

AO 106 (Rev. 06/09) Application for a Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

Four Premises and Two Electronic Devices, See Attached Affidavit and Riders

Case No. 18 MAG 2969

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): Four Premises and Two Electronic Devices, See Attached Affidavit and Riders

located in the Southern District of New York, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDERS.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- [x] evidence of a crime;
[x] contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
[x] property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
[] a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Table with 2 columns: Code Section (18 U.S.C. s 371, 1005, 1014, 1343 and 1344, and 52 USC 30116 and 30109) and Offense Description (Conspiracy, false bank entries, false statements to a financial institution, wire fraud, bank fraud, and illegal campaign contributions)

The application is based on these facts:

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDER.

- [x] Continued on the attached sheet.
[] Delayed notice of ___ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: ___) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.



Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: 04/08/2018

Judge's signature

City and state: NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Printed name and title

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for a Search and Seizure Warrant for the Premises Known and Described as (1) 502 Park Avenue, [REDACTED] New York, New York 10022, (2) Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, (3) Safe Deposit Box # [REDACTED] Located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and (4) Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein, and the Electronic Devices Known and Described as (1) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED] and (2) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED],
Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for Search and Seizure
Warrant**

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

[REDACTED] Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,

deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant

[REDACTED]

2. I make this Affidavit in support of an application pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the premises specified below (the "Subject

Premises”) and the electronic devices specified below (the “Subject Devices”) for, and to seize, the items and information described in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge; my review of documents and other evidence; my conversations with other law enforcement personnel; and my training, experience and advice received concerning the use of electronic devices in criminal activity and the forensic analysis of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

B. The Subject Premises and Subject Devices

3. Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2, Subject Premises-3 and Subject Premises-4 (collectively, the “Subject Premises”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Premises-1 is Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] floor of the building. Based on my review of New York City property records, I have learned that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own Subject Premises-1.¹ Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-1 is Cohen’s full-time residence.

b. Subject Premises-2 is an office located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza

¹ As noted *infra*, I have learned that on or about October 28, 2015, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza. Subject Premises-2 is located on the 23rd floor of the building inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The office is assigned to Michael Cohen. As described below, Michael Cohen works and conducts meetings at Subject Premises-2.

c. Subject Premises-3 is a safety deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019. Based on my review of records maintained by TD Bank, I have learned that the safety deposit box is approximately five inches by ten inches in size, and is marked as box [REDACTED]. The safety deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.

d. Subject Premises-4 is Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to search warrants described below, I have learned that on or about January 5, 2018, Cohen received an email from an employee of Loews Regency, which included a price quote for a long-term stay suite based on a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, 2018.² On or about January 29, 2018, Cohen sent an email to a Loews Regency employee, stating, in pertinent part: "I just spoke to my wife and she has scheduled the move for Thursday. Please mark down that we will be taking possession on Thursday, February 1st." Based on my review of cell phone location data, I have learned that, over the past 24 hours, two cellular phones used by Cohen have been located in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4. In particular, on or about

² Although the quoted price contemplated a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, it appears that Cohen did not move in until February 1, and as of today, April 8, cellphone location information demonstrates that Cohen's cellular phones are in still in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4.

April 8, 2018, law enforcement agents using a “triggerfish” device identified Room 1728 as the room within the hotel in which the Subject Devices are most likely present.³

e. Therefore, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4.

4. Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 (collectively, the “Subject Devices”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Device-1 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

██████████ Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

b. Subject Device-2 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

██████████ Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

c. Based on my training, experience, and research, and from consulting the manufacturer’s and service providers’ advertisements and product technical specifications available online, I know that the Subject Devices have capabilities that allow them to, among other things: make and receive telephone calls; save and store contact information; send and receive

³ Based on my conversations with these agents, I understand that it is also possible that the Subject Devices are one floor below, in Room 1628. However, as noted, I understand that Cohen received a price quote for a long-term stay suite and is residing there with his family. Based on my conversations with FBI agents conducting surveillance, I understand that Room 1728 appears to be a suite, whereas Room 1628 appears to be a standard room.

emails and text messages; download and run mobile telephone applications, including encrypted call and messaging application such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust; take, send, and receive pictures and videos; save and store notes and passwords; and store documents.

C. The Subject Offenses

5. For the reasons detailed below, I believe that there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Bank Fraud Offenses”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Campaign Finance Offenses”), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”).

D. Prior Applications

6. The FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAO”) have been investigating several courses of criminal conduct by Michael Cohen. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

7. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen Gmail Account") sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the "First Cohen Gmail Warrant").

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen iCloud Account" and the "Cohen iCloud Warrant").

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the "Second Cohen Gmail Warrant").

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the "Cohen MDCPC Account") sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account⁴ and November 13, 2017 (the "First Cohen MDCPC Warrant").

8. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI's New York Field Office. As part of that referral, on or about February 8, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and Cohen MDCPC Warrant. On or about March 7, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO

⁴ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.

with all non-privileged content obtained pursuant to the Cohen iCloud Warrant.⁵ A filter team working with the SCO had previously reviewed the content produced pursuant to these warrants for privilege.

9. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained search warrants for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account and the Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and the “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”). The content produced pursuant to these warrants is subject to an ongoing review for privilege by an SDNY filter team.⁶

10. The emails search warrants described above are referred to collectively as the “Cohen Email Warrants.”

11. On or about April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained a warrant for prospective and historical cellphone location information for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2. On or about April 8, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained authority to employ an electronic technique, commonly known as a “triggerfish,” to determine the location of Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2.

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview


12. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, schemes by Target Subject Michael Cohen (a) to defraud multiple banks from in or about 2016 up to and including the present, and (b) to make an illegal

⁵ The SCO had previously provided a subset of this non-privileged content on or about February 2, 2018.

⁶ On or about February 28, 2018 and April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained Rule 41 search warrants authorizing the search of emails and content obtained pursuant to previously issued warrants for additional subject offenses.

campaign contribution in October 2016 to then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. As noted, Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

13. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally misrepresented his ability to pay cash by failing to disclose cash he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; (iii) failed to disclose tens of thousands of dollars he received in monthly interest income, and (iv) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, ██████████ ██████████ in connection with ██████████ acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to fraudulently induce the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations and personal guarantees that Cohen and his wife had signed.





15. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Cohen Email Warrants, information obtained pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, as well as my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen has used the Subject Premises to (a) receive documents related to the transaction intended to relieve Cohen of his taxi medallion debt, (b) receive documents and/or conduct meetings related to his consulting work, (c) receive documents and/or conduct meetings relating to his finances and assets, some of which, as noted above and as detailed further herein, he has concealed from the banks in connection with the refinancing of his taxi medallion debt, (d) [REDACTED] and (e) house and operate electronic devices that were utilized in connection with, among other things, the taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's consulting work, and [REDACTED]. Specifically, as described below, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED], as well as electronic devices containing such evidence, all of which constitute or contain evidence of the Subject Offenses. Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's consulting work, his finances, and [REDACTED] as well as electronic devices containing such evidence. Subject Premises-3, as described below, likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's assets and finances, including assets that may not have been disclosed to banks in connection with the refinancing of Cohen's taxi medallion debt or documents relating to such assets, and documents or evidence related to [REDACTED]. Subject Premises-4 likely contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which themselves contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, including concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED]. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Probable Cause Regarding Subjects' Commission of the Subject Offenses⁷

The Bank Fraud Scheme

(i) Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

16. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through LLCs controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling National Bank ("Sterling") and the Melrose Credit Union ("Melrose"), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions lost value, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash and income, among other things. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my participation in interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the "Sterling Employee-1") and two other

⁷ In the following recitation of probable cause, I frequently refer to phone calls or text messages involving Cohen. The text messages described herein as sent or received by Cohen were all sent or received from the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2. The vast majority of the phone calls described herein made or received by Cohen were made or received by the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2, although in certain limited instances Cohen used a landline or other phone.

Sterling employees (“Sterling Employee-2” and “Sterling Employee-3”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).⁸ Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. ~~Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to make his monthly loan payments to Capital One.~~

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount

⁸ One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion LLCs entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the LLC. The address listed for each of the LLCs was the address for Subject Premises-1. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. The personal guaranty agreements stated that the LLCs had offices at the address for Subject Premises-1, and contained a notice provision that stated that any notices required by the agreements should be mailed to Subject Premises-1. In total, Sterling agreed to lend approximately \$22 million to the Cohens’ companies.

d. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of Cohen’s taxi medallion debt to Melrose.⁹

⁹ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).

e. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.¹⁰ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8,

¹⁰ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen’s statements, his personal financial information “indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments.” Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen’s monthly payments.

g. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks.¹¹ According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen’s representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by, among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

h. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to

¹¹ Based on my review of property records, I know that on or about October 28, 2015, around the time period when Sterling raised the possibility of Cohen posting his personal residence—Subject Premises-1—as collateral, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallion entities to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent by Cohen to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

i. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 told [REDACTED] that Melrose had agreed to the deal in principle, and that Sterling would be sending the parties a term sheet shortly.

j. In order for the banks to conduct diligence and evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about June 7, 2017, Sterling

Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an “updated personal financial statement,” completed jointly with Cohen’s wife, and Cohen’s most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the “May 2017 Financial Statement”) that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen’s accountant, [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen’s assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.¹²

k. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about specific line items on the financial statement, including the cash amount, value of medallions, and total liabilities. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

l. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen and [REDACTED], attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between

¹² Based on my review of Cohen’s financial statements, I know that the precipitous decline in assets from his 2014 financial statement to his 2017 financial statements can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen’s real estate assets and medallion investments.

Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. The term sheet included a cover letter addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. The parties negotiated the provisions of the term sheet and, on or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] and Cohen a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

m. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789, respectively, in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

n. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling

required and requested additional financial statements and tax returns for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about September 25, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his 2016 tax return. The tax return listed Cohen's mailing address as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

o. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED], Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000.¹³ Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (including the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),¹⁴ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first

¹³ Based on my review of Cohen's financial statements, I know that this further decline in assets can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen's real estate assets and medallion investments.

¹⁴ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

time, he indicated was held by a trust).¹⁵ The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

p. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—i.e., in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank — that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

q. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. The demand letter was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. The notice of default was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018,

¹⁵ Based on my review of property records maintained by the City of New York, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that in 2015, Cohen transferred his residence to a trust. He did not disclose that transaction to [REDACTED] or Sterling until in or about September 2017.

stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would “bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential.” Cohen also requested by email on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen’s debts have been satisfied and that Cohen’s personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

r. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, the [REDACTED]’ attorney emailed attorneys for Sterling and stated that “at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward.”

s. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen’s loans to Sterling Employee-3, who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, my review of telephone call notes taken by Sterling Employee-3, and my review of telephone records, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke several times to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or restructuring Cohen’s outstanding taxi medallion loans. On the calls, which in total lasted more than an hour, Cohen stated in sum and substance that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 to pay toward the medallion loans. On the call, in the course of reviewing the failed Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling Employee-3 questioned Cohen about the price [REDACTED] was to have paid for each medallion, and whether there was a side agreement between Cohen and [REDACTED]. Cohen denied that there was any side agreement with [REDACTED]

t. On or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to

\$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

u. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that since January 30, 2018, Sterling has continued to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position. In particular, according to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen and Sterling have an agreement in principal to restructure Cohen's loans based in part of Cohen's agreement to make a principal payment of approximately \$750,000, to make a payment of \$500,000 to become current on interest payments, and to post \$192,000 in cash collateral for his future monthly payments on the loan. Cohen also agreed to pledge an interest he had in a property. Sterling Employee-3 has stated that had Cohen indicated he had more than \$1,250,000 available to him, Sterling would have, among other things, negotiated for a larger reduction to the principal amount of the loan.

(ii) Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work

17. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple written and oral representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose¹⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen misled the bank by claiming he had insufficient liquidity to satisfy his obligations or meet the bank’s demands, while withholding information about these ongoing revenue streams and liquid financial assets at First Republic.

18. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with a First Republic sales manager (“First Republic Employee-1”) and a First Republic senior managing director (“First Republic Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

¹⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction.

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts at First Republic, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities. According to First Republic's know-your-customer records on Cohen,¹⁷ his primary physical address is the address for Subject Premises-1.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the "Essential Consultants Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for Essential Consultants LLC was the address for Subject Premises-1. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, First Republic Employee-1 conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form¹⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, as described below, the account was not intended to receive—and does not

¹⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

¹⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen's statements.

appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.

c. I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, ~~from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the~~ following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 into the Essential Consultants Account from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.

ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and February 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received eleven wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$1,099,780.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T sent \$100,000 to the

Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T sent \$600,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (“KAI”). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a “monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017.”

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about February 1, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$3,033,112.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23. Cohen’s withdrawals from the Essential Consultants account reveal that it was used for largely personal purposes, including to pay, among other things, American Express bills and fees from “the Core Club,” a private social club in New York.

d. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the “MDC&A Account”).

Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for MDC&A Account was the address for Subject Premises-1. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. As noted above, Subject Premises-2 is located inside the New York office of Squire Patton Boggs. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction or the subsequent loan refinancing negotiations, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

19. Based on my review of emails that were seized pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration. Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Gmail Account, the Cohen MDCPC Account, and public sources, I have learned the following:

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a "Consulting Agreement" between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render "consulting and advisory services, as requested" by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants "a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand

(\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017. I have also reviewed invoices in amounts of \$150,000 that Cohen emailed to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. At the top of the invoices the address listed for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2.

b. On or about May 8, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with BTA Bank. The signature block on Cohen’s email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC” and provided the address for Subject Premises-2. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between BTA Bank and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 8, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services” to BTA Bank, and that BTA Bank would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand (\$1,800,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through monthly payments of \$150,000. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an employee of BTA Bank, and attached to the email an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants, with the address of Subject Premises-2. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about January 23, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a consulting agreement with AT&T, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-1. The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty

Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about March 1, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in equal monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. In or about February 2017, Cohen began negotiating the terms of a “strategic alliance” with Squire Patton Boggs. On or about March 4, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs emailed Cohen a “strategic alliance agreement.” Under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to generate business for the law firm, and Squire Patton Boggs agreed to pay to Cohen “an annual strategic alliance fee of \$500,000, payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments.” Squire Patton Boggs also agreed to provide Cohen with “dedicated and segregated office space in [Squire Patton Boggs’s] New York and Washington D.C. offices, which office space shall be physically separate from [Squire Patton Boggs’s] offices and have locked doors and its own locked file cabinets.” On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

20. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] (as noted above, Cohen's accountant at the time), my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] and my review of notes and [REDACTED], I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at Subject Premises-2. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen in which [REDACTED] wrote that "[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017" and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any value associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: "[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates

POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[l]ooks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. In a letter dated October 6, 2017, addressed to [REDACTED], Cohen stated, “I have reviewed the attached statement of financial condition and find it to be correct and consistent with the representations that I made to your firm. The attached is an accurate reflection of my assets, liabilities and net worth (deficit) as of September 30, 2017.” Attached to that letter was the September 2017 Financial Statement, which, as noted above, was then transmitted to Sterling in connection with the proposed taxi medallion transaction between Sterling, Cohen, and [REDACTED]

21. Based on my review of a report of an interview with Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Cohen did not disclose his income stream from Essential Consultants to Sterling Employee-1 or, to his knowledge, anyone else at Sterling. According to Sterling Employee-1, knowledge of such an income stream would have affected Sterling’s demands during the negotiations, particularly with respect to the amount of a principal paydown of Cohen’s debt.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

22. In addition to withholding the existence of his Essential Consultants income from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September

2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. I also know that on or about January 30, 2018, in a telephone call with Sterling Employee-3, and on February 1, 2018, in an email to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen represented that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 in cash. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by forensic accountants, I have learned that Cohen had approximately \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Additionally, as of February 1, 2018, Cohen had approximately \$6,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had a total of \$1,389,245.78 in these accounts.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$1,284,996.13 in these accounts.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$261,517.55 in this account.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$3,332,992.95 in these accounts.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife. Cohen also has a safety deposit box at TD Bank—Subject Premises-3. The safety deposit box was opened on December 13, 2017 in the names of Michael and Laura Cohen.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$4,713,935.08 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, Sterling Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$6,268,732.59 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.¹⁹

23. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's written and oral representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or to its decision whether approve of the transfer of those loans to [REDACTED]

¹⁹ Based on my review of the account schedules described above, I know that, as of the date of this affidavit, the account balances for TD Bank have not yet been included in the schedule for either date and the account balances for Sterling National Bank and Bethpage Credit Union have not yet been included in the schedule for February 1, 2018. Thus, to the extent that these accounts have positive balances, Cohen's total balances in fact were even higher on these dates.

Cohen Has Unreported Interest Income

24. It appears that Cohen also hid from Sterling interest income that he was receiving in connection with a six million dollar loan he made to another individual. Specifically, I know from my review of the May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen did not disclose that he had made a note receivable in the amount of approximately \$6 million, or that he was earning approximately \$60,000 per month in interest income in connection with that loan. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were reviewed by another law enforcement agent, my review of property records and documents obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. Based on my review of property records, I have learned that on or about March 12, 2012, Cohen agreed to lend [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approximately \$2,000,000.²⁰ It appears that the promissory note was unsecured by any real property. On or about April 28, 2014, Cohen and [REDACTED] amended the promissory note, and restructured the loan to increase the principal amount to approximately \$5,000,000. Under the terms of the amended promissory note, the loan was secured by [REDACTED] apartment in [REDACTED], Florida. On or about April 8, 2015, Cohen and [REDACTED] restated the promissory note to increase the principal amount to \$6,000,000.²¹

b. Based on my review of a copy of the restated note, which was obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that under the terms of the amended and restated

²⁰ I learned from Getzel that [REDACTED]

²¹ The note states that the loan is to [REDACTED] husband and wife, jointly and severally. For ease of reference, I refer simply to "[REDACTED]" herein.

promissory note, Cohen's loan to [REDACTED] is an interest-only loan, and that the principal balance of the loan bears interest at an annual rate of 12.25 percent. I also know that the amended and restated promissory note includes a schedule of payments that require [REDACTED] to pay Cohen approximately \$61,250 per month beginning in April 2015 and ending in April 2019. The note also requires that [REDACTED] repay the principal balance of \$6,000,000 on April 28, 2019.

c. Based on my review of bank records, I have learned that, consistent with the terms of the amended and restated promissory note, [REDACTED] has made monthly payments of approximately \$61,250 since April 2015. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have learned that from April 2015 to October 2015, Cohen received checks from an entity called [REDACTED], totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank.²² It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is the owner of [REDACTED]. From my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have also learned that since October 2015, Cohen has received checks from an entity called [REDACTED], totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank. It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is also the owner of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] In total, it appears that Cohen receives approximately \$735,000 per year in interest payments from [REDACTED].

d. Based on my review of Cohen's May 2017 and September 2017 Financial Statements, my review of his 2015 and 2016 tax returns obtained via subpoena and from the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that Cohen did

²² In April 2015, Cohen received a pro-rated payment. For all months thereafter, the total payment equaled \$61,250, but [REDACTED] often made the payment in multiple checks.

not disclose this interest income he was receiving from [REDACTED] to Sterling or Melrose, or list it on his tax returns. I have also learned that while this interest income is taxable, Cohen did not tell [REDACTED]—his accountant—about the income, and [REDACTED] only learned about the income because he began doing [REDACTED] taxes in 2017.²³

25. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information relating to the interest income he is receiving from [REDACTED] in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan.

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

26. As set forth in detail below, during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED] Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side agreement he had negotiated with [REDACTED]: it appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately \$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and my participation in interviews with Sterling Employee-1, Sterling Employee-2, and Sterling Employee-3, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. The term sheet listed Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from

²³ Accordingly, this interest income—which should have been reported as such on Cohen's tax returns—is included herein in calculations of Cohen's true cash position.

Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED] including a \$3.8 million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

c. On or about January 30, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen whether Cohen had a side agreement with [REDACTED] to pay [REDACTED] a sum of money for entering into the medallion transaction. Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen about such an arrangement because, according to Sterling Employee-3, the price that [REDACTED] was paying for each medallion appeared to be well above the market price. Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he had no side agreement—and never had a side agreement—with [REDACTED].

27. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and my participation in an interview

with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."²⁴


b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.


28. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]


The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme




²⁴ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.














































C. Probable Cause Justifying Search of the Subject Premises and Subject Devices

45. Based on the foregoing, my review of records produced pursuant to subpoenas and the Cohen Email Warrants, and the iCloud Warrant, and my training and experience, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices have been used in furtherance of the Subject Offenses and are likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen permanently resides at Subject Premises-1 and, at least in part, works at both Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2, and that those locations contain evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and his [REDACTED]. Additionally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains evidence of Cohen's assets and [REDACTED]. Finally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, in which Cohen is temporarily residing, contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which, in turn, contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, such as evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and [REDACTED]

46. First, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen lives and operates his businesses, at least in part, at Subject Premises-1. Specifically, from my review of property records, I know that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own (in trust) Subject Premises-1. From my review of Cohen's tax returns, I know he lists his primary residence as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen routinely refers to Subject Premises-1 as his home. For example, on or about September 28, 2017 and October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed individuals that his home address is the address for Subject Premises-1. I also know from my review of emails that Cohen receives package delivery notifications that list Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. Cohen has also provided the address of Subject Premises-1 as the address for Essential Consultants and Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. For example, the certificates of incorporation and account opening documents at First Republic for both entities list their addresses as the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(d). The consulting agreement between Essential Consultants and AT&T also indicated the address for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c).

47. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, the address for all of Cohen's taxi medallion LLCs is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 16(c). Additionally, the medallion loan documents indicate that any mailings related to the loans should be sent to Subject Premises-1. *See id.* Based on my training and experience, as well as my review of public sources, I know that individuals keep records of properties and assets in which they have ownership interests. Accordingly, I submit that Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence of Cohen's ownership of the taxi medallion LLCs, the revenue that those medallions generate, and the transaction with Sterling in 2014 to re-finance the medallion loans that were then with Capital One Bank.

b. From my review of records maintained by Sterling, I also know that Sterling addressed documents relating to the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's attempts to modify the terms of the medallion loans to Subject Premises-1. For instance, Sterling addressed the transaction term sheet, *see supra* ¶ 16(l), and its demand letter and notice of default, *see supra* ¶ 16(q), to Subject Premises-1. Accordingly, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's negotiations with Sterling. Some of those records—such as records relating to a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]—were concealed from Sterling and cannot be obtained via subpoena to Sterling. Additionally, even where documents were sent to Cohen by Sterling (and therefore are available from Sterling via subpoena), the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to Cohen's possession or knowledge of the documents.

c. From my review of records maintained by First Republic, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing addresses for the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(e). Accordingly, it is likely that Subject

Premises-1 contains records relating to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account, including, among other things, account opening documents, bank statements, documents provided as part of the know-your-customer process, any notes made by Cohen when he was opening the accounts, wire transfer records, and canceled checks. Even where these records can be obtained from First Republic, the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts, or his knowledge of transactions or the existence of funds in accounts.

d. Based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, TD Bank, Morgan Stanley, City National Bank, Signature Bank, and Bethpage Credit Union, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing for his accounts at each of these financial institutions. Accordingly, it is likely that Subject Premises-1 contains records relating to these accounts, including, among other things, bank statements that list account balances. The existence of these records in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts and his knowledge of the balances in these accounts.

e. Additionally, Cohen may have records of other bank accounts or assets that were not disclosed to Sterling and are not presently known by law enforcement. For example, as described above, Cohen has received interest income since 2015 that he has not disclosed to Sterling or paid taxes on. Also, on Cohen's August 2014 Financial Statement, *see supra* ¶ 16(e), he disclosed \$10,000,000 in "investments in overseas entities."³⁰ The value of these investments was omitted from subsequent financial statements. However, for the reasons outlined above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen omitted the value of those investments from his 2017

³⁰ Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that Cohen told Sterling Employee-3 that the reference to "investments in overseas entities" on his 2014 Financial Statement was to serve merely as a "placeholder" for potential future investments.

financial statements in order to understate his assets. As Subject Premises-1 is Cohen's primary residence and he uses Subject Premises-1 as the mailing address for bank records, there is probable cause to believe that account statements for unknown bank accounts or assets concealed from Sterling are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T and produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to AT&T for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from AT&T. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-1 for at least one consulting arrangement involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 may contain records of other consulting arrangements that Cohen, through Essential Consultants, has with other individuals or entities.

g. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that [REDACTED] accounting firm sent documents to Subject Premises-1 and used the address for Subject Premises-1 as the address listed on Cohen's personal and corporate tax returns. *See supra* ¶ 16(n). For instance, on or about October 6, 2017, an employee at [REDACTED] accounting firm emailed Cohen that she had sent Cohen's September 2017 Financial Statement by FedEx to Cohen's attention. Accordingly, Cohen's tax records are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

h. Based on my review of bank records and publicly-available documents, I know that

[REDACTED]



i. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, I know that Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account. Based on my review of location records provided by Apple pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, I know that electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 to, among other things, place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 contains electronic devices, including certain Apple products, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

j. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I understand that Subject Premises-1 recently sustained water damage to certain parts of the premises, and that Cohen has engaged contractors to perform certain remediation work on the premises. In addition, as set forth above, I believe that Cohen and his family are temporarily residing at Subject Premises-4 in the Loew's Regency Hotel, which is approximately two blocks from Subject Premises-1. However, based on my review of a work order sent to Cohen's email by a contractor, I understand that the first phase of the work order called for the contractor to "Pack & Remove all items & furnishings in Living Room, Kitchen, Sons Room & Dining Room" and store them off-site. In addition, based on my review of drawings sent to Cohen by the contractor, it appears that the work is primarily being done in these rooms. Thus, I believe that the construction – to the extent it is still ongoing – would not necessarily have caused Cohen to move

all documents or evidence responsive to the warrant out of Subject Premises-1, because it does not appear that work is being done to the portion of Subject Premises-1, such as a home office or Cohen's own room, where such documents or evidence would most likely be found.³¹

48. Second, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen uses Subject Premises-2 as office space, and also that Subject Premises-2 contains certain electronic devices. Specifically, from my review of the "strategic alliance agreement" between Squire Patton Boggs and Cohen, and my review of the press release on Squire Patton Boggs's website, I know that Cohen has an office at Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(d), 19(e). Indeed, I have learned that pursuant to Cohen's agreement with the law firm, he has "dedicated and segregated office space" in Squire Patton Boggs's offices on the 23rd floor of 30 Rockefeller Plaza, and that the space is "physically separate" from the firm's offices and has "locked doors and its own locked file cabinets." *See supra* ¶ 19(e). Additionally, I know that under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to "arrange for [his] own computer server system that is not connected to [Squire Patton Boggs's] computer network system." I know from my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] who met Cohen at Subject Premises-2 in 2017, that Subject Premises-2 is an office with a door, it appears to be used only by Cohen, and it contains, among other things, a computer and paper files. According to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] saw Cohen at Subject Premises-2, he had two cellular telephones in Subject Premises-2. I also know from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen uses the address for Subject Premises-2 in the signature block

³¹ As noted below, based on my training and experience, I believe that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring some items with them, such as portable electronic devices or sensitive items, meaning that Cohen has likely taken some evidence from Subject Premises-1 to Subject Premises-4. Nevertheless, given the temporary nature of Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 and the scope of the work being done at Subject Premises-1, I believe it is unlikely that Cohen has taken *all* evidence that would be subject to seizure out of Subject Premises-1.

on his emails. Based on my review of notes of a call between Cohen and First Republic Employee-2 (which notes were taken by another First Republic employee, who was participating in the call and taking notes), I know that, on or about November 15, 2017, Cohen told First Republic Employee-2 that he had a new office at 30 Rock. Moreover, I know from an article in *Vanity Fair* published on or about February 14, 2018, that Cohen was interviewed by the magazine in Subject Premises-2 in or about February 2018.

49. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, when Cohen was emailing with Sterling Employee-3 in 2018 about a modification to his existing loan from Sterling, Cohen listed his address in his email as the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(t), 16(u). Accordingly, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's loan modification negotiations with Sterling.

b. Based on my review of records obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to KAI and BTA for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 19(a), 19(b). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from KAI and BTA, among other entities with which Cohen had a consulting arrangement. Additionally, based on my review of emails sent in 2018 that were obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen continues to enter into consulting arrangements through Essential Consultants, and agreements

relating to those arrangements indicate that Essential Consultants is located at Subject Premises-2. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-2 for multiple consulting arrangements involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 may contain records of other unknown consulting arrangements that Cohen has with other individuals or entities.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, as well as my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that [REDACTED] visited Subject Premises-2 to meet with Cohen about his taxes. *See supra* ¶ 20(a). At that meeting, [REDACTED] discussed with Cohen whether Cohen should disclose Essential Consultants on his personal financial statement to banks. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence relating to Cohen's taxes, or notes of his conversation with [REDACTED]. Moreover, the fact that Cohen used Subject Premises-2 for a meeting regarding his personal financial matters provides probable cause to believe that documents and information regarding his finances will be found in Subject Premises-2.

d. Based on my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that Cohen maintains a computer in Subject Premises-2. From my review of IP data produced pursuant to a subpoena and pen register to Google, it appears that Cohen is logging into his Gmail account from Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 contains electronic devices, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

e. Based upon my training and experience, I have learned that individuals who maintain businesses typically keep records relating to the business—such as contracts with clients and records of payments—at the business' identified location. I am not aware of any addresses

associated with Essential Consultants other than Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2 will contain business records for Essential Consultants.

50. Third, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. In particular:

a. As noted above, Cohen has two bank accounts at TD Bank. In or about November 2017, as Cohen was receiving substantial income from consulting work—which he did not disclose to Sterling—Cohen opened the safety deposit box at TD Bank, which is Subject Premises-3. In light of the aforementioned evidence that Cohen conceals assets, including assets at TD Bank, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains financial assets, objects of value and/or documents relating to such assets or objects of value that Cohen likely did not disclose to Sterling. Indeed, based on my training and experience, I am aware that people often conceal valuable items in safety deposit boxes. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 will contain evidence of the Bank Fraud Offenses.





51. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and cell phone location information, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4. *See supra* ¶¶ 3(d). There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4 contains instrumentalities and evidence of the Subject Offenses, including, the following:



³³ As noted above, Subject Premises-3 is approximately five inches by ten inches. Accordingly, I do not believe that it would fit a large volume of hard copy documents; however, a small number of hard-copy documents, or a large volume of documents contained on a flash drive or other portable storage device, would fit in Subject Premises-3.

b. As described above, at the time Cohen moved to Subject Premises-4, he was also in the midst of ongoing negotiations with Sterling regarding the refinancing of his medallion debts. For example, on January 30, 2018, Cohen had a lengthy phone call with Sterling Employee-3 about his finances and the proposed restructuring, and on February 1, 2018, Cohen sent an email to Sterling Employee-3 claiming that he did not have more than \$1.25 million in cash. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(u). Thus, there is probable cause that Cohen took at least some documents and evidence relating to his ongoing negotiations with Sterling with him to Subject Premises-4, in order to reference and consult them in connection with these negotiations.

c. As described above, Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account, and these electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 – Cohens' permanent residence – to place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. *See supra* ¶¶ 47(i). Although Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 is temporary, based on my training and experience I know that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring portable electronic devices with them, such as cellular phones, tablets, or laptops. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, where Cohen currently appears to be residing, contains electronic devices, including Subject Device-1, Subject Device-2, and/or certain Apple products, that for the reasons discussed herein are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

d. Moreover, as set forth above, based on cellphone location information I know that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 were in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4 as recently as this morning (April 8, 2018). As set forth above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen used the Subject Devices in furtherance of the Subject Offenses, including to communicate with Sterling employees regarding the medallion transaction, with First Republic employees regarding

the Essential Consultants Account, with his accountant regarding his finances, and with

52. Although Cohen appears to be residing currently in Subject Premises-4, it is unknown whether Cohen will be physically present within Subject Premises-4 at the moment the warrant sought herein are executed. If Cohen is within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 – his cellphones – will likely also be within Subject Premises-4. If Cohen is not within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, the devices will likely be on his person, wherever he is located (which, based on location data for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 as recently as today, is likely to be in the Southern District of New York). As such, this warrant seeks separate authority to seize Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, in the event that those devices are not located within Subject Premises-4 (or another Subject Premises) at the moment the warrants sought herein are executed.

D. Probable Cause Justifying Search of ESI

53. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and Subject Premises-4 contain electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses (and, as set forth above, that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 are themselves electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses). Specifically, based on my review of information produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, the iCloud Warrant, and subpoenas, as well as pen register data, I submit that there is probable cause that Subject Premises-1 contains an Apple iPad Mini, a MacBook Pro, and has, at various times, contained Apple cellphones; similarly, there is probable cause that Subject Premises-2 contains a computer and has, at various times, contained Apple

cellphones. These devices are likely to include evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses for the following reasons:

a. As described throughout this affidavit, Cohen used email to send and receive communications related to the Subject Offenses. In particular, Cohen used email to send and receive communications with Sterling, First Republic, [REDACTED] the entities to which he is providing consulting services [REDACTED] among others. While some of these emails have already been obtained via subpoenas and search warrants, I know from my training and experience that individuals can and do delete emails from their Internet-based inboxes but retain copies of those emails on their hard drives. I also know that individuals often have multiple email accounts, some of which may not be known to law enforcement, and as a result electronic devices can be a unique repository of all emails relevant to certain Subject Offenses. Indeed, from my involvement in this investigation, I know that Cohen had an email account with the Trump Organization, but the USAO and FBI have not been able to obtain the contents of that account to date. Thus, emails relevant to the Subject Offenses are likely stored on electronic devices in Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and/or Subject Premises-4.

b. Additionally, Subject Premises-1, Subject Premise-2 and Subject Premises-4 likely contain electronic copies of documents relevant to the Subject Offenses. Indeed, I know from my training and experience that individuals often retain copies of important documents on their computers or other electronic devices capable of storing information, including cellphones (such as the Subject Devices) and tablets. Here, there are a number of documents that Cohen has likely retained that will be relevant to the Subject Offenses. For example, electronic devices may include documentation of Cohen's true net worth, a listing of his assets, an accounting of his available

cash, consulting agreements with third parties, and [REDACTED] among other evidence of the Subject Offenses.

c. Third, I know from my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen sent up online banking with First Republic. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who set up online banking often receive electronic notices concerning financial transactions and, on occasion, save records of their financial transactions to their devices. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's electronic devices contain evidence of banking activity, including the existence of bank accounts or assets that Cohen did not disclose to Sterling or Melrose.

d. Fourth, from my review of records produced by Apple, I know that Cohen communicates using text message as well as encrypted communications applications. These applications that Cohen has downloaded onto a phone include, but are not limited to, WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust. I know from my review of toll records and text messages that, in particular, Cohen communicated with [REDACTED] using these encrypted applications. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's cellphones – the Subject Devices – will contain encrypted messages that are not otherwise accessible relating to the Subject Offenses.

54. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who engage in financial crimes commonly use computers to communicate with co-conspirators, keep financial ledgers, and retain fraudulent documents. As a result, they often store data on their computers related to their illegal activity, which can include logs of online or cellphone-based "chats" with co-conspirators; email correspondence; contact information of co-conspirators, including telephone numbers, email addresses, and identifiers for instant messaging and social medial accounts; bank account numbers; and/or records of uses of funds.

55. Based on my training and experience, I also know that, where computers are used in furtherance of criminal activity, evidence of the criminal activity can often be found months or even years after it occurred. This is typically true because:

- Electronic files can be stored on a hard drive for years at little or no cost and users thus have little incentive to delete data that may be useful to consult in the future.
- Even when a user does choose to delete data, the data can often be recovered months or years later with the appropriate forensic tools. When a file is “deleted” on a home computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear, but instead remains on the hard drive, in “slack space,” until it is overwritten by new data that cannot be stored elsewhere on the computer. Similarly, files that have been viewed on the Internet are generally downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache,” which is only overwritten as the “cache” fills up and is replaced with more recently viewed Internet pages. Thus, the ability to retrieve from a hard drive or other electronic storage media depends less on when the file was created or viewed than on a particular user’s operating system, storage capacity, and computer habits.
- In the event that a user changes computers, the user will typically transfer files from the old computer to the new computer, so as not to lose data. In addition, users often keep backups of their data on electronic storage media such as thumb drives, flash memory cards, CD-ROMs, or portable hard drives.

56. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that Cohen engaged in the Subject Offenses, and that evidence of this criminal activity is likely to be found in the Subject Premises, on computers and electronic media found in the Subject Premises, and on the Subject Devices. In particular, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to the proposed warrants, including the following:

- a. Evidence necessary to establish the occupancy or ownership of the Subject Premises, including without limitation, utility and telephone bills, mail envelopes, addressed correspondence, bank statements, identification documents, and keys.
- b. Evidence relating to Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

d. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

e. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

f. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

g. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records.

h. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen.





p. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

q. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

r. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

III. Procedures for Searching ESI

A. Execution of Warrant for ESI

57. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) provides that a warrant to search for and seize property "may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or

copying of electronically stored information . . . for later review.” Consistent with Rule 41, this application requests authorization to seize any computer devices and storage media and transport them to an appropriate law enforcement facility for review. This is typically necessary for a number of reasons:

- First, the volume of data on computer devices and storage media is often impractical for law enforcement personnel to review in its entirety at the search location.
- Second, because computer data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, computer devices are ideally examined in a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, where trained personnel, using specialized software, can make a forensic copy of the storage media that can be subsequently reviewed in a manner that does not change the underlying data.
- Third, there are so many types of computer hardware and software in use today that it can be impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized personnel and equipment potentially required to safely access the underlying computer data.
- Fourth, many factors can complicate and prolong recovery of data from a computer device, including the increasingly common use of passwords, encryption, or other features or configurations designed to protect or conceal data on the computer, which often take considerable time and resources for forensic personnel to detect and resolve.

