vassili Zubilin would probably have been May up until Zubilin's departure from the United States in the latter part of August, 1944. You will recall that Zubilin was attached as a Second Secretary to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., but spent a considerable amount of time in New York City. According to [redacted] information, under May, the Legal Resident Agent, there were individuals in official or semi-official Soviet positions who were designated as "cadre men." These individuals apparently headed various individual networks which were being operated by the MGB in the United States. We have not identified all of these individuals, but have succeeded in identifying a few of them. One of the more important ones was Vladimir S. Pravdin, the former head of the Tass News Agency in New York City. Pravdin was in contact with a number of American correspondents, apparently both on an open and clandestine basis. Among his contacts were persons such as Johannes Steale, Richard Lanterbach, and Stephen Laird. We are conducting investigations on all of these individuals. It is to be

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noted that Laird is presently employed by CBS. Another individual who has been identified with reasonable certainty is Mikhail Chaliapin, who was, in 1944, attached to the Soviet Consulate in New York City, and we had previously conducted investigation concerning him in connection with the Altschuler network during 1943 and 1944. Another individual who was heading a particular network was an individual designated by the cover name of Shtok. This individual may be identical with Seman Markovich Semenov, who was attached to the Amtorg Trading Corporation in 1943 and 1944. Semenov was the subject of an extensive investigation prior to his departure for the Soviet Union in September, 1944. (S)

The Legal Resident Agent at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., following his arrival in the United States in September, 1944, was Anatoli Gromov who, you will recall, we identified in connection with the Silvermaster case. According to [redacted] Gromov, who was designated under the cover name of VETIN, was to take over the activities of the Government network following his arrival. In addition to the individuals mentioned heretofore who were MGB agents attached to official establishments, there is a considerable number that we have not identified to date and there are others who occupied relatively minor positions who have been identified. All of these individuals identified by us have departed from the United States. We are attempting to develop to the fullest possible extent the activities of these individuals even though they have returned to the Soviet Union because their information gives us a fuller insight into MGB activities in this country. (S) (u)

OTHER IDENTIFICATIONS (u)

A brief mention is being made of certain other identifications which have been made from the information supplied by [redacted] (S) (u)

Charles Davila, an individual active in Roumanian circles in the United States, was designated by the MGB under the cover name of Dekar. He apparently was cooperating with the MGB in connection with their interest in Roumanian affairs in 1944. He is being actively investigated. (S) (u)

Roman Moczulski, in 1944, was employed by the Polish Telegraphic Agency, and was being recruited, according to [redacted] by the MGB. He is the subject of a pending investigation. (S) (u)

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Sava N. Kosanovic, Yugoslavian Ambassador to the United States, was designated by the MGB under the cover name of Kolo and he apparently was cooperating with the MGB. Kosanovic is the subject of investigation in connection with Yugoslavian Activities in the United States. (S) (u)

Ivan Subasic who, in 1945, formed a coalition government with Tito in Yugoslavia, was being used by the MGB in 1944 in the United States. He was designated under the cover name of Sares. He is presently in Yugoslavia. (S) (u)

[redacted] in 1944, was in the United States as a French refugee and was active on the newspaper "France-Amerique." The MGB was in contact with him, according to [redacted] and was making arrangements for his future use in connection with his pending departure for Algiers, North Africa. He is presently believed to be in France. (S) (u)

Anton S. Ivancic who, in 1944, was the President of a Yugoslav seaman's club in New York City, was active in behalf of the MGB, and they made arrangements for his being contacted in London upon his return to London. It is to be noted that Ivancic later returned to Yugoslavia where he was killed in an accident, the accident reportedly being a planned affair. The investigation on him has been closed. (S) (u)

RECOMMENDATION

The information contained in this memorandum has been set forth in order to briefly summarize for you the important investigative developments. The [redacted] case is being used as a control file to insure that the individual cases growing out of the information from [redacted] (S) are promptly and vigorously handled. It is contemplated that from time to time memoranda such as this will be prepared in order that the entire picture with respect to the instant investigation will be available to you. (S) (u)

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Very important to press all angles. Please bring this memo up to date from time to time for my information. (u)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT  
FROM : V. P. KEAY  
SUBJECT : [REDACTED]

DATE: September 29, 1950

Classified by [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR

5668 SGP/Ger 7/31/97  
(Per NSA LTR DTD 7/9/97)  
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Captain Joseph Wenger, Deputy Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, advised Mr. Reynolds in extreme confidence that a great deal of pressure is being brought to bear on Admiral Stone as the Director of AFSA to distribute [REDACTED] material. (S)  
You will recall that General Carter W. Clarke, when he was Director of the Army Security Agency, advised Mr. Reynolds in extreme confidence that Admiral Stone had indicated a desire to disseminate [REDACTED] material at least to the Central Intelligence Agency. (S)  
At that time, General Clarke resisted the desires of Admiral Stone and was successful in having General Bradley issue instructions to Admiral Stone that [REDACTED] material would only be made available to the FBI. Captain Wenger confidentially advised that the Central Intelligence Agency suspects the existence of [REDACTED]. He stated that Admiral Stone does not know what the outcome will be but promised to keep Mr. Reynolds fully advised before any action is taken. (S)

dissemination without approval of Mr. Ladd. (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

Mr. Reynolds will keep close contact with Captain Wenger in this regard. It is believed that the Bureau should adopt the policy in this particular case that no dissemination should be made to any other American agency than the Bureau. General Bradley is advised as to the contents and, if a specific item is developed which either Admiral Stone or General Bradley believes should be made available to CIA or to any other American agency, it might be handled as a special case and arrangements perfected that the information could be brought to the attention of CIA without jeopardizing the source of information. (S)(u)

CLASS. & EXT. BY [REDACTED]  
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW [REDACTED]

RECORDED

OCT 6 1950

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*Most certainly agree  
Do everything possible  
to prevent loss of interests  
of security*

52 OCT 10 1950

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET (U)

TO: The Director (u)  
FROM: D. M. Ladd (u)  
SUBJECT: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
ESPIONAGE - R/ (u)

DATE: October 16, 1950

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Declassify on: OADR  
Classified by ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
4-14-92  
Class. Act. 5, 562  
Repeal-P.L. 11, 1-1-76, 23  
Date of Review 6-19-92

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the positive identification of Jurist (the cover name for a Soviet agent operating in 1944 and named by ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ as Harry Dexter White, deceased. White was formerly the Administrative Assistant to former Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau.

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DECLASSIFY ON: NSA (U)  
7/28/97 BY: WLS/KJW

DETAILS:

You have previously been advised of information obtained from ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ concerning a Soviet espionage agent designated by the cover name of Jurist, who was active during 1944. According to the previous information received from ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ regarding Jurist, during April, 1944, he had reported on conversations between the then Secretary of State Hull and Vice President Wallace. He also reported on Wallace's proposed trip to China. On August 5, 1944, he reported to the Soviets that he was confident of President Roosevelt's victory in the coming elections unless there was a huge military failure. He also reported that Truman's nomination as Vice President was calculated to secure the vote of the conservative wing of the Democratic Party. It was also reported that Jurist was willing for any self-sacrifice in behalf of the MGB, but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have an effect on the elections. It was also mentioned that he would be returning to Washington, D. C., on August 17, 1944.

The new information from ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ indicates that Jurist and Morgenthau were to make a trip to London and Normandy and were leaving the United States on August 5, 1944.

On the basis of the foregoing, the tentative identification of Harry Dexter White as Jurist appears to be conclusively established inasmuch as Morgenthau and White left the United States on a confidential trip to the Normandy beachhead on August 5, 1944, and they returned to the United States on August 17, 1944.

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

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17

You may recall that Harry Dexter White was named by Whittaker Chambers in his statements as having been a source of information for Chambers in his work in Soviet espionage until Chambers broke with the Soviets in 1938. Chambers produced a handwritten memorandum that White had given him and our Laboratory established this memorandum as being in White's handwriting. The Treasury Department advised that parts of this material were highly confidential, coming to the Treasury Department from the Department of State. (S) (u)

In addition to the foregoing, Elizabeth T. Bentley in November, 1945, advised that she had learned through Nathan Gregory Silvermaster that White was supplying Silvermaster with information which was obtained by White in the course of his duties as Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. (S) (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached hereto a blind memorandum which has been prepared for the information and assistance of [redacted] (S) setting forth this identification. There is also attached a memorandum to the field giving them the new information from [redacted] which establishes conclusively the identity of White as Jurist [redacted] (S) (u)

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Attachment

\*Delivered to [redacted] (S)  
on Nov. 4, 1950. (u)  
BY [redacted]

(u) (u) Le 10/17  
22 Ad sources

W.C. W.  
✓ OK ok  
Wouldn't it be well to send substance to Ad. Goyers for information of the President? (u) (S)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR  
FROM : MR. LADD  
SUBJECT: ESPIONAGE - R (u)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE DATE: February 28, 1977 BY: [initials]

CLASS. & EXT. BY: [initials]  
REASON: FCIM II 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW: 7/7/82

FOI/PA Trade  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12958  
DATE 3/27/84 INITIALS

PURPOSE

This memorandum is designed to give you a concise picture of the developments in this case in our investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States, based on information from [redacted]. The period covered by [redacted] information is only from April, 1944, to May, 1945. However, our investigation has shown that many of the MGB agents involved continued their activities through a much later period. It would appear from available information that the main fields of Soviet interests were in (a) United States atomic energy and other scientific developments; (b) infiltration of the United States Government agencies; and (c) infiltration of Trotskyite and White Russian activities. There is attached a memorandum to the field instructing them to follow this matter closely.

INTRODUCTION

You may recall that from time to time you have been furnished memoranda in this case designed to give you an overall view of activities of the MGB (Soviet Intelligence) based on information from [redacted]. This source has been able to provide us information relating back to the period April, 1944, to May, 1945, regarding Soviet (MGB) operations in the United States. The main limitations on the information are that in many instances it is very fragmentary and, in addition, the Soviets' extensive use of code names makes identifications difficult. You will be interested to know that based on investigation from the [redacted] source we have identified 108 persons involved in Soviet espionage activities who have, at one time, been active in the United States. Of this number we already had received information from other sources indicating espionage involvement on 44 these persons. However, 64 persons were not previously known to us as involved in espionage and have been identified through investigation conducted pursuant to this case. A chart explaining this in more detail is set forth on Page

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7/28/97 See subject (1/6)

Classified by [initials]  
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(u) [redacted] (S)  
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE AGENTS IN [REDACTED] CASE  
(5)

Total Number Involved in Soviet Espionage	
Number Previously Known to us from other information	44
Number Not Previously Known to us	64
	<u>108</u>
Soviet Officials Not Now in United States	29 <sup>a</sup>
Other Persons Not Now in United States	20
Persons Deceased	9
(Burd, Duggan, Golos, Ivancic, Kournakoff, Lauterbach, Malisoff, Stapler, White)	
Persons Now Cooperative With us	12
(Bentley, D. Greenglass <sup>b</sup> , R. Greenglass, Black, Elitcher, Gold <sup>c</sup> , Menaker, Miller, Moczulski, Morros <sup>d</sup> , Sabatini, York)	
Persons who have been or are being prosecuted (Brothman, Coplon, Fuchs <sup>e</sup> , Gold, Greenglass, Gubitchev, Moskowitz, J. Rosenberg, E. Rosenberg, Slack, Sobell)	11
Persons involved in Silvermaster Network	11
Persons involved in Mocase	3
Other persons on whom there are pending investigations	<u>18</u>

Less those counted twice, described below

- a. Gubitchev is also listed as having been prosecuted.
- b. Greenglass is also listed in those being prosecuted.
- c. Gold is also listed as having been prosecuted.
- d. Morros also counted in Mocase subjects.
- e. Fuchs also counted in those not now in United States.