58. As discussed herein, Squire Patton Boggs is a functioning law firm that conducts legitimate business unrelated to Cohen’s commission of the Subject Offenses. Subject Premises-2 is an office located inside of Squire Patton Boggs’s New York office. In order to execute the warrant in the most reasonable fashion, law enforcement personnel will attempt to investigate on the scene of what computers or storage media, if any, must be seized or copied, and what computers or storage media need not be seized or copied. Law enforcement personnel will speak with Squire Patton Boggs personnel on the scene as may be appropriate to determine which files and electronic devices within Subject Premises-2 belong to or were used by Cohen. While, based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Cohen shared electronic devices or a server with Squire Patton Boggs, where appropriate, law enforcement personnel will copy data, rather than physically seize

computers, to reduce the extent of any disruption of Squire Patton Boggs's operations. If, after inspecting the seized computers off-site, it is determined that some or all of this equipment is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the evidence, the Government will return it.

59. Additionally, because Cohen is an attorney, and claims to serve as a personal attorney for Trump, the review of evidence seized from the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

B. Accessing ESI on the Subject Devices

60. As described above, the Subject Devices are both Apple brand devices.

61. I know from my training and experience, as well as from information found in publicly available materials including those published by Apple, that some models of Apple devices such as iPhones and iPads offer their users the ability to unlock the device via the use of a fingerprint or thumbprint (collectively, "fingerprint") in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Touch ID. I also know that the Apple iPhone X offers its users the ability to unlock the device via the use of facial recognition (through infrared and visible light scans) in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Face ID.

62. If a user enables Touch ID on a given Apple device, he or she can register up to 5 fingerprints that can be used to unlock that device. The user can then use any of the registered

fingerprints to unlock the device by pressing the relevant finger(s) to the device's Touch ID sensor, which is found in the round button (often referred to as the "home" button) found at the bottom center of the front of the device. If a user enables Face ID on a given Apple device, he or she can unlock the device by raising the iPhone to his or her face, or tapping the screen. In my training and experience, users of Apple devices that offer Touch ID or Face ID often enable it because it is considered to be a more convenient way to unlock the device than by entering a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password, as well as a more secure way to protect the device's contents.

63. In some circumstances, Touch ID or Face ID cannot be used to unlock a device that has either security feature enabled, and a passcode or password must be used instead. These circumstances include: (1) when the device has just been turned on or restarted; (2) when more than 48 hours has passed since the last time the device was unlocked; (3) when the passcode or password has not been entered in the last 6 days, and the device has not been unlocked via Touch ID in the last 8 hours or the device has not been unlocked via Face ID in the last 4 hours; (4) the device has received a remote lock command; or (5) five unsuccessful attempts to unlock the device via Touch ID or Face ID are made.

64. The passcodes or passwords that would unlock the Subject Devices are not known to law enforcement. Thus, it will likely be necessary to press the fingers of the user of the Subject Devices to the devices' Touch ID sensor, or hold the Subject Devices in front of the user's face to activate the Face ID sensor, in an attempt to unlock the devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant. Attempting to unlock the relevant Apple devices via Touch ID with the use of the fingerprints of the user, or via Face ID by holding the device in front of the user's face, is necessary because the government may not otherwise be able to access the data contained on those devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant.

65. Based on these facts and my training and experience, it is likely that Cohen is the user of the Subject Devices, and thus that his fingerprints are among those that are able to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or his face is able to unlock the Subject Devices via Face ID.

66. Although I do not know which of a given user's 10 fingerprints is capable of unlocking a particular device, based on my training and experience I know that it is common for a user to unlock a Touch ID-enabled Apple device via the fingerprints on thumbs or index fingers. In the event that law enforcement is unable to unlock the Subject Devices as described above within the five attempts permitted by Touch ID, this will simply result in the device requiring the entry of a password or passcode before it can be unlocked.

67. I also know from my training and experience, and my review of publicly available materials published by Apple that Apple brand devices, such as the Subject Devices, have a feature that allows a user to erase the contents of the device remotely. By logging into the Internet, the user or any other individual who possesses the user's account information can take steps to completely wipe the contents of the device, thereby destroying evidence of criminal conduct, along with any other information on the device. The only means to prevent this action is to disable the device's ability to connect to the Internet immediately upon seizure, which requires either access to the device itself to alter the settings, or the use of specialized equipment that is not consistently available to law enforcement agents at every arrest.

68. Due to the foregoing, I request that the Court authorize law enforcement to press the fingers (including thumbs) of Cohen to the Touch ID sensors the Subject Devices, or hold the Subject Devices in front of Cohen's face, for the purpose of attempting to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or Face ID in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant.

C. Review of ESI

69. Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

70. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to determine which files or other ESI contain evidence or fruits of the Subject Offenses. Such techniques may include, for example:

- surveying directories or folders and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- conducting a file-by-file review by “opening” or reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents (analogous to performing a cursory examination of each document in a file cabinet to determine its relevance);
- “scanning” storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted data or deliberately hidden files; and
- performing electronic keyword searches through all electronic storage areas to determine the existence and location of data potentially related to the subject matter of the investigation³⁴; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

³⁴ Keyword searches alone are typically inadequate to detect all relevant data. For one thing, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files, such as images and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, there may be information properly subject to seizure but that is not captured by a keyword search because the information does not contain the keywords being searched.

71. Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to restrict their search to data falling within the categories of evidence specified in the warrant. Depending on the circumstances, however, law enforcement personnel may need to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

D. Return of ESI

72. If the Government determines that the electronic devices are no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data, and the devices themselves are not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return these items, upon request. Computer data that is encrypted or unreadable will not be returned unless law enforcement personnel have determined that the data is not (i) an instrumentality of the offense, (ii) a fruit of the criminal activity, (iii) contraband, (iv) otherwise unlawfully possessed, or (v) evidence of the Subject Offenses.

IV. Conclusion and Ancillary Provisions

73. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrants.

74. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



Special Agent
FBI

Sworn to before me on
8th day of April, 2018 *BY TELEPHONE*


HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-1

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-1”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] of the building.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.
- f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-2

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-2”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

An office belonging to or assigned to Michael Cohen located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112, inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.
- f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, any desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone belonging to Michael Cohen

or in his possession, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT C

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-3

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-3”) are described as follows, and include all locked and closed containers found therein:

A safe deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, marked as box # [REDACTED]. The safe deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.


II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-3 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

1. Evidence relating to Michael Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, assets, monthly and annual income, and income sources, from January 1, 2013 to the present



- 
9. Any portable electronic storage device.

B. Search of Seized Electronic Devices

Probable cause exists to search any seized electronic storage device for the items set forth in Section II(A)(1)-(8), above.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any electronic storage device, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect

any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT D

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

██████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT E

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-1

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-1”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-1, or hold Subject Device-1 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-1 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-1 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-1 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-1, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT F

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-2

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-2”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-2, or hold Subject Device-2 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-2 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



contribution reporting requirements, and campaign contribution limits.

o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-2 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-2 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-2, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 106 (Rev. 06/09) Application for a Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of
*(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)*
Four Premises and Two Electronic Devices, See
Attached Affidavit and Riders

)
)
)
)

Case No.

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property *(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location)*:
Four Premises and Two Electronic Devices, See Attached Affidavit and Riders

located in the Southern District of New York, there is now concealed *(identify the person or describe the property to be seized)*:

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDERS.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is *(check one or more)*:

- evidence of a crime;
- contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
- property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
- a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

<i>Code Section</i>	<i>Offense Description</i>
18 U.S.C. s 371, 1005, 1014, 1343 and 1344, and 52 USC 30116 and 30109	Conspiracy, false bank entries, false statements to a financial institution, wire fraud, bank fraud, and illegal campaign contributions

The application is based on these facts:

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDER.

- Continued on the attached sheet.
- Delayed notice of _____ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: _____) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

[Redacted Signature]

Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: 04/08/2018

/s/ Henry B. Pitman
Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Printed name and title

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for a Search and Seizure Warrant for the Premises Known and Described as (1) 502 Park Avenue, [REDACTED] New York, New York 10022, (2) Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, (3) Safe Deposit Box # [REDACTED] Located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and (4) Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein, and the Electronic Devices Known and Described as (1) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED] and (2) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED].
Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for Search and Seizure
Warrant**

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

[REDACTED] Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,

deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant

[REDACTED]

2. I make this Affidavit in support of an application pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the premises specified below (the "Subject

Premises”) and the electronic devices specified below (the “Subject Devices”) for, and to seize, the items and information described in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge; my review of documents and other evidence; my conversations with other law enforcement personnel; and my training, experience and advice received concerning the use of electronic devices in criminal activity and the forensic analysis of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

B. The Subject Premises and Subject Devices

3. Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2, Subject Premises-3 and Subject Premises-4 (collectively, the “Subject Premises”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Premises-1 is Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] floor of the building. Based on my review of New York City property records, I have learned that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own Subject Premises-1.¹ Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-1 is Cohen’s full-time residence.

b. Subject Premises-2 is an office located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza

¹ As noted *infra*, I have learned that on or about October 28, 2015, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza. Subject Premises-2 is located on the 23rd floor of the building inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The office is assigned to Michael Cohen. As described below, Michael Cohen works and conducts meetings at Subject Premises-2.

c. Subject Premises-3 is a safety deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019. Based on my review of records maintained by TD Bank, I have learned that the safety deposit box is approximately five inches by ten inches in size, and is marked as box [REDACTED]. The safety deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.

d. Subject Premises-4 is Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to search warrants described below, I have learned that on or about January 5, 2018, Cohen received an email from an employee of Loews Regency, which included a price quote for a long-term stay suite based on a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, 2018.² On or about January 29, 2018, Cohen sent an email to a Loews Regency employee, stating, in pertinent part: "I just spoke to my wife and she has scheduled the move for Thursday. Please mark down that we will be taking possession on Thursday, February 1st." Based on my review of cell phone location data, I have learned that, over the past 24 hours, two cellular phones used by Cohen have been located in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4. In particular, on or about

² Although the quoted price contemplated a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, it appears that Cohen did not move in until February 1, and as of today, April 8, cellphone location information demonstrates that Cohen's cellular phones are still in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4.

April 8, 2018, law enforcement agents using a “triggerfish” device identified Room 1728 as the room within the hotel in which the Subject Devices are most likely present.³

e. Therefore, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4.

4. Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 (collectively, the “Subject Devices”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Device-1 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

██████████ Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

b. Subject Device-2 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

██████████ Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

c. Based on my training, experience, and research, and from consulting the manufacturer’s and service providers’ advertisements and product technical specifications available online, I know that the Subject Devices have capabilities that allow them to, among other things: make and receive telephone calls; save and store contact information; send and receive

³ Based on my conversations with these agents, I understand that it is also possible that the Subject Devices are one floor below, in Room 1628. However, as noted, I understand that Cohen received a price quote for a long-term stay suite and is residing there with his family. Based on my conversations with FBI agents conducting surveillance, I understand that Room 1728 appears to be a suite, whereas Room 1628 appears to be a standard room.

emails and text messages; download and run mobile telephone applications, including encrypted call and messaging application such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust; take, send, and receive pictures and videos; save and store notes and passwords; and store documents.

C. The Subject Offenses

5. For the reasons detailed below, I believe that there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of ~~18 U.S.C. §§ 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud)~~ (collectively, the “Bank Fraud Offenses”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Campaign Finance Offenses”), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”).

D. Prior Applications

6. The FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAO”) have been investigating several courses of criminal conduct by Michael Cohen. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

7. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen Gmail Account") sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the "First Cohen Gmail Warrant").

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen iCloud Account" and the "Cohen iCloud Warrant").

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the "Second Cohen Gmail Warrant").

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the "Cohen MDCPC Account") sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account⁴ and November 13, 2017 (the "First Cohen MDCPC Warrant").

8. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI's New York Field Office. As part of that referral, on or about February 8, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and Cohen MDCPC Warrant. On or about March 7, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO

⁴ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.

with all non-privileged content obtained pursuant to the Cohen iCloud Warrant.⁵ A filter team working with the SCO had previously reviewed the content produced pursuant to these warrants for privilege.

9. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained search warrants for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account and the Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and the “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”). The content produced pursuant to these warrants is subject to an ongoing review for privilege by an SDNY filter team.⁶

10. The emails search warrants described above are referred to collectively as the “Cohen Email Warrants.”

11. On or about April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained a warrant for prospective and historical cellphone location information for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2. On or about April 8, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained authority to employ an electronic technique, commonly known as a “triggerfish,” to determine the location of Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2.

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview


12. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, schemes by Target Subject Michael Cohen (a) to defraud multiple banks from in or about 2016 up to and including the present, and (b) to make an illegal

⁵ The SCO had previously provided a subset of this non-privileged content on or about February 2, 2018.

⁶ On or about February 28, 2018 and April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained Rule 41 search warrants authorizing the search of emails and content obtained pursuant to previously issued warrants for additional subject offenses.

campaign contribution in October 2016 to then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. As noted, Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

13. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally misrepresented his ability to pay cash by failing to disclose cash he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; (iii) failed to disclose tens of thousands of dollars he received in monthly interest income, and (iv) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, ██████████ in connection with ██████████ acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to fraudulently induce the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations and personal guarantees that Cohen and his wife had signed.



[REDACTED]

15. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Cohen Email Warrants, information obtained pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, as well as my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen has used the Subject Premises to (a) receive documents related to the transaction intended to relieve Cohen of his taxi medallion debt, (b) receive documents and/or conduct meetings related to his consulting work, (c) receive documents and/or conduct meetings relating to his finances and assets, some of which, as noted above and as detailed further herein, he has concealed from the banks in connection with the refinancing of his taxi medallion debt, (d) [REDACTED] and (e) house and operate electronic devices that were utilized in connection with, among other things, the taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's consulting work, and [REDACTED]. Specifically, as described below, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED], as well as electronic devices containing such evidence, all of which constitute or contain evidence of the Subject Offenses. Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's consulting work, his finances, and [REDACTED] as well as electronic devices containing such evidence. Subject Premises-3, as described below, likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's assets and finances, including assets that may not have been disclosed to banks in connection with the refinancing of Cohen's taxi medallion debt or documents relating to such assets, and documents or evidence related to [REDACTED]. Subject Premises-4 likely contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which themselves contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, including concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED]. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Probable Cause Regarding Subjects' Commission of the Subject Offenses⁷

The Bank Fraud Scheme

(i) Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

16. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through LLCs controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling National Bank ("Sterling") and the Melrose Credit Union ("Melrose"), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions lost value, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash and income, among other things. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my participation in interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the "Sterling Employee-1") and two other

⁷ In the following recitation of probable cause, I frequently refer to phone calls or text messages involving Cohen. The text messages described herein as sent or received by Cohen were all sent or received from the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2. The vast majority of the phone calls described herein made or received by Cohen were made or received by the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2, although in certain limited instances Cohen used a landline or other phone.

Sterling employees (“Sterling Employee-2” and “Sterling Employee-3”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).⁸ Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to make his monthly loan payments to Capital One.

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount

⁸ One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion-LLCs entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the LLC. The address listed for each of the LLCs was the address for Subject Premises-1. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. The personal guaranty agreements stated that the LLCs had offices at the address for Subject Premises-1, and contained a notice provision that stated that any notices required by the agreements should be mailed to Subject Premises-1. In total, Sterling agreed to lend approximately \$22 million to the Cohens’ companies.

d. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of Cohen’s taxi medallion debt to Melrose.⁹

⁹ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).

e. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.¹⁰ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8,

¹⁰ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen’s statements, his personal financial information “indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments.” Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen’s monthly payments.

g. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks.¹¹ According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen’s representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by, among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

h. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to

¹¹ Based on my review of property records, I know that on or about October 28, 2015, around the time period when Sterling raised the possibility of Cohen posting his personal residence—Subject Premises-1—as collateral, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallion entities to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent by Cohen to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

i. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 told [REDACTED] that Melrose had agreed to the deal in principle, and that Sterling would be sending the parties a term sheet shortly.

j. In order for the banks to conduct diligence and evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about June 7, 2017, Sterling

Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an “updated personal financial statement,” completed jointly with Cohen’s wife, and Cohen’s most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the “May 2017 Financial Statement”) that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen’s accountant, [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen’s assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.¹²

k. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about specific line items on the financial statement, including the cash amount, value of medallions, and total liabilities. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

l. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen and [REDACTED], attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between

¹² Based on my review of Cohen’s financial statements, I know that the precipitous decline in assets from his 2014 financial statement to his 2017 financial statements can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen’s real estate assets and medallion investments.

Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. The term sheet included a cover letter addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. The parties negotiated the provisions of the term sheet and, on or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] and Cohen a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

m. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789, respectively, in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

n. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling

required and requested additional financial statements and tax returns for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about September 25, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his 2016 tax return. The tax return listed Cohen's mailing address as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

o. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED], Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000.¹³ Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (including the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),¹⁴ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first

¹³ Based on my review of Cohen's financial statements, I know that this further decline in assets can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen's real estate assets and medallion investments.

¹⁴ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

time, he indicated was held by a trust).¹⁵ The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

p. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—i.e., in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank — that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

q. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. The demand letter was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. The notice of default was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018,

¹⁵ Based on my review of property records maintained by the City of New York, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that in 2015, Cohen transferred his residence to a trust. He did not disclose that transaction to [REDACTED] or Sterling until in or about September 2017.

stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would “bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential.” Cohen also requested by email on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen’s debts have been satisfied and that Cohen’s personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

r. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, the [REDACTED] attorney emailed attorneys for Sterling and stated that “at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward.”

s. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen’s loans to Sterling Employee-3, who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, my review of telephone call notes taken by Sterling Employee-3, and my review of telephone records, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke several times to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or restructuring Cohen’s outstanding taxi medallion loans. On the calls, which in total lasted more than an hour, Cohen stated in sum and substance that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 to pay toward the medallion loans. On the call, in the course of reviewing the failed Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling Employee-3 questioned Cohen about the price [REDACTED] was to have paid for each medallion, and whether there was a side agreement between Cohen and [REDACTED]. Cohen denied that there was any side agreement with [REDACTED]

t. On or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to

\$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

u. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that since January 30, 2018, Sterling has continued to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position. In particular, according to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen and Sterling have an agreement in principal to restructure Cohen's loans based in part of Cohen's agreement to make a principal payment of approximately \$750,000, to make a payment of \$500,000 to become current on interest payments, and to post \$192,000 in cash collateral for his future monthly payments on the loan. Cohen also agreed to pledge an interest he had in a property. Sterling Employee-3 has stated that had Cohen indicated he had more than \$1,250,000 available to him, Sterling would have, among other things, negotiated for a larger reduction to the principal amount of the loan.

(ii) Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work

17. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple written and oral representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose¹⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen misled the bank by claiming he had insufficient liquidity to satisfy his obligations or meet the bank’s demands, while withholding information about these ongoing revenue streams and liquid financial assets at First Republic.

18. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with a First Republic sales manager (“First Republic Employee-1”) and a First Republic senior managing director (“First Republic Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

¹⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction.

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts at First Republic, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities. According to First Republic's know-your-customer records on Cohen,¹⁷ his primary physical address is the address for Subject Premises-1.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the "Essential Consultants Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for Essential Consultants LLC was the address for Subject Premises-1. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, First Republic Employee-1 conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form¹⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, as described below, the account was not intended to receive—and does not

¹⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

¹⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen's statements.

appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.

c. I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 into the Essential Consultants Account from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.

ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and February 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received eleven wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$1,099,780.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T sent \$100,000 to the

Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T sent \$600,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. ("KAI"). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a "monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017."

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about February 1, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$3,033,112.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23. Cohen's withdrawals from the Essential Consultants account reveal that it was used for largely personal purposes, including to pay, among other things, American Express bills and fees from "the Core Club," a private social club in New York.

d. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the "MDC&A Account").

Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for MDC&A Account was the address for Subject Premises-1. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. As noted above, Subject Premises-2 is located inside the New York office of Squire Patton Boggs. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction or the subsequent loan refinancing negotiations, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

19. Based on my review of emails that were seized pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration. Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Gmail Account, the Cohen MDCPC Account, and public sources, I have learned the following:

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a "Consulting Agreement" between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render "consulting and advisory services, as requested" by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants "a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand

(\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017. I have also reviewed invoices in amounts of \$150,000 that Cohen emailed to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. At the top of the invoices the address listed for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2.

b. On or about May 8, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with BTA Bank. The signature block on Cohen’s email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC” and provided the address for Subject Premises-2. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between BTA Bank and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 8, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services” to BTA Bank, and that BTA Bank would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand (\$1,800,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through monthly payments of \$150,000. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an employee of BTA Bank, and attached to the email an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants, with the address of Subject Premises-2. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about January 23, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a consulting agreement with AT&T, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-1. The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty

Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about March 1, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in equal monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. In or about February 2017, Cohen began negotiating the terms of a “strategic alliance” with Squire Patton Boggs. On or about March 4, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs emailed Cohen a “strategic alliance agreement.” Under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to generate business for the law firm, and Squire Patton Boggs agreed to pay to Cohen “an annual strategic alliance fee of \$500,000, payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments.” Squire Patton Boggs also agreed to provide Cohen with “dedicated and segregated office space in [Squire Patton Boggs’s] New York and Washington D.C. offices, which office space shall be physically separate from [Squire Patton Boggs’s] offices and have locked doors and its own locked file cabinets.” On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

20. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] (as noted above, Cohen's accountant at the time), my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] and my review of notes and [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at Subject Premises-2. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen in which [REDACTED] wrote that "[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017" and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any value associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: "[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates

POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[l]ooks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. In a letter dated October 6, 2017, addressed to [REDACTED], Cohen stated, “I have reviewed the attached statement of financial condition and find it to be correct and consistent with the representations that I made to your firm. The attached is an accurate reflection of my assets, liabilities and net worth (deficit) as of September 30, 2017.” Attached to that letter was the September 2017 Financial Statement, which, as noted above, was then transmitted to Sterling in connection with the proposed taxi medallion transaction between Sterling, Cohen, and [REDACTED]

21. Based on my review of a report of an interview with Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Cohen did not disclose his income stream from Essential Consultants to Sterling Employee-1 or, to his knowledge, anyone else at Sterling. According to Sterling Employee-1, knowledge of such an income stream would have affected Sterling’s demands during the negotiations, particularly with respect to the amount of a principal paydown of Cohen’s debt.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

22. In addition to withholding the existence of his Essential Consultants income from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September

2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. I also know that on or about January 30, 2018, in a telephone call with Sterling Employee-3, and on February 1, 2018, in an email to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen represented that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 in cash. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by forensic accountants, I have learned that Cohen had approximately \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Additionally, as of February 1, 2018, Cohen had approximately \$6,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had a total of \$1,389,245.78 in these accounts.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$1,284,996.13 in these accounts.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$261,517.55 in this account.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$3,332,992.95 in these accounts.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife. Cohen also has a safety deposit box at TD Bank—Subject Premises-3. The safety deposit box was opened on December 13, 2017 in the names of Michael and Laura Cohen.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$4,713,935.08 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, Sterling Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$6,268,732.59 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.¹⁹

23. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's written and oral representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or to its decision whether approve of the transfer of those loans to [REDACTED]

¹⁹ Based on my review of the account schedules described above, I know that, as of the date of this affidavit, the account balances for TD Bank have not yet been included in the schedule for either date and the account balances for Sterling National Bank and Bethpage Credit Union have not yet been included in the schedule for February 1, 2018. Thus, to the extent that these accounts have positive balances, Cohen's total balances in fact were even higher on these dates.

Cohen Has Unreported Interest Income

24. It appears that Cohen also hid from Sterling interest income that he was receiving in connection with a six million dollar loan he made to another individual. Specifically, I know from my review of the May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen did not disclose that he had made a note receivable in the amount of approximately \$6 million, or that he was earning approximately \$60,000 per month in interest income in connection with that loan. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were reviewed by another law enforcement agent, my review of property records and documents obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. Based on my review of property records, I have learned that on or about March 12, 2012, Cohen agreed to lend [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approximately \$2,000,000.²⁰ It appears that the promissory note was unsecured by any real property. On or about April 28, 2014, Cohen and [REDACTED] amended the promissory note, and restructured the loan to increase the principal amount to approximately \$5,000,000. Under the terms of the amended promissory note, the loan was secured by [REDACTED] apartment in [REDACTED], Florida. On or about April 8, 2015, Cohen and [REDACTED] restated the promissory note to increase the principal amount to \$6,000,000.²¹

b. Based on my review of a copy of the restated note, which was obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that under the terms of the amended and restated

²⁰ I learned from Getzel that [REDACTED]

²¹ The note states that the loan is to [REDACTED] husband and wife, jointly and severally. For ease of reference, I refer simply to "[REDACTED]" herein.

promissory note, Cohen's loan to [REDACTED] is an interest-only loan, and that the principal balance of the loan bears interest at an annual rate of 12.25 percent. I also know that the amended and restated promissory note includes a schedule of payments that require [REDACTED] to pay Cohen approximately \$61,250 per month beginning in April 2015 and ending in April 2019. The note also requires that [REDACTED] repay the principal balance of \$6,000,000 on April 28, 2019.

c. Based on my review of bank records, I have learned that, consistent with the terms of the amended and restated promissory note, [REDACTED] has made monthly payments of approximately \$61,250 since April 2015. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have learned that from April 2015 to October 2015, Cohen received checks from an entity called [REDACTED] totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank.²² It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is the owner of [REDACTED]. From my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have also learned that since October 2015, Cohen has received checks from an entity called [REDACTED] totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank. It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is also the owner of [REDACTED]. In total, it appears that Cohen receives approximately \$735,000 per year in interest payments from [REDACTED].

d. Based on my review of Cohen's May 2017 and September 2017 Financial Statements, my review of his 2015 and 2016 tax returns obtained via subpoena and from the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that Cohen did

²² In April 2015, Cohen received a pro-rated payment. For all months thereafter, the total payment equaled \$61,250, but [REDACTED] often made the payment in multiple checks.

not disclose this interest income he was receiving from [REDACTED] to Sterling or Melrose, or list it on his tax returns. I have also learned that while this interest income is taxable, Cohen did not tell [REDACTED]—his accountant—about the income, and [REDACTED] only learned about the income because he began doing [REDACTED] taxes in 2017.²³

25. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information relating to the interest income he is receiving from [REDACTED] in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan.

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

26. As set forth in detail below, during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED] Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side agreement he had negotiated with [REDACTED]. It appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately \$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and my participation in interviews with Sterling Employee-1, Sterling Employee-2, and Sterling Employee-3, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. The term sheet listed Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from

²³ Accordingly, this interest income—which should have been reported as such on Cohen's tax returns—is included herein in calculations of Cohen's true cash position.

Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED] including a \$3.8-million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

c. On or about January 30, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen whether Cohen had a side agreement with [REDACTED] to pay [REDACTED] a sum of money for entering into the medallion transaction. Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen about such an arrangement because, according to Sterling Employee-3, the price that [REDACTED] was paying for each medallion appeared to be well above the market price. Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he had no side agreement—and never had a side agreement—with [REDACTED].

27. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and my participation in an interview

with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."²⁴

b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.

28. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme



²⁴ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.







































C. Probable Cause Justifying Search of the Subject Premises and Subject Devices

45. Based on the foregoing, my review of records produced pursuant to subpoenas and the Cohen Email Warrants, and the iCloud Warrant, and my training and experience, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices have been used in furtherance of the Subject Offenses and are likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen permanently resides at Subject Premises-1 and, at least in part, works at both Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2, and that those locations contain evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and his [REDACTED]. Additionally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains evidence of Cohen's assets and [REDACTED]. Finally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, in which Cohen is temporarily residing, contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which, in turn, contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, such as evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and [REDACTED]

46. First, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen lives and operates his businesses, at least in part, at Subject Premises-1. Specifically, from my review of property records, I know that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own (in trust) Subject Premises-1. From my review of Cohen's tax returns, I know he lists his primary residence as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen routinely refers to Subject Premises-1 as his home. For example, on or about September 28, 2017 and October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed individuals that his home address is the address for Subject Premises-1. I also know from my review of emails that Cohen receives package delivery notifications that list Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. Cohen has also provided the address of Subject Premises-1 as the address for Essential Consultants and Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. For example, the certificates of incorporation and account opening documents at First Republic for both entities list their addresses as the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(d). The consulting agreement between Essential Consultants and AT&T also indicated the address for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c).

47. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, the address for all of Cohen's taxi medallion LLCs is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 16(c). Additionally, the medallion loan documents indicate that any mailings related to the loans should be sent to Subject Premises-1. *See id.* Based on my training and experience, as well as my review of public sources, I know that individuals keep records of properties and assets in which they have ownership interests. Accordingly, I submit that Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence of Cohen's ownership of the taxi medallion LLCs, the revenue that those medallions generate, and the transaction with Sterling in 2014 to re-finance the medallion loans that were then with Capital One Bank.

b. From my review of records maintained by Sterling, I also know that Sterling addressed documents relating to the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's attempts to modify the terms of the medallion loans to Subject Premises-1. For instance, Sterling addressed the transaction term sheet, *see supra* ¶ 16(l), and its demand letter and notice of default, *see supra* ¶ 16(q), to Subject Premises-1. Accordingly, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's negotiations with Sterling. Some of those records—such as records relating to a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]—were concealed from Sterling and cannot be obtained via subpoena to Sterling. Additionally, even where documents were sent to Cohen by Sterling (and therefore are available from Sterling via subpoena), the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to Cohen's possession or knowledge of the documents.

c. From my review of records maintained by First Republic, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing addresses for the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(e). Accordingly, it is likely that Subject

Premises-1 contains records relating to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account, including, among other things, account opening documents, bank statements, documents provided as part of the know-your-customer process, any notes made by Cohen when he was opening the accounts, wire transfer records, and canceled checks. Even where these records can be obtained from First Republic, the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts, or his knowledge of transactions or the existence of funds in accounts.

d. Based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, TD Bank, Morgan Stanley, City National Bank, Signature Bank, and Bethpage Credit Union, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing for his accounts at each of these financial institutions. Accordingly, it is likely that Subject Premises-1 contains records relating to these accounts, including, among other things, bank statements that list account balances. The existence of these records in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts and his knowledge of the balances in these accounts.

e. Additionally, Cohen may have records of other bank accounts or assets that were not disclosed to Sterling and are not presently known by law enforcement. For example, as described above, Cohen has received interest income since 2015 that he has not disclosed to Sterling or paid taxes on. Also, on Cohen's August 2014 Financial Statement, *see supra* ¶ 16(e), he disclosed \$10,000,000 in "investments in overseas entities."³⁰ The value of these investments was omitted from subsequent financial statements. However, for the reasons outlined above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen omitted the value of those investments from his 2017

³⁰ Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that Cohen told Sterling Employee-3 that the reference to "investments in overseas entities" on his 2014 Financial Statement was to serve merely as a "placeholder" for potential future investments.

financial statements in order to understate his assets. As Subject Premises-1 is Cohen's primary residence and he uses Subject Premises-1 as the mailing address for bank records, there is probable cause to believe that account statements for unknown bank accounts or assets concealed from Sterling are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T and produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to AT&T for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from AT&T. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-1 for at least one consulting arrangement involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 may contain records of other consulting arrangements that Cohen, through Essential Consultants, has with other individuals or entities.

g. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that [REDACTED] accounting firm sent documents to Subject Premises-1 and used the address for Subject Premises-1 as the address listed on Cohen's personal and corporate tax returns. *See supra* ¶ 16(n). For instance, on or about October 6, 2017, an employee at [REDACTED] accounting firm emailed Cohen that she had sent Cohen's September 2017 Financial Statement by FedEx to Cohen's attention. Accordingly, Cohen's tax records are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

h. Based on my review of bank records and publicly-available documents, I know that

[REDACTED]



i. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, I know that Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account. Based on my review of location records provided by Apple pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, I know that electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 to, among other things, place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 contains electronic devices, including certain Apple products, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

j. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I understand that Subject Premises-1 recently sustained water damage to certain parts of the premises, and that Cohen has engaged contractors to perform certain remediation work on the premises. In addition, as set forth above, I believe that Cohen and his family are temporarily residing at Subject Premises-4 in the Loew's Regency Hotel, which is approximately two blocks from Subject Premises-1. However, based on my review of a work order sent to Cohen's email by a contractor, I understand that the first phase of the work order called for the contractor to "Pack & Remove all items & furnishings in Living Room, Kitchen, Sons Room & Dining Room" and store them off-site. In addition, based on my review of drawings sent to Cohen by the contractor, it appears that the work is primarily being done in these rooms. Thus, I believe that the construction – to the extent it is still ongoing – would not necessarily have caused Cohen to move

all documents or evidence responsive to the warrant out of Subject Premises-1, because it does not appear that work is being done to the portion of Subject Premises-1, such as a home office or Cohen's own room, where such documents or evidence would most likely be found.³¹

48. Second, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen uses Subject Premises-2 as office space, and also that Subject Premises-2 contains certain electronic devices. Specifically, from my review of the "strategic alliance agreement" between Squire Patton Boggs and Cohen, and my review of the press release on Squire Patton Boggs's website, I know that Cohen has an office at Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(d), 19(e). Indeed, I have learned that pursuant to Cohen's agreement with the law firm, he has "dedicated and segregated office space" in Squire Patton Boggs's offices on the 23rd floor of 30 Rockefeller Plaza, and that the space is "physically separate" from the firm's offices and has "locked doors and its own locked file cabinets." *See supra* ¶ 19(e). Additionally, I know that under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to "arrange for [his] own computer server system that is not connected to [Squire Patton Boggs's] computer network system." I know from my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] who met Cohen at Subject Premises-2 in 2017, that Subject Premises-2 is an office with a door, it appears to be used only by Cohen, and it contains, among other things, a computer and paper files. According to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] saw Cohen at Subject Premises-2, he had two cellular telephones in Subject Premises-2. I also know from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen uses the address for Subject Premises-2 in the signature block

³¹ As noted below, based on my training and experience, I believe that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring some items with them, such as portable electronic devices or sensitive items, meaning that Cohen has likely taken some evidence from Subject Premises-1 to Subject Premises-4. Nevertheless, given the temporary nature of Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 and the scope of the work being done at Subject Premises-1, I believe it is unlikely that Cohen has taken *all* evidence that would be subject to seizure out of Subject Premises-1.

on his emails. Based on my review of notes of a call between Cohen and First Republic Employee-2 (which notes were taken by another First Republic employee, who was participating in the call and taking notes), I know that, on or about November 15, 2017, Cohen told First Republic Employee-2 that he had a new office at 30 Rock. Moreover, I know from an article in *Vanity Fair* published on or about February 14, 2018, that Cohen was interviewed by the magazine in Subject Premises-2 in or about February 2018.

49. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, when Cohen was emailing with Sterling Employee-3 in 2018 about a modification to his existing loan from Sterling, Cohen listed his address in his email as the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(t), 16(u). Accordingly, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's loan modification negotiations with Sterling.

b. Based on my review of records obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to KAI and BTA for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 19(a), 19(b). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from KAI and BTA, among other entities with which Cohen had a consulting arrangement. Additionally, based on my review of emails sent in 2018 that were obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen continues to enter into consulting arrangements through Essential Consultants, and agreements

relating to those arrangements indicate that Essential Consultants is located at Subject Premises-2. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-2 for multiple consulting arrangements involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 may contain records of other unknown consulting arrangements that Cohen has with other individuals or entities.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, as well as my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that [REDACTED] visited Subject Premises-2 to meet with Cohen about his taxes. *See supra* ¶ 20(a). At that meeting, [REDACTED] discussed with Cohen whether Cohen should disclose Essential Consultants on his personal financial statement to banks. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence relating to Cohen's taxes, or notes of his conversation with [REDACTED]. Moreover, the fact that Cohen used Subject Premises-2 for a meeting regarding his personal financial matters provides probable cause to believe that documents and information regarding his finances will be found in Subject Premises-2.

d. Based on my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that Cohen maintains a computer in Subject Premises-2. From my review of IP data produced pursuant to a subpoena and pen register to Google, it appears that Cohen is logging into his Gmail account from Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 contains electronic devices, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

e. Based upon my training and experience, I have learned that individuals who maintain businesses typically keep records relating to the business—such as contracts with clients and records of payments—at the business' identified location. I am not aware of any addresses

associated with Essential Consultants other than Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2 will contain business records for Essential Consultants.

50. Third, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. In particular:

a. As noted above, Cohen has two bank accounts at TD Bank. In or about November 2017, as Cohen was receiving substantial income from consulting work—which he did not disclose to Sterling—Cohen opened the safety deposit box at TD Bank, which is Subject Premises-3. In light of the aforementioned evidence that Cohen conceals assets, including assets at TD Bank, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains financial assets, objects of value and/or documents relating to such assets or objects of value that Cohen likely did not disclose to Sterling. Indeed, based on my training and experience, I am aware that people often conceal valuable items in safety deposit boxes. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 will contain evidence of the Bank Fraud Offenses.





51. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and cell phone location information, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4. *See supra* ¶¶ 3(d). There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4 contains instrumentalities and evidence of the Subject Offenses, including, the following:



³³ As noted above, Subject Premises-3 is approximately five inches by ten inches. Accordingly, I do not believe that it would fit a large volume of hard copy documents; however, a small number of hard-copy documents, or a large volume of documents contained on a flash drive or other portable storage device, would fit in Subject Premises-3.

b. As described above, at the time Cohen moved to Subject Premises-4, he was also in the midst of ongoing negotiations with Sterling regarding the refinancing of his medallion debts. For example, on January 30, 2018, Cohen had a lengthy phone call with Sterling Employee-3 about his finances and the proposed restructuring, and on February 1, 2018, Cohen sent an email to Sterling Employee-3 claiming that he did not have more than \$1.25 million in cash. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(u). Thus, there is probable cause that Cohen took at least some documents and evidence relating to his ongoing negotiations with Sterling with him to Subject Premises-4, in order to reference and consult them in connection with these negotiations.

c. As described above, Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account, and these electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 – Cohens' permanent residence – to place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. *See supra* ¶¶ 47(i). Although Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 is temporary, based on my training and experience I know that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring portable electronic devices with them, such as cellular phones, tablets, or laptops. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, where Cohen currently appears to be residing, contains electronic devices, including Subject Device-1, Subject Device-2, and/or certain Apple products, that for the reasons discussed herein are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

d. Moreover, as set forth above, based on cellphone location information I know that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 were in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4 as recently as this morning (April 8, 2018). As set forth above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen used the Subject Devices in furtherance of the Subject Offenses, including to communicate with Sterling employees regarding the medallion transaction, with First Republic employees regarding

the Essential Consultants Account, with his accountant regarding his finances, and with

52. Although Cohen appears to be residing currently in Subject Premises-4, it is unknown whether Cohen will be physically present within Subject Premises-4 at the moment the warrant sought herein are executed. If Cohen is within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 – his cellphones – will likely also be within Subject Premises-4. If Cohen is not within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, the devices will likely be on his person, wherever he is located (which, based on location data for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 as recently as today, is likely to be in the Southern District of New York). As such, this warrant seeks separate authority to seize Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, in the event that those devices are not located within Subject Premises-4 (or another Subject Premises) at the moment the warrants sought herein are executed.

D. Probable Cause Justifying Search of ESI

53. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and Subject Premises-4 contain electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses (and, as set forth above, that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 are themselves electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses). Specifically, based on my review of information produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, the iCloud Warrant, and subpoenas, as well as pen register data, I submit that there is probable cause that Subject Premises-1 contains an Apple iPad Mini, a MacBook Pro, and has, at various times, contained Apple cellphones; similarly, there is probable cause that Subject Premises-2 contains a computer and has, at various times, contained Apple

cellphones. These devices are likely to include evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses for the following reasons:

a. As described throughout this affidavit, Cohen used email to send and receive communications related to the Subject Offenses. In particular, Cohen used email to send and receive communications with Sterling, First Republic, [REDACTED] the entities to which he is providing consulting services [REDACTED] among others. While some of these emails have already been obtained via subpoenas and search warrants, I know from my training and experience that individuals can and do delete emails from their Internet-based inboxes but retain copies of those emails on their hard drives. I also know that individuals often have multiple email accounts, some of which may not be known to law enforcement, and as a result electronic devices can be a unique repository of all emails relevant to certain Subject Offenses. Indeed, from my involvement in this investigation, I know that Cohen had an email account with the Trump Organization, but the USAO and FBI have not been able to obtain the contents of that account to date. Thus, emails relevant to the Subject Offenses are likely stored on electronic devices in Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and/or Subject Premises-4.

b. Additionally, Subject Premises-1, Subject Premise-2 and Subject Premises-4 likely contain electronic copies of documents relevant to the Subject Offenses. Indeed, I know from my training and experience that individuals often retain copies of important documents on their computers or other electronic devices capable of storing information, including cellphones (such as the Subject Devices) and tablets. Here, there are a number of documents that Cohen has likely retained that will be relevant to the Subject Offenses. For example, electronic devices may include documentation of Cohen's true net worth, a listing of his assets, an accounting of his available

cash, consulting agreements with third parties, and [REDACTED] among other evidence of the Subject Offenses.

c. Third, I know from my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen set up online banking with First Republic. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who set up online banking often receive electronic notices concerning financial transactions and, on occasion, save records of their financial transactions to their devices. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's electronic devices contain evidence of banking activity, including the existence of bank accounts or assets that Cohen did not disclose to Sterling or Melrose.

d. Fourth, from my review of records produced by Apple, I know that Cohen communicates using text message as well as encrypted communications applications. These applications that Cohen has downloaded onto a phone include, but are not limited to, WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust. I know from my review of toll records and text messages that, in particular, Cohen communicated with [REDACTED] using these encrypted applications. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's cellphones – the Subject Devices – will contain encrypted messages that are not otherwise accessible relating to the Subject Offenses.

54. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who engage in financial crimes commonly use computers to communicate with co-conspirators, keep financial ledgers, and retain fraudulent documents. As a result, they often store data on their computers related to their illegal activity, which can include logs of online or cellphone-based "chats" with co-conspirators; email correspondence; contact information of co-conspirators, including telephone numbers, email addresses, and identifiers for instant messaging and social media accounts; bank account numbers; and/or records of uses of funds.

55. Based on my training and experience, I also know that, where computers are used in furtherance of criminal activity, evidence of the criminal activity can often be found months or even years after it occurred. This is typically true because:

- Electronic files can be stored on a hard drive for years at little or no cost and users thus have little incentive to delete data that may be useful to consult in the future.
- Even when a user does choose to delete data, the data can often be recovered months or years later with the appropriate forensic tools. When a file is “deleted” on a home computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear, but instead remains on the hard drive, in “slack space,” until it is overwritten by new data that cannot be stored elsewhere on the computer. Similarly, files that have been viewed on the Internet are generally downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache,” which is only overwritten as the “cache” fills up and is replaced with more recently viewed Internet pages. Thus, the ability to retrieve from a hard drive or other electronic storage media depends less on when the file was created or viewed than on a particular user’s operating system, storage capacity, and computer habits.
- In the event that a user changes computers, the user will typically transfer files from the old computer to the new computer, so as not to lose data. In addition, users often keep backups of their data on electronic storage media such as thumb drives, flash memory cards, CD-ROMs, or portable hard drives.

56. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that Cohen engaged in the Subject Offenses, and that evidence of this criminal activity is likely to be found in the Subject Premises, on computers and electronic media found in the Subject Premises, and on the Subject Devices. In particular, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to the proposed warrants, including the following:

- a. Evidence necessary to establish the occupancy or ownership of the Subject Premises, including without limitation, utility and telephone bills, mail envelopes, addressed correspondence, bank statements, identification documents, and keys.
- b. Evidence relating to Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

d. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

e. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

f. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

g. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records.

h. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen.





p. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

q. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

r. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

III. Procedures for Searching ESI

A. Execution of Warrant for ESI

57. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) provides that a warrant to search for and seize property "may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or

copying of electronically stored information . . . for later review.” Consistent with Rule 41, this application requests authorization to seize any computer devices and storage media and transport them to an appropriate law enforcement facility for review. This is typically necessary for a number of reasons:

- First, the volume of data on computer devices and storage media is often impractical for law enforcement personnel to review in its entirety at the search location.
- Second, because computer data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, computer devices are ideally examined in a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, where trained personnel, using specialized software, can make a forensic copy of the storage media that can be subsequently reviewed in a manner that does not change the underlying data.
- Third, there are so many types of computer hardware and software in use today that it can be impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized personnel and equipment potentially required to safely access the underlying computer data.
- Fourth, many factors can complicate and prolong recovery of data from a computer device, including the increasingly common use of passwords, encryption, or other features or configurations designed to protect or conceal data on the computer, which often take considerable time and resources for forensic personnel to detect and resolve.

58. As discussed herein, Squire Patton Boggs is a functioning law firm that conducts legitimate business unrelated to Cohen’s commission of the Subject Offenses. Subject Premises-2 is an office located inside of Squire Patton Boggs’s New York office. In order to execute the warrant in the most reasonable fashion, law enforcement personnel will attempt to investigate on the scene of what computers or storage media, if any, must be seized or copied, and what computers or storage media need not be seized or copied. Law enforcement personnel will speak with Squire Patton Boggs personnel on the scene as may be appropriate to determine which files and electronic devices within Subject Premises-2 belong to or were used by Cohen. While, based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Cohen shared electronic devices or a server with Squire Patton Boggs, where appropriate, law enforcement personnel will copy data, rather than physically seize

computers, to reduce the extent of any disruption of Squire Patton Boggs's operations. If, after inspecting the seized computers off-site, it is determined that some or all of this equipment is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the evidence, the Government will return it.

59. Additionally, because Cohen is an attorney, and claims to serve as a personal attorney for Trump, the review of evidence seized from the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

B. Accessing ESI on the Subject Devices

60. As described above, the Subject Devices are both Apple brand devices.

61. I know from my training and experience, as well as from information found in publicly available materials including those published by Apple, that some models of Apple devices such as iPhones and iPads offer their users the ability to unlock the device via the use of a fingerprint or thumbprint (collectively, "fingerprint") in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Touch ID. I also know that the Apple iPhone X offers its users the ability to unlock the device via the use of facial recognition (through infrared and visible light scans) in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Face ID.

62. If a user enables Touch ID on a given Apple device, he or she can register up to 5 fingerprints that can be used to unlock that device. The user can then use any of the registered

fingerprints to unlock the device by pressing the relevant finger(s) to the device's Touch ID sensor, which is found in the round button (often referred to as the "home" button) found at the bottom center of the front of the device. If a user enables Face ID on a given Apple device, he or she can unlock the device by raising the iPhone to his or her face, or tapping the screen. In my training and experience, users of Apple devices that offer Touch ID or Face ID often enable it because it is considered to be a more convenient way to unlock the device than by entering a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password, as well as a more secure way to protect the device's contents.

63. In some circumstances, Touch ID or Face ID cannot be used to unlock a device that has either security feature enabled, and a passcode or password must be used instead. These circumstances include: (1) when the device has just been turned on or restarted; (2) when more than 48 hours has passed since the last time the device was unlocked; (3) when the passcode or password has not been entered in the last 6 days, and the device has not been unlocked via Touch ID in the last 8 hours or the device has not been unlocked via Face ID in the last 4 hours; (4) the device has received a remote lock command; or (5) five unsuccessful attempts to unlock the device via Touch ID or Face ID are made.

64. The passcodes or passwords that would unlock the Subject Devices are not known to law enforcement. Thus, it will likely be necessary to press the fingers of the user of the Subject Devices to the devices' Touch ID sensor, or hold the Subject Devices in front of the user's face to activate the Face ID sensor, in an attempt to unlock the devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant. Attempting to unlock the relevant Apple devices via Touch ID with the use of the fingerprints of the user, or via Face ID by holding the device in front of the user's face, is necessary because the government may not otherwise be able to access the data contained on those devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant.

65. Based on these facts and my training and experience, it is likely that Cohen is the user of the Subject Devices, and thus that his fingerprints are among those that are able to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or his face is able to unlock the Subject Devices via Face ID.

66. Although I do not know which of a given user's 10 fingerprints is capable of unlocking a particular device, based on my training and experience I know that it is common for a user to unlock a Touch ID-enabled Apple device via the fingerprints on thumbs or index fingers. In the event that law enforcement is unable to unlock the Subject Devices as described above within the five attempts permitted by Touch ID, this will simply result in the device requiring the entry of a password or passcode before it can be unlocked.

67. I also know from my training and experience, and my review of publicly available materials published by Apple that Apple brand devices, such as the Subject Devices, have a feature that allows a user to erase the contents of the device remotely. By logging into the Internet, the user or any other individual who possesses the user's account information can take steps to completely wipe the contents of the device, thereby destroying evidence of criminal conduct, along with any other information on the device. The only means to prevent this action is to disable the device's ability to connect to the Internet immediately upon seizure, which requires either access to the device itself to alter the settings, or the use of specialized equipment that is not consistently available to law enforcement agents at every arrest.

68. Due to the foregoing, I request that the Court authorize law enforcement to press the fingers (including thumbs) of Cohen to the Touch ID sensors the Subject Devices, or hold the Subject Devices in front of Cohen's face, for the purpose of attempting to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or Face ID in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant.

C. Review of ESI

69. Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

70. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to determine which files or other ESI contain evidence or fruits of the Subject Offenses. Such techniques may include, for example:

- surveying directories or folders and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- conducting a file-by-file review by “opening” or reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents (analogous to performing a cursory examination of each document in a file cabinet to determine its relevance);
- “scanning” storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted data or deliberately hidden files; and
- performing electronic keyword searches through all electronic storage areas to determine the existence and location of data potentially related to the subject matter of the investigation³⁴; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

³⁴ Keyword searches alone are typically inadequate to detect all relevant data. For one thing, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files, such as images and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, there may be information properly subject to seizure but that is not captured by a keyword search because the information does not contain the keywords being searched.

71. Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to restrict their search to data falling within the categories of evidence specified in the warrant. Depending on the circumstances, however, law enforcement personnel may need to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

D. Return of ESI

72. If the Government determines that the electronic devices are no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data, and the devices themselves are not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return these items, upon request. Computer data that is encrypted or unreadable will not be returned unless law enforcement personnel have determined that the data is not (i) an instrumentality of the offense, (ii) a fruit of the criminal activity, (iii) contraband, (iv) otherwise unlawfully possessed, or (v) evidence of the Subject Offenses.

IV. Conclusion and Ancillary Provisions

73. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrants.

74. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



FBI

Sworn to before me on
8th day of April, 2018

/s/ Henry B. Pitman
HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-1

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-1”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] of the building.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.
- f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-2

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-2”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

An office belonging to or assigned to Michael Cohen located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112, inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.
- f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

_____ and any payments by _____ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including _____ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, any desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone belonging to Michael Cohen

or in his possession, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT C

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-3

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-3”) are described as follows, and include all locked and closed containers found therein:


A safe deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, marked as box # [REDACTED]. The safe deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-3 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

1. Evidence relating to Michael Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, assets, monthly and annual income, and income sources, from January 1, 2013 to the present

- 
9. Any portable electronic storage device.

B. Search of Seized Electronic Devices

Probable cause exists to search any seized electronic storage device for the items set forth in Section II(A)(1)-(8), above.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any electronic storage device, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect

any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT D

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.
- f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

██████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT E

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-1

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-1”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-1, or hold Subject Device-1 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-1 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-1 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-1 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-1, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ATTACHMENT F

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-2

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-2”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-2, or hold Subject Device-2 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-2 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



contribution reporting requirements, and campaign contribution limits.

o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-2 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-2 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-2, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

502 Park Avenue, Apartment [redacted] New York, New York 10022, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A

Case No. 18 MAG 2969

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): 502 Park Avenue, Apartment [redacted] New York, New York 10022, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court.

USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for [] days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of []

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 2:54 PM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Executing officer's signature</i></p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Printed name and title</i></p>	

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-1

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-1”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] of the building.

II. Items to Be Seized

~~A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses~~

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

████████████████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address)) Case No.
502 Park Avenue, Apartment [redacted] New York, New York)
10022, and any closed containers/items contained)
therein, See Attachment A)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
502 Park Avenue, Apartment [redacted] New York, New York 10022, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):
See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for [] days (not to exceed 30). [] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of []

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54p.m. /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Executing officer's signature</i></p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Printed name and title</i></p>	

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-1

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-1”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] of the building.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

████████████████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-1 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

18 MAG 2969

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

Case No.

Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment B

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment B

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[X] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 PM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT B

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-2

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-2”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

An office belonging to or assigned to Michael Cohen located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112, inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

██████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, any desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone belonging to Michael Cohen

or in his possession, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Case No.

Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd)
Floor, New York, New York 10112, and any closed)
containers/items contained therein, See Attachment B)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment B

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 pm [s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Executing officer's signature</i></p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Printed name and title</i></p>	

ATTACHMENT B

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-2

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-2”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

An office belonging to or assigned to Michael Cohen located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112, inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

████████████████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, any desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone belonging to Michael Cohen

or in his possession, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-2 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.

2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

Case No.

B)

Safe Deposit Box located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Att. C

18 MAG 2969

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

Safe Deposit Box located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment C

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment C

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-8-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 AM

J. Henry Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Executing officer's signature</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Printed name and title</i></p>	

ATTACHMENT C

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-3

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-3”) are described as follows, and include all locked and closed containers found therein:

A safe deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, marked as box [REDACTED]. The safe deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.


II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-3 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

1. Evidence relating to Michael Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, assets, monthly and annual income, and income sources, from January 1, 2013 to the present.



- 
9. Any portable electronic storage device.

B. Search of Seized Electronic Devices

Probable cause exists to search any seized electronic storage device for the items set forth in Section II(A)(1)-(8), above.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any electronic storage device, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect

any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Case No.

Safe Deposit Box: [redacted] Located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Att. C

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
Safe Deposit Box: [redacted] Located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment C

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment C

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 p.m. /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Executing officer's signature</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Printed name and title</i></p>	

ATTACHMENT C

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-3

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-3”) are described as follows, and include all locked and closed containers found therein:

A safe deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, marked as box [REDACTED]. The safe deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.


II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-3 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

1. Evidence relating to Michael Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, assets, monthly and annual income, and income sources, from January 1, 2013 to the present.



- 
9. Any portable electronic storage device.

B. Search of Seized Electronic Devices

Probable cause exists to search any seized electronic storage device for the items set forth in Section II(A)(1)-(8), above.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any electronic storage device, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect

any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

) Case No. 18 MAG 2969

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York

(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment D

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-8-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 PM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT D

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and any payments by [REDACTED] Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Case No.

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728,)
New York, New York 10065, and any closed)
containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment D

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:59 p.m. /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT D

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted] See Attachment E

Case No. 18 MAG 2969

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted], See Attachment E

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment E

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for [] days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of []

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 PM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

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Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<div style="text-align: center;"> _____ <i>Executing officer's signature</i> </div>	
	<div style="text-align: center;"> _____ <i>Printed name and title</i> </div>	

ATTACHMENT E

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-1

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-1”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-1, or hold Subject Device-1 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-1 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-1 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-1 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-1, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Case No.

An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted])
See Attachment E)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted], See Attachment E

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment E

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 p.m. /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT E

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-1

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-1”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-1, or hold Subject Device-1 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-1 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED], and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances; from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-1 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-1 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-1, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted] See Attachment F

) Case No. 18 MAG 2969

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

E)

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted] See Attachment F

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment F

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for [] days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of []

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54 PM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT F

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-2

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-2”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-2, or hold Subject Device-2 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-2 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-2 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-2 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-2, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Case No.

An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted])
See Attachment F [redacted])

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): An Apple iPhone with Phone Number [redacted] See Attachment F

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment F

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:54pm /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.</p>		
Date: _____	<p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Executing officer's signature</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Printed name and title</i></p>	

ATTACHMENT F

I. Device Subject to Search and Seizure – Subject Device-2

The device that is the subject of this search and seizure warrant (“Subject Device-2”) is described as follows:

An Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number [REDACTED]

During the execution of this search warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to depress the fingerprints and/or thumbprints of Michael Cohen onto the Touch ID sensor of Subject Device-2, or hold Subject Device-2 in front of Cohen’s face to activate the Face ID sensor, in order to gain access to the contents of any such device as authorized by this warrant.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Device

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on Subject Device-2 for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”) described as follows:

- a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.
- b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.
- c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.
- d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.
- e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents or communications that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

If the Government determines that Subject Device-2 is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data on the device, and that Subject Device-2 is not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return Subject Device-2, upon request.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of
*(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)*

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room
1628

18 MAG 2968
Case No.

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property *(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location)*:

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628, a Suite that Encompasses Rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630 New York, New York 10065

located in the Southern District of New York, there is now concealed *(identify the person or describe the property to be seized)*:

See Attached Affidavit and its Attachment A

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is *(check one or more)*:

- evidence of a crime;
- contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
- property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
- a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

<i>Code Section(s)</i>	<i>Offense Description(s)</i>
18 USC 371, 1005, 1014, 1343, 1344; 52 USC 30116 and 30109	Conspiracy, false bank entries, false statements to a financial institution, wire fraud, bank fraud, and illegal campaign contributions

The application is based on these facts:

See Attached Affidavit and its Attachment A

- Continued on the attached sheet.
- Delayed notice of 30 days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: _____) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.



Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: 4/9/18

City and state: New York, NY

Henry Pitman
Judge's signature

Honorable Henry Pitman
Printed name and title


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for a Search and Seizure Warrant for the Premises Known and Described as Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628, a Suite that Encompasses Rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630 New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein
Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for Search and Seizure
Warrant**


SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

 Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,

deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant



2. On or about April 8, 2018, the Honorable Henry B. Pitman, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a search and seizure warrant for the premises known and described as Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein. The warrant and my supporting affidavit (the "Affidavit") are appended hereto. The Affidavit is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety as Exhibit A.

3. On or about April 9, 2018, based upon a conversation with another law enforcement agent who spoke to an employee of Loews Regency Hotel, I learned that Michael Cohen is in fact staying in Room 1628 (in a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, "Room 1628"), not Room 1728. Accordingly, I respectfully submit the attached amended warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the following Subject Premises: Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein ("Subject Premises-4"). For the reasons detailed in the Affidavit and herein, I believe that there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4 contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the "Bank Fraud Offenses"), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Campaign Finance Offenses"), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses) (collectively, the "Subject Offenses").

4. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachment A to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrant.

5. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



Special Agent
FBI

Sworn to before me on *BY TELEPHONE*
9th day of April, 2018


HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1628 (a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, “Room 1628”), located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 16th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

██████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for a Search and Seizure Warrant for the Premises Known and Described as (1) 502 Park Avenue, [REDACTED] New York, New York 10022, (2) Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, (3) Safe Deposit Box # [REDACTED] Located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and (4) Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein, and the Electronic Devices Known and Described as (1) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED] and (2) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED].
Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for Search and Seizure
Warrant**

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

[REDACTED] Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,
deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant

[REDACTED]

2. I make this Affidavit in support of an application pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the premises specified below (the "Subject

Premises”) and the electronic devices specified below (the “Subject Devices”) for, and to seize, the items and information described in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge; my review of documents and other evidence; my conversations with other law enforcement personnel; and my training, experience and advice received concerning the use of electronic devices in criminal activity and the forensic analysis of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

B. The Subject Premises and Subject Devices

3. Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2, Subject Premises-3 and Subject Premises-4 (collectively, the “Subject Premises”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Premises-1 is Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] floor of the building. Based on my review of New York City property records, I have learned that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own Subject Premises-1.¹ Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-1 is Cohen’s full-time residence.

b. Subject Premises-2 is an office located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza

¹ As noted *infra*, I have learned that on or about October 28, 2015, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza. Subject Premises-2 is located on the 23rd floor of the building inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The office is assigned to Michael Cohen. As described below, Michael Cohen works and conducts meetings at Subject Premises-2.

c. Subject Premises-3 is a safety deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019. Based on my review of records maintained by TD Bank, I have learned that the safety deposit box is approximately five inches by ten inches in size, and is marked as box [REDACTED]. The safety deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.

d. Subject Premises-4 is Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to search warrants described below, I have learned that on or about January 5, 2018, Cohen received an email from an employee of Loews Regency, which included a price quote for a long-term stay suite based on a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, 2018.² On or about January 29, 2018, Cohen sent an email to a Loews Regency employee, stating, in pertinent part: "I just spoke to my wife and she has scheduled the move for Thursday. Please mark down that we will be taking possession on Thursday, February 1st." Based on my review of cell phone location data, I have learned that, over the past 24 hours, two cellular phones used by Cohen have been located in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4. In particular, on or about

² Although the quoted price contemplated a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, it appears that Cohen did not move in until February 1, and as of today, April 8, cellphone location information demonstrates that Cohen's cellular phones are in still in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4.

April 8, 2018, law enforcement agents using a “triggerfish” device identified Room 1728 as the room within the hotel in which the Subject Devices are most likely present.³

e. Therefore, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4.

4. Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 (collectively, the “Subject Devices”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Device-1 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

b. Subject Device-2 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

c. Based on my training, experience, and research, and from consulting the manufacturer’s and service providers’ advertisements and product technical specifications available online, I know that the Subject Devices have capabilities that allow them to, among other things: make and receive telephone calls; save and store contact information; send and receive

³ Based on my conversations with these agents, I understand that it is also possible that the Subject Devices are one floor below, in Room 1628. However, as noted, I understand that Cohen received a price quote for a long-term stay suite and is residing there with his family. Based on my conversations with FBI agents conducting surveillance, I understand that Room 1728 appears to be a suite, whereas Room 1628 appears to be a standard room.

emails and text messages; download and run mobile telephone applications, including encrypted call and messaging application such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust; take, send, and receive pictures and videos; save and store notes and passwords; and store documents.

C. The Subject Offenses

5. For the reasons detailed below, I believe that there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of ~~18 U.S.C. §§ 1005~~ (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Bank Fraud Offenses”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Campaign Finance Offenses”), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”).

D. Prior Applications

6. The FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAO”) have been investigating several courses of criminal conduct by Michael Cohen. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

7. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen Gmail Account") sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the "First Cohen Gmail Warrant").

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen iCloud Account" and the "Cohen iCloud Warrant").

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the "Second Cohen Gmail Warrant").

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the "Cohen MDCPC Account") sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account⁴ and November 13, 2017 (the "First Cohen MDCPC Warrant").

8. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI's New York Field Office. As part of that referral, on or about February 8, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and Cohen MDCPC Warrant. On or about March 7, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO

⁴ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.

with all non-privileged content obtained pursuant to the Cohen iCloud Warrant.⁵ A filter team working with the SCO had previously reviewed the content produced pursuant to these warrants for privilege.

9. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained search warrants for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account and the Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and the “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”). The content produced pursuant to these warrants is subject to an ongoing review for privilege by an SDNY filter team.⁶

10. The emails search warrants described above are referred to collectively as the “Cohen Email Warrants.”

11. On or about April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained a warrant for prospective and historical cellphone location information for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2. On or about April 8, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained authority to employ an electronic technique, commonly known as a “triggerfish,” to determine the location of Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2.

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview

12. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, schemes by Target Subject Michael Cohen (a) to defraud multiple banks from in or about 2016 up to and including the present, and (b) to make an illegal

⁵ The SCO had previously provided a subset of this non-privileged content on or about February 2, 2018.

⁶ On or about February 28, 2018 and April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained Rule 41 search warrants authorizing the search of emails and content obtained pursuant to previously issued warrants for additional subject offenses.

campaign contribution in October 2016 to then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. As noted, Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

13. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally misrepresented his ability to pay cash by failing to disclose cash he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; (iii) failed to disclose tens of thousands of dollars he received in monthly interest income, and (iv) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, [REDACTED] in connection with [REDACTED] acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to fraudulently induce the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations and personal guarantees that Cohen and his wife had signed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Cohen Email Warrants, information obtained pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, as well as my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen has used the Subject Premises to (a) receive documents related to the transaction intended to relieve Cohen of his taxi medallion debt, (b) receive documents and/or conduct meetings related to his consulting work, (c) receive documents and/or conduct meetings relating to his finances and assets, some of which, as noted above and as detailed further herein, he has concealed from the banks in connection with the refinancing of his taxi medallion debt, (d) [REDACTED] and (e) house and operate electronic devices that were utilized in connection with, among other things, the taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's consulting work, and [REDACTED]. Specifically, as described below, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED], as well as electronic devices containing such evidence, all of which constitute or contain evidence of the Subject Offenses. Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's consulting work, his finances, and [REDACTED] as well as electronic devices containing such evidence. Subject Premises-3, as described below, likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's assets and finances, including assets that may not have been disclosed to banks in connection with the refinancing of Cohen's taxi medallion debt or documents relating to such assets, and documents or evidence related to [REDACTED]. Subject Premises-4 likely contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which themselves contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, including concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED]. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Probable Cause Regarding Subjects' Commission of the Subject Offenses⁷

The Bank Fraud Scheme

(i) Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

16. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through LLCs controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling National Bank ("Sterling") and the Melrose Credit Union ("Melrose"), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions lost value, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash and income, among other things. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my participation in interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the "Sterling Employee-1") and two other

⁷ In the following recitation of probable cause, I frequently refer to phone calls or text messages involving Cohen. The text messages described herein as sent or received by Cohen were all sent or received from the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2. The vast majority of the phone calls described herein made or received by Cohen were made or received by the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2, although in certain limited instances Cohen used a landline or other phone.

Sterling employees (“Sterling Employee-2” and “Sterling Employee-3”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).⁸ Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to make his monthly loan payments to Capital One.

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount

⁸ One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion-LLCs entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the LLC. The address listed for each of the LLCs was the address for Subject Premises-1. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. The personal guaranty agreements stated that the LLCs had offices at the address for Subject Premises-1, and contained a notice provision that stated that any notices required by the agreements should be mailed to Subject Premises-1. In total, Sterling agreed to lend approximately \$22 million to the Cohens’ companies.

d. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of Cohen’s taxi medallion debt to Melrose.⁹

⁹ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).

e. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.¹⁰ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8,

¹⁰ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen’s statements, his personal financial information “indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments.” Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen’s monthly payments.

g. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks.¹¹ According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen’s representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by, among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

h. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to

¹¹ Based on my review of property records, I know that on or about October 28, 2015, around the time period when Sterling raised the possibility of Cohen posting his personal residence—Subject Premises-1—as collateral, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallion entities to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent by Cohen to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

i. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 told [REDACTED] that Melrose had agreed to the deal in principle, and that Sterling would be sending the parties a term sheet shortly.

j. In order for the banks to conduct diligence and evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about June 7, 2017, Sterling

Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an “updated personal financial statement,” completed jointly with Cohen’s wife, and Cohen’s most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the “May 2017 Financial Statement”) that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen’s accountant, [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen’s assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.¹²

k. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about specific line items on the financial statement, including the cash amount, value of medallions, and total liabilities. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

l. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen and [REDACTED] [REDACTED], attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between

¹² Based on my review of Cohen’s financial statements, I know that the precipitous decline in assets from his 2014 financial statement to his 2017 financial statements can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen’s real estate assets and medallion investments.

Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. The term sheet included a cover letter addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. The parties negotiated the provisions of the term sheet and, on or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] and Cohen a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

m. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789, respectively, in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

n. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling

required and requested additional financial statements and tax returns for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about September 25, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his 2016 tax return. The tax return listed Cohen's mailing address as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

o. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED], Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000.¹³ Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (including the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),¹⁴ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first

¹³ Based on my review of Cohen's financial statements, I know that this further decline in assets can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen's real estate assets and medallion investments.

¹⁴ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

time, he indicated was held by a trust).¹⁵ The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

p. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—i.e., in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank — that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

q. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. The demand letter was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. The notice of default was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018,

¹⁵ Based on my review of property records maintained by the City of New York, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that in 2015, Cohen transferred his residence to a trust. He did not disclose that transaction to [REDACTED] or Sterling until in or about September 2017.

stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would “bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential.” Cohen also requested by email on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen’s debts have been satisfied and that Cohen’s personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

r. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, the [REDACTED] attorney emailed attorneys for Sterling and stated that “at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward.”

s. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen’s loans to Sterling Employee-3, who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, my review of telephone call notes taken by Sterling Employee-3, and my review of telephone records, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke several times to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or restructuring Cohen’s outstanding taxi medallion loans. On the calls, which in total lasted more than an hour, Cohen stated in sum and substance that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 to pay toward the medallion loans. On the call, in the course of reviewing the failed Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling Employee-3 questioned Cohen about the price [REDACTED] was to have paid for each medallion, and whether there was a side agreement between Cohen and [REDACTED]. Cohen denied that there was any side agreement with [REDACTED]

t. On or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to

\$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

u. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that since January 30, 2018, Sterling has continued to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position. In particular, according to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen and Sterling have an agreement in principal to restructure Cohen's loans based in part of Cohen's agreement to make a principal payment of approximately \$750,000, to make a payment of \$500,000 to become current on interest payments, and to post \$192,000 in cash collateral for his future monthly payments on the loan. Cohen also agreed to pledge an interest he had in a property. Sterling Employee-3 has stated that had Cohen indicated he had more than \$1,250,000 available to him, Sterling would have, among other things, negotiated for a larger reduction to the principal amount of the loan.

(ii) Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work

17. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple written and oral representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose¹⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen misled the bank by claiming he had insufficient liquidity to satisfy his obligations or meet the bank’s demands, while withholding information about these ongoing revenue streams and liquid financial assets at First Republic.

18. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with a First Republic sales manager (“First Republic Employee-1”) and a First Republic senior managing director (“First Republic Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

¹⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction.

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts at First Republic, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities. According to First Republic's know-your-customer records on Cohen,¹⁷ his primary physical address is the address for Subject Premises-1.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the "Essential Consultants Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for Essential Consultants LLC was the address for Subject Premises-1. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, First Republic Employee-1 conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form¹⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, as described below, the account was not intended to receive—and does not

¹⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

¹⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen's statements.

appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.

c. I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 into the Essential Consultants Account from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.

ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and February 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received eleven wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$1,099,780.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T sent \$100,000 to the

Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T sent \$600,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. ("KAI"). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a "monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017."

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about February 1, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$3,033,112.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23. Cohen's withdrawals from the Essential Consultants account reveal that it was used for largely personal purposes, including to pay, among other things, American Express bills and fees from "the Core Club," a private social club in New York.

d. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the "MDC&A Account").

Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for MDC&A Account was the address for Subject Premises-1. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. As noted above, Subject Premises-2 is located inside the New York office of Squire Patton Boggs. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction or the subsequent loan refinancing negotiations, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

19. Based on my review of emails that were seized pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration. Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Gmail Account, the Cohen MDCPC Account, and public sources, I have learned the following:

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a "Consulting Agreement" between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render "consulting and advisory services, as requested" by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants "a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand

(\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017. I have also reviewed invoices in amounts of \$150,000 that Cohen emailed to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. At the top of the invoices the address listed for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2.

b. On or about May 8, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with BTA Bank. The signature block on Cohen’s email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC” and provided the address for Subject Premises-2. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between BTA Bank and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 8, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services” to BTA Bank, and that BTA Bank would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand (\$1,800,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through monthly payments of \$150,000. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an employee of BTA Bank, and attached to the email an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants, with the address of Subject Premises-2. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about January 23, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a consulting agreement with AT&T, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-1. The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty

Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about March 1, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in equal monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. In or about February 2017, Cohen began negotiating the terms of a “strategic alliance” with Squire Patton Boggs. On or about March 4, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs emailed Cohen a “strategic alliance agreement.” Under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to generate business for the law firm, and Squire Patton Boggs agreed to pay to Cohen “an annual strategic alliance fee of \$500,000, payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments.” Squire Patton Boggs also agreed to provide Cohen with “dedicated and segregated office space in [Squire Patton Boggs’s] New York and Washington D.C. offices, which office space shall be physically separate from [Squire Patton Boggs’s] offices and have locked doors and its own locked file cabinets.” On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

20. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] (as noted above, Cohen's accountant at the time), my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] and my review of notes and [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at Subject Premises-2. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen in which [REDACTED] wrote that "[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017" and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any value associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: "[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates

POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[l]ooks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. In a letter dated October 6, 2017, addressed to [REDACTED], Cohen stated, “I have reviewed the attached statement of financial condition and find it to be correct and consistent with the representations that I made to your firm. The attached is an accurate reflection of my assets, liabilities and net worth (deficit) as of September 30, 2017.” Attached to that letter was the September 2017 Financial Statement, which, as noted above, was then transmitted to Sterling in connection with the proposed taxi medallion transaction between Sterling, Cohen, and [REDACTED]

21. Based on my review of a report of an interview with Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Cohen did not disclose his income stream from Essential Consultants to Sterling Employee-1 or, to his knowledge, anyone else at Sterling. According to Sterling Employee-1, knowledge of such an income stream would have affected Sterling’s demands during the negotiations, particularly with respect to the amount of a principal paydown of Cohen’s debt.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

22. In addition to withholding the existence of his Essential Consultants income from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September

2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. I also know that on or about January 30, 2018, in a telephone call with Sterling Employee-3, and on February 1, 2018, in an email to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen represented that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 in cash. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by forensic accountants, I have learned that Cohen had approximately \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Additionally, as of February 1, 2018, Cohen had approximately \$6,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had a total of \$1,389,245.78 in these accounts.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$1,284,996.13 in these accounts.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$261,517.55 in this account.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$3,332,992.95 in these accounts.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife. Cohen also has a safety deposit box at TD Bank—Subject Premises-3. The safety deposit box was opened on December 13, 2017 in the names of Michael and Laura Cohen.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$4,713,935.08 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, Sterling Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$6,268,732.59 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.¹⁹

23. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's written and oral representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or to its decision whether approve of the transfer of those loans to [REDACTED]

¹⁹ Based on my review of the account schedules described above, I know that, as of the date of this affidavit, the account balances for TD Bank have not yet been included in the schedule for either date and the account balances for Sterling National Bank and Bethpage Credit Union have not yet been included in the schedule for February 1, 2018. Thus, to the extent that these accounts have positive balances, Cohen's total balances in fact were even higher on these dates.

Cohen Has Unreported Interest Income

24. It appears that Cohen also hid from Sterling interest income that he was receiving in connection with a six million dollar loan he made to another individual. Specifically, I know from my review of the May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen did not disclose that he had made a note receivable in the amount of approximately \$6 million, or that he was earning approximately \$60,000 per month in interest income in connection with that loan. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were reviewed by another law enforcement agent, my review of property records and documents obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. Based on my review of property records, I have learned that on or about March 12, 2012, Cohen agreed to lend [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approximately \$2,000,000.²⁰ It appears that the promissory note was unsecured by any real property. On or about April 28, 2014, Cohen and [REDACTED] amended the promissory note, and restructured the loan to increase the principal amount to approximately \$5,000,000. Under the terms of the amended promissory note, the loan was secured by [REDACTED] apartment in [REDACTED], Florida. On or about April 8, 2015, Cohen and [REDACTED] restated the promissory note to increase the principal amount to \$6,000,000.²¹

b. Based on my review of a copy of the restated note, which was obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that under the terms of the amended and restated

²⁰ I learned from Getzel that [REDACTED]

²¹ The note states that the loan is to [REDACTED] husband and wife, jointly and severally. For ease of reference, I refer simply to "[REDACTED]" herein.

promissory note, Cohen's loan to [REDACTED] is an interest-only loan, and that the principal balance of the loan bears interest at an annual rate of 12.25 percent. I also know that the amended and restated promissory note includes a schedule of payments that require [REDACTED] to pay Cohen approximately \$61,250 per month beginning in April 2015 and ending in April 2019. The note also requires that [REDACTED] repay the principal balance of \$6,000,000 on April 28, 2019.

c. Based on my review of bank records, I have learned that, consistent with the terms of the amended and restated promissory note, [REDACTED] has made monthly payments of approximately \$61,250 since April 2015. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have learned that from April 2015 to October 2015, Cohen received checks from an entity called [REDACTED] totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank.²² It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is the owner of [REDACTED]. From my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have also learned that since October 2015, Cohen has received checks from an entity called [REDACTED] totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank. It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is also the owner of [REDACTED]. In total, it appears that Cohen receives approximately \$735,000 per year in interest payments from [REDACTED].

d. Based on my review of Cohen's May 2017 and September 2017 Financial Statements, my review of his 2015 and 2016 tax returns obtained via subpoena and from the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that Cohen did

²² In April 2015, Cohen received a pro-rated payment. For all months thereafter, the total payment equaled \$61,250, but [REDACTED] often made the payment in multiple checks.

not disclose this interest income he was receiving from [REDACTED] to Sterling or Melrose, or list it on his tax returns. I have also learned that while this interest income is taxable, Cohen did not tell [REDACTED]—his accountant—about the income, and [REDACTED] only learned about the income because he began doing [REDACTED] taxes in 2017.²³

25. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information relating to the interest income he is receiving from [REDACTED] in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan.