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During the past several months we have not, through our liaison with [redacted] received much new information. Inquiry has determined that work is being pushed on certain technical phases of this material by [redacted] and it is expected that considerable new material will be forthcoming within the next six months. The extent of the new material is not known at this time to [redacted]. In the meantime we are actively investigating in the field in an effort to identify a number of unidentified agents. These investigations are being closely supervised in order to insure that they are being properly investigated. The following is a brief resume of the important ramifications of this matter. (S)

ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs

In September, 1949, acting on the basis of information secured from [redacted] we furnished to [redacted] information indicating that Fuchs had been active in the United States as a Soviet espionage agent. In January, 1950, during interview with [redacted] Fuchs confessed to atomic espionage on behalf of the Soviets. Fuchs was thereafter arrested and convicted for violation of the [redacted]. On March 1, 1950, he was given the maximum sentence of fourteen years. Fuchs was exhaustively interviewed by Bureau representatives in London during May, 1950, and furnished information of value concerning his espionage activities in the United States. (S)

Harry Gold

Our investigation to identify Fuchs' American contacts began simultaneously with our identification of Fuchs as an espionage agent in September, 1949. We had a little information from [redacted] concerning this man which indicated not only that he had been in contact with Fuchs, but was also in contact with Abraham Brothman. We also secured information concerning him from Fuchs and Mrs. and Mr. Robert Heisenman, who are Fuchs' sister and brother-in-law respectively. All of the persons rejected photographs of Harry Gold which were shown to them initially. However, after an involved investigation we

21

centered on Harry Gold as our best suspect, and on May 22, 1950, he admitted extensive espionage activity in the United States. Also on May 22, 1950, Fuchs tentatively identified motion pictures of Gold which were shown to him as his espionage co-workers. Fuchs, on the following day, definitely identified the photographs of Gold. Gold was arrested on May 23, 1950, and indicted on June 9, 1950, by a Federal Grand Jury in the Eastern District of New York. He pled guilty to this indictment and on December 9, 1950, Judge James P. McGranery in Philadelphia sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment, less the time served since his plea of guilty on July 20, 1950. (S)

Alfred Dean Slack (u)

One of the persons named by Harry Gold was Alfred Slack. On the basis of information from Gold, Slack was interviewed on June 15, 1950, at which time he admitted his espionage activities and admitted he had furnished to Gold a sample of formula for the explosive "EDX" while Slack was employed by Holston Ordnance Works, Kingsport, Tennessee, in 1944. Slack was indicted in the Eastern District of Tennessee on June 15, 1950, pled guilty, and on September 22, 1950, he was sentenced to fifteen years by Judge Robert L. Taylor at Greeneville, Tennessee.

Thomas L. Black (u)

Another individual identified by Gold as active in espionage for the Soviets was Thomas L. Black. Gold admitted he was initiated into the Soviet espionage activity by Black, a chemist, in 1935. In an interview on June 20, 1950, Black admitted becoming involved with the Soviets in 1934 in espionage activities under Gaik B. Ovakimian, a Soviet espionage agent who had operated in the United States and who was arrested by FBI Agents in New York City on May 5, 1941, and later charged with violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (Ovakimian departed from the United States on July 23, 1941, as a result of negotiations between the United States Government and the Soviet Union.) Black has admitted working for Ovakimian and a number of other Soviet espionage superiors. The full facts concerning Black have been furnished to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The Department stated that Black's activities in espionage are not such as to charge him with transmitting information relating to the national defense. The Department is considering the prosecution of Black for failure to register.

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the Internal Security Act of 1950. Black is still cooperative with our Philadelphia Office and has furnished considerable information of value. (S)(u)

Abraham Brothman (S)(u)  
Miriam Moskowitz

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The activities of Abraham Brothman were first brought to the attention of the FBI in 1945, at which time Elizabeth Bentley made her disclosure. Brothman was also identified in July, 1950, on the basis of information from [redacted] a Soviet agent designated under the cover name of "Constructor Gold, in signed statements, named Brothman as one of the individuals from whom he had obtained industrial information for transmission to the Soviets during a period in the early 1940's. Gold advised that he had made false statements concerning his relationship with Brothman to both the FBI and a Federal Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York in 1947. Miriam Moskowitz, a former secretary of Brothman, and later his partner in his business, was alleged by Gold to have been present during some of the discussions between Gold and Brothman relative to their intended false testimony before the Federal Grand Jury.

Although the Criminal Division of the Department did not feel that Brothman could be charged with espionage, an indictment was returned against Brothman and Moskowitz on July 29, 1950, charging them with conspiracy to obstruct and impede the administration of justice. They were arrested by the FBI on July 29, on this indictment. The trial of Brothman and Moskowitz commenced on November 10, 1950, in the District Court in the Southern District of New York. On November 22, 1950, the jury returned a verdict guilty as to each defendant. Federal Judge Irving Kaufman, on November 28, 1950, sentenced Brothman to serve a sentence of 10 years and to pay a fine of \$15,000. Judge Kaufman sentenced Moskowitz to serve two years and to pay a fine of \$10,000.

David Greenglass (S)(u)

Harry Gold, on June 1, 1950, furnished information regarding a contact made in June, 1945, in Albuquerque, New Mexico with a soldier and his wife, later identified through investigation as David and Ruth Greenglass. Gold paid Greenglass \$500 on the occasion and in turn received information relative to classified technical experiments being conducted at the atomic energy project.

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at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Information from [redacted] also reflected that Greenglass had been recruited into Soviet espionage activity in the Fall of 1944. On June 15, 1950, David Greenglass was interviewed in New York City and admitted his espionage activity as outlined by Gold. Greenglass was arrested on June 16, 1950, in New York City based on a complaint filed in Albuquerque, New Mexico, charging him with violation of the Espionage Conspiracy Statute. Greenglass was indicted at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on July 6, 1950. He has also been indicted in the Southern District of New York, and the last superseding indictment was dated January 31, 1951. He has pleaded guilty to this indictment and he is to be sentenced following the completion of the Rosenberg-Sobell trial, which is scheduled to begin on March 6, 1951. (S)(U)

Through arrangements made by Mr. O. John Rogge, Greenglass' attorney, both David Greenglass and his wife have given considerable amount of information implicating their brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, and other individuals in Soviet espionage. Greenglass will be one of the main witnesses in the trial of Julius Rosenberg and Sobell. (S)(U)

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (S)(U)

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(A) The interviews of David and Ruth Greenglass reveal their admissions of espionage activity carried on at the Los Alamos and under the direction of Julius Rosenberg, who is the husband of David's sister, Ethel. We also received information from [redacted] which indicated that Rosenberg, who was designated the cover names of "Antenna" and "Liberal," had operated an extensive espionage network. One of the persons indicated in contact of Rosenberg was Max Elitcher, who had been employed at the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy Department, from 1940 until 1948. Elitcher has admitted that Rosenberg and Morton Sobell both attempted to recruit Elitcher into the Soviet espionage network. Gold has furnished a signed statement in which he identified Rosenberg as being an individual who appeared at a rendezvous in Elmhurst, Long Island, New York, on the first Sunday in February, 1950. This meeting had been arranged by Gold's Russian superior. The meeting, however, in fact did not result in any conversation between Gold and Rosenberg as Rosenberg did not actually approach Gold. (S)(U)

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David and Ruth Greenglass have also admitted that shortly after the arrest of Gold on May 29, 1950, Rosenberg told them they must flee from the United States via Mexico, and gave them in all \$5,000 in cash. \$4,000 of this sum was turned over by Ruth Greenglass to her brother-in-law, Louis Abel, who later, at the direction of Ruth, turned it over to O. John Rogge, counsel for the Greenglasses. (S) (U)

Additional information has been secured from the Greenglasses and from Elitcher relative to the espionage activities of Rosenberg which would make it appear that he is possibly the most important espionage agent which we have arrested to date in connection with this matter. Some of the details of the espionage apparatus in which he was operating will be set forth hereinafter under various other individuals who were in the network. (S) (U)

The facts concerning Rosenberg's espionage activities were furnished to the Criminal Division of the Department and an authorized complaint was filed in the Southern District of New York on July 17, 1950, charging Rosenberg with violation of Espionage Conspiracy Statute. Rosenberg was arrested on July 17, 1950, and has been held in jail on default of \$100,000 bail on his plea of not guilty. An authorized complaint was filed in the Southern District of New York on August 11, 1950, charging Ethel Rosenberg with a violation of the Espionage Conspiracy Statute. She was arrested by Bureau Agents on that date and remanded to jail in default of \$100,000 bail. Neither Julius or Ethel Rosenberg have been in any way cooperative during their interviews. They were both indicted in a superseding indictment filed on January 31, 1951. It is expected that their trial, along with the trial of Morton Sobell, will commence in the Southern District of New York on March 6, 1951. (S) (U)

Morton Sobell (S) (U)

As indicated hereinbefore, Max Elitcher has admitted that he was approached by Julius Rosenberg on a number of occasions in 1944 and subsequent thereto for the purpose of having him furnish information for transmittal to the Soviet Union. Rosenberg also informed Elitcher that Morton Sobell was cooperating with them. Elitcher has admitted that on one occasion he (S) (U)

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accompanied Sobell when Sobell took information from Sobell's home on Long Island, New York, to Julius Rosenberg, although he did not see the actual delivery of the information and did not know the contents of the information. Both Sobell and Elitcher had been employed by the Reeves Instrument Company in New York City. They had both gone to the City College of New York, graduating in 1938 in the same class with Rosenberg. Elitcher claimed he was recruited into the Communist Party by Sobell in 1939 while they were both working in Washington, D.C.

Sobell failed to return to work on June 16, 1950, the day of the arrest of David Greenglass in New York City. Investigation reflected he and his family left New York by American Lines on June 22, 1950, for Mexico City, Mexico. He was located in Mexico City through Bureau investigation, and he was arrested by the Mexican Security Police on August 16, 1950. He and his family were deported from Mexico to Laredo, Texas, on August 19, 1950. Sobell was arrested and arraigned on the same date before the United States Commissioner in Laredo on the basis of a complaint and warrant issued in New York City on August 3, 1950, charging him with conspiring with Rosenberg to commit espionage. He was named in a superseding indictment along with Ethel and Julius Rosenberg and David Greenglass on January 31, 1951. It is contemplated that his trial, along with the Rosenbergs, will commence on March 6, 1951. The Government's case against Sobell is based primarily upon the information furnished by Elitcher and the available evidence incident to his flight from the United States. Neither Sobell nor his wife furnished any information of value when interviewed. (u)

William Perl (u)

A

On the basis of [redacted] information, we determined that William Perl, who was employed by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in Cleveland during 1944, was part of the Julius Rosenberg espionage ring. We also learned from David Greenglass that Rosenberg reportedly had two apartments in New York City which he used in preparing material on microfilms in connection with his espionage activities. One of these apartments was said to be located in the Greenwich Village Section of New York City. Our investigation developed that an apartment at 65 Morton Street, Greenwich Village, New York City, was rented under the name of Alfred Sarant from 1949

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until January, 1950. Perl has admitted that he occupied this apartment in 1946 and 1947 while attending Columbia University. We have determined from the Superintendent of this apartment building that the apartment did contain photographic equipment

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[redacted] who has resigned from his position with the FBI and who is presently employed at Columbia University as an instructor, has been interviewed both by Bureau Agents and before the Federal Grand Jury in New York City. While he admits knowing Fletcher, Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant, all contacts of Rosenberg, he denied knowing Rosenberg since school days and denied knowing Michael Sidorovich, another member of the espionage ring. In interview on July 27, 1950, he admitted that on July 23, 1950 Vivian Glassman, a former paramour of Joel Barr, another member of the espionage apparatus, had contacted him. He stated she gave him instructions to leave the country by way of Mexico, mention Rosenberg, and offered him some money to use for his flight. [redacted] claimed that he did not know the purpose of this contact and he refused the money. Vivian Glassman, in an interview, admitted knowing Rosenberg and admitted going out to Cleveland and convincing Perl, offering him money to go to Mexico. She claimed so person not known to her had contacted her and requested her to make the trip. (S)(U)

In connection with [redacted] denial before the Federal Grand Jury on [redacted] that he knew [redacted], we have developed three witnesses in Cleveland who are in a position to testify that they saw Sidorovich and Perl together when Perl and Sidorovich were trying to purchase a car. It also appears that [redacted] may have committed perjury in denying his association with both [redacted] and [redacted] as well as [redacted]. The facts as developed have been presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and to the United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York. They have stated that while a perjury violation can apparently be established, they desire to hold off on the matter until after the Rosenberg trial has taken place. This matter is being closely followed with the Department. (S)(U)

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Michael and Anne Sidorovich (U)

Information from [redacted] reflects that in [redacted] of 1944 Michael Sidorovich was being sent to Cleveland to establish [redacted] (S)

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~~liaison~~ with William Perl for the Rosenberg espionage network. In addition to this information, David and Ruth Greenglass have identified photographs of Michael and Anne Sidorovich as close friends of Rosenberg and his wife. They have advised that they visited Rosenberg's apartment in January, 1945, at which time Anne Sidorovich was present. After Anne left, Rosenberg cut a box top in half and gave one-half to the Greenglasses and said that the other half would be in the possession of Anne Sidorovich who would travel to New Mexico to secure atomic energy information from David. This contact, however, was never established.

Michael Sidorovich was interviewed on July 25, 1950, and on subsequent occasions. He admitted Young Communist League activity in New York City and admitted fighting as part of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain. He admitted knowing Rosenberg and David Greenglass. He denied espionage activity on behalf of Rosenberg or anyone else. He specifically denied knowing Wil Perl. As set forth hereinbefore, witnesses are available to establish the relationship between Perl and Sidorovich.