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

26. As set forth in detail below, during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED] Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side agreement he had negotiated with [REDACTED]. It appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately \$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and my participation in interviews with Sterling Employee-1, Sterling Employee-2, and Sterling Employee-3, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. The term sheet listed Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from

²³ Accordingly, this interest income—which should have been reported as such on Cohen's tax returns—is included herein in calculations of Cohen's true cash position.

Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED] including a \$3.8-million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

c. On or about January 30, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen whether Cohen had a side agreement with [REDACTED] to pay [REDACTED] a sum of money for entering into the medallion transaction. Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen about such an arrangement because, according to Sterling Employee-3, the price that [REDACTED] was paying for each medallion appeared to be well above the market price. Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he had no side agreement—and never had a side agreement—with [REDACTED].

27. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and my participation in an interview

with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."²⁴


b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.

28. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme



²⁴ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.








































C. Probable Cause Justifying Search of the Subject Premises and Subject Devices

45. Based on the foregoing, my review of records produced pursuant to subpoenas and the Cohen Email Warrants, and the iCloud Warrant, and my training and experience, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices have been used in furtherance of the Subject Offenses and are likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen permanently resides at Subject Premises-1 and, at least in part, works at both Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2, and that those locations contain evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and his [REDACTED]. Additionally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains evidence of Cohen's assets and [REDACTED]. Finally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, in which Cohen is temporarily residing, contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which, in turn, contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, such as evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and [REDACTED]

46. First, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen lives and operates his businesses, at least in part, at Subject Premises-1. Specifically, from my review of property records, I know that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own (in trust) Subject Premises-1. From my review of Cohen's tax returns, I know he lists his primary residence as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen routinely refers to Subject Premises-1 as his home. For example, on or about September 28, 2017 and October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed individuals that his home address is the address for Subject Premises-1. I also know from my review of emails that Cohen receives package delivery notifications that list Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. Cohen has also provided the address of Subject Premises-1 as the address for Essential Consultants and Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. For example, the certificates of incorporation and account opening documents at First Republic for both entities list their addresses as the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(d). The consulting agreement between Essential Consultants and AT&T also indicated the address for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c).

47. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, the address for all of Cohen's taxi medallion LLCs is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 16(c). Additionally, the medallion loan documents indicate that any mailings related to the loans should be sent to Subject Premises-1. *See id.* Based on my training and experience, as well as my review of public sources, I know that individuals keep records of properties and assets in which they have ownership interests. Accordingly, I submit that Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence of Cohen's ownership of the taxi medallion LLCs, the revenue that those medallions generate, and the transaction with Sterling in 2014 to re-finance the medallion loans that were then with Capital One Bank.

b. From my review of records maintained by Sterling, I also know that Sterling addressed documents relating to the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's attempts to modify the terms of the medallion loans to Subject Premises-1. For instance, Sterling addressed the transaction term sheet, *see supra* ¶ 16(l), and its demand letter and notice of default, *see supra* ¶ 16(q), to Subject Premises-1. Accordingly, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's negotiations with Sterling. Some of those records—such as records relating to a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]—were concealed from Sterling and cannot be obtained via subpoena to Sterling. Additionally, even where documents were sent to Cohen by Sterling (and therefore are available from Sterling via subpoena), the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to Cohen's possession or knowledge of the documents.

c. From my review of records maintained by First Republic, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing addresses for the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(e). Accordingly, it is likely that Subject

Premises-1 contains records relating to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account, including, among other things, account opening documents, bank statements, documents provided as part of the know-your-customer process, any notes made by Cohen when he was opening the accounts, wire transfer records, and canceled checks. Even where these records can be obtained from First Republic, the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts, or his knowledge of transactions or the existence of funds in accounts.

d. Based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, TD Bank, Morgan Stanley, City National Bank, Signature Bank, and Bethpage Credit Union, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing for his accounts at each of these financial institutions. Accordingly, it is likely that Subject Premises-1 contains records relating to these accounts, including, among other things, bank statements that list account balances. The existence of these records in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts and his knowledge of the balances in these accounts.

e. Additionally, Cohen may have records of other bank accounts or assets that were not disclosed to Sterling and are not presently known by law enforcement. For example, as described above, Cohen has received interest income since 2015 that he has not disclosed to Sterling or paid taxes on. Also, on Cohen's August 2014 Financial Statement, *see supra* ¶ 16(e), he disclosed \$10,000,000 in "investments in overseas entities."³⁰ The value of these investments was omitted from subsequent financial statements. However, for the reasons outlined above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen omitted the value of those investments from his 2017

³⁰ Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that Cohen told Sterling Employee-3 that the reference to "investments in overseas entities" on his 2014 Financial Statement was to serve merely as a "placeholder" for potential future investments.

financial statements in order to understate his assets. As Subject Premises-1 is Cohen's primary residence and he uses Subject Premises-1 as the mailing address for bank records, there is probable cause to believe that account statements for unknown bank accounts or assets concealed from Sterling are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T and produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to AT&T for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from AT&T. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-1 for at least one consulting arrangement involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 may contain records of other consulting arrangements that Cohen, through Essential Consultants, has with other individuals or entities.

g. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that [REDACTED] accounting firm sent documents to Subject Premises-1 and used the address for Subject Premises-1 as the address listed on Cohen's personal and corporate tax returns. *See supra* ¶ 16(n). For instance, on or about October 6, 2017, an employee at [REDACTED] accounting firm emailed Cohen that she had sent Cohen's September 2017 Financial Statement by FedEx to Cohen's attention. Accordingly, Cohen's tax records are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

h. Based on my review of bank records and publicly-available documents, I know that



i. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, I know that Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account. Based on my review of location records provided by Apple pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, I know that electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 to, among other things, place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 contains electronic devices, including certain Apple products, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

j. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I understand that Subject Premises-1 recently sustained water damage to certain parts of the premises, and that Cohen has engaged contractors to perform certain remediation work on the premises. In addition, as set forth above, I believe that Cohen and his family are temporarily residing at Subject Premises-4 in the Loew's Regency Hotel, which is approximately two blocks from Subject Premises-1. However, based on my review of a work order sent to Cohen's email by a contractor, I understand that the first phase of the work order called for the contractor to "Pack & Remove all items & furnishings in Living Room, Kitchen, Sons Room & Dining Room" and store them off-site. In addition, based on my review of drawings sent to Cohen by the contractor, it appears that the work is primarily being done in these rooms. Thus, I believe that the construction – to the extent it is still ongoing – would not necessarily have caused Cohen to move

all documents or evidence responsive to the warrant out of Subject Premises-1, because it does not appear that work is being done to the portion of Subject Premises-1, such as a home office or Cohen's own room, where such documents or evidence would most likely be found.³¹

48. Second, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen uses Subject Premises-2 as office space, and also that Subject Premises-2 contains certain electronic devices. Specifically, from my review of the "strategic alliance agreement" between Squire Patton Boggs and Cohen, and my review of the press release on Squire Patton Boggs's website, I know that Cohen has an office at Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(d), 19(e). Indeed, I have learned that pursuant to Cohen's agreement with the law firm, he has "dedicated and segregated office space" in Squire Patton Boggs's offices on the 23rd floor of 30 Rockefeller Plaza, and that the space is "physically separate" from the firm's offices and has "locked doors and its own locked file cabinets." *See supra* ¶ 19(e). Additionally, I know that under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to "arrange for [his] own computer server system that is not connected to [Squire Patton Boggs's] computer network system." I know from my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] who met Cohen at Subject Premises-2 in 2017, that Subject Premises-2 is an office with a door, it appears to be used only by Cohen, and it contains, among other things, a computer and paper files. According to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] saw Cohen at Subject Premises-2, he had two cellular telephones in Subject Premises-2. I also know from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen uses the address for Subject Premises-2 in the signature block

³¹ As noted below, based on my training and experience, I believe that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring some items with them, such as portable electronic devices or sensitive items, meaning that Cohen has likely taken some evidence from Subject Premises-1 to Subject Premises-4. Nevertheless, given the temporary nature of Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 and the scope of the work being done at Subject Premises-1, I believe it is unlikely that Cohen has taken *all* evidence that would be subject to seizure out of Subject Premises-1.

on his emails. Based on my review of notes of a call between Cohen and First Republic Employee-2 (which notes were taken by another First Republic employee, who was participating in the call and taking notes), I know that, on or about November 15, 2017, Cohen told First Republic Employee-2 that he had a new office at 30 Rock. Moreover, I know from an article in *Vanity Fair* published on or about February 14, 2018, that Cohen was interviewed by the magazine in Subject Premises-2 in or about February 2018.

49. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, when Cohen was emailing with Sterling Employee-3 in 2018 about a modification to his existing loan from Sterling, Cohen listed his address in his email as the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(t), 16(u). Accordingly, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's loan modification negotiations with Sterling.

b. Based on my review of records obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to KAI and BTA for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 19(a), 19(b). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from KAI and BTA, among other entities with which Cohen had a consulting arrangement. Additionally, based on my review of emails sent in 2018 that were obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen continues to enter into consulting arrangements through Essential Consultants, and agreements

relating to those arrangements indicate that Essential Consultants is located at Subject Premises-2. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-2 for multiple consulting arrangements involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 may contain records of other unknown consulting arrangements that Cohen has with other individuals or entities.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, as well as my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that [REDACTED] visited Subject Premises-2 to meet with Cohen about his taxes. *See supra* ¶ 20(a). At that meeting, [REDACTED] discussed with Cohen whether Cohen should disclose Essential Consultants on his personal financial statement to banks. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence relating to Cohen's taxes, or notes of his conversation with [REDACTED]. Moreover, the fact that Cohen used Subject Premises-2 for a meeting regarding his personal financial matters provides probable cause to believe that documents and information regarding his finances will be found in Subject Premises-2.

d. Based on my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that Cohen maintains a computer in Subject Premises-2. From my review of IP data produced pursuant to a subpoena and pen register to Google, it appears that Cohen is logging into his Gmail account from Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 contains electronic devices, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

e. Based upon my training and experience, I have learned that individuals who maintain businesses typically keep records relating to the business—such as contracts with clients and records of payments—at the business' identified location. I am not aware of any addresses

associated with Essential Consultants other than Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2 will contain business records for Essential Consultants.

50. Third, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. In particular:

a. As noted above, Cohen has two bank accounts at TD Bank. In or about November 2017, as Cohen was receiving substantial income from consulting work—which he did not disclose to Sterling—Cohen opened the safety deposit box at TD Bank, which is Subject Premises-3. In light of the aforementioned evidence that Cohen conceals assets, including assets at TD Bank, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains financial assets, objects of value and/or documents relating to such assets or objects of value that Cohen likely did not disclose to Sterling. Indeed, based on my training and experience, I am aware that people often conceal valuable items in safety deposit boxes. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 will contain evidence of the Bank Fraud Offenses.





51. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and cell phone location information, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4. *See supra* ¶¶ 3(d). There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4 contains instrumentalities and evidence of the Subject Offenses, including, the following:



³³ As noted above, Subject Premises-3 is approximately five inches by ten inches. Accordingly, I do not believe that it would fit a large volume of hard copy documents; however, a small number of hard-copy documents, or a large volume of documents contained on a flash drive or other portable storage device, would fit in Subject Premises-3.

b. As described above, at the time Cohen moved to Subject Premises-4, he was also in the midst of ongoing negotiations with Sterling regarding the refinancing of his medallion debts. For example, on January 30, 2018, Cohen had a lengthy phone call with Sterling Employee-3 about his finances and the proposed restructuring, and on February 1, 2018, Cohen sent an email to Sterling Employee-3 claiming that he did not have more than \$1.25 million in cash. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(u). Thus, there is probable cause that Cohen took at least some documents and evidence relating to his ongoing negotiations with Sterling with him to Subject Premises-4, in order to reference and consult them in connection with these negotiations.

c. As described above, Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account, and these electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 – Cohens' permanent residence – to place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. *See supra* ¶¶ 47(i). Although Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 is temporary, based on my training and experience I know that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring portable electronic devices with them, such as cellular phones, tablets, or laptops. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, where Cohen currently appears to be residing, contains electronic devices, including Subject Device-1, Subject Device-2, and/or certain Apple products, that for the reasons discussed herein are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

d. Moreover, as set forth above, based on cellphone location information I know that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 were in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4 as recently as this morning (April 8, 2018). As set forth above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen used the Subject Devices in furtherance of the Subject Offenses, including to communicate with Sterling employees regarding the medallion transaction, with First Republic employees regarding

the Essential Consultants Account, with his accountant regarding his finances, and with

52. Although Cohen appears to be residing currently in Subject Premises-4, it is unknown whether Cohen will be physically present within Subject Premises-4 at the moment the warrant sought herein are executed. If Cohen is within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 – his cellphones – will likely also be within Subject Premises-4. If Cohen is not within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, the devices will likely be on his person, wherever he is located (which, based on location data for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 as recently as today, is likely to be in the Southern District of New York). As such, this warrant seeks separate authority to seize Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, in the event that those devices are not located within Subject Premises-4 (or another Subject Premises) at the moment the warrants sought herein are executed.

D. Probable Cause Justifying Search of ESI

53. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and Subject Premises-4 contain electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses (and, as set forth above, that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 are themselves electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses). Specifically, based on my review of information produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, the iCloud Warrant, and subpoenas, as well as pen register data, I submit that there is probable cause that Subject Premises-1 contains an Apple iPad Mini, a MacBook Pro, and has, at various times, contained Apple cellphones; similarly, there is probable cause that Subject Premises-2 contains a computer and has, at various times, contained Apple

cellphones. These devices are likely to include evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses for the following reasons:

a. As described throughout this affidavit, Cohen used email to send and receive communications related to the Subject Offenses. In particular, Cohen used email to send and receive communications with Sterling, First Republic, [REDACTED] the entities to which he is providing consulting services [REDACTED] among others. While some of these emails have already been obtained via subpoenas and search warrants, I know from my training and experience that individuals can and do delete emails from their Internet-based inboxes but retain copies of those emails on their hard drives. I also know that individuals often have multiple email accounts, some of which may not be known to law enforcement, and as a result electronic devices can be a unique repository of all emails relevant to certain Subject Offenses. Indeed, from my involvement in this investigation, I know that Cohen had an email account with the Trump Organization, but the USAO and FBI have not been able to obtain the contents of that account to date. Thus, emails relevant to the Subject Offenses are likely stored on electronic devices in Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and/or Subject Premises-4.

b. Additionally, Subject Premises-1, Subject Premise-2 and Subject Premises-4 likely contain electronic copies of documents relevant to the Subject Offenses. Indeed, I know from my training and experience that individuals often retain copies of important documents on their computers or other electronic devices capable of storing information, including cellphones (such as the Subject Devices) and tablets. Here, there are a number of documents that Cohen has likely retained that will be relevant to the Subject Offenses. For example, electronic devices may include documentation of Cohen's true net worth, a listing of his assets, an accounting of his available

cash, consulting agreements with third parties, and [REDACTED] among other evidence of the Subject Offenses.

c. Third, I know from my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen sent up online banking with First Republic. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who set up online banking often receive electronic notices concerning financial transactions and, on occasion, save records of their financial transactions to their devices. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's electronic devices contain evidence of banking activity, including the existence of bank accounts or assets that Cohen did not disclose to Sterling or Melrose.

d. Fourth, from my review of records produced by Apple, I know that Cohen communicates using text message as well as encrypted communications applications. These applications that Cohen has downloaded onto a phone include, but are not limited to, WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust. I know from my review of toll records and text messages that, in particular, Cohen communicated with [REDACTED] using these encrypted applications. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's cellphones – the Subject Devices – will contain encrypted messages that are not otherwise accessible relating to the Subject Offenses.

54. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who engage in financial crimes commonly use computers to communicate with co-conspirators, keep financial ledgers, and retain fraudulent documents. As a result, they often store data on their computers related to their illegal activity, which can include logs of online or cellphone-based "chats" with co-conspirators; email correspondence; contact information of co-conspirators, including telephone numbers, email addresses, and identifiers for instant messaging and social media accounts; bank account numbers; and/or records of uses of funds.

55. Based on my training and experience, I also know that, where computers are used in furtherance of criminal activity, evidence of the criminal activity can often be found months or even years after it occurred. This is typically true because:

- Electronic files can be stored on a hard drive for years at little or no cost and users thus have little incentive to delete data that may be useful to consult in the future.
- Even when a user does choose to delete data, the data can often be recovered months or years later with the appropriate forensic tools. When a file is “deleted” on a home computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear, but instead remains on the hard drive, in “slack space,” until it is overwritten by new data that cannot be stored elsewhere on the computer. Similarly, files that have been viewed on the Internet are generally downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache,” which is only overwritten as the “cache” fills up and is replaced with more recently viewed Internet pages. Thus, the ability to retrieve from a hard drive or other electronic storage media depends less on when the file was created or viewed than on a particular user’s operating system, storage capacity, and computer habits.
- In the event that a user changes computers, the user will typically transfer files from the old computer to the new computer, so as not to lose data. In addition, users often keep backups of their data on electronic storage media such as thumb drives, flash memory cards, CD-ROMs, or portable hard drives.

56. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that Cohen engaged in the Subject Offenses, and that evidence of this criminal activity is likely to be found in the Subject Premises, on computers and electronic media found in the Subject Premises, and on the Subject Devices. In particular, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to the proposed warrants, including the following:

- a. Evidence necessary to establish the occupancy or ownership of the Subject Premises, including without limitation, utility and telephone bills, mail envelopes, addressed correspondence, bank statements, identification documents, and keys.
- b. Evidence relating to Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

d. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

e. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

f. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

g. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records.

h. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen.





p. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

q. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

r. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

III. Procedures for Searching ESI

A. Execution of Warrant for ESI

57. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) provides that a warrant to search for and seize property "may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or

copying of electronically stored information . . . for later review.” Consistent with Rule 41, this application requests authorization to seize any computer devices and storage media and transport them to an appropriate law enforcement facility for review. This is typically necessary for a number of reasons:

- First, the volume of data on computer devices and storage media is often impractical for law enforcement personnel to review in its entirety at the search location.
- Second, because computer data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, computer devices are ideally examined in a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, where trained personnel, using specialized software, can make a forensic copy of the storage media that can be subsequently reviewed in a manner that does not change the underlying data.
- Third, there are so many types of computer hardware and software in use today that it can be impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized personnel and equipment potentially required to safely access the underlying computer data.
- Fourth, many factors can complicate and prolong recovery of data from a computer device, including the increasingly common use of passwords, encryption, or other features or configurations designed to protect or conceal data on the computer, which often take considerable time and resources for forensic personnel to detect and resolve.

58. As discussed herein, Squire Patton Boggs is a functioning law firm that conducts legitimate business unrelated to Cohen’s commission of the Subject Offenses. Subject Premises-2 is an office located inside of Squire Patton Boggs’s New York office. In order to execute the warrant in the most reasonable fashion, law enforcement personnel will attempt to investigate on the scene of what computers or storage media, if any, must be seized or copied, and what computers or storage media need not be seized or copied. Law enforcement personnel will speak with Squire Patton Boggs personnel on the scene as may be appropriate to determine which files and electronic devices within Subject Premises-2 belong to or were used by Cohen. While, based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Cohen shared electronic devices or a server with Squire Patton Boggs, where appropriate, law enforcement personnel will copy data, rather than physically seize

computers, to reduce the extent of any disruption of Squire Patton Boggs's operations. If, after inspecting the seized computers off-site, it is determined that some or all of this equipment is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the evidence, the Government will return it.

59. Additionally, because Cohen is an attorney, and claims to serve as a personal attorney for Trump, the review of evidence seized from the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

B. Accessing ESI on the Subject Devices

60. As described above, the Subject Devices are both Apple brand devices.

61. I know from my training and experience, as well as from information found in publicly available materials including those published by Apple, that some models of Apple devices such as iPhones and iPads offer their users the ability to unlock the device via the use of a fingerprint or thumbprint (collectively, "fingerprint") in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Touch ID. I also know that the Apple iPhone X offers its users the ability to unlock the device via the use of facial recognition (through infrared and visible light scans) in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Face ID.

62. If a user enables Touch ID on a given Apple device, he or she can register up to 5 fingerprints that can be used to unlock that device. The user can then use any of the registered

fingerprints to unlock the device by pressing the relevant finger(s) to the device's Touch ID sensor, which is found in the round button (often referred to as the "home" button) found at the bottom center of the front of the device. If a user enables Face ID on a given Apple device, he or she can unlock the device by raising the iPhone to his or her face, or tapping the screen. In my training and experience, users of Apple devices that offer Touch ID or Face ID often enable it because it is considered to be a more convenient way to unlock the device than by entering a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password, as well as a more secure way to protect the device's contents.

63. In some circumstances, Touch ID or Face ID cannot be used to unlock a device that has either security feature enabled, and a passcode or password must be used instead. These circumstances include: (1) when the device has just been turned on or restarted; (2) when more than 48 hours has passed since the last time the device was unlocked; (3) when the passcode or password has not been entered in the last 6 days, and the device has not been unlocked via Touch ID in the last 8 hours or the device has not been unlocked via Face ID in the last 4 hours; (4) the device has received a remote lock command; or (5) five unsuccessful attempts to unlock the device via Touch ID or Face ID are made.

64. The passcodes or passwords that would unlock the Subject Devices are not known to law enforcement. Thus, it will likely be necessary to press the fingers of the user of the Subject Devices to the devices' Touch ID sensor, or hold the Subject Devices in front of the user's face to activate the Face ID sensor, in an attempt to unlock the devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant. Attempting to unlock the relevant Apple devices via Touch ID with the use of the fingerprints of the user, or via Face ID by holding the device in front of the user's face, is necessary because the government may not otherwise be able to access the data contained on those devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant.

65. Based on these facts and my training and experience, it is likely that Cohen is the user of the Subject Devices, and thus that his fingerprints are among those that are able to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or his face is able to unlock the Subject Devices via Face ID.

66. Although I do not know which of a given user's 10 fingerprints is capable of unlocking a particular device, based on my training and experience I know that it is common for a user to unlock a Touch ID-enabled Apple device via the fingerprints on thumbs or index fingers. In the event that law enforcement is unable to unlock the Subject Devices as described above within the five attempts permitted by Touch ID, this will simply result in the device requiring the entry of a password or passcode before it can be unlocked.

67. I also know from my training and experience, and my review of publicly available materials published by Apple that Apple brand devices, such as the Subject Devices, have a feature that allows a user to erase the contents of the device remotely. By logging into the Internet, the user or any other individual who possesses the user's account information can take steps to completely wipe the contents of the device, thereby destroying evidence of criminal conduct, along with any other information on the device. The only means to prevent this action is to disable the device's ability to connect to the Internet immediately upon seizure, which requires either access to the device itself to alter the settings, or the use of specialized equipment that is not consistently available to law enforcement agents at every arrest.

68. Due to the foregoing, I request that the Court authorize law enforcement to press the fingers (including thumbs) of Cohen to the Touch ID sensors the Subject Devices, or hold the Subject Devices in front of Cohen's face, for the purpose of attempting to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or Face ID in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant.

C. Review of ESI

69. Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

70. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to determine which files or other ESI contain evidence or fruits of the Subject Offenses. Such techniques may include, for example:

- surveying directories or folders and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- conducting a file-by-file review by “opening” or reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents (analogous to performing a cursory examination of each document in a file cabinet to determine its relevance);
- “scanning” storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted data or deliberately hidden files; and
- performing electronic keyword searches through all electronic storage areas to determine the existence and location of data potentially related to the subject matter of the investigation³⁴; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

³⁴ Keyword searches alone are typically inadequate to detect all relevant data. For one thing, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files, such as images and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, there may be information properly subject to seizure but that is not captured by a keyword search because the information does not contain the keywords being searched.

71. Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to restrict their search to data falling within the categories of evidence specified in the warrant. Depending on the circumstances, however, law enforcement personnel may need to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

D. Return of ESI

72. If the Government determines that the electronic devices are no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data, and the devices themselves are not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return these items, upon request. Computer data that is encrypted or unreadable will not be returned unless law enforcement personnel have determined that the data is not (i) an instrumentality of the offense, (ii) a fruit of the criminal activity, (iii) contraband, (iv) otherwise unlawfully possessed, or (v) evidence of the Subject Offenses.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

Case No.

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment D

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30). [] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:59 p.m. /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

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Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT D

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

████████████████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media; including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for a Search and Seizure Warrant for the Premises Known and Described as Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628, a Suite that Encompasses Rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630 New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein
Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for Search and Seizure
Warrant**

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:



Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,

deposes and says:

I. Introduction



2. On or about April 8, 2018, the Honorable Henry B. Pitman, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a search and seizure warrant for the premises known and described as Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein. The warrant and my supporting affidavit (the "Affidavit") are appended hereto. The Affidavit is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety as Exhibit A.

3. On or about April 9, 2018, based upon a conversation with another law enforcement agent who spoke to an employee of Loews Regency Hotel, I learned that Michael Cohen is in fact staying in Room 1628 (in a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, "Room 1628"), not Room 1728. Accordingly, I respectfully submit the attached amended warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the following Subject Premises: Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein ("Subject Premises-4"). For the reasons detailed in the Affidavit and herein, I believe that there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4 contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the "Bank Fraud Offenses"), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Campaign Finance Offenses"), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses) (collectively, the "Subject Offenses").

4. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachment A to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrant.

5. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



Special Agent
FBI

Sworn to before me on
9th day of April, 2018

/s/ Henry B. Pitman

HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1628 (a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, “Room 1628”), located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 16th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for a Search and Seizure Warrant for the Premises Known and Described as (1) 502 Park Avenue, [REDACTED] New York, New York 10022, (2) Michael Cohen's Office at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10112, (3) Safe Deposit Box # [REDACTED] Located at the TD Bank Branch at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019, and (4) Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and Any Closed Containers/Items Contained Therein, and the Electronic Devices Known and Described as (1) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED] and (2) an Apple iPhone with Phone Number [REDACTED].
Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for Search and Seizure
Warrant**

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

[REDACTED] Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,

deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant

[REDACTED]

2. I make this Affidavit in support of an application pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the premises specified below (the "Subject

Premises”) and the electronic devices specified below (the “Subject Devices”) for, and to seize, the items and information described in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge; my review of documents and other evidence; my conversations with other law enforcement personnel; and my training, experience and advice received concerning the use of electronic devices in criminal activity and the forensic analysis of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

B. The Subject Premises and Subject Devices

3. Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2, Subject Premises-3 and Subject Premises-4 (collectively, the “Subject Premises”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Premises-1 is Apartment [REDACTED] located inside the building at 502 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The building located at 502 Park Avenue is a 32-floor brick residential building. Subject Premises-1 is located on the [REDACTED] floor of the building. Based on my review of New York City property records, I have learned that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own Subject Premises-1.¹ Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-1 is Cohen’s full-time residence.

b. Subject Premises-2 is an office located on the 23rd floor of the building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112. The building located at 30 Rockefeller Plaza

¹ As noted *infra*, I have learned that on or about October 28, 2015, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

is a 66-floor office building that spans the entire block between Sixth Avenue and Rockefeller Plaza. Subject Premises-2 is located on the 23rd floor of the building inside of the offices of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs. The office is assigned to Michael Cohen. As described below, Michael Cohen works and conducts meetings at Subject Premises-2.

c. Subject Premises-3 is a safety deposit box located inside the TD Bank branch location at 500 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10019. Based on my review of records maintained by TD Bank, I have learned that the safety deposit box is approximately five inches by ten inches in size, and is marked as box [REDACTED]. The safety deposit box is in the name of Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen.

d. Subject Premises-4 is Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to search warrants described below, I have learned that on or about January 5, 2018, Cohen received an email from an employee of Loews Regency, which included a price quote for a long-term stay suite based on a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, 2018.² On or about January 29, 2018, Cohen sent an email to a Loews Regency employee, stating, in pertinent part: "I just spoke to my wife and she has scheduled the move for Thursday. Please mark down that we will be taking possession on Thursday, February 1st." Based on my review of cell phone location data, I have learned that, over the past 24 hours, two cellular phones used by Cohen have been located in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4. In particular, on or about

² Although the quoted price contemplated a three-month stay from January 8 to April 8, it appears that Cohen did not move in until February 1, and as of today, April 8, cellphone location information demonstrates that Cohen's cellular phones are in still in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4.

April 8, 2018, law enforcement agents using a “triggerfish” device identified Room 1728 as the room within the hotel in which the Subject Devices are most likely present.³

e. Therefore, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4.

4. Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 (collectively, the “Subject Devices”) are particularly described as:

a. Subject Device-1 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

██████████ Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-1 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

b. Subject Device-2 is an Apple iPhone serviced by AT&T with the telephone number

██████████ Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is subscribed to Michael Cohen. Based on my review of cellphone location information maintained by AT&T, I have learned that Subject Device-2 is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

c. Based on my training, experience, and research, and from consulting the manufacturer’s and service providers’ advertisements and product technical specifications available online, I know that the Subject Devices have capabilities that allow them to, among other things: make and receive telephone calls; save and store contact information; send and receive

³ Based on my conversations with these agents, I understand that it is also possible that the Subject Devices are one floor below, in Room 1628. However, as noted, I understand that Cohen received a price quote for a long-term stay suite and is residing there with his family. Based on my conversations with FBI agents conducting surveillance, I understand that Room 1728 appears to be a suite, whereas Room 1628 appears to be a standard room.

emails and text messages; download and run mobile telephone applications, including encrypted call and messaging application such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust; take, send, and receive pictures and videos; save and store notes and passwords; and store documents.

C. The Subject Offenses

5. For the reasons detailed below, I believe that there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of ~~18 U.S.C. §§ 1005~~ (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Bank Fraud Offenses”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Campaign Finance Offenses”), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”).

D. Prior Applications

6. The FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAO”) have been investigating several courses of criminal conduct by Michael Cohen. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

7. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen Gmail Account") sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the "First Cohen Gmail Warrant").

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen iCloud Account" and the "Cohen iCloud Warrant").

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the "Second Cohen Gmail Warrant").

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the "Cohen MDCPC Account") sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account⁴ and November 13, 2017 (the "First Cohen MDCPC Warrant").

8. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI's New York Field Office. As part of that referral, on or about February 8, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and Cohen MDCPC Warrant. On or about March 7, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO

⁴ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.

with all non-privileged content obtained pursuant to the Cohen iCloud Warrant.⁵ A filter team working with the SCO had previously reviewed the content produced pursuant to these warrants for privilege.

9. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained search warrants for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account and the Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and the “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”). The content produced pursuant to these warrants is subject to an ongoing review for privilege by an SDNY filter team.⁶

10. The emails search warrants described above are referred to collectively as the “Cohen Email Warrants.”

11. On or about April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained a warrant for prospective and historical cellphone location information for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2. On or about April 8, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained authority to employ an electronic technique, commonly known as a “triggerfish,” to determine the location of Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2.

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview

12. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, schemes by Target Subject Michael Cohen (a) to defraud multiple banks from in or about 2016 up to and including the present, and (b) to make an illegal

⁵ The SCO had previously provided a subset of this non-privileged content on or about February 2, 2018.

⁶ On or about February 28, 2018 and April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained Rule 41 search warrants authorizing the search of emails and content obtained pursuant to previously issued warrants for additional subject offenses.

campaign contribution in October 2016 to then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. As noted, Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

13. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally misrepresented his ability to pay cash by failing to disclose cash he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; (iii) failed to disclose tens of thousands of dollars he received in monthly interest income, and (iv) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, [REDACTED] in connection with [REDACTED] acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to fraudulently induce the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations and personal guarantees that Cohen and his wife had signed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Cohen Email Warrants, information obtained pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, as well as my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen has used the Subject Premises to (a) receive documents related to the transaction intended to relieve Cohen of his taxi medallion debt, (b) receive documents and/or conduct meetings related to his consulting work, (c) receive documents and/or conduct meetings relating to his finances and assets, some of which, as noted above and as detailed further herein, he has concealed from the banks in connection with the refinancing of his taxi medallion debt, (d) [REDACTED] and (e) house and operate electronic devices that were utilized in connection with, among other things, the taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's consulting work, and [REDACTED]. Specifically, as described below, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED], as well as electronic devices containing such evidence, all of which constitute or contain evidence of the Subject Offenses. Additionally, as described below, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's consulting work, his finances, and [REDACTED] as well as electronic devices containing such evidence. Subject Premises-3, as described below, likely contains evidence relating to Cohen's assets and finances, including assets that may not have been disclosed to banks in connection with the refinancing of Cohen's taxi medallion debt or documents relating to such assets, and documents or evidence related to [REDACTED]. Subject Premises-4 likely contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which themselves contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, including concerning Cohen's taxi medallion loans, his negotiations with banks, his personal finances, his consulting work, his tax returns, and [REDACTED]. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Probable Cause Regarding Subjects' Commission of the Subject Offenses⁷

The Bank Fraud Scheme

(i) Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

16. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through LLCs controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling National Bank ("Sterling") and the Melrose Credit Union ("Melrose"), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions lost value, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash and income, among other things. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my participation in interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the "Sterling Employee-1") and two other

⁷ In the following recitation of probable cause, I frequently refer to phone calls or text messages involving Cohen. The text messages described herein as sent or received by Cohen were all sent or received from the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2. The vast majority of the phone calls described herein made or received by Cohen were made or received by the telephone numbers associated with Subject Device-1 or Subject Device-2, although in certain limited instances Cohen used a landline or other phone.

Sterling employees (“Sterling Employee-2” and “Sterling Employee-3”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).⁸ Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to make his monthly loan payments to Capital One.

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount

⁸ One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion-LLCs entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the LLC. The address listed for each of the LLCs was the address for Subject Premises-1. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. The personal guaranty agreements stated that the LLCs had offices at the address for Subject Premises-1, and contained a notice provision that stated that any notices required by the agreements should be mailed to Subject Premises-1. In total, Sterling agreed to lend approximately \$22 million to the Cohens’ companies.

d. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of Cohen’s taxi medallion debt to Melrose.⁹

⁹ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).

e. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.¹⁰ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8,

¹⁰ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen’s statements, his personal financial information “indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments.” Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen’s monthly payments.

g. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks.¹¹ According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen’s representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by, among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

h. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to

¹¹ Based on my review of property records, I know that on or about October 28, 2015, around the time period when Sterling raised the possibility of Cohen posting his personal residence—Subject Premises-1—as collateral, Cohen transferred Subject Premises-1 into a trust.

assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallion entities to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent by Cohen to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

i. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 told [REDACTED] that Melrose had agreed to the deal in principle, and that Sterling would be sending the parties a term sheet shortly.

j. In order for the banks to conduct diligence and evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about June 7, 2017, Sterling

Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an “updated personal financial statement,” completed jointly with Cohen’s wife, and Cohen’s most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the “May 2017 Financial Statement”) that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen’s accountant, [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen’s assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.¹²

k. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about specific line items on the financial statement, including the cash amount, value of medallions, and total liabilities. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

l. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen and [REDACTED] [REDACTED], attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between

¹² Based on my review of Cohen’s financial statements, I know that the precipitous decline in assets from his 2014 financial statement to his 2017 financial statements can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen’s real estate assets and medallion investments.

Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. The term sheet included a cover letter addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. The parties negotiated the provisions of the term sheet and, on or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] and Cohen a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

m. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789, respectively, in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

n. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling

required and requested additional financial statements and tax returns for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about September 25, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his 2016 tax return. The tax return listed Cohen's mailing address as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

o. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED], Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000.¹³ Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (including the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),¹⁴ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first

¹³ Based on my review of Cohen's financial statements, I know that this further decline in assets can be explained primarily by reported depreciation in the value of Cohen's real estate assets and medallion investments.

¹⁴ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

time, he indicated was held by a trust).¹⁵ The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

p. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—i.e., in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank — that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

q. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. The demand letter was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. The notice of default was addressed to Cohen at Subject Premises-1. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018,

¹⁵ Based on my review of property records maintained by the City of New York, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that in 2015, Cohen transferred his residence to a trust. He did not disclose that transaction to [REDACTED] or Sterling until in or about September 2017.

stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would “bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential.” Cohen also requested by email on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen’s debts have been satisfied and that Cohen’s personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

r. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, the [REDACTED] attorney emailed attorneys for Sterling and stated that “at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward.”

s. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen’s loans to Sterling Employee-3, who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, my review of telephone call notes taken by Sterling Employee-3, and my review of telephone records, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke several times to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or restructuring Cohen’s outstanding taxi medallion loans. On the calls, which in total lasted more than an hour, Cohen stated in sum and substance that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 to pay toward the medallion loans. On the call, in the course of reviewing the failed Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling Employee-3 questioned Cohen about the price [REDACTED] was to have paid for each medallion, and whether there was a side agreement between Cohen and [REDACTED]. Cohen denied that there was any side agreement with [REDACTED]

t. On or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to

\$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

u. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. The signature block on the email indicated that Cohen's address was the address for Subject Premises-2. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that since January 30, 2018, Sterling has continued to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position. In particular, according to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen and Sterling have an agreement in principal to restructure Cohen's loans based in part of Cohen's agreement to make a principal payment of approximately \$750,000, to make a payment of \$500,000 to become current on interest payments, and to post \$192,000 in cash collateral for his future monthly payments on the loan. Cohen also agreed to pledge an interest he had in a property. Sterling Employee-3 has stated that had Cohen indicated he had more than \$1,250,000 available to him, Sterling would have, among other things, negotiated for a larger reduction to the principal amount of the loan.

(ii) Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work

17. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple written and oral representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose¹⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen misled the bank by claiming he had insufficient liquidity to satisfy his obligations or meet the bank’s demands, while withholding information about these ongoing revenue streams and liquid financial assets at First Republic.

18. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with a First Republic sales manager (“First Republic Employee-1”) and a First Republic senior managing director (“First Republic Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

¹⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction.

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts at First Republic, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities. According to First Republic's know-your-customer records on Cohen,¹⁷ his primary physical address is the address for Subject Premises-1.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the "Essential Consultants Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for Essential Consultants LLC was the address for Subject Premises-1. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, First Republic Employee-1 conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form¹⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, as described below, the account was not intended to receive—and does not

¹⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

¹⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen's statements.

appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.

c. I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 into the Essential Consultants Account from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.

ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and February 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received eleven wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$1,099,780.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T sent \$100,000 to the

Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T sent \$600,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. ("KAI"). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a "monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017."

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about February 1, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$3,033,112.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23. Cohen's withdrawals from the Essential Consultants account reveal that it was used for largely personal purposes, including to pay, among other things, American Express bills and fees from "the Core Club," a private social club in New York.

d. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the "MDC&A Account").

Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. According to account opening documents, the primary address for MDC&A Account was the address for Subject Premises-1. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. As noted above, Subject Premises-2 is located inside the New York office of Squire Patton Boggs. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction or the subsequent loan refinancing negotiations, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

19. Based on my review of emails that were seized pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration. Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Gmail Account, the Cohen MDCPC Account, and public sources, I have learned the following:

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a "Consulting Agreement" between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render "consulting and advisory services, as requested" by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants "a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand

(\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017. I have also reviewed invoices in amounts of \$150,000 that Cohen emailed to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. At the top of the invoices the address listed for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2.

b. On or about May 8, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with BTA Bank. The signature block on Cohen’s email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC” and provided the address for Subject Premises-2. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between BTA Bank and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 8, 2017. The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-2. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services” to BTA Bank, and that BTA Bank would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand (\$1,800,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through monthly payments of \$150,000. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email to an employee of BTA Bank, and attached to the email an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants, with the address of Subject Premises-2. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about January 23, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a consulting agreement with AT&T, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The agreement indicates that Essential Consultants had the address of Subject Premises-1. The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty

Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about March 1, 2017, Cohen appears to have entered into a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in equal monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. In or about February 2017, Cohen began negotiating the terms of a “strategic alliance” with Squire Patton Boggs. On or about March 4, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs emailed Cohen a “strategic alliance agreement.” Under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to generate business for the law firm, and Squire Patton Boggs agreed to pay to Cohen “an annual strategic alliance fee of \$500,000, payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments.” Squire Patton Boggs also agreed to provide Cohen with “dedicated and segregated office space in [Squire Patton Boggs’s] New York and Washington D.C. offices, which office space shall be physically separate from [Squire Patton Boggs’s] offices and have locked doors and its own locked file cabinets.” On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

20. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] (as noted above, Cohen's accountant at the time), my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] and my review of notes and [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at Subject Premises-2. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen in which [REDACTED] wrote that "[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017" and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any value associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: "[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates

POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[l]ooks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. In a letter dated October 6, 2017, addressed to [REDACTED], Cohen stated, “I have reviewed the attached statement of financial condition and find it to be correct and consistent with the representations that I made to your firm. The attached is an accurate reflection of my assets, liabilities and net worth (deficit) as of September 30, 2017.” Attached to that letter was the September 2017 Financial Statement, which, as noted above, was then transmitted to Sterling in connection with the proposed taxi medallion transaction between Sterling, Cohen, and [REDACTED]

21. Based on my review of a report of an interview with Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Cohen did not disclose his income stream from Essential Consultants to Sterling Employee-1 or, to his knowledge, anyone else at Sterling. According to Sterling Employee-1, knowledge of such an income stream would have affected Sterling’s demands during the negotiations, particularly with respect to the amount of a principal paydown of Cohen’s debt.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

22. In addition to withholding the existence of his Essential Consultants income from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September

2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. I also know that on or about January 30, 2018, in a telephone call with Sterling Employee-3, and on February 1, 2018, in an email to Sterling Employee-3, Cohen represented that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 in cash. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by forensic accountants, I have learned that Cohen had approximately \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Additionally, as of February 1, 2018, Cohen had approximately \$6,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had a total of \$1,389,245.78 in these accounts.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$1,284,996.13 in these accounts.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$261,517.55 in this account.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$3,332,992.95 in these accounts.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife. Cohen also has a safety deposit box at TD Bank—Subject Premises-3. The safety deposit box was opened on December 13, 2017 in the names of Michael and Laura Cohen.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$4,713,935.08 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, Sterling Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley. As of February 1, 2018, Cohen had \$6,268,732.59 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, City National Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.¹⁹

23. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's written and oral representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or to its decision whether approve of the transfer of those loans to [REDACTED]

¹⁹ Based on my review of the account schedules described above, I know that, as of the date of this affidavit, the account balances for TD Bank have not yet been included in the schedule for either date and the account balances for Sterling National Bank and Bethpage Credit Union have not yet been included in the schedule for February 1, 2018. Thus, to the extent that these accounts have positive balances, Cohen's total balances in fact were even higher on these dates.

Cohen Has Unreported Interest Income

24. It appears that Cohen also hid from Sterling interest income that he was receiving in connection with a six million dollar loan he made to another individual. Specifically, I know from my review of the May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen did not disclose that he had made a note receivable in the amount of approximately \$6 million, or that he was earning approximately \$60,000 per month in interest income in connection with that loan. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were reviewed by another law enforcement agent, my review of property records and documents obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. Based on my review of property records, I have learned that on or about March 12, 2012, Cohen agreed to lend [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approximately \$2,000,000.²⁰ It appears that the promissory note was unsecured by any real property. On or about April 28, 2014, Cohen and [REDACTED] amended the promissory note, and restructured the loan to increase the principal amount to approximately \$5,000,000. Under the terms of the amended promissory note, the loan was secured by [REDACTED] apartment in [REDACTED], Florida. On or about April 8, 2015, Cohen and [REDACTED] restated the promissory note to increase the principal amount to \$6,000,000.²¹

b. Based on my review of a copy of the restated note, which was obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that under the terms of the amended and restated

²⁰ I learned from Getzel that [REDACTED]

²¹ The note states that the loan is to [REDACTED] husband and wife, jointly and severally. For ease of reference, I refer simply to "[REDACTED]" herein.

promissory note, Cohen's loan to [REDACTED] is an interest-only loan, and that the principal balance of the loan bears interest at an annual rate of 12.25 percent. I also know that the amended and restated promissory note includes a schedule of payments that require [REDACTED] to pay Cohen approximately \$61,250 per month beginning in April 2015 and ending in April 2019. The note also requires that [REDACTED] repay the principal balance of \$6,000,000 on April 28, 2019.

c. Based on my review of bank records, I have learned that, consistent with the terms of the amended and restated promissory note, [REDACTED] has made monthly payments of approximately \$61,250 since April 2015. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have learned that from April 2015 to October 2015, Cohen received checks from an entity called [REDACTED] totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank.²² It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is the owner of [REDACTED]. From my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, I have also learned that since October 2015, Cohen has received checks from an entity called [REDACTED] totaling \$61,250 per month, which he deposited into his personal bank account at Capital One Bank. It appears from my review of bank records and public sources that [REDACTED] is also the owner of [REDACTED]. In total, it appears that Cohen receives approximately \$735,000 per year in interest payments from [REDACTED].

d. Based on my review of Cohen's May 2017 and September 2017 Financial Statements, my review of his 2015 and 2016 tax returns obtained via subpoena and from the Cohen Email Warrants, and my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that Cohen did

²² In April 2015, Cohen received a pro-rated payment. For all months thereafter, the total payment equaled \$61,250, but [REDACTED] often made the payment in multiple checks.

not disclose this interest income he was receiving from [REDACTED] to Sterling or Melrose, or list it on his tax returns. I have also learned that while this interest income is taxable, Cohen did not tell [REDACTED]—his accountant—about the income, and [REDACTED] only learned about the income because he began doing [REDACTED] taxes in 2017.²³

25. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information relating to the interest income he is receiving from [REDACTED] in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan.

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

26. As set forth in detail below, during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED] Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side agreement he had negotiated with [REDACTED]. It appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately \$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and my participation in interviews with Sterling Employee-1, Sterling Employee-2, and Sterling Employee-3, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. The term sheet listed Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from

²³ Accordingly, this interest income—which should have been reported as such on Cohen's tax returns—is included herein in calculations of Cohen's true cash position.

Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED] including a \$3.8-million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

c. On or about January 30, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen whether Cohen had a side agreement with [REDACTED] to pay [REDACTED] a sum of money for entering into the medallion transaction. Sterling Employee-3 asked Cohen about such an arrangement because, according to Sterling Employee-3, the price that [REDACTED] was paying for each medallion appeared to be well above the market price. Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he had no side agreement—and never had a side agreement—with [REDACTED].

27. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and my participation in an interview

with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."²⁴

b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.

28. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme



²⁴ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.







































C. Probable Cause Justifying Search of the Subject Premises and Subject Devices

45. Based on the foregoing, my review of records produced pursuant to subpoenas and the Cohen Email Warrants, and the iCloud Warrant, and my training and experience, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices have been used in furtherance of the Subject Offenses and are likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen permanently resides at Subject Premises-1 and, at least in part, works at both Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2, and that those locations contain evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and his [REDACTED]. Additionally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains evidence of Cohen's assets and [REDACTED]. Finally, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, in which Cohen is temporarily residing, contains electronic

devices, including Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, which, in turn, contain evidence of the Subject Offenses, such as evidence relating to the Sterling taxi medallion transaction, Cohen's assets, Cohen's consulting work for Essential Consultants LLC, and [REDACTED]

46. First, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen lives and operates his businesses, at least in part, at Subject Premises-1. Specifically, from my review of property records, I know that Michael Cohen and Laura Cohen own (in trust) Subject Premises-1. From my review of Cohen's tax returns, I know he lists his primary residence as Subject Premises-1. Additionally, from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen routinely refers to Subject Premises-1 as his home. For example, on or about September 28, 2017 and October 6, 2017, Cohen emailed individuals that his home address is the address for Subject Premises-1. I also know from my review of emails that Cohen receives package delivery notifications that list Cohen's address as the address for Subject Premises-1. Cohen has also provided the address of Subject Premises-1 as the address for Essential Consultants and Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. For example, the certificates of incorporation and account opening documents at First Republic for both entities list their addresses as the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(d). The consulting agreement between Essential Consultants and AT&T also indicated the address for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c).

47. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, the address for all of Cohen's taxi medallion LLCs is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 16(c). Additionally, the medallion loan documents indicate that any mailings related to the loans should be sent to Subject Premises-1. *See id.* Based on my training and experience, as well as my review of public sources, I know that individuals keep records of properties and assets in which they have ownership interests. Accordingly, I submit that Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence of Cohen's ownership of the taxi medallion LLCs, the revenue that those medallions generate, and the transaction with Sterling in 2014 to re-finance the medallion loans that were then with Capital One Bank.

b. From my review of records maintained by Sterling, I also know that Sterling addressed documents relating to the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's attempts to modify the terms of the medallion loans to Subject Premises-1. For instance, Sterling addressed the transaction term sheet, *see supra* ¶ 16(l), and its demand letter and notice of default, *see supra* ¶ 16(q), to Subject Premises-1. Accordingly, Subject Premises-1 likely contains evidence concerning the [REDACTED] transaction and Cohen's negotiations with Sterling. Some of those records—such as records relating to a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]—were concealed from Sterling and cannot be obtained via subpoena to Sterling. Additionally, even where documents were sent to Cohen by Sterling (and therefore are available from Sterling via subpoena), the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to Cohen's possession or knowledge of the documents.

c. From my review of records maintained by First Republic, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing addresses for the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(b), 18(e). Accordingly, it is likely that Subject

Premises-1 contains records relating to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account, including, among other things, account opening documents, bank statements, documents provided as part of the know-your-customer process, any notes made by Cohen when he was opening the accounts, wire transfer records, and canceled checks. Even where these records can be obtained from First Republic, the fact that they may be found in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts, or his knowledge of transactions or the existence of funds in accounts.

d. Based on my review of records maintained by Capital One Bank, TD Bank, Morgan Stanley, City National Bank, Signature Bank, and Bethpage Credit Union, I know that Cohen provided the address for Subject Premises-1 as the mailing for his accounts at each of these financial institutions. Accordingly, it is likely that Subject Premises-1 contains records relating to these accounts, including, among other things, bank statements that list account balances. The existence of these records in Subject Premises-1 will be relevant to, among other things, Cohen's ownership of the accounts and his knowledge of the balances in these accounts.

e. Additionally, Cohen may have records of other bank accounts or assets that were not disclosed to Sterling and are not presently known by law enforcement. For example, as described above, Cohen has received interest income since 2015 that he has not disclosed to Sterling or paid taxes on. Also, on Cohen's August 2014 Financial Statement, *see supra* ¶ 16(e), he disclosed \$10,000,000 in "investments in overseas entities."³⁰ The value of these investments was omitted from subsequent financial statements. However, for the reasons outlined above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen omitted the value of those investments from his 2017

³⁰ Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-3, I have learned that Cohen told Sterling Employee-3 that the reference to "investments in overseas entities" on his 2014 Financial Statement was to serve merely as a "placeholder" for potential future investments.

financial statements in order to understate his assets. As Subject Premises-1 is Cohen's primary residence and he uses Subject Premises-1 as the mailing address for bank records, there is probable cause to believe that account statements for unknown bank accounts or assets concealed from Sterling are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

f. Based on my review of records maintained by AT&T and produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to AT&T for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-1. *See supra* ¶ 19(c). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from AT&T. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-1 for at least one consulting arrangement involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 may contain records of other consulting arrangements that Cohen, through Essential Consultants, has with other individuals or entities.

g. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I have learned that [REDACTED] accounting firm sent documents to Subject Premises-1 and used the address for Subject Premises-1 as the address listed on Cohen's personal and corporate tax returns. *See supra* ¶ 16(n). For instance, on or about October 6, 2017, an employee at [REDACTED] accounting firm emailed Cohen that she had sent Cohen's September 2017 Financial Statement by FedEx to Cohen's attention. Accordingly, Cohen's tax records are likely to be found in Subject Premises-1.

h. Based on my review of bank records and publicly-available documents, I know that

[REDACTED]



i. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, I know that Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account. Based on my review of location records provided by Apple pursuant to the iCloud Warrant, I know that electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 to, among other things, place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 contains electronic devices, including certain Apple products, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

j. Based on my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I understand that Subject Premises-1 recently sustained water damage to certain parts of the premises, and that Cohen has engaged contractors to perform certain remediation work on the premises. In addition, as set forth above, I believe that Cohen and his family are temporarily residing at Subject Premises-4 in the Loew's Regency Hotel, which is approximately two blocks from Subject Premises-1. However, based on my review of a work order sent to Cohen's email by a contractor, I understand that the first phase of the work order called for the contractor to "Pack & Remove all items & furnishings in Living Room, Kitchen, Sons Room & Dining Room" and store them off-site. In addition, based on my review of drawings sent to Cohen by the contractor, it appears that the work is primarily being done in these rooms. Thus, I believe that the construction – to the extent it is still ongoing – would not necessarily have caused Cohen to move

all documents or evidence responsive to the warrant out of Subject Premises-1, because it does not appear that work is being done to the portion of Subject Premises-1, such as a home office or Cohen's own room, where such documents or evidence would most likely be found.³¹

48. Second, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen uses Subject Premises-2 as office space, and also that Subject Premises-2 contains certain electronic devices. Specifically, from my review of the "strategic alliance agreement" between Squire Patton Boggs and Cohen, and my review of the press release on Squire Patton Boggs's website, I know that Cohen has an office at Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 18(d), 19(e). Indeed, I have learned that pursuant to Cohen's agreement with the law firm, he has "dedicated and segregated office space" in Squire Patton Boggs's offices on the 23rd floor of 30 Rockefeller Plaza, and that the space is "physically separate" from the firm's offices and has "locked doors and its own locked file cabinets." *See supra* ¶ 19(e). Additionally, I know that under the terms of the agreement, Cohen agreed to "arrange for [his] own computer server system that is not connected to [Squire Patton Boggs's] computer network system." I know from my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] who met Cohen at Subject Premises-2 in 2017, that Subject Premises-2 is an office with a door, it appears to be used only by Cohen, and it contains, among other things, a computer and paper files. According to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] saw Cohen at Subject Premises-2, he had two cellular telephones in Subject Premises-2. I also know from my review of emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen uses the address for Subject Premises-2 in the signature block

³¹ As noted below, based on my training and experience, I believe that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring some items with them, such as portable electronic devices or sensitive items, meaning that Cohen has likely taken some evidence from Subject Premises-1 to Subject Premises-4. Nevertheless, given the temporary nature of Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 and the scope of the work being done at Subject Premises-1, I believe it is unlikely that Cohen has taken *all* evidence that would be subject to seizure out of Subject Premises-1.

on his emails. Based on my review of notes of a call between Cohen and First Republic Employee-2 (which notes were taken by another First Republic employee, who was participating in the call and taking notes), I know that, on or about November 15, 2017, Cohen told First Republic Employee-2 that he had a new office at 30 Rock. Moreover, I know from an article in *Vanity Fair* published on or about February 14, 2018, that Cohen was interviewed by the magazine in Subject Premises-2 in or about February 2018.

49. There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. Specifically, from my review of emails produced pursuant to subpoena and the Cohen Email Warrants and iCloud Warrant, as well as my training and experience, I know the following:

a. According to records maintained by Sterling, when Cohen was emailing with Sterling Employee-3 in 2018 about a modification to his existing loan from Sterling, Cohen listed his address in his email as the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(t), 16(u). Accordingly, Subject Premises-2 likely contains evidence concerning Cohen's loan modification negotiations with Sterling.

b. Based on my review of records obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that the address Cohen provided to KAI and BTA for Essential Consultants is the address for Subject Premises-2. *See supra* ¶¶ 19(a), 19(b). Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence concerning the operation of Essential Consultants or money that Cohen received, through Essential Consultants, from KAI and BTA, among other entities with which Cohen had a consulting arrangement. Additionally, based on my review of emails sent in 2018 that were obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, I know that Cohen continues to enter into consulting arrangements through Essential Consultants, and agreements

relating to those arrangements indicate that Essential Consultants is located at Subject Premises-2. Additionally, because Cohen used the address for Subject Premises-2 for multiple consulting arrangements involving Essential Consultants, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 may contain records of other unknown consulting arrangements that Cohen has with other individuals or entities.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] accounting firm, and emails produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, as well as my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned that [REDACTED] visited Subject Premises-2 to meet with Cohen about his taxes. *See supra* ¶ 20(a). At that meeting, [REDACTED] discussed with Cohen whether Cohen should disclose Essential Consultants on his personal financial statement to banks. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 will contain evidence relating to Cohen's taxes, or notes of his conversation with [REDACTED]. Moreover, the fact that Cohen used Subject Premises-2 for a meeting regarding his personal financial matters provides probable cause to believe that documents and information regarding his finances will be found in Subject Premises-2.

d. Based on my participation in an interview with [REDACTED] I know that Cohen maintains a computer in Subject Premises-2. From my review of IP data produced pursuant to a subpoena and pen register to Google, it appears that Cohen is logging into his Gmail account from Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-2 contains electronic devices, that for reasons discussed below are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

e. Based upon my training and experience, I have learned that individuals who maintain businesses typically keep records relating to the business—such as contracts with clients and records of payments—at the business' identified location. I am not aware of any addresses

associated with Essential Consultants other than Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1 and Subject Premises-2 will contain business records for Essential Consultants.

50. Third, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 is likely to contain instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the Subject Offenses. In particular:

a. As noted above, Cohen has two bank accounts at TD Bank. In or about November 2017, as Cohen was receiving substantial income from consulting work—which he did not disclose to Sterling—Cohen opened the safety deposit box at TD Bank, which is Subject Premises-3. In light of the aforementioned evidence that Cohen conceals assets, including assets at TD Bank, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 contains financial assets, objects of value and/or documents relating to such assets or objects of value that Cohen likely did not disclose to Sterling. Indeed, based on my training and experience, I am aware that people often conceal valuable items in safety deposit boxes. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-3 will contain evidence of the Bank Fraud Offenses.





51. Based on my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants and cell phone location information, I believe that Cohen is temporarily residing in Subject Premises-4. *See supra* ¶¶ 3(d). There is also probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4 contains instrumentalities and evidence of the Subject Offenses, including, the following:



³³ As noted above, Subject Premises-3 is approximately five inches by ten inches. Accordingly, I do not believe that it would fit a large volume of hard copy documents; however, a small number of hard-copy documents, or a large volume of documents contained on a flash drive or other portable storage device, would fit in Subject Premises-3.

b. As described above, at the time Cohen moved to Subject Premises-4, he was also in the midst of ongoing negotiations with Sterling regarding the refinancing of his medallion debts. For example, on January 30, 2018, Cohen had a lengthy phone call with Sterling Employee-3 about his finances and the proposed restructuring, and on February 1, 2018, Cohen sent an email to Sterling Employee-3 claiming that he did not have more than \$1.25 million in cash. *See supra* ¶¶ 16(u). Thus, there is probable cause that Cohen took at least some documents and evidence relating to his ongoing negotiations with Sterling with him to Subject Premises-4, in order to reference and consult them in connection with these negotiations.

c. As described above, Cohen used at least one Apple iPhone, an Apple iPad Mini, and a MacBook Pro to access his iCloud account, and these electronic devices linked to Cohen's iCloud account were used at Subject Premises-1 – Cohens' permanent residence – to place telephone calls and backup files to Cohen's iCloud account. *See supra* ¶¶ 47(i). Although Cohen's stay at Subject Premises-4 is temporary, based on my training and experience I know that individuals who travel or stay in hotels for short-term periods commonly bring portable electronic devices with them, such as cellular phones, tablets, or laptops. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-4, where Cohen currently appears to be residing, contains electronic devices, including Subject Device-1, Subject Device-2, and/or certain Apple products, that for the reasons discussed herein are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses.

d. Moreover, as set forth above, based on cellphone location information I know that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 were in the vicinity of Subject Premises-4 as recently as this morning (April 8, 2018). As set forth above, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen used the Subject Devices in furtherance of the Subject Offenses, including to communicate with Sterling employees regarding the medallion transaction, with First Republic employees regarding

the Essential Consultants Account, with his accountant regarding his finances, and with

52. Although Cohen appears to be residing currently in Subject Premises-4, it is unknown whether Cohen will be physically present within Subject Premises-4 at the moment the warrant sought herein are executed. If Cohen is within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 – his cellphones – will likely also be within Subject Premises-4. If Cohen is not within Subject Premises-4 at that moment, the devices will likely be on his person, wherever he is located (which, based on location data for Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 as recently as today, is likely to be in the Southern District of New York). As such, this warrant seeks separate authority to seize Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2, in the event that those devices are not located within Subject Premises-4 (or another Subject Premises) at the moment the warrants sought herein are executed.

D. Probable Cause Justifying Search of ESI

53. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and Subject Premises-4 contain electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses (and, as set forth above, that Subject Device-1 and Subject Device-2 are themselves electronic devices that are likely to contain evidence of the Subject Offenses). Specifically, based on my review of information produced pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants, the iCloud Warrant, and subpoenas, as well as pen register data, I submit that there is probable cause that Subject Premises-1 contains an Apple iPad Mini, a MacBook Pro, and has, at various times, contained Apple cellphones; similarly, there is probable cause that Subject Premises-2 contains a computer and has, at various times, contained Apple

cellphones. These devices are likely to include evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses for the following reasons:

a. As described throughout this affidavit, Cohen used email to send and receive communications related to the Subject Offenses. In particular, Cohen used email to send and receive communications with Sterling, First Republic, [REDACTED] the entities to which he is providing consulting services [REDACTED] among others. While some of these emails have already been obtained via subpoenas and search warrants, I know from my training and experience that individuals can and do delete emails from their Internet-based inboxes but retain copies of those emails on their hard drives. I also know that individuals often have multiple email accounts, some of which may not be known to law enforcement, and as a result electronic devices can be a unique repository of all emails relevant to certain Subject Offenses. Indeed, from my involvement in this investigation, I know that Cohen had an email account with the Trump Organization, but the USAO and FBI have not been able to obtain the contents of that account to date. Thus, emails relevant to the Subject Offenses are likely stored on electronic devices in Subject Premises-1, Subject Premises-2 and/or Subject Premises-4.

b. Additionally, Subject Premises-1, Subject Premise-2 and Subject Premises-4 likely contain electronic copies of documents relevant to the Subject Offenses. Indeed, I know from my training and experience that individuals often retain copies of important documents on their computers or other electronic devices capable of storing information, including cellphones (such as the Subject Devices) and tablets. Here, there are a number of documents that Cohen has likely retained that will be relevant to the Subject Offenses. For example, electronic devices may include documentation of Cohen's true net worth, a listing of his assets, an accounting of his available

cash, consulting agreements with third parties, and [REDACTED] among other evidence of the Subject Offenses.

c. Third, I know from my review of emails obtained pursuant to the Cohen Email Warrants that Cohen set up online banking with First Republic. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who set up online banking often receive electronic notices concerning financial transactions and, on occasion, save records of their financial transactions to their devices. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's electronic devices contain evidence of banking activity, including the existence of bank accounts or assets that Cohen did not disclose to Sterling or Melrose.

d. Fourth, from my review of records produced by Apple, I know that Cohen communicates using text message as well as encrypted communications applications. These applications that Cohen has downloaded onto a phone include, but are not limited to, WhatsApp, Signal, and Dust. I know from my review of toll records and text messages that, in particular, Cohen communicated with [REDACTED] using these encrypted applications. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen's cellphones – the Subject Devices – will contain encrypted messages that are not otherwise accessible relating to the Subject Offenses.

54. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals who engage in financial crimes commonly use computers to communicate with co-conspirators, keep financial ledgers, and retain fraudulent documents. As a result, they often store data on their computers related to their illegal activity, which can include logs of online or cellphone-based "chats" with co-conspirators; email correspondence; contact information of co-conspirators, including telephone numbers, email addresses, and identifiers for instant messaging and social media accounts; bank account numbers; and/or records of uses of funds.

55. Based on my training and experience, I also know that, where computers are used in furtherance of criminal activity, evidence of the criminal activity can often be found months or even years after it occurred. This is typically true because:

- Electronic files can be stored on a hard drive for years at little or no cost and users thus have little incentive to delete data that may be useful to consult in the future.
- Even when a user does choose to delete data, the data can often be recovered months or years later with the appropriate forensic tools. When a file is “deleted” on a home computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear, but instead remains on the hard drive, in “slack space,” until it is overwritten by new data that cannot be stored elsewhere on the computer. Similarly, files that have been viewed on the Internet are generally downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache,” which is only overwritten as the “cache” fills up and is replaced with more recently viewed Internet pages. Thus, the ability to retrieve from a hard drive or other electronic storage media depends less on when the file was created or viewed than on a particular user’s operating system, storage capacity, and computer habits.
- In the event that a user changes computers, the user will typically transfer files from the old computer to the new computer, so as not to lose data. In addition, users often keep backups of their data on electronic storage media such as thumb drives, flash memory cards, CD-ROMs, or portable hard drives.

56. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that Cohen engaged in the Subject Offenses, and that evidence of this criminal activity is likely to be found in the Subject Premises, on computers and electronic media found in the Subject Premises, and on the Subject Devices. In particular, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to the proposed warrants, including the following:

- a. Evidence necessary to establish the occupancy or ownership of the Subject Premises, including without limitation, utility and telephone bills, mail envelopes, addressed correspondence, bank statements, identification documents, and keys.
- b. Evidence relating to Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

d. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

e. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

f. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

g. Evidence relating to Cohen's net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records.

h. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen.





p. Communications with others, including [redacted] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

q. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

r. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

III. Procedures for Searching ESI

A. Execution of Warrant for ESI

57. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) provides that a warrant to search for and seize property "may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or

copying of electronically stored information . . . for later review.” Consistent with Rule 41, this application requests authorization to seize any computer devices and storage media and transport them to an appropriate law enforcement facility for review. This is typically necessary for a number of reasons:

- First, the volume of data on computer devices and storage media is often impractical for law enforcement personnel to review in its entirety at the search location.
- Second, because computer data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, computer devices are ideally examined in a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, where trained personnel, using specialized software, can make a forensic copy of the storage media that can be subsequently reviewed in a manner that does not change the underlying data.
- Third, there are so many types of computer hardware and software in use today that it can be impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized personnel and equipment potentially required to safely access the underlying computer data.
- Fourth, many factors can complicate and prolong recovery of data from a computer device, including the increasingly common use of passwords, encryption, or other features or configurations designed to protect or conceal data on the computer, which often take considerable time and resources for forensic personnel to detect and resolve.

58. As discussed herein, Squire Patton Boggs is a functioning law firm that conducts legitimate business unrelated to Cohen’s commission of the Subject Offenses. Subject Premises-2 is an office located inside of Squire Patton Boggs’s New York office. In order to execute the warrant in the most reasonable fashion, law enforcement personnel will attempt to investigate on the scene of what computers or storage media, if any, must be seized or copied, and what computers or storage media need not be seized or copied. Law enforcement personnel will speak with Squire Patton Boggs personnel on the scene as may be appropriate to determine which files and electronic devices within Subject Premises-2 belong to or were used by Cohen. While, based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Cohen shared electronic devices or a server with Squire Patton Boggs, where appropriate, law enforcement personnel will copy data, rather than physically seize

computers, to reduce the extent of any disruption of Squire Patton Boggs's operations. If, after inspecting the seized computers off-site, it is determined that some or all of this equipment is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the evidence, the Government will return it.

59. Additionally, because Cohen is an attorney, and claims to serve as a personal attorney for Trump, the review of evidence seized from the Subject Premises and Subject Devices will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

B. Accessing ESI on the Subject Devices

60. As described above, the Subject Devices are both Apple brand devices.

61. I know from my training and experience, as well as from information found in publicly available materials including those published by Apple, that some models of Apple devices such as iPhones and iPads offer their users the ability to unlock the device via the use of a fingerprint or thumbprint (collectively, "fingerprint") in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Touch ID. I also know that the Apple iPhone X offers its users the ability to unlock the device via the use of facial recognition (through infrared and visible light scans) in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. This feature is called Face ID.

62. If a user enables Touch ID on a given Apple device, he or she can register up to 5 fingerprints that can be used to unlock that device. The user can then use any of the registered

fingerprints to unlock the device by pressing the relevant finger(s) to the device's Touch ID sensor, which is found in the round button (often referred to as the "home" button) found at the bottom center of the front of the device. If a user enables Face ID on a given Apple device, he or she can unlock the device by raising the iPhone to his or her face, or tapping the screen. In my training and experience, users of Apple devices that offer Touch ID or Face ID often enable it because it is considered to be a more convenient way to unlock the device than by entering a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password, as well as a more secure way to protect the device's contents.

63. In some circumstances, Touch ID or Face ID cannot be used to unlock a device that has either security feature enabled, and a passcode or password must be used instead. These circumstances include: (1) when the device has just been turned on or restarted; (2) when more than 48 hours has passed since the last time the device was unlocked; (3) when the passcode or password has not been entered in the last 6 days, and the device has not been unlocked via Touch ID in the last 8 hours or the device has not been unlocked via Face ID in the last 4 hours; (4) the device has received a remote lock command; or (5) five unsuccessful attempts to unlock the device via Touch ID or Face ID are made.

64. The passcodes or passwords that would unlock the Subject Devices are not known to law enforcement. Thus, it will likely be necessary to press the fingers of the user of the Subject Devices to the devices' Touch ID sensor, or hold the Subject Devices in front of the user's face to activate the Face ID sensor, in an attempt to unlock the devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant. Attempting to unlock the relevant Apple devices via Touch ID with the use of the fingerprints of the user, or via Face ID by holding the device in front of the user's face, is necessary because the government may not otherwise be able to access the data contained on those devices for the purpose of executing the search authorized by this warrant.

65. Based on these facts and my training and experience, it is likely that Cohen is the user of the Subject Devices, and thus that his fingerprints are among those that are able to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or his face is able to unlock the Subject Devices via Face ID.

66. Although I do not know which of a given user's 10 fingerprints is capable of unlocking a particular device, based on my training and experience I know that it is common for a user to unlock a Touch ID-enabled Apple device via the fingerprints on thumbs or index fingers. In the event that law enforcement is unable to unlock the Subject Devices as described above within the five attempts permitted by Touch ID, this will simply result in the device requiring the entry of a password or passcode before it can be unlocked.

67. I also know from my training and experience, and my review of publicly available materials published by Apple that Apple brand devices, such as the Subject Devices, have a feature that allows a user to erase the contents of the device remotely. By logging into the Internet, the user or any other individual who possesses the user's account information can take steps to completely wipe the contents of the device, thereby destroying evidence of criminal conduct, along with any other information on the device. The only means to prevent this action is to disable the device's ability to connect to the Internet immediately upon seizure, which requires either access to the device itself to alter the settings, or the use of specialized equipment that is not consistently available to law enforcement agents at every arrest.

68. Due to the foregoing, I request that the Court authorize law enforcement to press the fingers (including thumbs) of Cohen to the Touch ID sensors the Subject Devices, or hold the Subject Devices in front of Cohen's face, for the purpose of attempting to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or Face ID in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant.

C. Review of ESI

69. Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

70. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to determine which files or other ESI contain evidence or fruits of the Subject Offenses. Such techniques may include, for example:

- surveying directories or folders and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- conducting a file-by-file review by “opening” or reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents (analogous to performing a cursory examination of each document in a file cabinet to determine its relevance);
- “scanning” storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted data or deliberately hidden files; and
- performing electronic keyword searches through all electronic storage areas to determine the existence and location of data potentially related to the subject matter of the investigation³⁴; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

³⁴ Keyword searches alone are typically inadequate to detect all relevant data. For one thing, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files, such as images and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, there may be information properly subject to seizure but that is not captured by a keyword search because the information does not contain the keywords being searched.

71. Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to restrict their search to data falling within the categories of evidence specified in the warrant. Depending on the circumstances, however, law enforcement personnel may need to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.


D. Return of ESI

72. If the Government determines that the electronic devices are no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the data, and the devices themselves are not subject to seizure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the Government will return these items, upon request. Computer data that is encrypted or unreadable will not be returned unless law enforcement personnel have determined that the data is not (i) an instrumentality of the offense, (ii) a fruit of the criminal activity, (iii) contraband, (iv) otherwise unlawfully possessed, or (v) evidence of the Subject Offenses.

IV. Conclusion and Ancillary Provisions

73. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrants.

74. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.


Special Agent
FBI

Sworn to before me on
8th day of April, 2018

/s/ Henry B. Pitman
HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address) Case No.

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1728, New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment D

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment D

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-22-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-8-18 7:59 p.m. /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT D

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1728 located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 17th floor of the hotel.

~~**II. Items to Be Seized**~~

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.

2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

IV. Conclusion and Ancillary Provisions

73. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachments A, B, C, D, E and F to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrants.

74. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



Special Agent
FBI

Sworn to before me on
8th day of April, 2018 *BY TELEPHONE*


HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORIGINAL

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Southern District of New York

18 MAG 2968

Case No.

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628,)
New York, New York 10065, and any closed)
containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York

(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628 (a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, "Room 1628"), New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-16-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

[] Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-9-18 7:18 AM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1628 (a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, “Room 1628”), located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 16th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and any payments by [REDACTED] to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including [REDACTED] and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

Case No.

Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628,)
New York, New York 10065, and any closed)
containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York

(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
Loews Regency Hotel, 540 Park Avenue, Room 1628 (a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, "Room 1628"), New York, New York 10065, and any closed containers/items contained therein, See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-16-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[x] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

[] Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [] for days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-9-18 7:18 am /s/ Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
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Inventory made in the presence of :

Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the Court.

Date: _____

Executing officer's signature

Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT A

I. Premises to be Searched—Subject Premises-4

The premises to be searched (“Subject Premises-4”) are described as follows, and include electronic devices, and all locked and closed containers found therein:

Room 1628 (a suite encompassing rooms 1628, 1629, and 1630) (collectively, “Room 1628”), located inside the Loews Regency Hotel at 540 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10065. The building is a luxury hotel located on Park Avenue and 61st Street. Subject Premises-4 is located on the 16th floor of the hotel.

II. Items to Be Seized

A. Evidence, Fruits, and Instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy, as it pertains to the other Subject Offenses), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), and 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offenses”), described as follows:

a. Evidence relating to Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

b. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him.

c. Evidence relating to a plan, proposal, or agreement to modify loans that Cohen has with Sterling and/or Melrose.

d. Evidence relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or the nature of any work done by Cohen or any other individuals in connection with Essential Consultants.

e. Evidence of income to Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including any documents that indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Michael D. Cohen & Associates, or evidence of the purpose of accounts opened in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates.

f. Evidence relating to Cohen’s net worth, available cash and cash equivalents, monthly and annual income, income sources, and other assets, whether held personally or through entities, including tax returns, personal financial statements, and bank records, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

g. Evidence relating to agreements, loans, and/or financial transactions between Cohen and [REDACTED] and/or entities controlled by [REDACTED]

████████████████████ and any payments by ██████████ to Cohen, from January 1, 2012 to the present.



o. Communications with others, including ██████████ and/or other accountants, relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

p. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution related to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution, from January 1, 2013 to the present.

q. Evidence of Cohen's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

B. Search and Seizure of Electronically Stored Information

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include any computer devices and storage media that may contain any electronically stored information falling within the categories set forth in Section II.A of this Attachment above, including, but not limited to, a MacBook Pro, any other desktop and laptop computers, any Apple iPhone or other cellphone or smartphone

belonging to Michael Cohen or in his possession, an Apple iPad Mini, portable hard drives, disk drives, thumb drives, and personal digital assistants. In lieu of seizing any such computer devices or storage media, this warrant also authorizes the copying of such devices or media for later review.