**B** [redacted] also denied, before the Federal Grand Jury in New York City, his knowledge of [redacted]. **B** The perjury angle with respect to [redacted] has been presented to the Criminal Division and to the United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York. This matter is being closely followed. **TS (S) (U)**

**A** [redacted] **(S) (U)**  
Alfred Sarant

**A** Information from [redacted] reflects that in 1944 the Soviets were considering recruiting as part of the Rosenberg network Alfred Sarant. It has been established that Sarant was an associate of Julius Rosenberg and numerous other members of the Rosenberg espionage network. As set forth hereinbefore, it has also been determined that Sarant maintained an apartment at 65 Merton Street, New York City, and that considerable work in the photographic field was done in this apartment. Sarant was interviewed on July 19, 1950, and admitted acquaintanceship with Rosenberg, and admitted that on one occasion Rosenberg proposed marriage to him, but Sarant claimed he "didn't bite." Sarant admitted membership in the Communist Political Association in New York City in 1944. Sarant, on July 28, 1950, left his residence in Ithaca, New York, and went to visit relatives in New York City. In New York City he was joined by Carol Dayton, wife of Bruce F. Dayton, his next door neighbor. It has been determined that on August

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1950, they departed via Sarant's automobile for Tucson, Arizona. On August 8, 1950, they were driven across from Tucson into Mexico by a relative of Mrs. Dayton's. Efforts to locate Sarant and Carol Dayton in Mexico have failed to date. It is known that they traveled from Guaymas by air to Guadalajara on August 12, 1950. The facts developed concerning Sarant have been furnished to the Criminal Division of the Department, but no process is outstanding for the arrest of Sarant.

Clarke Fullerton Davis

David Greenglass has advised that he believes that of Rosenberg's espionage contacts was a man who was employed a \$200 per day consultant on a huge dam project in Egypt. Efforts have been made to identify this individual. The dam project undoubtedly the huge Aswan Dam Project on the Nile River. Information has been secured from both [redacted] and CIA to the effect that one Clarke Fullerton Davis has been a consultant at the Aswan Dam Project and is also working on a nitrate fertilizer project nearby. Davis, during the latter part of 1950, has been in contact with [redacted] and American Intelligence officers in Cairo, Egypt, has made vague reference to his ability to obtain information from the Soviet Embassy in Cairo, and has offered his services in penetrating the Soviet Embassy. There is a good possibility that Davis is the espionage contact of Rosenberg described above. We have not established any connection between Davis and Rosenberg, and we do not have any information indicating Communist activities or sympathies on the part of Davis. It is believed, however, that there is a strong possibility that in his contact with the intelligence authorities in Egypt he is attempting to place himself in a position where he can make a claim of cooperation at some later date. This matter is being closely followed with both CIA and [redacted].

Theodore A. Hall and Saville Sax

While not connected with the Rosenberg espionage information from [redacted] does reflect atomic espionage activity on the part of Theodore A. Hall and his friend, Saville Sax. The [redacted] information reflects that Hall, who has been a scientist and group leader at Los Alamos, had headed

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to one "Beck," identified as Sergei N. Kournakoff, documents pertaining to key personnel at Los Alamos. It was also reported that Hall's friend, Saville Sar, had delivered a copy of a report to the USSR Consulate in New York, where Sar was received by the Soviet agent identified under the cover name "Alexius." This individual has been identified as Anatoli Yakovlev, who also functioned as the Soviet superior over the Rosenberg and Gold networks. Hall and Sar are both present residing in Chicago, Illinois. Both of them have been active openly in the activities of Communist Party dominated or infiltrated organizations. They have been especially active obtaining signatures to the "Stockholm Peace Pledge." By memorandum dated February 16, 1951, the Chicago Office was instructed to conduct comprehensive interviews with both Hall and Sar. Chicago has asked New York for additional information regarding Kournakoff prior to conducting the interview. This being followed closely.

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Sergei N. Kournakoff was, during the period when in contact with Hall and Sar, also the military analyst for Daily Worker and New Masses. In 1946 he returned to the Soviet Union. The Daily Worker of July 19, 1949, reported that he was in Moscow on July 5, 1949. Other information from [redacted] would appear to indicate that he operated as a Soviet espionage agent mainly in the infiltration of White Russian activities. We are continuing to conduct investigation of these activities in an effort to identify other Soviet agents.

SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT  
ESPIONAGE

Andrei Ivanovich Schevchenko

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Information from [redacted] substantiated investigation, has shown that Andrei Ivanovich Schevchenko group leader in an espionage network which was obtaining information regarding scientific developments. Schevchenko, Russian National, arrived in the United States at New York June 19, 1942, as an engineer of the Soviet Government Purchase Commission. Shortly thereafter he became the Russian representative at the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo, New York, for inspection of aircraft allocated to the Soviet Union. On February 23, 1945, he became a Vice-Chairman of the Antorg

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Trading Corporation in New York City. During the major portion of the time that Scheuchenko was attached to the Bell Aircraft Corporation we were investigating him and we operate three double Agents in this case. In early December, 1945, the New York Journal American published an article setting forth details of our investigation of Scheuchenko, and on January 3, 1946, Scheuchenko left the United States for the Soviet Union. We now know, from the [redacted] information, that Scheuchenko was just as important in the Soviet espionage operations in the United States as we believed him to be during our investigation of him while he was in the United States. details of some of his contacts will be set forth hereinafter

Nikolai Pavlovich Ostrovsky (u)

The information from [redacted] reflects that of the individuals who was assisting Scheuchenko in his network was Ostrovsky. Ostrovsky, a Russian National, entered the United States at Great Falls, Montana, on July 23, 1943. On June 17, 1944, Ostrovsky was transferred to the Bell Aircraft Company, Niagara Falls, New York, where he became an assistant to Scheuchenko. On April 5, 1945, he was transferred to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. He subsequently left the United States, information from [redacted]

have furnished [redacted] the details of Ostrovsky's espionage activities in connection with the Scheuchenko case.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Mazurin (u)

In November, 1944, according to information which has been received from [redacted] the MGB headquarters in Moscow was requested to authorize using the services of Mazurin, a Soviet engineer who was working at the Bell Aircraft plant with Scheuchenko. Mazurin, a Russian National, had entered the United States on May 12, 1944, as an engineer in the Division of Aviation of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. He was stationed at the Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, New York, from September 6, 1944, until about July 1, 1945. He left the United States for the Soviet Union on August 26, 1945. Our investigation of Mazurin indicated that he was an assistant or "man" for Scheuchenko in Scheuchenko's espionage activities at Bell Aircraft Corporation.

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(u) Vladimir Morkovin

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The information from [redacted] reflects that Morkovin, who was designated under the code name of "Anther," was a member of the Scheuchenko network. Morkovin was born July 28, 1917, at Prague, Czechoslovakia. He entered the United States at New York on August 15, 1935, and was naturalized a United States citizen on May 19, 1941. He was educated at the University of Southern California, University of Syracuse, and received a Ph.D in 1941 from the University of Wisconsin. From 1943 to 1946 he was employed by Bell Aircraft Corporation. From 1946-1947 he was employed by the Office of Naval Research as applied mathematician. He is presently attached to the Dept of Aeronautical Engineering, University of Michigan. We know from our investigation of Scheuchenko that he had been in contact with Andrei Scheuchenko, and we conducted some investigation of him on the basis of his contacts with Scheuchenko. We have an investigation at the present time concerning Morkovin and he has also been investigated under the Loyalty Program.

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(u) William Pinsky

(S) Information from [redacted] reflects that William Pinsky was known to the Soviets under the cover name of "Cor". It is not known whether Pinsky actually furnished information to the MGB. However, our investigation of Scheuchenko did show he had numerous contacts with Pinsky. Pinsky was born May 2, 1914, in New York City, and is of Russian descent. He was employed by the Curtis-Wright Corporation on December 22, 1940, as a technical engineer. He was employed by the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Cheektowage, New York, from August 12, 1941, to January 31, 1947. He is believed to be presently residing at 1213 Circle Avenue, Forsyth Park, Illinois, which is the home of his father. He has been the subject of investigation both as a result of his earlier contacts with Scheuchenko and on the basis of the recently received information from [redacted].

[redacted] (u)

We are presently attempting to identify another contact of Scheuchenko on the basis of information from [redacted]. This information reflects that on September 15, 1946, Scheuchenko

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had a meeting with one "Stamp" (unidentified) and they visited a mutual acquaintance, "B," who was then working on a "robot plant." "B" had furnished to Schevchenko information concerning the production of robots. From the information available we have definitely ascertained that the robot in question is the JB-2 robot bomb, commonly known as the "buzz bomb," the production of which commenced about July, 1944. The principal contractor for the manufacture of these robots was the Republic Aircraft Company, Long Island, New York. The identity of "B" has not been established. However, we have an active investigation in progress in an effort to make this identification.

George Andrew Beiser (S)

We have just received information from [redacted] which reflects that on May 25, 1945, the Moscow headquarters of the MGB had advised that Schevchenko had made the acquaintance at the end of 1943 of George Beiser. A review of the Bureau's files reflects that this individual is probably identical with George Andrew Beiser, who was born July 5, 1909, Neenah, Wisconsin. He was employed by the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo, New York, from February, 1942, to August, 1946, and during a portion of this period he was loaned to the Government by the Bell Aircraft Corporation and had miscellaneous assignments overseas. We have a record reflecting that as of February 28, 1946, he was employed by the National Military Establishment, Research and Development Board, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. We have no previous knowledge of this individual having had any connection with Schevchenko. It is also to be noted that the [redacted] information does not specifically indicate that Beiser was willing to, or had furnished any information to Schevchenko. Instructions were issued to the Washington Field Office on February 28, 1951, to determine if this individual is still employed by the Government, and to determine whether his present activities indicate he is engaged in Soviet espionage. This matter will be closely followed, and if he is still employed by the Government a decision will be made as to whether he should be investigated under the Loyalty Program.

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William Marias Malisoff (S)

Another agent who has been identified on the basis of [redacted] information is William Marias Malisoff. This

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individual was not working in the Scheuchste network, but apparently had been working, according to [redacted] information, under Semen M. Semenov, who also, at one time, operated Harry Gold. According to [redacted] information, the Soviets, in 1944, were having considerable trouble with Malisoff as he wanted a sizable lump sum payment to help him establish a laboratory. When his request was flatly refused by his Soviet contact, Malisoff complained with considerable irritation that his intelligence production had been worth millions of dollars to the USSR and his request for aid was meager. Malisoff, who is now deceased, was, in 1944, the owner and General Manager of the Unified Laboratories, Inc., Room 621, 1775 Broadway New York City. This concern was principally engaged in research on lubricating processes for war industries and on applications in biochemistry. We had investigated Malisoff earlier on the basis that we had observed him in contact with Gaik B. Ovakimian, a known Soviet agent, during 1940 and 1941. As noted previously, we are not engaged in any investigation of Malisoff at the present time on the basis of his death, which occurred on November 16, 1948.

INFILTRATION OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Silvermaster Network

(S) (S)

[S] The [redacted] information deals in part with the operations of the MGB in their recruitment and use of personnel in various Government agencies previously known to us in our investigation in the Nathan Gregory Silvermaster case. Individuals positively or tentatively identified from [redacted] informants and who were employed in Government agencies, included Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Ludwig Ullman, Bala and Sonia Gold, Victor Perlo, Harry Magdoff, Peter Rhodes, Allen Rosenberg, Harold Glasser, Duncan Lee, and Harry Dexter White. All of the above individuals were implicated in the Silvermaster network according to information provided to us by Elizabeth T. Bentley. In addition to the above individuals, we have also identified from [redacted] information other members active in this network which include Joseph Katz, Anatoli B. Gromov, and Jacob Golos. Joseph Katz is the subject of a separate write-up in connection with other espionage activities on his part.

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34

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In addition to the foregoing we have a considerable number of individuals attached to the same network, identified only through cover names, that we are attempting to identify by investigation. The most important of these is described hereinafter.

~~Albert~~ (u)

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As noted above, the most important phase of our renewed interest in the Silvermaster network on the basis of our information from [redacted] is to identify the Soviet espionage agent who was, according to the source, in 1944-1945, running this network. This individual was designated by the cover name of "Albert." Only a few particulars are available from the source regarding his identity. We know he did maintain a liaison with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and with Harry Dexter White. Mention is made on one occasion that it had been recommended to "Albert" by a subagent that he, "Albert," go to a dry climate for his health. It is, therefore, to be presumed that he had some sort of respiratory illness.

We do know from Bentley's information of two of her Soviet superiors, either of whom might be "Albert." Both of them, however, are still unidentified. The first of these was a dentist known to Bentley as "Charlie." Bentley never saw him. He did receive and issue instructions to the Silvermaster network. The second possibility is a Soviet espionage superior of Bentley known to her as "Bill." We have never identified him, although Bentley did deal with him directly and she has furnished a detailed description of "Bill." We are closely following this matter and have opened investigations to identify "Albert," "Bill," and "Charlie."