The items to be seized from Subject Premises-4 also include:

1. Any items or records needed to access the data stored on any seized or copied computer devices or storage media, including but not limited to any physical keys, encryption devices, or records of login credentials, passwords, private encryption keys, or similar information.
2. Any items or records that may facilitate a forensic examination of the computer devices or storage media, including any hardware or software manuals or other information concerning the configuration of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.
3. Any evidence concerning the identities or locations of those persons with access to, control over, or ownership of the seized or copied computer devices or storage media.

C. Review of ESI

Following seizure of any computer devices and storage media and/or the creation of forensic image copies, law enforcement personnel (which may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained therein for information responsive to the warrant.

In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various techniques to locate information responsive to the warrant, including, for example:

- surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain (analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
- opening or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to determine their precise contents;
- scanning storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files or deliberately hidden files;
- performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation; and
- reviewing metadata, system information, configuration files, registry data, and any other information reflecting how, when, and by whom the computer was used.

Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to search only for files, documents, or other electronically stored information within the categories identified in Sections II.A and II.B of this Attachment. However, law enforcement personnel are authorized to conduct a complete review of all the ESI from seized devices or storage media if necessary to evaluate its contents and to locate all data responsive to the warrant.

Additionally, review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.



B. The Provider, the Subject Account and the Subject Offenses

2. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 for all content and other information associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Account”), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the “MDCPC Account”), [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “[REDACTED] Account”), [REDACTED] (the [REDACTED] Account”), and [REDACTED]@aol.com (the “[REDACTED] Account”) (collectively, the “Subject Accounts”). The Cohen Account, [REDACTED] Account, and [REDACTED] Account are maintained and controlled by Google, Inc., headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043 (“Google”), the MDCPC Account is maintained and controlled by 1 & 1 Internet, Inc., headquartered at 701 Lee Road, Suite 300, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania 19087 (“1 & 1”), and th [REDACTED] Account is maintained and controlled by Oath, Inc., 22000 AOL Way, Dulles, Virginia 20166 (“Oath”) (together, the “Providers”). The information to be searched is described in the following paragraphs and in Attachments A, B, C and D to the proposed warrants.

3. As detailed below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”). The Target Subjects of this investigation are MICHAEL COHEN (“Cohen”) and others known and unknown. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge, my review of documents produced pursuant to grand jury subpoenas and prior search warrants, my review of interview reports prepared by other law enforcement officers, and my conversations with other law enforcement officers, as well as

my training and experience concerning the use of email in criminal activity. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts I have learned during my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

C. Services and Records of the Provider

4. I have learned the following about the Providers:

a. The Providers offer email services to the public. In particular, Google permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under the domain name gmail.com. Google also allows a subscriber to maintain email accounts under any domain name under the subscriber's control. For example, if a subscriber controls the domain name ' [REDACTED] ' Google enables the subscriber to host any email address under this domain name on servers operated by Google. Oath permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under the domain name aol.com. 1 & 1 permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under any domain name under the subscriber's control. For example, if a subscriber controls the domain name [REDACTED] ' 1 & 1 enables the subscriber to host any email address under this domain name on servers operated by 1 & 1. A subscriber using the Providers' services can access his or her email account from any computer connected to the Internet.

b. The Providers maintain the following records and information with respect to every subscriber account:

i. *Email contents.* In general, any email (which can include attachments such as documents, images, and videos) sent to or from a subscriber's account, or stored in draft form in the account, is maintained on the Providers' servers unless and until the subscriber deletes the email. If the subscriber does not delete the email, it can remain on the Providers' computers

indefinitely. Even if the subscriber deletes the email, it may continue to be available on the Provider's servers for a certain period of time.

ii. *Address book.* The Providers also allow subscribers to maintain the equivalent of an address book, comprising email addresses and other contact information of other email users.

iii. *Subscriber and billing information.* The Providers collect and maintain (typically unverified) identifying information about each subscriber, including, for example, name, username, address, telephone number, and alternate email addresses. The Providers also maintain records concerning the date on which the account was created, the Internet protocol ("IP") address of the user at the time of account creation, the current status of the account (*e.g.*, active or closed), the length of service, and the types of services utilized by the subscriber. Additionally, for paying subscribers, the Providers maintain records of the subscriber's means and source of payment, including any credit card or bank account number.

iv. *Transactional information.* The Providers also typically retain certain transactional information about the use of each account on its system. This information can include records of login (*i.e.*, session) times and durations and the methods used to connect to the account (such as logging into the account through the Providers' website).

v. *Customer correspondence.* The Providers also typically maintain records of any customer service contacts with or about the subscriber, including any inquiries or complaints concerning the subscriber's account.

vi. *Search history.* Google and Oath also typically maintain records of any search history or web history associated with the subscriber's account.

vii. *Associated content.* Google also typically maintains content and records relating to the following applications that are associated with its e-mail accounts: (A) “Google Docs,” which provides document-editing software that can be used to create, share, store, and manage documents online; (B) “Google Drive,” which enables users to store files on Google servers, where they can be accessed remotely by the user and others; and (C) “Gchat” or “Instant Messenger,” which provides a chat interface through which users can communicate with each other in real time. Oath also typically maintains content and records relating to AOL instant message, which provides a chat interface through which users can communicate with each other in real time.

viii. *Preserved and backup records.* The Providers also maintain preserved copies of the foregoing categories of records with respect to an account, for at least 90 days, upon receiving a preservation request from the Government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f). The Providers may also maintain backup copies of the foregoing categories of records pursuant to its own data retention policy.

D. Jurisdiction and Authority to Issue Warrant

5. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(A), the Government may require a provider of an electronic communications service or a remote computing service, such as the Providers, to disclose all stored content and all non-content records or other information pertaining to a subscriber, by obtaining a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

6. A search warrant under § 2703 may be issued by “any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge of such a court)” that “has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i).

7. When the Government obtains records under § 2703 pursuant to a search warrant, the Government is not required to notify the subscriber of the existence of the warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), (c)(2) & (3). Additionally, the Government may obtain an order precluding the Provider from notifying the subscriber or any other person of the warrant, for such period as the Court deems appropriate, where there is reason to believe that such notification will seriously jeopardize an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

E. Prior Applications

8. On or about July 18, 2017, in connection with an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Account sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained from Judge Howell search warrants for emails in the Cohen Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017, and emails in the MDCPC Account sent or received between the opening of the account and November 13, 2017. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of their investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office. As part of that referral, the SCO provided the USAO with emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the search warrants executed by the SCO, which had already been reviewed for privilege.¹ As discussed below, this affidavit is based in part on my review of

¹ In an abundance of caution, in a separate application the USAO has sought authorization, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, to review the emails obtained pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants for evidence related to certain additional conduct that was not the focus of the Prior Cohen Account Warrants. The emails obtained from the Prior Cohen Account Warrants that relate to that additional conduct do not form a basis for the instant application.

responsive materials produced pursuant to the July 18 and November 13, 2017 warrants (the “Prior Cohen Account Warrants”).

9. On or about November 7, 2017, and January 4, 2018, as well as certain prior dates, the SCO sought and obtained from Judge Howell orders authorizing and extending the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to record communications sent to or from the Cohen Account. The SCO has provided pen register data obtained pursuant to those orders to the USAO. This affidavit, as discussed below, is based in part on my review of the pen register data obtained pursuant to the November 7, 2017 and January 4, 2018 orders (the “Pen Register Data”).

10. On or about February 16, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained from the Honorable Debra Freeman, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of New York, an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for email header information associated with the MDCPC Account. This affidavit, as discussed below, is based in part on my review of email header information produced by 1 & 1 in response to that order (the “MDCPC Header Information”).

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview

11. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, a scheme by Target Subject Michael Cohen to defraud multiple banks. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

12. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth

in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally omitted cash assets that he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; and (iii) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, [REDACTED] in connection with [REDACTED] acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to and had secured proposed agreements from the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations worth millions of dollars.

13. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, MDCPC Header Information, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, I have learned that Cohen has used the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account to, among other things, (i) communicate with [REDACTED] and their attorney, [REDACTED] about the proposed transfer of Cohen's medallions and associated debts; (ii) negotiate a pay-down of the principal amount of the taxi medallion loans; (iii) communicate with his accountant about the contents of the false financial statements at issue; and (iv) send those false financial statements to banks. Additionally, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account, respectively, to communicate with Cohen about the status of the taxi medallion transaction, and to send relevant financial statements to banks. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

14. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through limited liability corporations ("LLCs") controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling

National Bank (“Sterling”) and the Melrose Credit Union (“Melrose”), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions were devalued, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash, and financial outlook. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my review of reports prepared by law enforcement officers of interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the “Sterling Employee-1”) and my participation in an interview with a Sterling employee (the “Sterling Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).² Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One Bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to pay his monthly loan payments.

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling

² One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One Bank. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One Bank in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion corporations entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the corporation. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. In total, Sterling agreed to lend

approximately \$22 million to the Cohens' companies. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of that debt to Melrose.³ Under the terms of Sterling's participation agreements with Melrose, Sterling was precluded from amending or modifying the loans without the consent of Melrose.

d. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.⁴ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

e. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies and significant devaluation of taxi medallions. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around

³ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA").

⁴ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8, 2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen's statements, his personal financial information "indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments." Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen's monthly payments.

f. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks. According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen's representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by,

among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

g. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallions to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent from the Cohen Account to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

h. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that

Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, [REDACTED] emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the [REDACTED] Account to inquire about the status of the transaction. Sterling Employee-1 responded to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account that Melrose had agreed to the deal, and that Sterling would be sending [REDACTED] a term sheet shortly.

i. In order for the banks to evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about October 26, 2016, a Sterling employee emailed the [REDACTED] Account about the "Cohen Medallion Purchase," and stated "[i]n order to proceed with the assumption of Michael's loans," Sterling needed certain financial information from [REDACTED] responded from the [REDACTED] Account, copying [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, that he would send a financial statement and tax returns shortly. Additionally, on or about June 7, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an "updated personal financial statement," completed jointly with Cohen's wife, and Cohen's most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the Cohen Account, attaching a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the "May 2017 Financial Statement"), that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen's accountant [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in

cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.

j. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed each line of the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about the cash amount listed on the May 2017 Financial Statement. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

k. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen at the Cohen Account and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. On or about August 29, 2017, [REDACTED] emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the [REDACTED] Account, requesting that he be included on "all future e-mails to [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] concerning this matter," and providing proposed edits to the term sheet. On or about August 30, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, Cohen at the Cohen Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, and provided them with a revised term sheet. On or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, Cohen at the Cohen Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

l. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the

remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789 respectively in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

m. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling required and requested additional financial statements for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about October 5, 2017, [REDACTED] sent from the [REDACTED] Account to a Sterling employee a copy of [REDACTED] personal financial statement. The financial statement lists the [REDACTED] Account as the email contact for [REDACTED]. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Account, re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Account, emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

n. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED] Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000. Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),⁵ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first time, he indicated was held in trust). The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

o. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that at or around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the

⁵ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank – that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

p. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018, from the Cohen Account, stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would "bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential." Cohen also requested by email sent from the Cohen Account on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen's debts have been satisfied and that Cohen's personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

q. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] attorney, emailed attorneys for Sterling from the [REDACTED] Account and stated that "at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward."

r. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen's loans to an employee at Sterling who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans ("Sterling Employee-3"). From my review of telephone call notes, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or

restructuring Cohen's outstanding taxi medallion loans. Based on my review of an email between Sterling Employee-3 and Cohen, I know that on the January 30, 2018 call, Cohen stated that he would send a "corrected current" version of his personal financial statement. Following that call, on or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account a copy of the September 2017 Financial Statement. Later that day, Cohen again emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to \$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen at the Cohen Account and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

s. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Sterling continues to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position.

C. Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work


15. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in purported consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen withheld information about liquid financial assets at First Republic.

16. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with two First Republic employees, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities.


⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the “Essential Consultants Account”). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, a First Republic employee (“First Republic Employee-1”) conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions⁷ about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen’s statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, the account was not intended to receive—and does not appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.




⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen’s statements.



d. Second, I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC, which were deposited into the Essential Consultants Account. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.



ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, Cohen began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$999,800.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T wired \$100,000 to the Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received nine \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T wired \$550,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (“KAI”). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a “monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017.”

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about January 10, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$2,883,132.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23.

e. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the "MDC&A Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

17. Based on my review of emails from the Cohen Account that were seized pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account ostensibly were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration.¹⁰ Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Account and public sources, I have learned the following:

¹⁰ Based on my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen is not registered as a lobbyist or as a person acting as an agent of foreign principals, as may have been required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the Cohen Account to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services, as requested” by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017.

b. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email from an alternate email address, copying the Cohen Account, to an employee of BTA Bank. To the email, Cohen attached an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about February 13, 2017, Cohen emailed an AT&T employee from the Cohen Account what appears to be a consulting agreement, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about January 17, 2017, Cohen emailed to a representative of Novartis from the Cohen Account a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that

relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in even monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm, announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

18. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] and my review of notes and a [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at a law firm in Manhattan, New York. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen at the Cohen

Account in which [REDACTED] wrote that “[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017” and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any assets associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: “[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value.

d. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[l]ooks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. Neither Essential Consultants nor MDC&A was listed on the September 2017 Financial Statement that was provided to Sterling.

19. Based on the foregoing, and from my review of bank records and emails sent by Cohen to Sterling, I know that the September 2017 Financial Statement made no mention whatsoever of assets that Cohen held in the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account. As of September 30, 2017—the date of the September 2017 Financial Statement—Cohen had

approximately \$673,729.95 in the Essential Consultants Account and \$248,619.28 in the MDC&A Account. As of October 6, 2017, the date when [REDACTED] asked Cohen about the two accounts, Cohen had approximately \$823,709.95 in the Essential Consultants Account and \$248,619.28 in the MDC&A Account.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

20. In addition to withholding the existence of the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant, I have learned that Cohen had over \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife—and the total balance across the two accounts as of September 30, 2017 was \$300,096.72.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$5,014,051.80 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, Signature Bank, TD Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.

21. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or approve of the transfer of those loans to

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

22. As set forth in detail below, it appears that during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED], Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side deal he had negotiated with [REDACTED] it appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately

\$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and reports prepared by law enforcement officers of interviews with Sterling Employee-1, as well as my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. *See supra* ¶ 14(k). According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED], including a \$3.8 million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

23. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and a report prepared by law enforcement agents of an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side-payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."¹¹

b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.

24. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

¹¹ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.

D. Probable Cause Regarding the Subject Accounts

25. As set forth above, since at least September 2015, if not earlier, Cohen has told Sterling that he has difficulty making payments on his medallion loans and, since at least October 2016, Cohen has been actively engaged in an attempt to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debts to [REDACTED]. In the course of doing so, Cohen has used the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account to engage in email communications regarding the terms of the transactions and the undisclosed side-payment with [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account. Specifically, as described above, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts have been used regarding the proposed Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction with Sterling:

a. Cohen has used the Cohen Account to, among other things, negotiate a pay-down of the principal amount of the loan, *see supra* ¶ 14(g), to send term sheets to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(j), to communicate with his accountant about the contents of financial statements, *see supra* ¶ 16, to send financial statements to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(i), (l), to check on the status of the transaction as of January 24, 2018, *see supra* ¶ 14(n), to negotiate a reduction of his debt with Sterling on or around January 31, 2018, *see supra* ¶ 14(o), to tell Sterling on February 1, 2018, he does not have the ability to pay more than \$1,250,000, *see supra* ¶ 14(p), and to communicate with individuals responsible for sources of payments to the Essential Consultants Account, *see supra* ¶ 15. In other words, from the communications described above, it appears likely that the Cohen Account will contain recent evidence of the Subject Offenses, including communications and potential misrepresentations to Sterling, and evidence indicating that statements made to Sterling are false or misleading.

b. [REDACTED] has used the [REDACTED] Account to communicate about the proposed taxi medallion transaction with Cohen, which appears to have been discussed as early

as October 2016. *See supra* ¶ 14(g).¹² Specifically, as described above, as early as May 2, 2017, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to inquire about the status of the transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(h). He used the [REDACTED] Account to exchange drafts of the proposed term sheet with Cohen, [REDACTED] and Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(j). The [REDACTED] Account was also used by [REDACTED] to send a personal financial statement for [REDACTED] to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(l). The [REDACTED] Account was copied on emails from the [REDACTED] Account about the transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(i), and was listed on [REDACTED] financial statement as the contact email for [REDACTED], *see supra* ¶ 14(m). Additionally, based on my review of MDCPC Header Information, I know that on or about September 1, 2017—at or around the time the [REDACTED] and Cohen were negotiating a term sheet—[REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to send and receive eight emails from Cohen at the MDCPC Account.

c. [REDACTED] has used the [REDACTED] Account to communicate with Sterling employees, Cohen, and [REDACTED] about the proposed taxi medallion transaction since at least December 2016. *See supra* ¶¶ 14(g), 24(c). Specifically, on or about August 29, 2017, [REDACTED] told Sterling that he should be included on “all future e-mails” involving the proposed transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(j). Additionally, [REDACTED] was involved in making revisions to the parties’ term sheets, and he told Sterling on January 29, 2018 that [REDACTED] would not go forward with the planned transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(j), (n). Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that the [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence of the negotiations between Sterling and the parties, evidence of a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] and the reasons for the collapse of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction.

¹² For instance, from records provided by Sterling, I know that on or about December 2, 2016, [REDACTED] sent an email to a Sterling employee using the [REDACTED] Account. The email forwarded correspondence between [REDACTED] who was using the [REDACTED] Account, and an employee of Capital One regarding extending [REDACTED] loan with Capital One.

26. Additionally, it appears that Cohen set up the MDCPC Account to receive emails he was previously receiving at the Cohen Account. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that on or about May 5, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the MDCPC Account to a blind copy list of recipients stating that “[d]ue to the overwhelming volume of phone calls and emails coming into my previous cellular number and e-mail address, I have elected to create for Clients Only the following. Kindly use this new information for all future contact and communications.” The signature line on the email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC,” as well as the MDCPC Account as the email address.¹³

27. In addition, based on my review of emails from the MDCPC Account produced pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants and the MDCPC Header Information, I have learned that Cohen has used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from the Cohen Account, to communicate with the [REDACTED] Account, and to send and receive emails from other email accounts about his political consulting business. Additionally, from my review of the MDCPC Header Information, it appears that since the [REDACTED] Cohen has continued to send and receive emails at the MDCPC Account that appear likely to be relevant to the commission of the Subject Offenses. For example, emails obtained pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, as well as the MDCPC Header Information have revealed the following:

- a. On approximately eight occasions in August and September 2017, while Cohen, [REDACTED] were communicating about a term sheet for the Cohen-[REDACTED] taxi

¹³ Based on my review of emails from the MDCPC Account obtained pursuant to subpoena, I have learned that Cohen has used the account to communicate with numerous individuals with whom he does not enjoy an attorney-client privilege, including some of the individuals described below. *See infra* ¶ 27.

medallion transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(k), Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send or receive emails from [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account. For instance, on or about August 22, 2017, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1 and copied Cohen on the email at the MDCPC Account. On the same day, Sterling Employee-1 responded to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account and Cohen at the MDCPC Account. On or about August 22, 2017, Cohen also used the MDCPC Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1.

b. As noted above, on or about September 1, 2017, Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send or receive eight emails with the [REDACTED] Account.

c. Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from individuals who work at companies with whom it appears Cohen has a political consulting agreement. For example, beginning in April 2017—the same month when Cohen began receiving payments from AT&T, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(c)—Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from AT&T employees. These emails contain, among other things, invoices from Cohen to AT&T for consulting work by Cohen. Similarly, beginning in April 2017—which is also the month Cohen began receiving payments from Novartis for consulting work, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(d)—Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from employees of Novartis. These emails concern, among other things, invoices from Cohen and requests for Novartis for Cohen's assistance on an initiative relating to drug pricing.

d. From my review of the MDCPC Header Information, I have learned that Cohen has continued to use the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from individuals who work at companies with whom it appears Cohen had a political consulting agreement, such as Novartis and AT&T. For instance, on approximately six occasions between November 28, 2017 and January 30, 2018, the MDCPC Account was used to send and receive emails from accounts belonging to

individuals using @att.com email addresses. Similarly, on approximately seventeen occasions between December 1, 2017 and February 20, 2018, the MDCPC Account was used to send and receive emails from accounts belonging to individuals using @novartis.com email addresses. Since November 15, 2017, the MDCPC Account has also sent and received emails with individuals using the email domains @bta.kz, which I believe is the email domain used by employees of BTA Bank, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(b), and @squirepb.com, which I believe is the email domain used by employees of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs—both of which Cohen appears to have a consulting relationship with, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(e), 17(e). Accordingly, it appears that Cohen continues to use the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails that will be relevant to whether he is maintaining a consulting business, what type of consulting work he is doing, and whether he is receiving money for that consulting work.

28. In addition to the foregoing, based on my review of the Pen Register Data, *see supra* ¶ 9, it appears that since the date of the last search warrant on the Cohen Account (*i.e.*, November 13, 2017), Cohen has continued to use the Cohen Account to communicate with the [REDACTED] Account, the [REDACTED] Account, and other email accounts that appear likely to be relevant to the commission of the Subject Offenses described above. For example, the Pen Register Data has revealed the following:

a. Emails sent by the Cohen Account to the [REDACTED] Account on or about December 18, 2017 at 8:26 p.m., December 21, 2017 at 9:35 p.m., December 22, 2017 at 4:32 p.m., January 3, 2018 at 8:01 a.m., January 3, 2018 at 2:56 p.m., and January 4, 2018 at 3:31 p.m.

b. An email sent by the Cohen Account to the [REDACTED] Account on or about January 25, 2018 at 8:55 p.m.

c. Emails from the Cohen Account to the email account [REDACTED] on or about December 1, 2017 at 2:14 p.m., December 29, 2017 at 10:20 p.m., January 2, 2018 at 3:52 p.m., January 2, 2018 at 5:44 p.m., and January 8, 2018 at 6:38 p.m. Based upon my review of emails contained in the Cohen Account, I have learned that the [REDACTED] email account belongs to [REDACTED] Cohen's accountant, through whom Cohen made misrepresentations to financial institutions, as discussed above.

d. Emails from the Cohen Account to email accounts belonging to Sterling employees, including Sterling Employee-1, on or about January 25, 2018 at 10:23 p.m., January 26, 2018 at 12:55 a.m., January 29, 2018 at 5:30 p.m., January 29, 2018 at 8:29 p.m., January 30, 2018 at 6:44 p.m.

e. An email sent from the Cohen Account to the email account clientservicenyc@firstrepublic.com on or about January 25, 2018 at 5:29 p.m. As stated above, First Republic is the bank at which the Essential Consultants Account is held.

f. Numerous emails sent from the Cohen Account to the email account [REDACTED] including emails on or about December 4, 2017 at 2:17 p.m. and January 29, 2018 at 5:43 p.m. Based upon the email address and domain name, as well as my review of reports of interviews and documents reflecting that Cohen's taxi medallions were leased and operated by [REDACTED], I believe that the [REDACTED] email address belongs to [REDACTED]

29. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that Cohen used the Cohen Account to send and receive documents related to the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction. Based on my training and experience, I know that Google allows users of e-mail accounts to easily save documents to file sharing and retention platforms such as Google Docs and Google Drive. I

also know, from my training and experience, that users of e-mail accounts often use instant messaging interfaces linked to their email accounts. Further, I have learned that the Providers maintain records of search and web histories associated with email accounts and, based on my training and experience, users of e-mail accounts use associated web search browsers associated with a subscriber's account to research topics they are e-mailing about. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that content information associated with the Subject Accounts will also contain evidence related to the Subject Offenses.

30. Thus, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that emails and other content information from the Subject Accounts will contain evidence of Cohen's efforts to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debt, and his misrepresentations and omissions to Sterling and Melrose in connection with these negotiations. Although Cohen appears to have communicated with [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] primarily through the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account, I know, based on my involvement in the investigation, that Cohen also used at least one other email account associated with his position at the Trump Organization. Thus, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that emails and other content information from the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account since on or about October 1, 2016—the approximate date of when Cohen's efforts to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debt began—will reflect communications with the Cohen Account, MDCPC Account, and possibly one or more additional accounts used by Cohen, and probable cause to believe that such emails will constitute evidence of Cohen's commission of the Subject Offenses, including the extent to which Cohen did or did not inform other individuals involved in the conduct described above—such as [REDACTED]—of his misstatements and omissions to financial institutions.

31. Temporal Limitation. This application seeks all emails and other requested content information specified in Attachments A, B, C, and D for the following periods:

a. For the Cohen Account, this application seeks all emails sent, created, or received between November 14, 2017, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, the SCO obtained and provided to the USAO emails from the Cohen Account that were sent, created, or received before November 14, 2017. This application also seeks other information specified above associated with the Cohen Account that was created between December 1, 2014 (the month when Cohen entered into the medallion loans with Sterling), and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive.

b. For the MDCPC Account, this application seeks all emails sent, created, or received between November 14, 2017, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, pursuant to a prior warrant, the SCO obtained and provided to the USAO emails from the MDCPC Account that were sent, created, or received before November 14, 2017.

c. For the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account, this application seeks emails and all other content information specified above sent, created, or received between October 1, 2016, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, October 2016 is the month in which Cohen began negotiating the taxi medallion sale with the [REDACTED]

d. For the [REDACTED] Account, this application seeks emails and all other content information specified above sent, created, or received between December 1, 2016, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, December 2016 is the month in which [REDACTED] began representing the [REDACTED] in relation to the taxi medallion transaction.

E. Evidence, Fruits and Instrumentalities

32. Based upon the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Google's servers associated with the Cohen Account will contain evidence,

fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachment A to the proposed warrant for the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Cohen Account or MDCPC Account.

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account and [REDACTED] relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

33. Based upon the foregoing, I further submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Google's servers associated with the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who

communicated with the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling, Melrose, or other financial institution(s), regarding Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account were accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

34. Based upon the foregoing, I further submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Oath's servers associated with the [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the [REDACTED] Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the [REDACTED] Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the [REDACTED] Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling, Melrose, or other financial institution(s), regarding Cohen's finances; and

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution.

III. Review of the Information Obtained Pursuant to the Warrant

35. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not required for service of a search warrant issued under § 2703, or for the collection or production of responsive records. Accordingly, the warrant requested herein will be transmitted to the Providers, which shall be directed to produce a digital copy of any responsive records to law enforcement personnel within 30 days from the date of service. Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the

status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will retain the records and review them for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses as specified in Section III of Attachments A, B and C to the proposed warrant.

36. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various methods to locate evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including but not limited to undertaking a cursory inspection of all emails within the Subject Account. This method is analogous to cursorily inspecting all the files in a file cabinet in an office to determine which paper evidence is subject to seizure. Although law enforcement personnel may use other methods as well, particularly including keyword searches, I know that keyword searches and similar methods are typically inadequate to detect all information subject to seizure. As an initial matter, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files commonly associated with emails, including attachments such as scanned documents, pictures, and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, keyword searches cannot be relied upon to capture all relevant communications in an account, as it is impossible to know in advance all of the unique words or phrases that investigative subjects will use in their communications, and consequently there are often many communications in an account that are relevant to an investigation but that do not contain any keywords that an agent is likely to search for.

37. Because Cohen and [REDACTED] are attorneys, the review of the content within the Subject Accounts will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable

privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

IV. Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing Order

38. The existence and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation are not publicly known. As a result, premature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested warrants could alert Cohen that he is under investigation, causing him to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. In particular, based on my experience investigating white collar cases, including cases featuring documents such as agreements, drafts of agreements, notes of conversations, and other documentary evidence, premature disclosure of an investigation may cause the target of the investigation to attempt to destroy or conceal such evidence. In addition, as also set forth above, Cohen uses computers and electronic communications in furtherance of his activity and thus could easily delete, encrypt, or otherwise conceal such digital evidence from law enforcement were he to learn of the Government’s investigation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(3). Cohen also appears to have the financial means that would facilitate his flight from prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(2), (5).

39. Accordingly, there is reason to believe that, were the Providers to notify the subscriber or others of the existence of the warrant, the investigation would be seriously jeopardized. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), I therefore respectfully request that the Court direct the Providers not to notify any person of the existence of the warrant for a period of 180 days from issuance, subject to extension upon application to the Court, if necessary.

40. For similar reasons, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government be permitted without further order of this Court to provide copies of the warrant and affidavit as

need be to personnel assisting it in the investigation and prosecution of this matter, and to disclose those materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

V. Conclusion

41. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that the Court issue the warrants sought herein pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (for contents) and § 2703(c)(1)(A) (for records and other information), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.




United States Attorney's Office
Southern District of New York

Sworn to before me this
28th day of February, 2018

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gabriel W. Gorenstein".

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Account
[REDACTED] maintained at
Premises Controlled by 1 & 1 Internet,
Inc., USAO Reference No.
2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: 1 & 1 Internet, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email account [REDACTED] maintained at premises controlled by 1 & 1 Internet, Inc., contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachment D hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachment D hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachment D. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 14 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.

2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Feb 28, 2018
Date Issued

10:45 a.m.
Time Issued


HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment D

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to 1 & 1 Internet, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 701 Lee Road, Suite 300, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania 19087, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED] (the "Subject Account") for the time period between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi

medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. The identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

18 MAG 169 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@gmail.com,
[REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED] Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Google, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com, [REDACTED]@gmail.com, and [REDACTED] maintained at premises controlled by Google, Inc., contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachments A and B hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachments A and B hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachments A and B. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 7 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via

electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.


2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Feb 28, 2018
Date Issued

10:44 am
Time Issued



HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment A

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Subject Account") for the time period referenced below.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email) limited to items sent, received, or created between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud

the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial

institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Email Search Attachment B

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com and [REDACTED] (the "Subject Accounts") for the time period between October 1, 2016 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Accounts:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Accounts, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Accounts.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Accounts, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Accounts, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Accounts, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Accounts.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Accounts.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Accounts;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Accounts about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Accounts was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the Subject Accounts owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

18 MAG 169 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Account
[REDACTED]@aol.com, Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Oath, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Oath, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email account [REDACTED]@aol.com, maintained at premises controlled by Oath, Inc., contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachment C hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachment C hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachment C. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 14 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.


2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Feb 28, 2018
Date Issued

10:45am
Time Issued



HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment C

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Oath, Inc. (the “Provider”), headquartered at 22000 AOL Way, Dulles, Virginia 20166, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider’s possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@aol.com (the “Subject Account”) for the time period between December 1, 2016 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider’s possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history.

g. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances; and

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

A Device Containing the Results of Three Email Search Warrants, See Attachment A

Case No. 18 MAG 1697

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): A Device Containing the Results of Three Email Search Warrants, See Attachment A

located in the Southern District of New York, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDER.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- [x] evidence of a crime; [] contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; [] property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime; [] a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Table with 2 columns: Code Section (18 USC 371, 1005, 1014, 1343, 1344) and Offense Description (Conspiracy to defraud the United States; false bank entries; false statements to a financial institution; wire fraud; bank fraud)

The application is based on these facts:

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDER.

- [x] Continued on the attached sheet. [x] Delayed notice of 30 days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days:) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.



Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: Feb 28, 2018

City and state: New York, NY

Judge's signature

Hon. Gabriel W. Gorenstein, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

18 MAG 1697

In the Matter of the Application of the United States Of America for a Search Warrant for A Device Containing the Results of Three Email Search Warrants, USAO Reference No 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

Agent Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern

District of New York, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant



2. I make this Affidavit in support of an application pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the electronic device specified below (the "Subject Device") for the items and information described in Attachment A. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge; my review of documents and other evidence; my conversations with other law enforcement personnel; and my training, experience and advice received concerning the use of computers in criminal activity and the forensic analysis of electronically stored information ("ESI"). Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable

cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

B. Prior Warrants and the Subject Device

3. As set forth in detail below, the USAO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) are investigating, among other things, a scheme by Michael Cohen to defraud multiple banks. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

4. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants (collectively, the “SCO Warrants”) for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Gmail Account”) sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017. This warrant, which is numbered 17-mj-00503, is attached as Exhibit A (the “First Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

b. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017. This warrant, which is numbered 17-mj-00855, is attached as Exhibit B (the “Second Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the “Cohen MDCPC Account”) sent or

received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account¹ and November 13, 2017. This warrant, which is numbered 17-mj-00854, is attached as Exhibit C (the “Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).

5. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office. As part of that referral, on or about February 8, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the SCO Warrants. A filter team working with the SCO had previously reviewed the e-mails produced pursuant to the SCO Warrants for privilege.

6. These emails are contained on the Subject Device, which is particularly described as a black and red USB drive with a white label that says “Tracking #: 180208140208.” That is, the Subject Device contains the emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the SCO Warrants, less any emails that were screened and removed by the SCO’s privilege team.

7. The Subject Device is presently located in the Southern District of New York.

C. The Subject Offenses

8. The affidavits in support of the SCO Warrants describe evidence of several different courses of conduct by Cohen, including, among other things, false statements to financial institutions relating to the purpose of an account he opened in the name of Essential Consultants LLC and the nature of funds flowing into that account, and activities undertaken by Cohen on behalf of certain foreign persons or foreign entities without having registered as a foreign agent. The SCO Warrants accordingly define the evidence to be seized by reference to subject offenses

¹ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.

and specific categories of information related to these courses of conduct. The subject offenses in the SCO Warrants are summarized as follows:

Exhibit	Warrant	Subject Offenses in Prior Warrant
A	First Cohen Gmail Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”))
B	Second Cohen Gmail Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (FARA)
C	Cohen MDCPC Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (FARA)

9. Based on my participation in this investigation, including my review of documents obtained pursuant to subpoena and court order, my conversations with witnesses and review of reports of conversations with witnesses, and my review of publicly available information, I have learned of additional conduct by Cohen, described below, which was not described in the affidavit seeking the First Cohen Gmail Warrant and was described briefly in the affidavits seeking the Second Cohen Gmail Warrant and the Cohen MDCPC Warrant.²

10. I am therefore requesting authority to expand the search of the non-privileged e-mails obtained pursuant to the SCO Warrants, as contained on the Subject Device, for evidence related to this additional conduct. As set forth below, in addition to the categories of evidence already described in the SCO Warrants, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Device contains evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”), related to the additional conduct described below.³

² I do not base this application on my review of emails obtained pursuant to the SCO Warrants.

³ The SCO Warrants cite many of the same statutes as subject offenses and describe categories of information that likely encompass evidence of the additional conduct described herein.

II. Probable Cause Regarding the Subject Offenses

11. Together with this application, I am submitting an application for a search warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703, for all content and other information associated with (a) the Cohen Gmail Account, for the time period November 14, 2017 to the present; (b) the Cohen MDCPC Account, for the time period November 14, 2017 to the present; and (c) three other email accounts. The affidavit in support of this application is attached as Exhibit D (the “Accompanying Affidavit”), and is incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

12. As set forth in the Accompanying Affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth in detail in the Accompanying Affidavit, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally omitted cash assets that he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; and (iii) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, [REDACTED], in connection with [REDACTED] acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen’s debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to and has secured proposed agreements from the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations worth millions of dollars.

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, I am seeking explicit authorization to search the Subject Device for evidence of this additional conduct.

13. As noted above, the Accompanying Affidavit seeks email content for the Cohen Gmail Account and the Cohen MDCPC Account for the period from November 14, 2017 to the present, and therefore establishes probable cause that a search of the email content from that time period will reveal evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses. As set forth below, the Accompanying Affidavit also establishes probable cause to believe that a search of the Subject Device (*i.e.*, the non-privileged emails from the earlier time periods covered by the SCO Warrants) will similarly reveal evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses.⁴ For example, as described in the Accompanying Affidavit:

a. In or about December 2014, Sterling National Bank (“Sterling”) agreed to lend approximately \$22 million to Cohen’s medallion companies. *See* Accompanying Affidavit ¶ 14(c).

b. In or about September 2015, Cohen began pushing Sterling for a reduction in his monthly payments. *See id.* ¶ 14(e).

c. In or about October 2016, Cohen told a Sterling employee (“Sterling Employee-1”) that he had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED], who would agree to assume Cohen’s debt with Sterling (and Melrose Credit Union, the participating bank). *See id.* ¶ 14(g). Negotiations of the potential taxi medallion transaction then followed for more than a year. *See id.* ¶¶ 14(g)-(q).

⁴ As noted, the Subject Device contains email content for the Cohen Gmail Account from the period of June 1, 2015 to November 13, 2017, and email content for the Cohen MDCPC Account for the period of March 2017 to November 13, 2017.

d. On or about February 22, 2017, the Cohen Gmail Account⁵ sent an email to a Sterling employee (“Sterling Employee-2”) stating that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.” *See id.* ¶ 14(g).

e. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the Cohen Gmail Account, attaching a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the “May 2017 Financial Statement”), that was also attached. *See id.* ¶ 14(i).

f. On or about October 5, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Gmail Account, re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Gmail Account, emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the “September 2017 Financial Statement”). *See id.* ¶ 14(m). The September 2017 Financial Statement omitted assets that Cohen held in certain bank accounts and substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents. *See id.* ¶¶ 19-20.

g. It appears that Cohen set up the Cohen MDCPC Account to receive emails he was previously receiving at the Cohen Gmail Account. On or about May 5, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the Cohen MDCPC Account to a blind copy list of recipients, stating that “[d]ue to the overwhelming volume of phone calls and emails coming into my previous cellular number and e-mail address, I have elected to create for Clients Only the following. Kindly use this new

⁵ As noted in n.2, *supra*, I do not base this application on my review of emails obtained pursuant to the SCO Warrants. Where the content of emails sent from or received by the Cohen Gmail Account and/or the Cohen MDPC Account are described herein, my description is based on copies of these emails produced by third parties pursuant to subpoena or otherwise.

information for all future contact and communications.” The signature line on the email listed the Cohen MDCPC Account as the new email address. *See id.* ¶ 26.

h. Based on my review of header information obtained by court order, I have learned that, on approximately eight occasions in August and September 2017, while Cohen, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] were communicating about a term sheet for the Cohen-[REDACTED] taxi medallion transaction, the Cohen MDCPC Account sent or received emails from [REDACTED], including emails on which Sterling employees were copied. On or about August 22, 2017, Cohen also used the Cohen MDCPC Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1. *See id.* ¶ 27(a).

i. Based on my review of header information obtained by court order, I have learned that on or about September 1, 2017—at or around the time the [REDACTED] and Cohen were negotiating a term sheet—the Cohen MDCPC Account sent or received eight emails to or from [REDACTED]. *See id.* ¶ 25(b).

14. Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that a search of the Subject Device will reveal evidence, fruit and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) –

who communicated with the Cohen Gmail Account and/or the Cohen MDCPC Account about any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Cohen Gmail Account and/or the Cohen MDCPC Account and [REDACTED] relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

e. Evidence indicating the Cohen Gmail Account and the Cohen MDCPC Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

III. Procedures for Searching ESI

A. Review of ESI

15. Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, interpreters, and outside vendors or technical experts under government control) will review the ESI contained on the Subject Device for information responsive to the warrant.

16. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various methods to locate evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including but not limited to undertaking a cursory inspection of all emails contained on the Subject Device. This method is analogous to cursorily inspecting all the files in a file cabinet in an office to determine which paper evidence is subject to seizure. Although law enforcement personnel may use other methods as well, particularly including keyword searches, I know that keyword searches and similar methods are typically inadequate to detect all information subject to seizure. As an initial matter, keyword

searches work only for text data, yet many types of files commonly associated with emails, including attachments such as scanned documents, pictures, and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, keyword searches cannot be relied upon to capture all relevant communications in an account, as it is impossible to know in advance all of the unique words or phrases that investigative subjects will use in their communications, and consequently there are often many communications in an account that are relevant to an investigation but that do not contain any keywords that an agent is likely to search for.

IV. Conclusion and Ancillary Provisions

17. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachment A to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrant.

18. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, and for the reasons more fully set forth in the Accompanying Affidavit, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



Special Agent, USAO

Sworn to before me on
28th day of February, 2018

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gabriel W. Gorenstein".

HON. GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Attachment A

I. Device to be Searched

The device to be searched (the “Subject Device”) is described as a black and red USB drive with a white label that says “Tracking #: 180208140208”, which contains emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the three search warrants, numbered 17-mj-00503, 17-mj-00855 and 17-mj-00854, obtained by the Special Counsel’s Office (“SCO”), less the emails that were screened and removed by the SCO’s privilege team.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Devices

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, interpreters, and outside vendors or technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on the Subject Device for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of one or more violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”), as listed below:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. The identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with [REDACTED]@gmail.com and/or [REDACTED] (the “Subject Accounts”) about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen’s bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

e. Evidence indicating the owner of the Subject Accounts' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

Exhibit A

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

FILED

JUL 21 2017

Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))
INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE EMAIL)
ACCOUNT [REDACTED]@GMAIL.COM)

Case: 1:17-mj-00503
Assigned To : Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 7/18/2017
Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property described above, and that such search will reveal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before August 1, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
 in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)

for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: July 18, 2017 4:30 PM

Beryl A. Howell
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC

Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.: <i>17-mj-00503</i>	Date and time warrant executed: <i>7/18/2017 8:18 PM</i>	Copy of warrant and inventory left with: <i>Google Legal Investigators Support</i>
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Inventory made in the presence of:

Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:

*Digital Files: Letter 1150069
1150069-20170719-1
See Attachment A for list of
Hash values for Production Files*

FILED
JUL 21 2017
Clerk, U.S. District and
Bankruptcy Courts

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.

Date: *7/20/2017*



Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the Google Mail Account [REDACTED]@gmail.com that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Google, a company headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by Google

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of the Google (hereinafter “the Provider”), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each ~~account or identifier listed in Attachment A:~~

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided

during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
 - g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
 - h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
 - i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
 - j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user;
-
- and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers (“ESN”), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers (“MEIN”), Mobile Equipment Identifier (“MEID”), Mobile Identification Numbers (“MIN”), Subscriber Identity Modules (“SIM”), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number (“MSISDN”), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (“IMSI”), or International Mobile Equipment Identities (“IMEI”).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, involving Michael Dean Cohen and occurring on or after January 1, 2016, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Bo and Abe Realty, LLC;
- c. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an

- account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;
- d. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
 - e. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
 - f. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
 - g. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
 - h. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
 - i. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

Exhibit B

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)
INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE EMAIL
ACCOUNT [REDACTED]@GMAIL.COM

Case: 1:17-mj-00855
Assigned To : Chief Judge Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 11/13/2017
Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search
of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property
described above, and that such search will reveal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before November 20, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the
property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory
as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose
property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)

for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 11/13/2017 at 4:50PM

[Signature]
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC

Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.</p>		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the Google Mail Account [REDACTED]@gmail.com that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Google, a company headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by Google

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of the Google (hereinafter "the Provider"), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
- g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
- h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
- i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
- j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user; and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers ("ESN"), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers ("MEIN"), Mobile Equipment Identifier ("MEID"), Mobile Identification Numbers ("MIN"), Subscriber Identity Modules ("SIM"), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number ("MSISDN"), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers ("IMSI"), or International Mobile Equipment Identities ("IMEI")).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act ("FARA"), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, involving Michael Dean Cohen and occurring on or after **June 1, 2015**, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

- c. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- d. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- e. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
- f. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
- g. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
- h. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

III. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner consistent with professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and other operative privileges. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit C

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)

INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACCOUNT
WHICH IS STORED AT THE
PREMISES OF 1&1 INTERNET, INC.

Case: 1:17-mj-00854
Assigned To : Chief Judge Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 11/13/2017
Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search
of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(Identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property
described above, and that such search will reveal (Identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before November 20, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the
property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory
as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose
property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)

for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 11/13/2017 at 4:45 PM Beryl A. Howell
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.</p>		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the email [REDACTED] that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by 1&1 Internet, Inc. ("1&1"), an electronic communication and/or remote computing service provider headquartered in Sunnyvale, California.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by 1&1

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of the 1&1 (hereinafter "the Provider"), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
- g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
- h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
- i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
- j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user; and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers (“ESN”), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers (“MEIN”), Mobile Equipment Identifier (“MEID”), Mobile Identification Numbers (“MIN”), Subscriber Identity Modules (“SIM”), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number (“MSISDN”), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (“IMSI”), or International Mobile Equipment Identities (“IMEI”).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, involving Michael Dean Cohen, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

- c. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- d. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- e. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
- f. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
- g. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
- h. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

III. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner consistent with professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and other operative privileges. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@email.com,

[REDACTED] Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
the Email Account [REDACTED]
Maintained at Premises Controlled by
Oath, Inc., and the Email Account
[REDACTED] maintained at
Premises Controlled by 1 & 1 Internet,
Inc., USAO Reference No.
2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

AGENT AFFIDAVIT

18 MAG 169 6

**Agent Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant
for Stored Electronic Communications**

STATE OF NEW YORK)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York, being duly sworn, deposes and states:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant

[REDACTED]



B. The Provider, the Subject Account and the Subject Offenses

2. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 for all content and other information associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Account”), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the “MDCPC Account”), [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “[REDACTED] Account”), [REDACTED] (the [REDACTED] Account”), and [REDACTED]@aol.com (the “[REDACTED] Account”) (collectively, the “Subject Accounts”). The Cohen Account, [REDACTED] Account, and [REDACTED] Account are maintained and controlled by Google, Inc., headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043 (“Google”), the MDCPC Account is maintained and controlled by 1 & 1 Internet, Inc., headquartered at 701 Lee Road, Suite 300, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania 19087 (“1 & 1”), and th [REDACTED] Account is maintained and controlled by Oath, Inc., 22000 AOL Way, Dulles, Virginia 20166 (“Oath”) (together, the “Providers”). The information to be searched is described in the following paragraphs and in Attachments A, B, C and D to the proposed warrants.

3. As detailed below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”). The Target Subjects of this investigation are MICHAEL COHEN (“Cohen”) and others known and unknown. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge, my review of documents produced pursuant to grand jury subpoenas and prior search warrants, my review of interview reports prepared by other law enforcement officers, and my conversations with other law enforcement officers, as well as

my training and experience concerning the use of email in criminal activity. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts I have learned during my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

C. Services and Records of the Provider

4. I have learned the following about the Providers:

a. The Providers offer email services to the public. In particular, Google permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under the domain name gmail.com. Google also allows a subscriber to maintain email accounts under any domain name under the subscriber's control. For example, if a subscriber controls the domain name '[REDACTED]' Google enables the subscriber to host any email address under this domain name on servers operated by Google. Oath permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under the domain name aol.com. 1 & 1 permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under any domain name under the subscriber's control. For example, if a subscriber controls the domain name '[REDACTED]' 1 & 1 enables the subscriber to host any email address under this domain name on servers operated by 1 & 1. A subscriber using the Providers' services can access his or her email account from any computer connected to the Internet.

b. The Providers maintain the following records and information with respect to every subscriber account:

i. *Email contents.* In general, any email (which can include attachments such as documents, images, and videos) sent to or from a subscriber's account, or stored in draft form in the account, is maintained on the Providers' servers unless and until the subscriber deletes the email. If the subscriber does not delete the email, it can remain on the Providers' computers

indefinitely. Even if the subscriber deletes the email, it may continue to be available on the Provider's servers for a certain period of time.

ii. *Address book.* The Providers also allow subscribers to maintain the equivalent of an address book, comprising email addresses and other contact information of other email users.

iii. *Subscriber and billing information.* The Providers collect and maintain (typically unverified) identifying information about each subscriber, including, for example, name, username, address, telephone number, and alternate email addresses. The Providers also maintain records concerning the date on which the account was created, the Internet protocol ("IP") address of the user at the time of account creation, the current status of the account (*e.g.*, active or closed), the length of service, and the types of services utilized by the subscriber. Additionally, for paying subscribers, the Providers maintain records of the subscriber's means and source of payment, including any credit card or bank account number.

iv. *Transactional information.* The Providers also typically retain certain transactional information about the use of each account on its system. This information can include records of login (*i.e.*, session) times and durations and the methods used to connect to the account (such as logging into the account through the Providers' website).

v. *Customer correspondence.* The Providers also typically maintain records of any customer service contacts with or about the subscriber, including any inquiries or complaints concerning the subscriber's account.

vi. *Search history.* Google and Oath also typically maintain records of any search history or web history associated with the subscriber's account.

vii. *Associated content.* Google also typically maintains content and records relating to the following applications that are associated with its e-mail accounts: (A) “Google Docs,” which provides document-editing software that can be used to create, share, store, and manage documents online; (B) “Google Drive,” which enables users to store files on Google servers, where they can be accessed remotely by the user and others; and (C) “Gchat” or “Instant Messenger,” which provides a chat interface through which users can communicate with each other in real time. Oath also typically maintains content and records relating to AOL instant message, which provides a chat interface through which users can communicate with each other in real time.

viii. *Preserved and backup records.* The Providers also maintain preserved copies of the foregoing categories of records with respect to an account, for at least 90 days, upon receiving a preservation request from the Government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f). The Providers may also maintain backup copies of the foregoing categories of records pursuant to its own data retention policy.

D. Jurisdiction and Authority to Issue Warrant

5. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(A), the Government may require a provider of an electronic communications service or a remote computing service, such as the Providers, to disclose all stored content and all non-content records or other information pertaining to a subscriber, by obtaining a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

6. A search warrant under § 2703 may be issued by “any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge of such a court)” that “has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i).

7. When the Government obtains records under § 2703 pursuant to a search warrant, the Government is not required to notify the subscriber of the existence of the warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), (c)(2) & (3). Additionally, the Government may obtain an order precluding the Provider from notifying the subscriber or any other person of the warrant, for such period as the Court deems appropriate, where there is reason to believe that such notification will seriously jeopardize an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

E. Prior Applications

8. On or about July 18, 2017, in connection with an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Account sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained from Judge Howell search warrants for emails in the Cohen Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017, and emails in the MDCPC Account sent or received between the opening of the account and November 13, 2017. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of their investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office. As part of that referral, the SCO provided the USAO with emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the search warrants executed by the SCO, which had already been reviewed for privilege.¹ As discussed below, this affidavit is based in part on my review of

¹ In an abundance of caution, in a separate application the USAO has sought authorization, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, to review the emails obtained pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants for evidence related to certain additional conduct that was not the focus of the Prior Cohen Account Warrants. The emails obtained from the Prior Cohen Account Warrants that relate to that additional conduct do not form a basis for the instant application.

responsive materials produced pursuant to the July 18 and November 13, 2017 warrants (the “Prior Cohen Account Warrants”).

9. On or about November 7, 2017, and January 4, 2018, as well as certain prior dates, the SCO sought and obtained from Judge Howell orders authorizing and extending the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to record communications sent to or from the Cohen Account. The SCO has provided pen register data obtained pursuant to those orders to the USAO. This affidavit, as discussed below, is based in part on my review of the pen register data obtained pursuant to the November 7, 2017 and January 4, 2018 orders (the “Pen Register Data”).

10. On or about February 16, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained from the Honorable Debra Freeman, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of New York, an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for email header information associated with the MDCPC Account. This affidavit, as discussed below, is based in part on my review of email header information produced by 1 & 1 in response to that order (the “MDCPC Header Information”).

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview

11. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, a scheme by Target Subject Michael Cohen to defraud multiple banks. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

12. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth

in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally omitted cash assets that he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; and (iii) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, [REDACTED] in connection with [REDACTED] acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to and had secured proposed agreements from the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations worth millions of dollars.

13. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, MDCPC Header Information, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, I have learned that Cohen has used the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account to, among other things, (i) communicate with [REDACTED] and their attorney, [REDACTED] about the proposed transfer of Cohen's medallions and associated debts; (ii) negotiate a pay-down of the principal amount of the taxi medallion loans; (iii) communicate with his accountant about the contents of the false financial statements at issue; and (iv) send those false financial statements to banks. Additionally, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account, respectively, to communicate with Cohen about the status of the taxi medallion transaction, and to send relevant financial statements to banks. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

14. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through limited liability corporations ("LLCs") controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling

National Bank (“Sterling”) and the Melrose Credit Union (“Melrose”), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions were devalued, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash, and financial outlook. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my review of reports prepared by law enforcement officers of interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the “Sterling Employee-1”) and my participation in an interview with a Sterling employee (the “Sterling Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).² Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One Bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to pay his monthly loan payments.

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling

² One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One Bank. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One Bank in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion corporations entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the corporation. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. In total, Sterling agreed to lend

approximately \$22 million to the Cohens' companies. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of that debt to Melrose.³ Under the terms of Sterling's participation agreements with Melrose, Sterling was precluded from amending or modifying the loans without the consent of Melrose.

d. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.⁴ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

e. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies and significant devaluation of taxi medallions. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around

³ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA").

⁴ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8, 2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen's statements, his personal financial information "indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments." Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen's monthly payments.

f. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks. According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen's representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by,

among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

g. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallions to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent from the Cohen Account to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

h. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that

Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, [REDACTED] emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the [REDACTED] Account to inquire about the status of the transaction. Sterling Employee-1 responded to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account that Melrose had agreed to the deal, and that Sterling would be sending [REDACTED] a term sheet shortly.

i. In order for the banks to evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about October 26, 2016, a Sterling employee emailed the [REDACTED] Account about the "Cohen Medallion Purchase," and stated "[i]n order to proceed with the assumption of Michael's loans," Sterling needed certain financial information from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] responded from the [REDACTED] Account, copying [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, that he would send a financial statement and tax returns shortly. Additionally, on or about June 7, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an "updated personal financial statement," completed jointly with Cohen's wife, and Cohen's most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the Cohen Account, attaching a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the "May 2017 Financial Statement"), that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen's accountant [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in

cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.

j. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed each line of the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about the cash amount listed on the May 2017 Financial Statement. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

k. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen at the Cohen Account and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. On or about August 29, 2017, [REDACTED] emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the [REDACTED] Account, requesting that he be included on "all future e-mails to [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] concerning this matter," and providing proposed edits to the term sheet. On or about August 30, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, Cohen at the Cohen Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, and provided them with a revised term sheet. On or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, Cohen at the Cohen Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

l. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the

remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789 respectively in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

m. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling required and requested additional financial statements for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about October 5, 2017, [REDACTED] sent from the [REDACTED] Account to a Sterling employee a copy of [REDACTED] personal financial statement. The financial statement lists the [REDACTED] Account as the email contact for [REDACTED]. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Account, re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Account, emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

n. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED] Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000. Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),⁵ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first time, he indicated was held in trust). The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

o. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that at or around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the

⁵ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank – that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

p. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018, from the Cohen Account, stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would "bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential." Cohen also requested by email sent from the Cohen Account on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen's debts have been satisfied and that Cohen's personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

q. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] attorney, emailed attorneys for Sterling from the [REDACTED] Account and stated that "at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward."

r. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen's loans to an employee at Sterling who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans ("Sterling Employee-3"). From my review of telephone call notes, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or

restructuring Cohen's outstanding taxi medallion loans. Based on my review of an email between Sterling Employee-3 and Cohen, I know that on the January 30, 2018 call, Cohen stated that he would send a "corrected current" version of his personal financial statement. Following that call, on or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account a copy of the September 2017 Financial Statement. Later that day, Cohen again emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to \$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen at the Cohen Account and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

s. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Sterling continues to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position.

C. Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work


15. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in purported consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen withheld information about liquid financial assets at First Republic.

16. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with two First Republic employees, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities.


⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the “Essential Consultants Account”). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, a First Republic employee (“First Republic Employee-1”) conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions⁷ about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen’s statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, the account was not intended to receive—and does not appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.




⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen’s statements.



d. Second, I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC, which were deposited into the Essential Consultants Account. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.



ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, Cohen began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$999,800.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T wired \$100,000 to the Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received nine \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T wired \$550,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (“KAI”). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a “monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017.”

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about January 10, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$2,883,132.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23.

e. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the "MDC&A Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

17. Based on my review of emails from the Cohen Account that were seized pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account ostensibly were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration.¹⁰ Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Account and public sources, I have learned the following:

¹⁰ Based on my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen is not registered as a lobbyist or as a person acting as an agent of foreign principals, as may have been required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the Cohen Account to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services, as requested” by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017.

b. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email from an alternate email address, copying the Cohen Account, to an employee of BTA Bank. To the email, Cohen attached an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about February 13, 2017, Cohen emailed an AT&T employee from the Cohen Account what appears to be a consulting agreement, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about January 17, 2017, Cohen emailed to a representative of Novartis from the Cohen Account a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that

relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in even monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm, announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

18. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] and my review of notes and a [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at a law firm in Manhattan, New York. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen at the Cohen

Account in which [REDACTED] wrote that “[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017” and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any assets associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: “[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value.

d. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[I]looks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. Neither Essential Consultants nor MDC&A was listed on the September 2017 Financial Statement that was provided to Sterling.

19. Based on the foregoing, and from my review of bank records and emails sent by Cohen to Sterling, I know that the September 2017 Financial Statement made no mention whatsoever of assets that Cohen held in the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account. As of September 30, 2017—the date of the September 2017 Financial Statement—Cohen had

approximately \$673,729.95 in the Essential Consultants Account and \$248,619.28 in the MDC&A Account. As of October 6, 2017, the date when [REDACTED] asked Cohen about the two accounts, Cohen had approximately \$823,709.95 in the Essential Consultants Account and \$248,619.28 in the MDC&A Account.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

20. In addition to withholding the existence of the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant, I have learned that Cohen had over \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife—and the total balance across the two accounts as of September 30, 2017 was \$300,096.72.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$5,014,051.80 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, Signature Bank, TD Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.

21. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or approve of the transfer of those loans to

[REDACTED]

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

22. As set forth in detail below, it appears that during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED], Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side deal he had negotiated with [REDACTED] it appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately

\$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and reports prepared by law enforcement officers of interviews with Sterling Employee-1, as well as my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. *See supra* ¶ 14(k). According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED] including a \$3.8 million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

23. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and a report prepared by law enforcement agents of an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side-payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."¹¹

b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.

24. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

¹¹ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.

D. Probable Cause Regarding the Subject Accounts

25. As set forth above, since at least September 2015, if not earlier, Cohen has told Sterling that he has difficulty making payments on his medallion loans and, since at least October 2016, Cohen has been actively engaged in an attempt to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debts to [REDACTED]. In the course of doing so, Cohen has used the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account to engage in email communications regarding the terms of the transactions and the undisclosed side-payment with [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account. Specifically, as described above, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts have been used regarding the proposed Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction with Sterling:

a. Cohen has used the Cohen Account to, among other things, negotiate a pay-down of the principal amount of the loan, *see supra* ¶ 14(g), to send term sheets to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(j), to communicate with his accountant about the contents of financial statements, *see supra* ¶ 16, to send financial statements to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(i), (l), to check on the status of the transaction as of January 24, 2018, *see supra* ¶ 14(n), to negotiate a reduction of his debt with Sterling on or around January 31, 2018, *see supra* ¶ 14(o), to tell Sterling on February 1, 2018, he does not have the ability to pay more than \$1,250,000, *see supra* ¶ 14(p), and to communicate with individuals responsible for sources of payments to the Essential Consultants Account, *see supra* ¶ 15. In other words, from the communications described above, it appears likely that the Cohen Account will contain recent evidence of the Subject Offenses, including communications and potential misrepresentations to Sterling, and evidence indicating that statements made to Sterling are false or misleading.

b. [REDACTED] has used the [REDACTED] Account to communicate about the proposed taxi medallion transaction with Cohen, which appears to have been discussed as early

as October 2016. *See supra* ¶ 14(g).¹² Specifically, as described above, as early as May 2, 2017, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to inquire about the status of the transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(h). He used the [REDACTED] Account to exchange drafts of the proposed term sheet with Cohen, [REDACTED] and Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(j). The [REDACTED] Account was also used by [REDACTED] to send a personal financial statement for [REDACTED] to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(l). The [REDACTED] Account was copied on emails from the [REDACTED] Account about the transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(i), and was listed on [REDACTED] financial statement as the contact email for [REDACTED] *see supra* ¶ 14(m). Additionally, based on my review of MDCPC Header Information, I know that on or about September 1, 2017—at or around the time the [REDACTED] and Cohen were negotiating a term sheet—[REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to send and receive eight emails from Cohen at the MDCPC Account.

c. [REDACTED] has used the [REDACTED] Account to communicate with Sterling employees, Cohen, and [REDACTED] about the proposed taxi medallion transaction since at least December 2016. *See supra* ¶¶ 14(g), 24(c). Specifically, on or about August 29, 2017, [REDACTED] told Sterling that he should be included on “all future e-mails” involving the proposed transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(j). Additionally, [REDACTED] was involved in making revisions to the parties’ term sheets, and he told Sterling on January 29, 2018 that [REDACTED] would not go forward with the planned transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(j), (n). Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that the [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence of the negotiations between Sterling and the parties, evidence of a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] and the reasons for the collapse of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction.

¹² For instance, from records provided by Sterling, I know that on or about December 2, 2016, [REDACTED] sent an email to a Sterling employee using the [REDACTED] Account. The email forwarded correspondence between [REDACTED] who was using the [REDACTED] Account, and an employee of Capital One regarding extending [REDACTED] loan with Capital One.

26. Additionally, it appears that Cohen set up the MDCPC Account to receive emails he was previously receiving at the Cohen Account. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that on or about May 5, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the MDCPC Account to a blind copy list of recipients stating that “[d]ue to the overwhelming volume of phone calls and emails coming into my previous cellular number and e-mail address, I have elected to create for Clients Only the following. Kindly use this new information for all future contact and communications.” The signature line on the email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC,” as well as the MDCPC Account as the email address.¹³

27. In addition, based on my review of emails from the MDCPC Account produced pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants and the MDCPC Header Information, I have learned that Cohen has used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from the Cohen Account, to communicate with the [REDACTED] Account, and to send and receive emails from other email accounts about his political consulting business. Additionally, from my review of the MDCPC Header Information, it appears that since the [REDACTED] Cohen has continued to send and receive emails at the MDCPC Account that appear likely to be relevant to the commission of the Subject Offenses. For example, emails obtained pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, as well as the MDCPC Header Information have revealed the following:

- a. On approximately eight occasions in August and September 2017, while Cohen, [REDACTED] were communicating about a term sheet for the Cohen- [REDACTED] taxi

¹³ Based on my review of emails from the MDCPC Account obtained pursuant to subpoena, I have learned that Cohen has used the account to communicate with numerous individuals with whom he does not enjoy an attorney-client privilege, including some of the individuals described below. *See infra* ¶ 27.

medallion transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(k), Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send or receive emails from [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] account. For instance, on or about August 22, 2017, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1 and copied Cohen on the email at the MDCPC Account. On the same day, Sterling Employee-1 responded to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] account and Cohen at the MDCPC Account. On or about August 22, 2017, Cohen also used the MDCPC Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1.

b. As noted above, on or about September 1, 2017, Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send or receive eight emails with the [REDACTED] Account.

c. Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from individuals who work at companies with whom it appears Cohen has a political consulting agreement. For example, beginning in April 2017—the same month when Cohen began receiving payments from AT&T, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(c)—Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from AT&T employees. These emails contain, among other things, invoices from Cohen to AT&T for consulting work by Cohen. Similarly, beginning in April 2017—which is also the month Cohen began receiving payments from Novartis for consulting work, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(d)—Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from employees of Novartis. These emails concern, among other things, invoices from Cohen and requests for Novartis for Cohen's assistance on an initiative relating to drug pricing.

d. From my review of the MDCPC Header Information, I have learned that Cohen has continued to use the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from individuals who work at companies with whom it appears Cohen had a political consulting agreement, such as Novartis and AT&T. For instance, on approximately six occasions between November 28, 2017 and January 30, 2018, the MDCPC Account was used to send and receive emails from accounts belonging to

individuals using @att.com email addresses. Similarly, on approximately seventeen occasions between December 1, 2017 and February 20, 2018, the MDCPC Account was used to send and receive emails from accounts belonging to individuals using @novartis.com email addresses. Since November 15, 2017, the MDCPC Account has also sent and received emails with individuals using the email domains @bta.kz, which I believe is the email domain used by employees of BTA Bank, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(b), and @squirepb.com, which I believe is the email domain used by employees of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs—both of which Cohen appears to have a consulting relationship with, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(e), 17(e). Accordingly, it appears that Cohen continues to use the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails that will be relevant to whether he is maintaining a consulting business, what type of consulting work he is doing, and whether he is receiving money for that consulting work.

28. In addition to the foregoing, based on my review of the Pen Register Data, *see supra* ¶ 9, it appears that since the date of the last search warrant on the Cohen Account (*i.e.*, November 13, 2017), Cohen has continued to use the Cohen Account to communicate with the [REDACTED] Account, the [REDACTED] Account, and other email accounts that appear likely to be relevant to the commission of the Subject Offenses described above. For example, the Pen Register Data has revealed the following:

a. Emails sent by the Cohen Account to the [REDACTED] Account on or about December 18, 2017 at 8:26 p.m., December 21, 2017 at 9:35 p.m., December 22, 2017 at 4:32 p.m., January 3, 2018 at 8:01 a.m., January 3, 2018 at 2:56 p.m., and January 4, 2018 at 3:31 p.m.

b. An email sent by the Cohen Account to the [REDACTED] Account on or about January 25, 2018 at 8:55 p.m.

c. Emails from the Cohen Account to the email account [REDACTED] on or about December 1, 2017 at 2:14 p.m., December 29, 2017 at 10:20 p.m., January 2, 2018 at 3:52 p.m., January 2, 2018 at 5:44 p.m., and January 8, 2018 at 6:38 p.m. Based upon my review of emails contained in the Cohen Account, I have learned that the [REDACTED] email account belongs to [REDACTED] Cohen's accountant, through whom Cohen made misrepresentations to financial institutions, as discussed above.

d. Emails from the Cohen Account to email accounts belonging to Sterling employees, including Sterling Employee-1, on or about January 25, 2018 at 10:23 p.m., January 26, 2018 at 12:55 a.m., January 29, 2018 at 5:30 p.m., January 29, 2018 at 8:29 p.m., January 30, 2018 at 6:44 p.m.

e. An email sent from the Cohen Account to the email account clientservicenyc@firstrepublic.com on or about January 25, 2018 at 5:29 p.m. As stated above, First Republic is the bank at which the Essential Consultants Account is held.

f. Numerous emails sent from the Cohen Account to the email account [REDACTED] including emails on or about December 4, 2017 at 2:17 p.m. and January 29, 2018 at 5:43 p.m. Based upon the email address and domain name, as well as my review of reports of interviews and documents reflecting that Cohen's taxi medallions were leased and operated by [REDACTED], I believe that the [REDACTED] email address belongs to [REDACTED]

29. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that Cohen used the Cohen Account to send and receive documents related to the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction. Based on my training and experience, I know that Google allows users of e-mail accounts to easily save documents to file sharing and retention platforms such as Google Docs and Google Drive. I

also know, from my training and experience, that users of e-mail accounts often use instant messaging interfaces linked to their email accounts. Further, I have learned that the Providers maintain records of search and web histories associated with email accounts and, based on my training and experience, users of e-mail accounts use associated web search browsers associated with a subscriber's account to research topics they are e-mailing about. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that content information associated with the Subject Accounts will also contain evidence related to the Subject Offenses.

30. Thus, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that emails and other content information from the Subject Accounts will contain evidence of Cohen's efforts to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debt, and his misrepresentations and omissions to Sterling and Melrose in connection with these negotiations. Although Cohen appears to have communicated with [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] primarily through the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account, I know, based on my involvement in the investigation, that Cohen also used at least one other email account associated with his position at the Trump Organization. Thus, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that emails and other content information from the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account since on or about October 1, 2016—the approximate date of when Cohen's efforts to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debt began—will reflect communications with the Cohen Account, MDCPC Account, and possibly one or more additional accounts used by Cohen, and probable cause to believe that such emails will constitute evidence of Cohen's commission of the Subject Offenses, including the extent to which Cohen did or did not inform other individuals involved in the conduct described above—such as [REDACTED]—of his misstatements and omissions to financial institutions.

31. Temporal Limitation. This application seeks all emails and other requested content information specified in Attachments A, B, C, and D for the following periods:

a. For the Cohen Account, this application seeks all emails sent, created, or received between November 14, 2017, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, the SCO obtained and provided to the USAO emails from the Cohen Account that were sent, created, or received before November 14, 2017. This application also seeks other information specified above associated with the Cohen Account that was created between December 1, 2014 (the month when Cohen entered into the medallion loans with Sterling), and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive.

b. For the MDCPC Account, this application seeks all emails sent, created, or received between November 14, 2017, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, pursuant to a prior warrant, the SCO obtained and provided to the USAO emails from the MDCPC Account that were sent, created, or received before November 14, 2017.

c. For the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account, this application seeks emails and all other content information specified above sent, created, or received between October 1, 2016, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, October 2016 is the month in which Cohen began negotiating the taxi medallion sale with the [REDACTED]

d. For the [REDACTED] Account, this application seeks emails and all other content information specified above sent, created, or received between December 1, 2016, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, December 2016 is the month in which [REDACTED] began representing the [REDACTED] in relation to the taxi medallion transaction.

E. Evidence, Fruits and Instrumentalities

32. Based upon the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Google's servers associated with the Cohen Account will contain evidence,

fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachment A to the proposed warrant for the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Cohen Account or MDCPC Account.

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account and [REDACTED] relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

33. Based upon the foregoing, I further submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Google's servers associated with the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who

communicated with the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling, Melrose, or other financial institution(s), regarding Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Account were accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

34. Based upon the foregoing, I further submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Oath's servers associated with the [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the [REDACTED] Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the [REDACTED] account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the [REDACTED] account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling, Melrose, or other financial institution(s), regarding Cohen's finances; and

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution.

III. Review of the Information Obtained Pursuant to the Warrant

35. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not required for service of a search warrant issued under § 2703, or for the collection or production of responsive records. Accordingly, the warrant requested herein will be transmitted to the Providers, which shall be directed to produce a digital copy of any responsive records to law enforcement personnel within 30 days from the date of service. Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the

status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will retain the records and review them for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses as specified in Section III of Attachments A, B and C to the proposed warrant.

36. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various methods to locate evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including but not limited to undertaking a cursory inspection of all emails within the Subject Account. This method is analogous to cursorily inspecting all the files in a file cabinet in an office to determine which paper evidence is subject to seizure. Although law enforcement personnel may use other methods as well, particularly including keyword searches, I know that keyword searches and similar methods are typically inadequate to detect all information subject to seizure. As an initial matter, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files commonly associated with emails, including attachments such as scanned documents, pictures, and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, keyword searches cannot be relied upon to capture all relevant communications in an account, as it is impossible to know in advance all of the unique words or phrases that investigative subjects will use in their communications, and consequently there are often many communications in an account that are relevant to an investigation but that do not contain any keywords that an agent is likely to search for.

37. Because Cohen and [REDACTED] are attorneys, the review of the content within the Subject Accounts will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable

privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

IV. Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing Order

38. The existence and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation are not publicly known. As a result, premature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested warrants could alert Cohen that he is under investigation, causing him to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. In particular, based on my experience investigating white collar cases, including cases featuring documents such as agreements, drafts of agreements, notes of conversations, and other documentary evidence, premature disclosure of an investigation may cause the target of the investigation to attempt to destroy or conceal such evidence. In addition, as also set forth above, Cohen uses computers and electronic communications in furtherance of his activity and thus could easily delete, encrypt, or otherwise conceal such digital evidence from law enforcement were he to learn of the Government’s investigation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(3). Cohen also appears to have the financial means that would facilitate his flight from prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(2), (5).

39. Accordingly, there is reason to believe that, were the Providers to notify the subscriber or others of the existence of the warrant, the investigation would be seriously jeopardized. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), I therefore respectfully request that the Court direct the Providers not to notify any person of the existence of the warrant for a period of 180 days from issuance, subject to extension upon application to the Court, if necessary.

40. For similar reasons, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government be permitted without further order of this Court to provide copies of the warrant and affidavit as

need be to personnel assisting it in the investigation and prosecution of this matter, and to disclose those materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

V. Conclusion

41. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that the Court issue the warrants sought herein pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. ~~§ 2703(b)(1)(A) (for contents) and § 2703(c)(1)(A) (for records and other information), and the~~ relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.

Special Agent Mason Posilkin
United States Attorney's Office
Southern District of New York

Sworn to before me this
28th day of February, 2018

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@gmail.com,
[REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED] Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Google, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com, [REDACTED]@gmail.com, and [REDACTED] maintained at premises controlled by Google, Inc., contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachments A and B hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachments A and B hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachments A and B. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 7 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via

electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.

2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the ~~existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of~~ 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Date Issued

Time Issued

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment A

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the “Provider”), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider’s possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Subject Account”) for the time period referenced below.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider’s possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email) limited to items sent, received, or created between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud

the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

~~c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;~~

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial

institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

~~i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject~~
Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Email Search Attachment B

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com and [REDACTED] (the "Subject Accounts") for the time period between October 1, 2016 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Accounts:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Accounts, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Accounts.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Accounts, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Accounts, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Accounts, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Accounts.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Accounts.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Accounts;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in tax medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who ~~communicated with the Subject Accounts about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or~~ agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in tax medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Accounts was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the Subject Accounts owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Account
[REDACTED]@aol.com, Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Oath, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Oath, Inc. (“Provider”)

United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the “Investigative Agencies”)

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email account [REDACTED]@aol.com, maintained at premises controlled by Oath, Inc., contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachment C hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachment C hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachment C. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 14 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.

2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, ~~except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider~~ for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Date Issued

Time Issued

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment C

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Oath, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 22000 AOL Way, Dulles, Virginia 20166, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@aol.com (the "Subject Account") for the time period between December 1, 2016 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

~~A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another~~
appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history.

~~g. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing~~
categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

~~d. Communications between the Subject Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances; and~~

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Account
[REDACTED] maintained at
Premises Controlled by 1 & 1 Internet,
Inc., USAO Reference No.
2018R00127

~~SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER~~

TO: 1 & 1 Internet, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email account [REDACTED] maintained at premises controlled by 1 & 1 Internet, Inc., contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachment D hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachment D hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachment D. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 14 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.

2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, ~~except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider~~ for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Date Issued

Time Issued

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment D

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to 1 & 1 Internet, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 701 Lee Road, Suite 300, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania 19087, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED] (the "Subject Account") for the time period between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi

medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. The identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

ORIGINAL

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address)

A Device Containing the Results of Three Email Search Warrants, See Attachment A

Case No. 18 MAG 1697

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): A Device Containing the Results of Three Email Search Warrants, See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before March 14, 2018 (not to exceed 14 days)

[] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [x] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

[x] Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. USMJ Initials

[x] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [x] for 30 days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: Feb 28, 2018 10:45am

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Gabriel W. Gorenstein, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

Attachment A

I. Device to be Searched

The device to be searched (the “Subject Device”) is described as a black and red USB drive with a white label that says “Tracking #: 180208140208”, which contains emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the three search warrants, numbered 17-mj-00503, 17-mj-00855 and 17-mj-00854, obtained by the Special Counsel’s Office (“SCO”), less the emails that were screened and removed by the SCO’s privilege team.

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Devices

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, interpreters, and outside vendors or technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on the Subject Device for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of one or more violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”), as listed below:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. The identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with [REDACTED]@gmail.com and/or [REDACTED] (the “Subject Accounts”) about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen’s bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

e. Evidence indicating the owner of the Subject Accounts' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

18 MAG 2877

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@gmail.com,
[REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED], Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

AGENT AFFIDAVIT

**Agent Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant
for Stored Electronic Communications**

STATE OF NEW YORK)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, being duly sworn, deposes and states:

I. Introduction



2. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 for all content and other information associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com, [REDACTED]@gmail.com, and [REDACTED] (the "Subject Accounts"), maintained and controlled by Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600

Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. The information to be searched is described in the following paragraphs and in Attachments A and B to the proposed warrant.