~~Judith Coplon~~ (u)

A

As you know, the [redacted] information enabled our identification of Coplon as a Soviet espionage agent. Two other individuals were involved with Coplon in her espionage activity in 1944. One was Marian Davis, now Marian D. Berdick who is married and living in Mexico City. She was formerly employed by OWI and by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. We have been generally following her activities through our Liaison

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Attache in Mexico, but there is no indication that she intends to return to the United States. The second individual who actually recruited Coplon was Flora Don Wovschia. She married a Russian National and went to the Soviet Union. She was formerly employed by OWI and by the State Department.

~~Alger Hiss~~ (U) (S)

Information from [redacted] reflects that on March 30, 1945, Anatoli B. Gromov, First Secretary and MGB representative at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., advised his Moscow headquarters concerning one "Ales." Gromov stated that in a conversation with "Ales" it was learned that he had for some years been the leader of a little group working for Soviet Military Intelligence. It was stated that this group was composed mainly of "Ales'" relatives. It was also stated that after the Yalta Conference a certain responsible Soviet channel got in touch with "Ales" and on behalf of the Soviet Military Intelligence had thanked "Ales."

The above information very closely corresponds to the information available through our investigation of Alger Hiss. The information from Whittaker Chambers does indicate that Hiss was active in Soviet espionage and that his wife, Priscilla, assisted him. We also know that Donald Hiss, the brother of Alger, was an employee of the State Department. We also know that Hiss did attend the Yalta Conference as a special advisor to the late President Roosevelt. The information from [redacted] is being considered in connection with our continued interest in Alger Hiss.

~~Harry Dexter White~~ (U)

While Harry Dexter White was mentioned above in connection with the Silvermaster network, the information concerning him from [redacted] is of some special interest. He was designated under the cover name of "Jurist" and was in a position to furnish high-level information to the Soviets involving such persons as President Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace, Cordell Hull, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. On April 29, 1944, he furnished to the Soviets information that Vice President Wallace was to go to China. The [redacted] information also indicates that White

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was not overly anxious to cooperate fully with the MGB because he was afraid that his exposure might lead to a political scandal involving the Administration. You will recall that Harry Dexter White is deceased at the present time. We did furnish, in a carefully paraphrased form, the identification of Harry Dexter White on the basis of [redacted] information to the White House under date of October 17, 1950. (S)

Vladimir S. Pravdin (U)

Vladimir S. Pravdin, who was the head of the Tass News Agency in the United States during 1944 and 1945, was also an MGB agent assisting in the infiltration of United States Government agencies. It is not entirely clear on the basis of the information from [redacted] whether these operations tied in directly with the Silvermaster network or whether he was operating a separate network. We do know that he was maintaining contact with, and receiving information from a number of newspaper correspondents in Washington. One of the individuals who was being reactivated into use by the MGB was Isidore F. Stone, in 1944 on the Editorial Staff of The Nation and Washington correspondent for "PM." This identification of Stone has just recently been made and we are undertaking an active investigation of Stone. (S)

Another of Pravdin's network was an individual designated under the cover name of "Yax." We initially considered as a suspect for this individual David Karr, the "leg man" for Drew Pearson. We have now discounted this possibility and are considering Laurence Todd and Samuel Krafsur. Another member of Pravdin's network was Josef Berger, who will be described separately hereinafter. Pravdin departed from the United States on March 11, 1946, for Russia. (U)

Josef Berger (U)

Information from [redacted] indicates that as of May 26, 1945, Josef Berger was being recruited by the Soviets as an espionage agent. Berger, in 1942, was employed by the Department of Justice as a speech-writer for former Attorney General Biddle. He thereafter went to work as a writer for the National Democratic Committee in Washington, D. C. He is present residing in New York City and appears to be employed as a writer. We have an active investigation on this individual at the present time. (S)

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TROTSKYITE INFILTRATION (S) (u)

Joseph Katz

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A

The information from [redacted] indicates one of the MGB's important agents in the United States in 1944 was Joseph Katz. Katz came to our attention on May 27, 1944, when we observed him in a clandestine meeting with Mikhail Chaliapin, a Soviet Consulate employee in New York City and a known Soviet espionage agent. We identified Katz through investigation in January, 1949, as Elizabeth Bentley's superior "Jack," under whom she had operated in 1944. We now have five other persons who will identify Katz as their espionage superior in the period 1938-1948. They are Harry Gold, Thomas L. Black, Amadeo Sabatini, Robert O. Kenaker, and Floyd C. Miller, who are all the subjects of separate write-ups herein. On the basis of information from these individuals it would appear that for many years Katz operated in Soviet espionage, primarily in investigating and handling the infiltration in the United States of Soviet persons and groups. He apparently had a great deal of success in his infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyite Party). (S) (u)

Katz, who was born March 15, 1912, in Lithuania, entered the United States with his parents on May 10, 1914. Katz' wife, Bessie, and daughter, Paula Jo, presently are living in New York City. Katz worked for the WPA from 1934 to 1936. He was a partner from 1939 to 1944 in the Meriden Dental Laboratories, Meriden, Connecticut. In 1941 Katz operated a parking lot in Upper Manhattan, New York City. In early 1944 he formed the Tempus Import Company which he sold in 1945. He then entered the Merchant Marine, apparently in order to avoid the draft. Since 1948 he has operated in a number of import and export businesses. (S) (u)

Also since 1948 he has been out of the United States and is believed to be primarily residing in Paris, France. As of December 12, 1950, he was staying at the Hotel Luce in Paris. Katz apparently is afraid to return to the United States because of his activities in Soviet espionage in this country. Steps are being undertaken to see if it will be possible to have the French Government deport Katz to the United States. We are also endeavoring to determine if the Criminal Division of the Department will authorize a complaint and warrant for Katz' arrest in the event we are able to put our hands on him. If Katz were willing to cooperate with us he could undoubtedly furnish us with an enormous amount of valuable information, enabling the prosecution of numerous Soviet agents in the United States. It is with this aim that we are carefully working towards his return to the United States. (S) (u)

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38

TOP SECRET

A Robert Owen Menaker (S)

Information from [redacted] reflects that Robert Owen Menaker operated as a Soviet agent in 1944 and was a contact of Floyd Cleveland Miller. We had an active investigation on Menaker and he became suspicious that he was under investigation and contacted former Special Agent Thomas M. McDade, who arranged for Menaker to be interviewed. Pursuant to this, Menaker voluntarily appeared at the New York Office on February 8, 1951, and was interviewed. He admitted espionage activities for the Soviets from 1937 to 1948. He identified as his superior Gregory L. Rabinovitch, who had been in the United States from 1930 to 1939, as the head of the Soviet Red Cross. He also identified Joseph Katz as his superior who furnished in some detail instructions for his activities in penetrating the Trotskyite movement. He also admitted working for the Midland Export Corporation at the request of the Soviets and traveling to South America for that company. The activities of Michael Burd, the head of the Midland Export Corporation, will be discussed separately in this memorandum. We expect to be able to obtain in greater detail from Menaker his activities in Soviet espionage. He was apparently not too important a Soviet agent as he could never learn to keep his mouth shut about his work. We are following this matter closely.

A Floyd Cleveland Miller (S)

Information from [redacted] reflects that Floyd Cleveland Miller was used successfully by the Soviets in infiltrating the Socialist Workers Party in 1944. The information also indicates he made a trip to Mexico and had conferred with Trotsky's widow. We determined through investigation that Miller under the name of Michael Cort, had been in the Socialist Workers Party from 1939 to 1945. Miller voluntarily appeared at the New York Office on February 9, 1951. He admitted joining the Communist Party in the mid 1930's and in 1937 being approached by his friend, Menaker, to work in Soviet espionage. He worked first under Gregory L. Rabinovitch, and later under Joseph Katz, as well as under a number of other Soviet superiors whom we are attempting to identify. One of his first jobs in Soviet espionage

39  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(u) was to assist Joseph Katz in tapping the telephone of Joseph Cannon, a Socialist Workers Party functionary. Miller also surveilled an anti-Soviet, David Paul Joffe, whom we have previously investigated. Miller's last contact, according to him, with the Soviets was by Katz. He said this was in 1948, but it is more likely that it was in 1947 as Katz left the United States in early 1948. Miller claims he has stopped Communist Party and espionage activities. It is contemplated that information in greater detail will be secured from Miller in later interviews which will assist us a great deal. We are following this matter very closely. ~~(S)~~

(u) Zalmond David Franklin ~~(S)~~

A - The above individual has been identified as an agent for the MGB in 1944, operated by Katz. Franklin was born September 14, 1909, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Our investigation shows that he operated with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain in 1937. Louis F. Budenz knew Franklin under the name of "Irving" and according to Budenz' book, Franklin operated in Canada as an espionage agent for the Soviets. The ~~(S)~~ have no information on this and Budenz admitted he has no definite facts to substantiate his allegation in his book. We do know from Budenz that Franklin's wife, in 1939, was Sylvia Callen, who was used by the Soviets in infiltrating the Trotskyite movement. Franklin is divorced from her at the present time. Jones Orin York, an admitted espionage agent, has also identified Franklin as his espionage superior at one time under the name of "Warner." We have an active investigation of Franklin at the present time and may desire to interview him in the near future notwithstanding his possible continued Communist or espionage activity in New York City. ~~(S)~~

(u) Michael Burd ~~(S)~~

A As noted above, Robert Owen Menaker, in the mid 1940's, worked for the Midland Export Corporation, a firm in New York headed by Michael Burd, now deceased. We know from information secured from ~~(S)~~ that Burd was acting for the Soviet in trying to get the State Department in 1944 and 1945 to issue transit visas through the United States to Mexico for two Soviet espionage agents, Nicholas and Maria Fisher. Burd was falsely ~~(S)~~

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claiming that they were his relatives. Information furnished to the Interdepartmental Visa Committee by the FBI regarding Burd helped stop this Soviet espionage effort. Nicholas and Maria Fisher are dealt with hereinafter.

(u) Nicholas and Maria Fisher

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While we have no information indicating that Nicholas and Maria Fisher, who are mentioned above, plan to operate in Trotskyite infiltration, it would appear very likely that such was the case. The information from [redacted] reflects that in the Summer of 1944 the MGB was laying plans to get Nicholas and Maria Fisher out of the Soviet Union and through the United States to Mexico. It appears that Michael Burd was laying these plans and one of the methods he apparently considered was to use David K. Niles. It was reported that persons surrounding David K. Niles would do anything for a bribe and they had already been paid up to \$6,000.

This method apparently was not used, however, and Burd attempted to claim to the State Department that the Fishers were his relatives. This failed and we do not know that the Fishers were ever able to reach the Western Hemisphere. Neither do we know their actual identities, nor do we have photographs of them. Our principal interest in the matter is its ramifications in this country through persons who were being used in connection with this matter. We are also continually alert for evidence of activities in Soviet espionage on the part of David K. Niles.

(u) Altschuler Network

A

You will recall that we have conducted an extensive investigation in the Lydia Altschuler, was., et al, Internal Security - R case concerning an espionage network involving cipher messages in secret ink exchanged between persons in the New York City area and persons in Mexico City and South America. The secret ink messages dealt primarily with the efforts of the espionage parallel to free Frank Jackson, Trotsky's killer, who was imprisoned in Mexico City. You may recall that there were eight messages in the Altschuler traffic which we were never able to decipher because we could not find the book used in the encipherment; however, from [redacted] information we identified this book as "Una Excursion a los Indios Ranqueles," a paper-

4/1

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~~(S)~~ Edition published in Argentina. Through this identification our Cryptographic Laboratory deciphered seven of the eight remaining messages intercepted in the Altschuler case. These messages extend the ramifications of the espionage parallel we investigated in the Altschuler case, and one message shows the network was, in 1943, setting up a radio station in Argentina. One of the messages reflects that the same code was to be used by the station as in the secret writing message in the Altschuler case. This message also gives the frequency to be used and the time of the intended operations. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

It is also of considerable interest to note that there were radio station setups at the Soviet Consulates in New York City and San Francisco in 1943 which transmitted messages in code, and among the intercepts available in connection with these two transmitters there have been found intercepts of a station operating on at least one of the frequencies set forth in the secret ink messages. It has been discovered that on ten occasions between February 22, 1943, and October 12, 1943, transmissions believed to emanate from the Soviet Consulate in New York City fit the radio operation procedures which were set forth in the secret writing message dated February 1, 1943. Three of these transmissions contained an identical cipher message in five-digit groups. This message has been deciphered and reads "I send greetings -- I await news." This would appear to be a message sent in an attempt to establish radio contact. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

An investigation is being conducted to determine to what extent we can develop additional information concerning this network on the basis of the new information which has been developed through the ~~(S)~~ information and through the additional decipherment of the secret writing messages in the Altschuler case.

A ~~(S)~~

WHITE RUSSIAN INFILTRATION ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~  
Viktor A. Krapchenko

You will recall that in the Spring of 1944 Krapchenko defected from his position with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D.C. The information from ~~(S)~~ reflects that thereafter he was designated by the cover name of ~~(S)~~

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"Tomar" by the MGB and they were active in determining his activities and associates. They had a woman designated by the cover name of "Ola" who was to travel from Washington, D.C. to New York City to establish contact with Lydia Estrin, the mistress of David Dallin, both of whom were active in Russian Social Democratic circles and were assisting Kravchenko. We have not been successful in identifying "Ola" to date, although we have conducted an extensive investigation in this respect. It is also noted that "Ola" was acquainted with Leora Peabody Cunningham and the Soviets knew that she was employed by the Naval Communications. We have interviewed Cunningham, who is now married to a man by the name of Teatsoulas, and she is still employed by Naval Communications. There is no definite information to the effect that she was ever used by the MGB. We also have interviewed Alexei Stoopenkov who apparently was acquainted with both Cunningham and "Ola." Stoopenkov has furnished us certain information which has assisted us in our investigation, but has not definitely enabled us to identify "Ola." Stoopenkov presently is a State Department employee, working as a guard attached to the American Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. ~~SECRET~~

Another individual who was infiltrating the Russian Social Democratic group which was assisting Kravchenko, was a person designated by the cover name of "Tulip." It also appears that he was active in Trotskyite circles. Because of the lack of identifying information concerning him, we have not been successful in identifying him to date, although an active investigation is being carried out. ~~SECRET~~

Prince Nicholas V. Orloff ~~SECRET~~

A ~~SECRET~~ We have recently identified, on the basis of information from ~~██████████~~ Soviet espionage agent, Prince Nicholas Orloff. Our information from ~~██████████~~ reflects that Orloff in 1944, was contemplating employment with either the State Department or OSS, but later was successful in getting employment as an interpreter with the United Nations, a position he still holds. We have just instituted an investigation of him to determine if he is still active as a Soviet espionage agent. Orloff is generally known as a White Russian, being related to the Czar's family. However, some White Russian circles do not trust him fully. We through his wife, whom he described to the MGB as a great patriot, to possibly be able to get Orloff to cooperate with us. ~~SECRET~~

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OTHER ESPIONAGE NETWORKS

The Moccasin

Through [redacted] information we determined that Boris Morros' cover name was "Frost" (which is the English equivalent of Morez in Russian, although the Soviets used the name as Frest). Alfred K. Stern, according to [redacted] was designated under the cover name of "Louis," and a memorandum prepared by him obtained by us through investigative efforts in February, 1945, was summarized in the [redacted] information and sent by the MGB in New York City to Moscow. While the above has not assisted materially our efforts in investigating the Moccasin, it does furnish corroborative information to that furnished by our informant, Morros.

In addition to the foregoing, there is information from [redacted] regarding a person designated by the cover name "Aida" who was working in 1944 for the United Palestine Appeal and the MGB desired to place her with the Committee of Jewish Writers and Artists in New York City where they thought she would be of greater use to them. A tentative identification of this individual has been made as Esther Trebach Rand, who has been implicated in the espionage network in the Moccasin and she is a contact of Jacques Soble. We are conducting investigation in an attempt to verify tentative identification of Rand.

The Communist Party

The [redacted] information reflects that the Soviets were able to make extensive use of the Communist Party, USA, both for recruitment and for checking on various individuals regarding whom the MGB wanted information. Earl Browder was known by the MGB under the cover name of "Rulovoy," and Browder was cognizant of the Soviet activity in the infiltration of various United States Government agencies. There is also some indication in [redacted] information that he knew of other activity on the part of the [redacted] we are attempting, through investigation, to identify an individual designated by the cover name of "Echo" who appears, according to [redacted] to have occupied a responsible position in the Communist Party and to have been used in various ways by the MGB.

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44

TOP SECRET

MGB Soviet Officials (u)

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A It is not possible in a memorandum of this length to detail the information available from [redacted] regarding MGB officials attached to official and semi-official Soviet establishments in the United States. We have almost conclusively established that the individual who was operating the New York network is identical with Pavel Fedosimov. He undoubtedly was the legal resident agent for the MGB at the Soviet Consulate in New York. He also directed activities which were outside the New York area, reaching to the West Coast.

Under Fedosimov there were a number of individuals in official or semi-official Soviet positions who were designated as "cadre-men." These individuals apparently headed various individual networks which were being operated by the MGB in the United States. We have not identified all of these individuals but some of the important ones were Vladimir S. Pravdin, the head of Tass News Agency who has been mentioned previously; Semen Semenov, who headed an espionage network which included Abraham Brothman, Thomas L. Black, and Harry Gold; Anatoli A. Yakovlev who has been mentioned previously and who was in charge of the Rosenberg network and took over the activities of Theodore A. Hall and Saville Sax, who have been mentioned previously. Another individual who had helped in the recruitment of Judith Coplow and Flora Don Wouschin was Stepan H. Choundenko. He was a clerk attached to the Soviet Consulate in New York City.

A The legal resident agent at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., following his arrival in the United States in September, 1944, was Anatoli Gromov, whom we identified in connection with the Silvermaster case. We are attempting to determine to the fullest possible extent the activities of these Soviet officials, none of whom are in the United States at the present time. We do have one individual here now by the name of Semyon Makarov, whom we know from information from [redacted] operated in Australia as an MGB agent. His activities are being closely followed inasmuch as he undoubtedly is still active MGB agent.

#### OBSERVATIONS

It has not been possible in this memorandum to detail all of the identifications which we have made based on the

TOP SECRET

45

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : L. L. LAUGHLIN

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

DATE: August 31, 1951

PURPOSE:

To record the results of a contact made by Mr. Reynolds with General Canine, Director of AFSA, relative to a request that consideration be given to making the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency aware of [REDACTED] material.

BACKGROUND:

Reference is made to my memorandum to you in the above-captioned matter dated August 14, 1951, which indicated that Captain Joseph Fenger, Deputy Director of AFSA, had advised Mr. Reynolds that he had received a request from [REDACTED] with AFSA, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be made aware of [REDACTED] material. It is to be noted that [REDACTED] material received to date primarily relates to the activities of the MGB in New York City during the period, May 1944 to May 1945, and, as such, is basically a United States internal problem with little, if any, relation to CIA responsibilities. A small amount of material relates to MGB activities in Australia and Great Britain. This material is furnished to [REDACTED] and investigations are handled by [REDACTED].

The referenced memorandum recommended that the Bureau maintain the view that there is no reason to make General Smith or any other personnel of CIA aware of this activity or the contents of [REDACTED] material at this time. It further recommended that Mr. Reynolds contact General Canine, Director of AFSA, to acquaint him with the background of [REDACTED] as well as its importance to the FBI.

DETAILS:

Mr. Reynolds contacted General Canine, at which time Mr. Reynolds briefed the General in the background of [REDACTED] material. Mr. Reynolds explained to General Canine the history surrounding the dissemination of [REDACTED] material. It was pointed out to General Canine that the Bureau

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Classified by [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR  
9/28/67  
See 50/601  
AFSA  
AFSA LTR DTG 4/18/51  
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feels that the material developed from this source is extremely important and must be held with utmost security.

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General Canine stated that he did not intend to be pressured by [redacted] or anyone else into releasing any information developed by the Armed Forces Security Agency to any organization or individual who has no right to the information. General Canine advised Mr. Reynolds that he has been informed of the very close relationship between the Bureau and the people at AFSA who are working on [redacted] material as well as the great contribution the Bureau has made to the success that has been attained in the reading of this material. General Canine stated that he has been informed that the information developed from this material deals primarily activities within the United States and, therefore, there has no reason to inform any other agency than the Bureau. General Canine pointed out that, if he was to inform General Smith of the contents of the messages which pertain to the Burgess - MacLean case, General Smith would probably desire to be advised as to the contents of other messages. He stated that, regardless of whatever assurances he might give to General Smith that the other messages contained no information of interest to CIA, General Smith would still desire to have one of his own employees review the material to make certain that CIA would be completely apprised of the contents of all the material.

Mr. Reynolds pointed out to General Canine that the Bureau is not in a position to tell him to whom he should disseminate this information. Mr. Reynolds indicated that the Bureau did desire, however, that General Canine realize the importance of this material to the Bureau and that, in the event the material was going to be made available to any other agency, the Bureau would like to be advised in order that the Bureau might voice an objection. (u)

General Canine stated that he appreciates the significance of this material to the Bureau as well as the desire of the Bureau that it be held as closely as possible. He desired Mr. Reynolds to assure the Director that he will hold this material closely and not make it available to any other agency other than General Bradley, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without first consulting the FBI.

ACTION:

There is to be no further action taken at this time.

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time relative to furnishing the material developed from  
to the Director of the Central Intelligence  
Agency. The Liaison Unit, however, will continue to maintain  
a close contact with AFSA in order that the Bureau will be  
kept completely aware of any developments which might deal  
with the dissemination of this material. ~~to be~~

(u) [ Apparent Gen. Amine's  
attitude. ] \*  
\* K,

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- 3 -  
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48



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD  
FROM : A. H. BELMONT  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)  
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: May 23, 1952

TOP SECRET

PURPOSE:

To set forth the results of the conference held between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Armed Forces Security Agency regarding the [REDACTED] material, as obtained through liaison with AFSA.

DETAILS:

Mr. Oliver Kirby, who is the assistant head of the Russian Section at the Armed Forces Security Agency, which handles the material we call [REDACTED] was interviewed by Supervisors S. D. Ellis and R. J. Lamphere on May 22, 1952. Mr. Kirby said that on May 20, 1952, he and Captain Jeffrey Dennis, who is the head of the Russian Section, had a conference with Mr. Jason Paige and Mr. William Harvey of the Central Intelligence Agency. You will recall that this conference was the one arranged between General Smith of CIA and General Canine of AFSA. Prior to the conference, Captain Dennis had been instructed by General Canine that no collateral information received by AFSA from the Bureau was to be shown to or discussed with the CIA representatives.

Therefore, at the meeting, CIA was shown a summary of the messages which did not include any identifications made by the Bureau. The CIA representatives expressed interest in this material and particularly were interested in more details concerning messages which reflected that in 1944 and 1945 OSS was penetrated by the MGB. You may recall that this is the material which corroborates the information previously furnished to us by Elizabeth Bentley regarding the Soviet Intelligence penetration of OSS, including agents such as Duncan Lee, an assistant to General Donovan. The CIA representatives were interested in the information dealing with Donald MacLean, a British diplomat who disappeared, and the Bucha case.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.  
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Classified by [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR

(S) - appropriate Agency

[REDACTED] (S)  
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49

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Mr. Kirby stated that the conference with CIA lasted approximately 3 1/2 hours, much of the time being taken up with explaining to CIA the limitations on the material. CIA was informed that the principal traffic emanated from New York to Moscow, that there was also considerable traffic between Canberra, Australia, and Moscow, and a smaller amount of traffic between London and Moscow, as well as a little other traffic. (u)

Mr. Kirby said he informed CIA that AFSA was not in the identification business and that identifications made on the basis of the material were known to the Bureau and were the result of the Bureau's work. He explained further that the Bureau has been dealing with AFSA on this problem for a period of four years. He therefore informed the CIA representatives that in so far as identifications were concerned from the traffic, AFSA could not give this information to CIA. He tactfully suggested that such details would be available only through the Bureau. (u)

Mr. Kirby said he did not find it necessary to explain to CIA the extent to which the material has been published and made available to the Bureau and he was not asked any such question. He said further he was not asked and did not tell the CIA representatives of the fact that the Bureau has furnished to AFSA in considerable detail the results of our investigations. He stated that the CIA representatives indicated they intended to approach the Bureau regarding certain aspects of this problem. (u)

Mr. Kirby purposely had not called in to the conference Mr. Meredith Gardner, the cryptanalyst who works on the problem, as he did not want Gardner placed in the position of having to answer questions regarding the extent of the material and the identifications made from the material. He said that this enabled Dennis and himself to take the position that they were not fully aware of all the work which has been done in connection with this matter. He said that he expected that CIA would probably contact the Bureau and would thereafter again contact his agency in order to obtain further information regarding matters which CIA feels will be of interest to their agency. (u)

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RECOMMENDATION:

A  
The foregoing is for your information and it is felt that we can anticipate that Mr. Harvey or Mr. Paige will be contacting the Bureau regarding this matter. It is felt that we should continue to maintain the position that AFSA is the only agency which can disseminate the actual information. It is felt we should (S) limit any discussion with CIA to cases where they have a definite responsibility, such as MGB agents now abroad, former OSS personnel, and the like. ~~TOP SECRET~~

(u) I concur. In view of loose methods in CIA & some of its questionable personnel we must be most circumspect.

b.

- 3 -

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51

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd  
FROM : A. H. Belmont  
SUBJECT : [REDACTED] (S)  
ESPIONAGE - R

TOP SECRET

DATE: June 23, 1952

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

PURPOSE:

(S) CIA has suggested a discussion of two categories of cases. (1) Cases involving MGB penetration of OSS and (2) Cases where CIA has a definite responsibility and interest. The penetration of OSS by the MGB will involve cases where we have information which involves individuals who were also named by Elizabeth Bentley. Relative to cases where CIA has a definite responsibility, there is being outlined herein certain cases where some advantage may accrue to us from a discussion with CIA, in that we will request the coverage of leads abroad. As a general proposition it is believed we should limit our discussion with CIA and should be restrictive in the cases discussed.

BACKGROUND:

It is to be recalled that General Walter Bedell Smith of CIA finally succeeded in getting from General Canine of the Armed Forces Security Agency an agreement to have CIA have limited access to the material we call [REDACTED] which relates primarily to the activities of the MGB in the United States and relates to a limited degree to MGB activities in other countries.

Subsequent to the agreement between General Smith and General Canine we learned through our liaison with the Armed Forces Security Agency that William Harvey and Jason Page of CIA were being given some material by AFSA, but AFSA had taken the position that identifications made were the result of the Bureau's work and were consequently, a matter between the Bureau and CIA.

CURRENT REQUEST OF CIA:

Mr. Harvey in his conference on June 18, 1952 stated he had reviewed certain of the material at the Armed Forces Security Agency. He said he recognized [REDACTED] that the FBI [REDACTED]

Classified by Multiple [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR

7/3/57  
CLASSIFIED BY 5568 SLD/GCL  
DECLASSIFY ON: (U) (S)  
PER NSA LTR DTD 7/9/97

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What is back of Harvey & Page?

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Had the prime interest in this material by reason of the fact that it was primarily domestic in nature. He stated, however, that a considerable amount of it dealt with former employees of OSS and inasmuch as CIA has a large number of former OSS employ on their staff, that they felt that they have a definite interest in this material. Mr. Harvey also said that he thought CIA might be of assistance to the Bureau in running out leads abroad which have developed from the Bureau's work on this material. He indicated that only two persons in CIA at the present time had access to the material and these were himself and one named Jason [redacted].

*These [redacted] would be a definite source of [redacted] CIA [redacted] [redacted]*

You pointed out to Mr. Harvey that his agency was always anxious to establish a liaison whenever CIA felt that there was something that they could learn from another agency but that they were not always prone to reciprocate and that you would consider the matter further after checking into the cases involved in this traffic. (u)

It is felt that any discussion with CIA should be restrictive and limited to the two categories of cases suggested by Harvey, details concerning which are being set forth hereinafter. (u)

PENETRATION OF OSS: (u)

The bulk of the cases stemming from [redacted] (S) regarding the penetration of OSS deal with the same group of individuals who were named by Elizabeth Bentley in November, 1945. A summary of the cases stemming from Elizabeth Bentley's disclosures dated February 21, 1946, was made available to Admiral Sowers, then of the Central Intelligence Group, on April 2, 1946. This included the data from Bentley regarding the penetration of OSS. In the following cases on Halperin, Lee, and Wheeler no discussion with CIA would appear necessary as we have disseminated to them. It may be that they will want to raise these cases from the standpoint of OSS documents abstracted and whether they can assist us in locating such documents. (u)

Maurice Halperin (u)

Maurice Halperin was an OSS employee who was named by Elizabeth Bentley as engaged in Soviet espionage. He appears to be identical with the MGB agent identified in the [redacted] information under the cover name of Hars. According to Bentley, Halperin furnished bulletins and reports prepared by OSS to her.

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as well as State Department cables, to which he evidently had access. We are currently doing some work with CIA in connection with these documents, based on what Bentley told us and on the basis of [redacted] information. We are trying to find certain documents which Bentley can identify as coming from Halperin. ~~(S)~~

Duncan Chaplin Lee [redacted] (u)

Lee was employed by OSS from 1942 to 1946. He is identified in the [redacted] information as a Soviet agent who was designated under the cover name of Koch. Among the data furnished by him, according to [redacted] was (1) a list of OSS employees suspected of being Communists or Communist sympathizers. (2) Information concerning an OSS report on the trip to Russia made by the Polish-American Catholic Father Orlemanski, and (3) Information concerning OSS operations in China and Japan. Elizabeth Bentley has also furnished information alleging that Lee gave her information from OSS files. ~~(S)~~

Donald Niven Wheeler [redacted] (u)

Wheeler was employed by OSS from 1941 to 1946. Bentley named him as having been a Soviet agent who furnished her information obtained from OSS files. The [redacted] information reflects his cover name was Isra. We have previously requested investigation of CIA in the Wheeler case, which actually stems from the [redacted] information, but we did not, of course, advise CIA what the basis of our information was. CIA is aware of the Bentley allegations. ~~(S)~~

Muse [redacted] (u)

We have also conducted some investigation to identify a Soviet agent designated under the cover name of Muse. We have very little data from [redacted] on him, except that he reported to the MGB on OSS matters and personnel on two occasions. He is also mentioned in connection with members of the Victor Perlo group as described by Elizabeth Bentley. There is a possibility that Muse may be Helen Tenney, a former OSS employee from whom Bentley received OSS reports and memoranda. CIA is aware of the allegations concerning Tenney from Bentley. ~~(S)~~

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X Karou

7  
[ ] (u)

This is an unidentified individual who may or may not be a Soviet agent on the basis of the [redacted] information. The only available data is that in April, 1944, he had turned over to Ivan Subasic, an important Yugoslavian leader and an MGB agent, a telegram. At the end of June, 1944, it was reported he was to travel to London with General Donovan, then head of OSS. This may be a case where the MGB had designated an individual by a cover name for security reasons while he was not in reality an actual agent of the MGB. It might be noted that William Donovan, the head of OSS, was himself designated under the cover name of "Radio Announcer." It is possible the CIA can assist in clearing this matter up.

X CASES WHERE CIA HAS A RESPONSIBILITY: [ ] (u)

The following are cases where the individual we are investigating is abroad or would otherwise be of definite interest and responsibility to CIA.

A  
X Alexander Belenky [ ] (u)

Belenky, Russian born, came to the U. S. in 1941. According to the [redacted] information in 1944 Belenky was supplying information to the MGB in New York City. It is known that during the same period, our investigation of Alexander Fomine reflected that he was in contact with Belenky.

From 1946 to 1951, Belenky made several trips to Europe, reportedly on business. As a result of information furnished by us to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, that Service held hearings when Belenky attempted to re-enter the U. S. and consequently, he voluntarily departed from the U. S. for France on February 8, 1952. He is in very ill health. We have previously given to CIA all pertinent data with the exception of [redacted] information.

X Charles A. Davila [ ] (u)

Charles A. Davila, former Rumanian Ambassador to the U. S. from 1929 to 1939, has been employed by the National Committee for a Free Europe since 1950 on the Rumanian Research Desk in New York City. As you know, CIA has a direct interest in the operation of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

- 4 -

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55

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(S)  
[redacted] has advised that Davila was known under the cover name of Docker and that on October 9, 1944, he was definitely recruited by the MGB and that more than mere political collaboration was expected both at that time and in the future. According to the source, Davila understood the nature of the work expected of him. (S) (u)

When Davila applied for employment with the National Committee for a Free Europe in 1950, CIA sent through a name check on him. By letter dated August 22, 1950, CIA was advised of the pro-Russian activities and statements of Davila in the 1940's. They were not advised of the [redacted] information at that time. (S)

A report showing recent activity of Davila was disseminated to CIA in May of this year. This report showed the results of an interview with Davila. (S) (u)

Carlos Robles Galdames (S) (u)

A - According to [redacted] (S) in 1944, an individual designated under the cover name of Greg was in the U. S. and was planning to return to South America. He was a Soviet espionage agent. We identified this individual as Galdames, and found that he had made a trip in November, 1943, from Chile to the U. S. for study in the pharmaceutical field. In June, 1944, he returned to Chile to form a drug company. Our most recent information indicates he is presently in Santiago, Chile. We have not previously given CIA any information in this case, as our only source of information is the [redacted] information. We did make a name check of CIA and found that they had no data on Galdames. (S) (u)

Boleslaw K. Gebert (S) (u)

Gebert was identified by us as identical with an individual described by [redacted] under the cover name of Ataman, who was apparently used by the MGB in connection with Polish political activities in the U. S. in 1944. Gebert was in the U. S. as a Polish alien from 1912 to 1947, and was an important Communist in the Polish field. He returned to Poland in 1947 and investigative reports have been disseminated to CIA. These reports, of course, did not include the [redacted] data. (S) (u)

~~TOP SECRET~~

56



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Joseph Katz (u)

Katz has been identified as a Soviet agent by Elizabeth Bentley, Harry Gold and others. He is also identified as such by material from [redacted] and the latter source has supplied considerable information relative to his activities in the U. S. CIA is already cognizant of his identity as a Soviet agent. Katz has been out of the U. S. since 1948; from the latter date until about mid-1951 he was principally in France; since then he is believed to have been in Israel. CIA has conducted investigation of Katz in France, and has been asked to conduct investigation in Israel. Due to his importance as a Soviet agent, as he is outside the U. S., and as CIA knows of him, it is felt likely that they will inquire concerning the possibility of his being mentioned in the traffic. Further, as he is now in the jurisdiction of CIA, it is felt we should inform them of the fact he is mentioned in the traffic. (S)(u)

Stephen Laird (u)

Stephen Laird, Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent, has been residing in Vic Vaud, Switzerland since December 1949. (S)(u)

Laird is identical with Yun in the [redacted] information. According to [redacted] Laird was considered to be a politically well developed person by the MGB in 1944, and was being utilized as an agent. (S)(u)

This case was referred to CIA for investigation in the fall of 1950. CIA has been followed periodically since that date but has produced practically no information concerning the activities and associations of Laird. (S)(u)

Oscar R. Lange (u)

Oscar Lange has been identified with an individual designated under the cover name of Friend by the MGB, according to [redacted] in 1944. He was being used by the MGB in connection with their interest in Polish political activities in the U. S. You may recall that he entered the U. S. in 1937, became a naturalized citizen in 1943, and renounced this citizenship in order to become Polish Ambassador to the U. S. He was removed from this position in 1946 and subsequently returned to Poland in 1947. He is, of course, well known to CIA. (S)(u)

- 6 -

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57

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\* Donald D. MacLean (S)(u)

You will recall that Donald D. MacLean is one of the two missing British diplomats who disappeared in May, 1951. The other individual was Guy Burgess. The two men disappeared just prior to the time that MacLean would have been identified as a Soviet agent on the basis of the [redacted] information. There is some indication that [redacted] former MIC representative in the U. S., may have tipped off the two men concerning the investigation. CIA has been considerably alarmed over this case because of the close relationship which existed between their office and Philby. We previously had a discussion with Harvey concerning this investigation. They are aware of the [redacted] data which was given to General Smith of CIA at the request of the British. (S)(u)

\* Nicholas W. Orloff (S)(u)

There is information from [redacted] which reflects that Orloff, who was designated by the MGB under the cover name of Usipoff, was in 1944 contemplating securing a job with the State Department or OSS. It therefore is considered likely that CIA will inquire as to his identity. Actually, he did not get the job with OSS because of data we had furnished OSS showing his work in Germany at an earlier period for the Germans. Orloff is presently attached to the United Nations. He is a White Russian, married to a U. S. citizen and is openly pro-Soviet at the present time. We have not disseminated information to CIA previously on this case. (S)(u)

\* [redacted] (S)(u)

[redacted] Russian born, came to the U. S. from Iran in 1944. We know from [redacted] that he had an assignment when he came to the U. S. [redacted] the U. S. for Iran in August, 1949, but is expected to return to the U. S. We have previously disseminated to CIA information concerning this case except the basic allegations from [redacted]. (S)(u)

\* Alfred E. Sarant (S)(u)

There is available information from [redacted] which reflects that Sarant was a member of the Rosenberg espionage network. Sarant fled from the United States in August, 1950. His [redacted]. (S)(u)

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58

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present whereabouts is not known. We previously disseminated all pertinent data concerning Sarant to CIA, and the only additional fact we can add is that there is information concerning him in the [redacted] information. (S)

Ricardo M. L. Setaro (S)(u)

Setaro, an Argentinian, entered the U. S. in 1942, to study journalism. He had previously operated a news agency in Buenos Aires, which was clandestinely distributing Tass News Agency dispatches. On the basis of the [redacted] information we know that he was an MGB agent in 1944, while acting as Assistant Editor in the Latin American Division of the Columbia Broadcasting System. After leaving CBS he was employed for a short period by Artkino Pictures, Inc., a distributing agent for Soviet films. In 1947 he returned to Argentina where he was last reported to be the Editor of a Communist newspaper. We have disseminated information concerning Setaro to CIA omitting, of course, the [redacted] information. (S)

Vassili V. Soukhomline (S)(u)

Soukhomline, Russian born, spent the war years in New York City where he was generally known as being pro-Soviet and as possibly a Soviet agent. He has been identified with fair certainty as an MGB agent designated under the cover name of Mars, according to [redacted]. It is also to be noted that Dr. Klaus Fuchs was told at one time that he could contact Soukhomline in Paris in order to make arrangements to talk to someone with a high technical knowledge concerning atomic energy. Soukhomline had left the U. S. in 1945 and had gone to France. He was expelled from that country in 1951 for his Communist activities. He is reportedly now in Prague where he edits the French bulletin of Telepress. CIA has conducted some investigation of Soukhomline at our request, but we have not, of course, furnished them the [redacted] data. (S)

Soviet Officials: (S)(u)

There has not been included herein write-ups on Soviet officials, it being felt that if we get into this field of discussion with CIA they will want to know what agents these Soviet

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officials operated in the U. S. ~~SECRET~~ This would open up the whole field of the ~~cases to CIA~~. Actually, on a considerable number of the Soviet officials who have been identified we have given CIA data in connection with our other investigative efforts in connection with these officials. Most of the officials we have identified left the U. S. in the 1944-1945 period. ~~(S)~~ [S]

RECOMMENDATION:

Bearing in mind that CIA now has a limited access to the ~~information and has approached the Bureau~~ to discuss certain cases with Mr. Harven and Mr. Paige of CIA, some discussion would appear to be in order. It is felt, however, that we should strictly limit our discussions of these cases and take under advisement any other requests CIA may make. [S]

It is also recommended that with respect to the cases mentioned herein where we have leads which could be covered abroad that we press CIA on whether they can and will cover such leads on a preferred basis, bearing in mind the importance of these cases. It is felt we should take the position that we want to see any discussions with CIA regarding these cases result in some benefit to the Bureau and not just to serve as a one-way street for CIA. ~~(S)~~ (u)

ROD

I agree but frankly I am not optimistic about any benefits accruing to the FBI from it. CIA gives a lot of wordage but few results of cooperation.

H.

(u) ~~(S)~~

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman  
FROM : A. H. Belmont  
SUBJECT: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ (S)  
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: Feb. 1, 1956

CC - Boardman  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Boardman  
Tully  
B.A. Wells  
RETURN TO BELMONT FOR FILING  
File in 1734

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose of attached summary is to consider possibilities of using ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ information for prosecution. In order to view this matter in its proper perspective it was believed necessary to set forth exactly what ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ information is as well as to briefly review the origin and history of how the Bureau came to receive this traffic. Consequently, the attached summary is divided into four parts as follows:

- I. EXPLANATION AND HISTORY OF ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ INFORMATION (S)
- II. WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ INFORMATION?
- III. NATURE OF ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ MESSAGES AND USE OF COVER NAMES (S)
- IV. PROSECUTION
  - A. Advantages
  - B. Disadvantages
  - C. Communications Intelligence Restrictions
  - D. Political Implications
  - E. International Implications
  - F. Effects on Pending Cases

There is no question that justice would be properly served if Judith Coplon and the Silvermaster-Perlo groups could be successfully prosecuted for their crimes against the United States. The introduction into evidence of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ information could be the turning point in the successful prosecution of these subjects; however, a careful study of all factors involved compels the conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of the U.S. or the Bureau to attempt to use ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ information for prosecution: 1) the question of law involved—whether or not the ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ information would be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule; 2) the fragmentary nature of the messages and the extensive use of cover names therein make positive identifications of the subjects difficult; 3) the severe restrictions surrounding the mention of communications intelligence data and the anticipated objections from the National Security Agency, the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board and perhaps the National Security Council against public disclosure of U.S. efforts and successes in the communications intelligence field.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Enclosure  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ ENCLOSURE

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(7)

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CLASSIFIED BY 1418/SGC  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
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Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

~~(S)~~ (u)

4) the resultant damage to U.S. efforts in this field if the Soviets learn of the degree of success in breaking their codes during the 1940's; 5) the political implications in this an election year; 6) the international repercussions and resultant Soviet propaganda when it is disclosed that the U.S. intercepted and worked on breaking Soviet coded messages when the countries were allied against the Axis; and 7) the effects on pending espionage cases which are based on [redacted] information. These factors weigh heavily against using [redacted] information for prosecution. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Based on information developed from [redacted] traffic, there has been prosecution of Judith Coplon, Valentin Gubitchev, Emil Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, Alfred Dean Slack, Abraham Brothman, Miriam Moskowitz, David Greenglass, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Morton Sobell and William Perl. All of these cases were investigations instituted by us directly or indirectly from [redacted] information. These prosecutions were instituted without using [redacted] information in court. ~~(S)~~ (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is believed that we should continue this policy. ~~(S)~~ (u)

I agree  
(u) (S)  
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(X) TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES OF USING [REDACTED] INFORMATION FOR PROSECUTION (S)

(X) I. EXPLANATION AND HISTORY OF [REDACTED] INFORMATION (S)

[REDACTED] (S) is a small group of cryptographers attached to National Security Agency (NSA) who work on deciphering certain Soviet intelligence messages covering the period 1942-46. These Soviet messages are made up of telegrams and cables and radio messages sent between Soviet intelligence operators in the United States and Moscow. Consequently, this material falls within the category of communications intelligence information and as such it is subject to the most stringent regulations governing dissemination on a "need-to-know" basis. These messages would seem to fall into the same category as teletypes from a field office to the Bureau (in code) and detailed reports were undoubtedly being sent by the MGB (Soviet Intelligence Service) in the diplomatic pouch. The usual Russian method in concealing the text of these messages is to first translate the Russian plain text into code by using a code book and then apply a one-time cipher pad to the code, thus making it practically impossible to recover the message. Interceptions of the [REDACTED] (S) messages were made by the U. S. Army. The intercepted messages consist of a series of numbers. These numbers are placed on work sheets by [REDACTED] and efforts are then made to arrive at the additive (the enciphering process). Once the additive is correctly determined the message can be read by using the MGB code book which has been partially reconstructed by NSA. The chief problem is to develop the additive. This requires painstaking effort by experienced cryptographers who can also translate Russian. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (S) work on this problem and work sheets have been made up by [REDACTED] and sent to [REDACTED] (S). Also, [REDACTED] (S) has a man in England working with [REDACTED] (S). In turn, [REDACTED] (S) have a cryptographer working full-time at [REDACTED] (S).

The first report received by the Bureau on MGB deciphered traffic was received from Army Security Agency (predecessor of NSA) 4/16/48. Colonel L.E. Forney, Intelligence (S)

Classified by [REDACTED] / [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR 8/1/85

(S) - Appropriate Agency

[REDACTED] (S)  
ENCLOSURE

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Division of the Army, advised at that time that the messages given to the Bureau were dated 1944 but the decodes had just been accomplished. Col. Forney advised that the fact that the Army had been able to break into Russian traffic was to be held very closely by the Bureau. The initial decodes also had been distributed to the Navy which was also working on decoding Russian traffic at that time. The Navy in turn informed CIA about the initial decodes. Since that time, however (until May 1952 when CIA began getting [redacted] information), this traffic has not been published, as is other communications intelligence traffic which is distributed to the authorized consumers, but kept on work sheets for security purposes. It was made available only to the Bureau and [redacted]. Some initial decodes of this Russian traffic were fragmentary and full of gaps. Col. Forney felt that the Bureau by studying the messages and conducting investigations would be able to develop information which would assist the Army cryptographers in reading additional unrecovered portions of the messages. The Army stated these messages were part of an MGB system and subsequent study has confirmed that opinion. (S)

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64



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(u) II. WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF [REDACTED] (S) INFORMATION? \*

From April 1948 until May 1952 the Bureau was the only U. S. agency, other than NSA, aware of this Russian MGB traffic. During that time [REDACTED] were working on the traffic in conjunction with [REDACTED] and, consequently, we know [REDACTED] were aware of

this traffic. In June 1948 Col. Forney advised that the Navy and Air Force should not be notified of the existence of [REDACTED] (S) information. In May 1952, through the insistence and pressure put on NSA by General Walter Bedell Smith, then head of CIA, that agency was given access to [REDACTED] information and has received and worked on it since that time. Although the Navy, Air Force and State are members of the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and as such are entitled to receive [REDACTED] information, they have not received it to date, except those original decodes which were given to the Navy in April 1948. Thereafter, the Navy was not given any other decodes. (S)

In rare cases where consideration is given to dissemination of [REDACTED] information by the Bureau, clearance is first obtained from NSA and if no objection is raised by that agency the information is paraphrased to protect the source. The information can then be given only to one cleared to receive communications intelligence material. Very few people in the Government are so cleared. (S)

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(u) VII. NATURE OF [REDACTED] (S) MESSAGES AND USE OF COVER NAMES (S)

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The messages [REDACTED] (S) furnishes the Bureau are, for the most part, very fragmentary and full of gaps. Some parts of the messages can never be recovered again because during the actual intercept the complete message was not obtained. Other portions can be recovered only through the skill of the cryptographers and with the Bureau's assistance. Frequently, through an examination of the messages and from a review of Bureau files, the Bureau can offer suspects for individuals involved. When [REDACTED] (S) breaks out a part of the message and reads it to the point where it is determined that reference is being made to certain information derived from U.S. Government records or documents, the Bureau conducts investigation to locate such records or documents. When located, these records are furnished to [REDACTED] (S) and if it turns out to be the correct document, [REDACTED] (S) uses it as a "crib" and thus is able to read previously unrecovered portions of the message. It must be realized that the [REDACTED] (S) cryptographers make certain assumptions as to meanings when deciphering these messages and thereafter the proper translation of Russian idioms can become a problem. It is for such reasons that [REDACTED] (S) has indicated that almost anything included in a translation of one of these deciphered messages may in the future be radically revised. (S)

Another very important factor to be considered when discussing the accuracy of these deciphered messages is the extensive use of cover names noted in this traffic. Once an individual was considered for recruitment as an agent by the Soviets, sufficient background data on him was sent to headquarters in Moscow. Thereafter, he was given a cover name and his true name was not mentioned again. This makes positive identifications most difficult since we seldom receive the initial message which states that agent "so and so" (true name) will henceforth be known as "\_\_\_\_\_" (cover name). Also, cover names were changed rather frequently and the cover name "Henry" might apply to two different individuals, depending upon the date it was used. Cover names were used for places and organizations as well as for persons, as witnessed by the fact that New York City was "Tyre" and the FBI was "Kata." All of the above factors make difficult a correct reading of the messages and point up the tentative nature of many identifications. (S)

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For example, among the first messages we received in 1948 was one concerning an individual with the cover name "Antenna." The message was dated 5/5/48 and it set forth information indicating that "Antenna" was 25 years of age, a "fellow countryman" (member of CP, USA), lived in "Tyre" (New York), took a course at Cooper Union in 1940, worked in the Signal Corps at Ft. Monmouth, and had a wife named Ethel. We made a tentative identification of "Antenna" as Joseph Weichbrod since the background of Weichbrod corresponded with the information known about "Antenna." Weichbrod was about the right age, had a Communist background, lived in NYC, attended Cooper Union in 1939, worked at the Signal Corps, Ft. Monmouth, and his wife's name was Ethel. He was a good suspect for "Antenna" until sometime later when we definitely established through investigation that "Antenna" was Julius Rosenberg. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Cover names were used not only to designate Soviet agents but other people mentioned in the messages were given cover names. For example, "Kapitan" (Captain) was former President F.D. Roosevelt. A survey of the traffic as a whole suggests that a cover name like "Kapitan" serves a different purpose than cover names assigned to agents operating for the Soviets in an intelligence capacity. The latter type of cover names are presumably designed to protect the person of the agent directly. The "Kapitan" type of cover name merely obscures the sense and thereby affords indirect protection to the agent and at the same time is calculated to baffle foreign intelligence organizations as to just what intelligence is being transmitted. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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(u) IV. PROSECUTION

(S) It is conceivable that if we could use [redacted] information in court the Government might successfully prosecute Judith Coplen and a number of the subjects in the Silvermaster and Perlo groups. It is also evident that a public disclosure of [redacted] information would corroborate Elizabeth Bentley. (S)

(S) Judith Coplen was not mentioned by name in the messages but the identifying information set forth in the [redacted] traffic, dated July 1944 and Jan. 1945, concerning the individual designated by the cover name "Sima" made it certain that "Sima" was Judith Coplen. Our subsequent investigation added additional evidence when it was determined that Coplen was still operating as a Soviet espionage agent in 1949 when she was observed in contact with her Soviet superior, Valentin Gubitchev. (S)

(S) The [redacted] information tends to fall into certain divisions corresponding to a considerable extent to the divisions apparent in the Silvermaster-Perlo cases. From the data set forth in the messages and from our knowledge of the Silvermaster and Perlo groups, as furnished by Elizabeth Bentley, it appears that Silvermaster is identical with the individual in [redacted] designated by the cover name "Robert." It also appears that "Donald" is William Ludwig Ulman; that Bentley herself is "Good Girl" and "Myrna"; whereas Helen Silvermaster appears to be "Dora"; Abraham George Silverman fits "Aileron" and Jake Golos appears identical with "Zouk." Others in the Silvermaster group have been tentatively identified with individuals designated by cover names in the [redacted] material. (S)

(S) The Perlo group fits into the [redacted] information when we examine the following message of 5/13/44: (S)

(S) (u) "Mayor" (unidentified) in NYC personally prepared a report to MGB headquarters in Moscow advising that some unspecified action had been taken regarding "Good Girl" (Bentley) in accordance with instructions of "Helmsman" (Earl Browder). "Mayor" then made reference to winter and also to "Magdoff-Kant" (probably Harry Magdoff). This latter reference was then followed by a statement that in "Good Girl's" opinion "they" are reliable. It was also mentioned that no one had interested himself in their possibilities.

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(u) The name "Stern" (unidentified) was mentioned and it was then reported that "Balder" (Victor Perlo), "Flumb" (Charles Kramer), "Ted" (Edward Fitzgerald) and "Kant" (Harry Magdoff) would take turns coming to NY every two weeks. "Mayer" said "Flumb" and "Ted" knew "Pal" (Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, whose cover name was later changed to "Robert").

With reference to the foregoing, it is to be recalled that Elizabeth Bentley advised that Jacob Golos informed her he had made contact with a group in Washington, D. C., through Earl Browder. After the death of Golos in 1943, two meetings were arranged with this group in 1944. The first meeting was arranged by Browder and is believed to have been held on 2/27/44. The meetings were held in the apartment of John Abt in NYC and Bentley was introduced to four individuals identified as Victor Perlo, Charles Kramer, Harry Magdoff and Edward Fitzgerald. (S)(u)

As can be seen from the above, if the (S) messages (and there are several of them) could be introduced into evidence their contents, along with the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley, might convict a number of Silvermaster and Perlo subjects. (S)(u)

(u) (S) 4. Advantages (S)

A The advantages of using (S) information for prosecutive benefits (assuming it would be admitted into evidence) are obvious. It would corroborate Elizabeth Bentley and enable the Government to convict a number of subjects such as Judith Coplan and Silvermaster, whose continued freedom from prosecution is a sin against justice. Public disclosure of these messages would vindicate the Bureau in the matter of the confidence we placed in Elizabeth Bentley's testimony. At the same time, the disadvantages of using (S) information publicly or in a prosecution appear overwhelming. (S)

TOP SECRET

69

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(u) B. Disadvantages

In the first place, we do not know if the deciphered messages would be admitted into evidence and if they were not, that would abruptly end any hope for prosecution. It is believed that the defense attorney would immediately move that the message be excluded, based on the hearsay evidence rule. He would probably claim that neither the person who sent the message (Soviet official) nor the person who received it (Soviet official) was available to testify and thus the contents of the message were purely hearsay as it related to the defendants. Consequently, in order to overcome such a motion it would be necessary to rely upon their admission through the use of expert testimony of those who intercepted the messages and those cryptographers who deciphered the messages. A question of law is involved herein. It is believed that the messages probably could be introduced in evidence on the basis of exception to the hearsay evidence rule to the effect that the expert testimony was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the documents and they were the best evidence available. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Assuming that the messages could be introduced in evidence, we then have a question of identity. The fragmentary nature of the messages themselves, the assumptions made by the cryptographers in breaking the messages, and the questionable interpretations and translations involved, plus the extensive use of cover names for persons and places, make the problem of positive identification extremely difficult. Here, again, reliance would have to be placed on the expert testimony of the cryptographers and it appears that the case would be entirely circumstantial. ~~(S)~~ (u)

A | Assuming further that the testimony of the Government's cryptographers were accepted as part of the Government's case, the defense probably would be granted authority by the court to have private cryptographers hired by the defense examine the messages as well as the work sheets of the Government's cryptographers. Also, in view of the fragmentary nature of the majority of these messages, the defense would make a request to have its cryptographers examine those messages which ~~has~~ been unsuccessful in breaking and which are not in evidence on the premise that such messages, if decoded, could exonerate their clients. This would lead to the exposure of Government techniques and practices in the cryptograph field to unauthorized persons and thus compromise the Government's efforts in the communications intelligence field. Also, this course of action would act to the Bureau's disadvantage since the additional messages would spotlight individuals on whom the Bureau has pending investigations. ~~(S)~~ (u)

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70

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In addition to the question of law involved, there are a number of other factors which weigh against the use of [redacted] information in court. These factors are most important from the Bureau's standpoint. (S)

(U) (S) C. Communications Intelligence Restrictions

[redacted] information is communications intelligence information and, consequently, it is all classified "Top Sec" and is strictly controlled. Reference to the existence of communications intelligence either directly or indirectly must be avoided except among those to whom the information is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. Dissemination of communications intelligence material is not on a "need-to-know" basis and the [redacted] material has been restricted even more so than other communications intelligence data since it has not been published and distributed to USCIB consumers, other than the FBI and, more recently, CIA. Before any decision could be made on using [redacted] information in court the messages would have to be declassified. Such declassification would, of course, have to be passed on by USCIB and it appears evident that the approval would also have to come from the Special Committee of the National Security Council for Communications Intelligence and, as a matter of fact, it probably would necessitate approval of the President. At the same time, it appears that [redacted] would have to be notified since [redacted] data has been decrypted through the joint efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom. In the Lauchlin Currie case when we considered the possibilities of prosecution, General Canine of NSA indicated it would be highly inadvisable to reveal U.S. efforts to break the Russian code. It is believed that NSA would strongly object to any attempt to use [redacted] information in court since to do so would reveal to the Soviets the degree of success the U.S. had in breaking the Soviet code which was used during 1943-46. In addition, this knowledge by the Soviets of the degree of success the U.S. had in breaking their code might work to the disadvantage of NSA in its current efforts to break the Russian codes. (S)

(U) (S) D. Political Implications

It is believed that disclosure of existence of [redacted] information at this time would probably place the Bureau right in the middle of a violent political war. This is an election year and the Republicans would undoubtedly use disclosure of the [redacted] information to emphasize the degree of [redacted] (S)

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71

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infiltration by Communists and Soviet agents into the U.S. Government during the 1940's when the Democrats were in power. At the same time, the Democrats would probably strike back by claiming that the FBI had withheld this information from the proper officials during the Democratic administration and at the same time would salvage what credit they could by claiming that the messages were intercepted and deciphered during the course of their administration and under their guidance. The Bureau would be right in the middle.

(u) F. International Implications

The Russians would undoubtedly scream that the U.S. had been expending money and manpower on intercepting and breaking the Russian code during the time the two countries were allied against a common enemy. Its propoganda machine would work overtime proving that this was evidence that the U.S. never acted in good faith during the war. Also, while no written record has been located in Bureau files to verify this it has been stated by NSA officials that during the war Soviet diplomats in the U.S. were granted permission to use Army radi facilities at the Pentagon to send messages to Moscow. It has been stated that President Roosevelt granted this permission and accompanied it with the promise to the Soviets that their messages would not be intercepted or interfered with by U.S. authorities. Here, again, the Soviets would villify the U.S. as an unfaithful ally and false friend.

(u) F. Effects on Pending Cases

The Bureau is currently investigating about 100 cases on individuals either mentioned in ~~the~~ traffic or having some connection therewith. In addition, some of the subjects in the Mccase are mentioned in the ~~the~~ traffic. The public revelation of our knowledge of this traffic and the individuals involved therein probably would cause some of these individuals who may be still operating for the Soviets to discontinue their activities and possibly disappear. The effects on these pending cases would be difficult to assess at this time.

A

(u) [Handwritten notes and signatures in a box, including 'WHS', 'ERT', and 'G...']

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72



(u) Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman  
FROM : A. H. Belmont  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]  
ESPIONAGE XR

TOP SECRET

DATE: November 26, 1955

Classified by *Nicholas Sances* (u)  
Declassify on: OADR *10/3/80*

SYNOPSIS:

We have brought up to date the summary entitled, "Operations of the MGB Residency at New York, 1944-45" on the basis of [REDACTED] information. Revised pages have been inserted in copies maintained at the Bureau. The Appendix to this Summary contains write-ups on each of the individuals who have been identified from [REDACTED] information or investigation arising therefrom. A total of 208 persons have been identified as having been active in Soviet intelligence operations for the MGB in the United States and a chart breaking this figure down is set forth in this memorandum. This memorandum was initially prepared for the Director on 10-26-50 and was brought up to date every 6 months until October, 1955. It was approved in April, 1956, this memorandum be brought up to date on an annual basis. It is noted that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is also brought up to date at the same time annually and includes substantially the same information included in this summary and appendix with the exception of the [REDACTED] cover names. This summary includes 10 additional identifications made during the past year. Our experience has shown that the information being obtained from [REDACTED] is diminishing and it is anticipated that additional identifications will be made less frequently than in the past. For this reason as well as the fact that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] includes substantially the same information, it is believed that the annual process of bringing this memorandum up to date be discontinued. However, as identifications are made, individual write-ups will be prepared and inserted into this summary and appendix in order that it will be current at all times.

ACTION:

If you approve, in the future the annual process of bringing up to date this summary will be discontinued and additional inserts will be prepared as identifications are made.

White  
7/11/56  
568 SC/O/SC  
A  
(Per NSA LTR. DTD. 7/6/97)

- JPL:jdb
- (5)
- (S)
- 1 - Boardman
- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Branigan
- 1 - Lee

RECORDED - 75

6/11/57

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DEC 4 1957

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TOP SECRET

73

*Handwritten notes and signatures*

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman

TOP SECRET

Re: [redacted] (S)

DETAILS:

The [redacted] summary was originally prepared for the Director on 10-26-50 and it was designed to give an over-all view of the MGB (Soviet intelligence) based on information by [redacted] (S). This source has been able to furnish us information regarding MGB operations in the 1940's. The main limitations on this information are that in many instances it is fragmentary and further, the Soviet extensive use of code names has made identifications difficult. (S)

Based on the investigations from [redacted] (S) information we have identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activities who have at one time been active in the United States or which activity has had some United States ramifications. Of this number we already had received information from other sources indicating espionage involvement on the part of 87 of these persons. However, 119 persons were not previously known to us as being involved in espionage and have been identified through investigation in this case.

A chart explaining these figures in more detail is set out

SOVIET ESPIONAGE AGENTS IN [redacted] CASE (S)

Total Number Involved in Soviet Espionage	206
Number Previously Known to Us from Other Information	87
Number Not Previously Known to Us	<u>119</u> 206
Soviet Officials Not Now in United States	61
Other Persons Not Now in United States	40
Persons Deceased	11
(Burd, Duggan, Golos, <sup>a</sup> . Ivancic, Kournakoff, Lauterbach, Malisoff, Sabatini, Staple, White, <sup>b</sup> . Briggs)	
Persons Now Cooperative with Us	14
(Bentley, <sup>c</sup> . D. Greenglass, <sup>d</sup> . R. Greenglass, Black, Elitcher, Gold, <sup>e</sup> . Menaker, Miller, Moczulski, Morros, <sup>f</sup> : Jack Soble, Myra Soble, York, [redacted])	

74

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman

TOP SECRET

Re: [redacted] (S)

Persons Who Have Been Prosecuted	15	
(Brothman, Coplon, Fuchs, G. Gold, Greenglass, Gubitchev, H. Moskowitz, J. Rosenberg, E. Rosenberg, Slack, Sobell, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, Perl, Hiss)		
Persons Involved in Silvermaster Network	29	
Persons Involved in Mccase	5	
Other Persons Now in United States	<u>43</u>	218
Less Those Counted Twice, Described Below	<u>12</u>	206

- a. Golos was also involved in Silvermaster network.
- b. White was also involved in Silvermaster network.
- c. Bentley was also involved in Silvermaster network.
- d. David Greenglass was also prosecuted.
- e. Gold was also prosecuted.
- f. Morros is also involved in Mccase.
- g. Fuchs also counted in those not now in United States.
- h. Gubitchev also counted as Soviet official.

In the Spring of 1954, [redacted] (S) began furnishing data concerning the activities of the MGB in San Francisco during the 1940's. [redacted] (S) advised there are about 400 messages which they believe they might be able to read in whole or in part. These messages cover San Francisco-Moscow traffic and are in the 1943-1946 period. To date, we have received 172 of these messages and we are pressing [redacted] (S) for more material since we believe we can identify more Soviet agents who operated in the United States from this link. [redacted] (S) has advised this traffic is extremely difficult to read. (S)

All phases of this matter are being closely followed and close supervision afforded to all cases in the field. Continuous research through Bureau files is being conducted to identify other agents and we are alert to the need of capitalizing on the information available to us to penetrate any presently operating Soviet espionage network. (S) (u)

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TOP SECRET

75