3. On or about February 28, 2018, I submitted an Affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 for all content and other information associated with the Subject Accounts maintained and controlled by the “Provider, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “Original Affidavit”), and which is incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.¹

4. On that same date, the Honorable Gabriel W. Gorenstein, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a search warrant for the requested data, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B (the “Original Search Warrant”). Shortly thereafter, the Provider was served with the Original Search Warrant. On or about March 7, 2018, the Provider provided a response to the Original Search Warrant. That return was incomplete because the Provider declined to produce data that it stored on computer servers located outside of the United States. It is my understanding, from speaking with the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this matter as well as other law enforcement agents, that the Provider’s refusal to provide foreign stored data was in light of the Second Circuit’s decision in which it held that Microsoft Corporation was not required to produce foreign stored data pursuant to a warrant issued under the Stored Communications Act. *See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation*, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), *cert. granted* 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (the “Microsoft Litigation”).

¹ The Original Affidavit also sought content information for two additional email accounts hosted by different providers. This affidavit only requests a search warrant with respect to the Subject Accounts described herein.

5. On March 23, 2018, the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (the “CLOUD Act”) was enacted and became law. The CLOUD Act clarifies that in responding to legal process issued under the Stored Communications Act, providers are required to disclose data even if it is stored abroad. Specifically, section 103 of the CLOUD Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 2713 as follows:

§ 2713. Required preservation and disclosure of communications and records
A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall comply with the obligations of this chapter to preserve, backup, or disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication and any record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber within such provider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.

6. From my background, training, and experience in this investigation and in others, I know that, in general, any email (which can include attachments such as documents, images, and videos) sent to or from a subscriber’s account, or stored in draft form in the account, is maintained on the Provider’s servers unless and until the subscriber deletes the email. If the subscriber does not delete the email, it can remain on the Provider’s computers indefinitely. Even if the subscriber deletes the email, it may continue to be available on the Provider’s servers for a certain period of time. In addition, from my review of other search warrant returns in this investigation, I know that the subjects of the investigation maintained email data relevant to the investigation in email accounts for many months after the email was sent or received.

7. Accordingly, I respectfully submit this Affidavit seeking the issuance of the attached proposed search warrant which seeks the same data as was sought in the Original Search Warrant, for the reasons set forth in the Original Affidavit and herein.

II. Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing Order

8. The existence and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation are not publicly known. As a result, premature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested warrants could alert target

subject Michael Cohen that he is under investigation, causing him to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. In particular, based on my experience investigating white collar cases, including cases featuring documents such as agreements, drafts of agreements, notes of conversations, and other documentary evidence, premature disclosure of an investigation may cause the target of the investigation to attempt to destroy or conceal such evidence. In addition, as set forth in the Original Affidavit, Cohen uses computers and electronic communications in furtherance of his activity and thus could easily delete, encrypt, or otherwise conceal such digital evidence from law enforcement were he to learn of the Government's investigation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(3). Cohen also appears to have the financial means that would facilitate his flight from prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(2), (5).

9. Accordingly, there is reason to believe that, were the Provider to notify the subscriber or others of the existence of the warrant, the investigation would be seriously jeopardized. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), I therefore respectfully request that the Court direct the Provider not to notify any person of the existence of the warrant for a period of 180 days from issuance, subject to extension upon application to the Court, if necessary.

10. For similar reasons, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government be permitted without further order of this Court to provide copies of the warrant and affidavit as need be to personnel assisting it in the investigation and prosecution of this matter, and to disclose those materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

III. Conclusion

11. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that the Court issue the warrant sought herein pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (for contents) and § 2703(c)(1)(A) (for records and other information), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.



United States Attorney's Office
Southern District of New York

Sworn to before me this
5TH day of April, 2018



HONORABLE HENRY B. PITMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Exhibit A



B. The Provider, the Subject Account and the Subject Offenses

2. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 for all content and other information associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Account”), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (the “MDCPC Account”), [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “[REDACTED] Account”), [REDACTED] (the [REDACTED] Account”), and [REDACTED]@aol.com (the “[REDACTED] Account”) (collectively, the “Subject Accounts”). The Cohen Account, [REDACTED] Account, and [REDACTED] Account are maintained and controlled by Google, Inc., headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043 (“Google”), the MDCPC Account is maintained and controlled by 1 & 1 Internet, Inc., headquartered at 701 Lee Road, Suite 300, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania 19087 (“1 & 1”), and th [REDACTED] Account is maintained and controlled by Oath, Inc., 22000 AOL Way, Dulles, Virginia 20166 (“Oath”) (together, the “Providers”). The information to be searched is described in the following paragraphs and in Attachments A, B, C and D to the proposed warrants.

3. As detailed below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud) (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”). The Target Subjects of this investigation are MICHAEL COHEN (“Cohen”) and others known and unknown. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge, my review of documents produced pursuant to grand jury subpoenas and prior search warrants, my review of interview reports prepared by other law enforcement officers, and my conversations with other law enforcement officers, as well as

my training and experience concerning the use of email in criminal activity. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts I have learned during my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

C. Services and Records of the Provider

4. I have learned the following about the Providers:

a. The Providers offer email services to the public. In particular, Google permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under the domain name gmail.com. Google also allows a subscriber to maintain email accounts under any domain name under the subscriber's control. For example, if a subscriber controls the domain name ' [REDACTED] ' Google enables the subscriber to host any email address under this domain name on servers operated by Google. Oath permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under the domain name aol.com. 1 & 1 permits subscribers to maintain email accounts under any domain name under the subscriber's control. For example, if a subscriber controls the domain name [REDACTED] ' 1 & 1 enables the subscriber to host any email address under this domain name on servers operated by 1 & 1. A subscriber using the Providers' services can access his or her email account from any computer connected to the Internet.

b. The Providers maintain the following records and information with respect to every subscriber account:

i. *Email contents.* In general, any email (which can include attachments such as documents, images, and videos) sent to or from a subscriber's account, or stored in draft form in the account, is maintained on the Providers' servers unless and until the subscriber deletes the email. If the subscriber does not delete the email, it can remain on the Providers' computers

indefinitely. Even if the subscriber deletes the email, it may continue to be available on the Provider's servers for a certain period of time.

ii. *Address book.* The Providers also allow subscribers to maintain the equivalent of an address book, comprising email addresses and other contact information of other email users.

iii. *Subscriber and billing information.* The Providers collect and maintain (typically unverified) identifying information about each subscriber, including, for example, name, username, address, telephone number, and alternate email addresses. The Providers also maintain records concerning the date on which the account was created, the Internet protocol ("IP") address of the user at the time of account creation, the current status of the account (*e.g.*, active or closed), the length of service, and the types of services utilized by the subscriber. Additionally, for paying subscribers, the Providers maintain records of the subscriber's means and source of payment, including any credit card or bank account number.

iv. *Transactional information.* The Providers also typically retain certain transactional information about the use of each account on its system. This information can include records of login (*i.e.*, session) times and durations and the methods used to connect to the account (such as logging into the account through the Providers' website).

v. *Customer correspondence.* The Providers also typically maintain records of any customer service contacts with or about the subscriber, including any inquiries or complaints concerning the subscriber's account.

vi. *Search history.* Google and Oath also typically maintain records of any search history or web history associated with the subscriber's account.

vii. *Associated content.* Google also typically maintains content and records relating to the following applications that are associated with its e-mail accounts: (A) “Google Docs,” which provides document-editing software that can be used to create, share, store, and manage documents online; (B) “Google Drive,” which enables users to store files on Google servers, where they can be accessed remotely by the user and others; and (C) “Gchat” or “Instant Messenger,” which provides a chat interface through which users can communicate with each other in real time. Oath also typically maintains content and records relating to AOL instant message, which provides a chat interface through which users can communicate with each other in real time.

viii. *Preserved and backup records.* The Providers also maintain preserved copies of the foregoing categories of records with respect to an account, for at least 90 days, upon receiving a preservation request from the Government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f). The Providers may also maintain backup copies of the foregoing categories of records pursuant to its own data retention policy.

D. Jurisdiction and Authority to Issue Warrant

5. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(A), the Government may require a provider of an electronic communications service or a remote computing service, such as the Providers, to disclose all stored content and all non-content records or other information pertaining to a subscriber, by obtaining a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

6. A search warrant under § 2703 may be issued by “any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge of such a court)” that “has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i).

7. When the Government obtains records under § 2703 pursuant to a search warrant, the Government is not required to notify the subscriber of the existence of the warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), (c)(2) & (3). Additionally, the Government may obtain an order precluding the Provider from notifying the subscriber or any other person of the warrant, for such period as the Court deems appropriate, where there is reason to believe that such notification will seriously jeopardize an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

E. Prior Applications

8. On or about July 18, 2017, in connection with an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Account sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained from Judge Howell search warrants for emails in the Cohen Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017, and emails in the MDCPC Account sent or received between the opening of the account and November 13, 2017. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of their investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office. As part of that referral, the SCO provided the USAO with emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the search warrants executed by the SCO, which had already been reviewed for privilege.¹ As discussed below, this affidavit is based in part on my review of

¹ In an abundance of caution, in a separate application the USAO has sought authorization, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, to review the emails obtained pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants for evidence related to certain additional conduct that was not the focus of the Prior Cohen Account Warrants. The emails obtained from the Prior Cohen Account Warrants that relate to that additional conduct do not form a basis for the instant application.

responsive materials produced pursuant to the July 18 and November 13, 2017 warrants (the “Prior Cohen Account Warrants”).

9. On or about November 7, 2017, and January 4, 2018, as well as certain prior dates, the SCO sought and obtained from Judge Howell orders authorizing and extending the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to record communications sent to or from the Cohen Account. The SCO has provided pen register data obtained pursuant to those orders to the USAO. This affidavit, as discussed below, is based in part on my review of the pen register data obtained pursuant to the November 7, 2017 and January 4, 2018 orders (the “Pen Register Data”).

10. On or about February 16, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained from the Honorable Debra Freeman, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of New York, an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for email header information associated with the MDCPC Account. This affidavit, as discussed below, is based in part on my review of email header information produced by 1 & 1 in response to that order (the “MDCPC Header Information”).

II. Probable Cause

A. Overview

11. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI are investigating, among other things, a scheme by Target Subject Michael Cohen to defraud multiple banks. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

12. The investigation has revealed that Cohen has made affirmative misrepresentations in and omitted material information from financial statements and other disclosures that Cohen provided to multiple banks in connection with a transaction intended to relieve Cohen of approximately \$22 million in debt he owed on taxi medallion loans from the banks. As set forth

in detail below, in these financial statements, and in his oral and other written statements to these banks, Cohen appears to have (i) intentionally omitted cash assets that he began receiving in 2017 from new consulting work; (ii) significantly understated his *total* holdings of cash and cash equivalents; and (iii) failed to inform the banks from which he was seeking debt relief that he had agreed to make a \$3.8 million cash payment to a third party, [REDACTED] in connection with [REDACTED] acquisition of the taxi medallions securing Cohen's debt. By making these misrepresentations and material omissions, Cohen avoided making monthly payments on his loans, and attempted to and had secured proposed agreements from the banks to relieve him of certain repayment obligations worth millions of dollars.

13. Based on my review of emails obtained from the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, MDCPC Header Information, and documents produced pursuant to subpoenas, I have learned that Cohen has used the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account to, among other things, (i) communicate with [REDACTED] and their attorney, [REDACTED] about the proposed transfer of Cohen's medallions and associated debts; (ii) negotiate a pay-down of the principal amount of the taxi medallion loans; (iii) communicate with his accountant about the contents of the false financial statements at issue; and (iv) send those false financial statements to banks. Additionally, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account, respectively, to communicate with Cohen about the status of the taxi medallion transaction, and to send relevant financial statements to banks. Accordingly, and as set forth in more detail below, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts will include evidence of the Subject Offenses.

B. Cohen's Statements to Sterling National Bank

14. As set forth in detail below, in 2014, Cohen, through limited liability corporations ("LLCs") controlled by him and his wife, Laura Cohen, entered into a series of loans from Sterling

National Bank (“Sterling”) and the Melrose Credit Union (“Melrose”), secured by taxi medallions, for approximately \$20 million. Though entered into by LLCs, the loans were also secured by personal guarantees in the names of both Cohen and his wife. Over time, as the taxi industry weakened and the medallions were devalued, Cohen sought to renegotiate the terms of those loans and/or relieve himself from their obligations, including the personal guarantees. As part of that effort, Cohen made a series of representations to Sterling and Melrose about his net worth, assets, available cash, and financial outlook. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and Melrose, and public sources concerning the taxi industry and the value of taxi medallions, as well as my review of reports prepared by law enforcement officers of interviews with a Sterling executive vice-president (the “Sterling Employee-1”) and my participation in an interview with a Sterling employee (the “Sterling Employee-2”), I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Taxi medallions are small metal plaques affixed to taxis. Without a medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in cities with medallion systems, such as New York City. Cohen and his wife own multiple LLCs that collectively own 32 taxi medallions (each LLC owns two medallions).² Cohen’s purchase of these New York taxi medallions was originally financed by loans from Capital One Bank, for which the medallions served as collateral. Cohen was not a taxi operator, and leased his medallions to a third party. That third party made monthly payments to Cohen, who in turn used some of those proceeds to pay his monthly loan payments.

b. In early 2014, Cohen became a customer of Sterling when he sought to refinance a mortgage on a rental property that he owned. In or around April 2014, Cohen raised with Sterling

² One of these companies, Mad Dog Cab Corp., was jointly owned by Sondra Cohen, who I believe is Cohen’s mother.

the prospect of refinancing his taxi medallion loans, which were then at Capital One Bank. By in or about September 2014, Cohen began negotiating a lending transaction with Sterling that would allow Cohen to pay off his loans at Capital One and borrow more money from the then-increase in value of the medallions. According to Sterling Employee-1, in 2014, prior to the recent upheaval in the taxi industry—as a result of the emergence of ride-sharing services, such as Uber—taxi medallion loans were viewed by banks and investors as safe, short term credits, as the market value of taxi medallions was consistently rising. Consequently, taxi medallion loans—like the loans held by Cohen—were frequently refinanced at increasing amounts as the value of the medallions rose. According to Sterling Employee-1, borrowers typically cashed out the increase in the loan amount and used the additional funds for other purposes. Cohen appears to have followed this approach in 2014, when he agreed to refinance his medallion loans for approximately \$22 million, which—according to letters from Capital One Bank in Sterling’s files—was greater than his previous debt at Capital One Bank (\$21 million, of which \$14.6 million was a line of credit to Cohen). This allowed Cohen to cash out the proceeds from the transaction.

c. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have learned that on or about December 8, 2014, each of Cohen’s sixteen taxi medallion corporations entered into loan agreements and promissory notes with Sterling for the principal sum of \$1,375,000, with repayment due on December 8, 2016. Each loan was signed by Michael or Laura Cohen, depending on who was the sole shareholder of the corporation. The loans were also each secured by a security agreement, dated the same day, making the medallions collateral for the notes. To give Sterling additional security, Michael and Laura Cohen signed personal guarantees and confessions of judgment, giving Sterling the right to pursue collection against the Cohens’ personal assets were their corporations to default under the loan agreements. In total, Sterling agreed to lend

approximately \$22 million to the Cohens' companies. Pursuant to participation agreements, Sterling transferred 45 percent of that debt to Melrose.³ Under the terms of Sterling's participation agreements with Melrose, Sterling was precluded from amending or modifying the loans without the consent of Melrose.

d. In evaluating Cohen's requested refinancing of the taxi medallions, Sterling (and Melrose, consistent with its participation in the deal) conducted due diligence. At Sterling's request, Cohen provided Sterling with a statement of financial condition, dated August 1, 2014 (the "August 2014 Financial Statement"), which indicated that Cohen had \$100,740,000 in total assets, \$23,550,000 in total liabilities, and a net worth of \$77,190,000.⁴ From my review of a Sterling credit memorandum, dated September 29, 2014, I know that Sterling viewed the transaction favorably because, accounting for loan payments, cash flows from the medallions were projected to be positive, the value of the collateral (as estimated by Sterling) exceeded \$42 million, and the net worth of Cohen—who was the direct obligor under the guarantee agreements—was over \$77 million. An internal Sterling credit and risk rating analysis report, dated October 20, 2014, recommended approval of the loans for substantially the same reasons.

e. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling and public sources, I have learned that over time, the collateral backing Cohen's loans (taxi medallions) lessened in value due to the rise in ride-sharing companies and significant devaluation of taxi medallions. Additionally, Cohen began falling behind on loan payments to Sterling and Melrose. I know from records maintained by Sterling and an interview with Sterling Employee-2 that, beginning in or around

³ Melrose, which had a business principally focused on taxi medallion loans, is now in conservatorship by the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA").

⁴ Cohen subsequently provided Sterling with a revised statement of financial condition, also dated August 1, 2014, which reported assets of \$99,420,000, total liabilities of \$23,550,000, and a net worth of \$75,870,000.

September 2015, Cohen told Sterling, in sum and substance, that the individual leasing Cohen's medallions had fallen behind in making payments to Cohen, and that as a result, the monthly cash flow from his taxi medallions had been reduced, leaving him with a shortfall of approximately \$16,000 each month. For instance, I have reviewed an email from Sterling Employee-2, dated September 9, 2015, summarizing a call with Cohen—which according to the email and toll records for Cohen's cellphone occurred on September 8, 2015—during which Cohen told Sterling Employee-2, in sum and substance, about his cash flow problems and a monthly shortfall of approximately \$16,000. In that same email, Sterling Employee-2 commented that despite Cohen's statements, his personal financial information "indicate[d] a strong ability to make up the difference in payments." Cohen, however, according to Sterling Employee-2, pushed the bank for a reduction in Cohen's monthly payments.

f. From my review of records maintained by Sterling and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Cohen and Sterling Employee-2 spoke again on September 28, 2015, and that during the call Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that the individual to whom Cohen leases the medallions had again reduced monthly payments to Cohen. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling that between in or about September 2015 and November 2015, Sterling raised the possibility—both internally and with Cohen—of Cohen posting his real estate holdings, personal residence, or some other collateral as additional security for the banks. According to these records, however, Cohen resisted these requests. From my review of loan documents and records maintained by Sterling, I know that in or about November 2015, as a result of Cohen's representation that he was not earning sufficient returns on his medallions to cover monthly interest payments, Sterling and Melrose agreed to amend their loans with Cohen by,

among other things, reducing the interest rate Cohen paid to Melrose and extending the loan maturity date to December 8, 2017.

g. I know from interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, as well as emails I have reviewed, that in or about October 2016, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1 that Cohen had a potential buyer of his taxi medallions, named [REDACTED] who would agree to assume Cohen's debt with Sterling and Melrose. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, as well as the interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2 referenced above, I know that by or before October 2016, Cohen had entered into negotiations to sell his sixteen corporate taxi medallions to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the balance of the loans, which at the time was \$21,376,000. I know from my review of records maintained by Sterling, and my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, that as a condition of the transfer of the medallion loans—and because Sterling was unfamiliar with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]—Sterling requested that Cohen make a substantial principal payment on the loan, of approximately one million dollars, prior to the transfer. Cohen rejected this request initially. But on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen told Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he would make a one million dollar principal reduction payment in order to move forward with the medallion transfer deal with [REDACTED]. Indeed, in an email sent from the Cohen Account to Sterling Employee-2 on or about February 22, 2017, Cohen confirmed that he “agreed to pay down 1 million from the loan amount.”

h. Pursuant to the participation agreements between Sterling and Melrose, Sterling was required to secure Melrose's agreement to participate in the transfer of the taxi medallion debt from Cohen to [REDACTED]. On or about April 17, 2017, Sterling sent a memorandum to Melrose summarizing the terms of the proposed transaction, and noting the requirement that

Melrose agree to the terms. On or about May 2, 2017, [REDACTED] emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the [REDACTED] Account to inquire about the status of the transaction. Sterling Employee-1 responded to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account that Melrose had agreed to the deal, and that Sterling would be sending [REDACTED] a term sheet shortly.

i. In order for the banks to evaluate the proposed transaction fully, they requested financial information from the parties. On or about October 26, 2016, a Sterling employee emailed the [REDACTED] Account about the “Cohen Medallion Purchase,” and stated “[i]n order to proceed with the assumption of Michael’s loans,” Sterling needed certain financial information from [REDACTED] responded from the [REDACTED] Account, copying [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, that he would send a financial statement and tax returns shortly. Additionally, on or about June 7, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen to request an “updated personal financial statement,” completed jointly with Cohen’s wife, and Cohen’s most recent federal income tax return. On or about June 8, 2017, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the Cohen Account, attaching a Sterling personal financial statement form that had been filled out by hand, which referenced a statement of financial condition, dated May 1, 2017 (the “May 2017 Financial Statement”), that was also attached. The May 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from Cohen’s accountant [REDACTED] stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The May 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$41,955,000, total liabilities of \$39,130,000, and a net worth of \$2,825,000. The May 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen’s assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in

cash, \$26,155,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings), \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence.

j. Based on my review of reports of law enforcement interviews of Sterling Employee-1, I have learned that Sterling Employee-1 reviewed each line of the May 2017 Financial Statement with Cohen to, among other things, verify its accuracy, and Sterling Employee-1 asked Cohen about the cash amount listed on the May 2017 Financial Statement. Cohen stated to Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that the May 2017 Financial Statement was accurate.

k. On or about August 16, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed Cohen at the Cohen Account and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, attaching a non-binding term sheet memorializing the potential transaction between Sterling, Melrose, Cohen, and [REDACTED]. On or about August 29, 2017, [REDACTED] emailed Sterling Employee-1 from the [REDACTED] Account, requesting that he be included on "all future e-mails to [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] concerning this matter," and providing proposed edits to the term sheet. On or about August 30, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 emailed [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, Cohen at the Cohen Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, and provided them with a revised term sheet. On or about September 5, 2017, Sterling Employee-1 sent [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, Cohen at the Cohen Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account a copy of the executed term sheet. According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen.

l. As part of the agreement, according to the term sheet, \$1,265,913 in principal (which is what would remain after the \$20,000,000 payment on the outstanding loan balance) would be repaid by Cohen and the two banks, with Cohen paying fifty percent and the banks dividing the

remaining half of the balance. Based on my review of an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, the parties reached a preliminary agreement that Cohen would pay \$632,956 of the remaining \$1,265,912 principal loan balance, and Sterling and Melrose would absorb \$357,167 and \$275,789 respectively in the form of charge-offs. According to Sterling Employee-1, Sterling was willing to divide the repayment of the outstanding principal balance—despite its prior insistence that Cohen make a principal pay-down of at least one million dollars—because Cohen represented on a telephone call with Sterling Employee-1, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient liquidity to pay the full outstanding principal balance. As part of the agreement, Sterling and Melrose also agreed to relieve Cohen and his wife of the personal guarantees that they made on behalf of the LLCs. Thus, after completing the [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would no longer have had any outstanding obligations to Sterling or Melrose.

m. Based on my review of emails sent by Sterling employees, I have learned that because the transaction between the parties was subject to full credit underwriting by Sterling and Melrose (as well as Melrose's regulators at NCUA), in August and September 2017, Sterling required and requested additional financial statements for Cohen and [REDACTED] for its credit underwriting process. In response to Sterling's requests, on or about October 5, 2017, [REDACTED] sent from the [REDACTED] Account to a Sterling employee a copy of [REDACTED] personal financial statement. The financial statement lists the [REDACTED] Account as the email contact for [REDACTED]. Additionally, on or about October 5, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Account, re-sent Sterling Employee-2 a copy of his May 2017 Financial Statement. A day later, on October 6, 2017, Cohen, using the Cohen Account, emailed Sterling Employee-2 a statement of financial condition, dated September 30, 2017 (the "September 2017 Financial Statement").

n. Like the May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement included a cover letter from [REDACTED] Cohen's accountant, stating, in sum and substance, that the information in the statement came from Cohen, and that [REDACTED] had not confirmed its accuracy or completeness. The September 2017 Financial Statement stated that Cohen had total assets of \$33,430,000, total liabilities of \$45,630,000, and a negative net worth of \$12,200,000. Notably, unlike Cohen's May 2017 Financial Statement, the September 2017 Financial Statement represented to Sterling that Cohen had a negative net worth. The September 2017 Financial Statement indicated that Cohen's assets were comprised of \$1,250,000 in cash, \$17,630,000 in closely held companies (such as the taxi medallion entities and his real estate holdings),⁵ \$3,200,000 in real estate investments, and his \$11,000,000 personal residence (which, for the first time, he indicated was held in trust). The September 2017 Financial Statement included assets and liabilities not held in Cohen's name, such as various entities associated with his taxi medallions and some of his real estate investment entities.

o. From my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I have also learned that at or around the time Cohen provided Sterling with these financial statements—in or around September 2017—Cohen stopped paying monthly loan payments on his taxi medallion loans altogether. According to Sterling Employee-2, Cohen informed Sterling, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient funds to pay the monthly principal and interest payments on his medallion loans. By in or about December 2017, Sterling and Melrose had not been paid approximately \$276,937.92 in monthly principal and interest payments on the medallion loans. Based on Cohen's financial condition as conveyed in the

⁵ Notably, the September 2017 Financial Statement valued each of Cohen's thirty-two New York taxi medallions at approximately \$180,187.50, which was considerably less than the \$650,000 valuation ascribed to each medallion in the Cohen-[REDACTED] term sheet.

September 2017 Financial Statement, and his delinquency in making payments to Sterling, among other things, the bank's credit underwriting committee determined (and memorialized in a December 2017 memorandum) that the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction was favorable for the bank – that is, that [REDACTED] would be a better borrower than Cohen.

p. On or about December 26, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a demand letter requesting the immediate receipt of past-due loan payments. On December 29, 2017, Sterling sent Cohen a letter stating that he was in default under the loans between Sterling and Cohen's medallion corporations. Cohen did not make an immediate payment on the loans, but instead sent an e-mail to Sterling Employee-1 on or about January 24, 2018, from the Cohen Account, stating that during the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Cohen would "bring all payments up to date as well as deposit the payoff differential." Cohen also requested by email sent from the Cohen Account on January 24, 2018, that at the closing of the Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, Sterling provide a letter stating that all of Cohen's debts have been satisfied and that Cohen's personal guarantees of the medallion loans had been terminated.

q. The Cohen- [REDACTED] transaction, however, did not close. On or about January 29, 2018, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] attorney, emailed attorneys for Sterling from the [REDACTED] Account and stated that "at this time there is no deal with Michael Cohen. Some of the numbers have changed and we are not prepared to go forward."

r. Based on my participation in the interview with Sterling Employee-2 and my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that after the Cohen- [REDACTED] deal fell apart, Sterling assigned Cohen's loans to an employee at Sterling who specializes in collecting on defaulting loans ("Sterling Employee-3"). From my review of telephone call notes, I know that Sterling Employee-3 spoke to Cohen on or about January 30, 2018 about paying down and/or

restructuring Cohen's outstanding taxi medallion loans. Based on my review of an email between Sterling Employee-3 and Cohen, I know that on the January 30, 2018 call, Cohen stated that he would send a "corrected current" version of his personal financial statement. Following that call, on or about January 31, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account a copy of the September 2017 Financial Statement. Later that day, Cohen again emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account and proposed paying \$500,000 to bring the loans current and \$750,000 to bring the principal balance to \$20,500,000. Cohen also suggested revised monthly interest payment amounts. On or about January 31, 2018, Sterling Employee-3 responded to Cohen at the Cohen Account and stated, in sum and substance, that Cohen would need to pay the entirety of the overdue payments and pay down the principal balance of the loan to \$20,000,000 (in total, a payment of approximately \$1,750,000), and would need to make larger monthly interest payments.

s. On or about February 1, 2018, Cohen emailed Sterling Employee-3 from the Cohen Account and proposed "[p]ayment of \$1.250m which ALL can be used to pay down principal, if [Sterling] will waive past due amounts," but stated "I do NOT have more than the \$1.250m." (Emphasis in original.) Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that he had insufficient financial resources to post additional collateral or pre-fund monthly payments. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned that Sterling continues to renegotiate the medallion loans with Cohen based on Cohen's representations about his current financial position.

C. Cohen Made Material Misrepresentations About His Finances to Banks

Cohen Concealed from Sterling and Melrose Cash Derived from Consulting Work


15. As set forth in detail below, despite multiple representations by Cohen to Sterling (and, by extension, Melrose⁶) that he had insufficient funds to pay down the principal balance of the medallion loans, make monthly interest payments, or pay past-due amounts, it appears that between 2016 and the present, Cohen opened and maintained bank accounts at First Republic Bank (“First Republic”), and then received millions of dollars in purported consulting payments in these accounts, which he did not disclose to Sterling. Cohen set up these accounts and received these funds during the very period in which he made disclosures to Sterling about his personal finances (including his assets and liabilities) and his ability to make payments on the medallion loans. In these disclosures to Sterling—and despite being asked about these bank accounts by his accountant—Cohen withheld information about liquid financial assets at First Republic.

16. Specifically, based on my review of documents and bank records produced pursuant to a subpoena by First Republic, and my participation in and review of reports of interviews with two First Republic employees, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. Cohen and his wife have been customers of First Republic since approximately June 2011. Cohen controls several checking and loan accounts, some in his own name and others in the names of corporate entities.


⁶ Based on my review of a report of an interview conducted with an employee of Melrose, I have learned that, pursuant to the participation agreement between Sterling and Melrose, Cohen’s financial statements and other records in Sterling’s possession were forwarded to Melrose so that Melrose could make a determination as to whether to approve of the Cohen- transaction. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Melrose employees, I also know that Cohen called employees at Melrose regarding the Cohen- transaction.

b. On or about October 26, 2016, in Manhattan, New York, Cohen opened a new checking account at First Republic in the name of Essential Consultants LLC (the “Essential Consultants Account”). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. When Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, a First Republic employee (“First Republic Employee-1”) conducted an in-person interview of Cohen. In response to a series of know-your-customer questions⁷ about the purpose of the account—the answers to which First Republic Employee-1 entered into a form⁸—Cohen stated, in sum and substance, that he was opening Essential Consultants as a real estate consulting company to collect fees for investment consulting work, and all of his consulting clients would be domestic individuals based in the United States. Cohen also stated, in sum and substance, that his purpose in setting up the account was to keep the revenue from his consulting business—which he said was not his main source of income—separate from his personal finances. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that Cohen’s statements about the intended purpose of the account and source of funds for the account were false. Specifically, the account was not intended to receive—and does not appear to have received—money in connection with real estate consulting work; in addition, the account has received substantial payments from foreign sources.




⁷ Certain financial institutions are required to conduct such procedures pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5318; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.

⁸ First Republic Employee-1 first filled out the form on the day he interviewed Cohen, October 26, 2016. On or about December 19, 2016, at the request of bank compliance personnel, First Republic Employee-1 updated the form to add more detail about Cohen’s statements.



d. Second, I know from my review of First Republic bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant that after Cohen opened the Essential Consultants Account, Cohen received payments into that account from foreign businesses and entities that do not reflect the stated client profile for the residential and commercial real-estate consulting services. Specifically, from my review of the Essential Consultants Account schedule and public sources, I know the following:

i. Beginning on or about January 31, 2017, Cohen began receiving monthly payments of \$83,333 from an entity called Columbus Nova LLC, which were deposited into the Essential Consultants Account. According to public sources, Columbus Nova is an investment management firm controlled by Renova Group, an industrial holding company based in Zurich, Switzerland that is controlled by Russian national Viktor Vekselberg. From January 2017 to August 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received seven payments totaling \$583,332.98 from Columbus Nova LLC.



ii. Beginning on or about April 5, 2017, Cohen began receiving payments from Novartis Investments, SARL, which I believe to be the in-house financial subsidiary of the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis International AG (“Novartis”). Between April 2017 and January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received ten wire payments from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Novartis, each in the amount of \$99,980, for a total of \$999,800.

iii. Beginning in or about April 2017, the Essential Consultants Account started receiving wire payments from a bank account associated with the telecommunications company AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”). Specifically, on or about April 14, 2017, AT&T wired \$100,000 to the Essential Consultants Account and, from in or about June 2017 to in or about January 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received nine \$50,000 payments from AT&T. In total, AT&T wired \$550,000 to the Essential Consultants Account.

iv. On or about May 10, 2017, June 9, 2017, July 10, 2017, and November 27, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received four deposits in the amount \$150,000 (totaling \$600,000) from a bank account in South Korea. The account holder from which the money was sent is Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (“KAI”). KAI is a South Korea-based company that produces and sells fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft, and satellites to the United States Department of Defense, among other customers.

v. On or about May 22, 2017, the Essential Consultants Account received a \$150,000 deposit from an account at Kazkommertsbank, a Kazakhstani bank. The listed account holder at Kazkommertsbank was a second Kazakhstani bank named BTA Bank, AO. A message accompanying the wire payment indicated that the payment was a “monthly consulting fee as per Inv BTA-101 DD May 10, 2017 consulting agreement W/N DD 08 05 2017 CNTR W/NDD 08/05/2017.”

vi. In total, from on or about January 31, 2017 to on or about January 10, 2018, the Essential Consultants Account received approximately \$2,883,132.98 in transfers and checks from the aforementioned entities. As of on or about January 10, 2018, the balance in the Essential Consultants Account was \$1,369,474.23.

e. On or about April 4, 2017, Cohen opened another new checking account at First Republic, this one in the name of Michael D. Cohen & Associates, P.C. (the "MDC&A Account"). Cohen was the only authorized signatory on the account. Among other things, the MDC&A Account received ten wire transfers and one check from an account in the name of Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm. In total, from on or about April 5, 2017, to on or about January 2, 2018, the MDC&A Account received \$426,097.70 in deposits, and the balance in the account as of January 2, 2018, was \$344,541.35. As discussed below, Cohen never disclosed any of the balance in the Essential Consultants or MDC&A accounts to Sterling during the negotiations with respect to the [REDACTED] transaction, including in his May 2017 Financial Statement and September 2017 Financial Statement.

17. Based on my review of emails from the Cohen Account that were seized pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, and my review of reports of interviews with employees of AT&T and Novartis, it appears that the aforementioned payments to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account ostensibly were for political consulting work, including consulting for international clients on issues pending before the Trump administration.¹⁰ Specifically, from my review of emails from the Cohen Account and public sources, I have learned the following:

¹⁰ Based on my review of public sources, I have learned that Cohen is not registered as a lobbyist or as a person acting as an agent of foreign principals, as may have been required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

a. On or about April 28, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the Cohen Account to an individual whom I believe is affiliated with KAI. In the email, Cohen attached a document purporting to be a “Consulting Agreement” between KAI and Essential Consultants dated as of about May 1, 2017. The document indicates that Essential Consultants would render “consulting and advisory services, as requested” by KAI, and that KAI would pay Essential Consultants “a consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000.00) US Dollars,” disbursed through eight \$150,000 installments between May 2017 and December 2017.

b. On or about May 10, 2017, Cohen sent an email from an alternate email address, copying the Cohen Account, to an employee of BTA Bank. To the email, Cohen attached an invoice to BTA Bank in the name of Essential Consultants. The invoice contemplated a \$150,000 payment to Essential Consultants for a “monthly consulting fee.”

c. On or about February 13, 2017, Cohen emailed an AT&T employee from the Cohen Account what appears to be a consulting agreement, which contemplates that Essential Consultants “shall render consulting and advisory services to [AT&T]” and that AT&T would “advise [Essential Consultants] of those issues and matters with respect to which AT&T Services desires [Essential Consultants]’s assistance and advice.” The contract calls for AT&T “to pay the Consultant for his services . . . a consulting fee of Fifty Thousand (\$50,000) Dollars . . . per month.” Based on my review of reports of interviews with AT&T employees, I have learned that AT&T retained Cohen to consult on political issues, including net neutrality, the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, and tax reform.

d. On or about January 17, 2017, Cohen emailed to a representative of Novartis from the Cohen Account a contract between Novartis and Essential Consultants, which provides that Essential Consultants will “provide consulting and advisory services to Novartis on matters that

relate to the repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act in the US and any other issues mutually agreeable to [Essential Consultants] and Novartis.” The contract provides for a “consulting fee of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (\$1,200,000) US dollars,” to be paid to Essential Consultants in even monthly installments over the course of a year. Based on my review of reports of interviews with Novartis employees, I have learned that Novartis retained Cohen to provide political consulting services and to gain access to relevant policymakers in the Trump Administration.

e. On or about April 3, 2017, Squire Patton Boggs, a law firm, announced on its website that it had formed a “strategic alliance” with Michael D. Cohen & Associates and would “jointly represent clients.”

18. Despite the significant amount of money that Cohen received into the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account, and the cash balance in both accounts, Cohen did not disclose that information to Sterling or Melrose. Specifically, based on my review of documents provided by [REDACTED] and my review of notes and a [REDACTED] I have learned the following:

a. In or about May 2017, [REDACTED] met with Cohen at a law firm in Manhattan, New York. At the meeting, Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he had set up a law practice called Michael D. Cohen & Associates P.C., and a consulting company called Essential Consultants LLC. Cohen told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, that he expected to earn \$75,000 per month in connection with his law practice, and that he expected gross revenues for the consulting business to be between five and six million dollars annually.

b. In or about October 2017, if not earlier, [REDACTED] was preparing a personal financial statement for Cohen. On or about October 6, 2017, [REDACTED] sent an email to Cohen at the Cohen

Account in which [REDACTED] wrote that “[a]ttached is a draft of the new PFS as of September 30, 2017” and attached a draft of the September 2017 Financial Statement. The draft statement reflected that as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had only \$1,250,000 in cash, total assets of approximately \$33,430,000 (comprised of taxi medallion interests, real estate interests, and his personal residence and property), and liabilities of approximately \$45,630,000, leaving him purportedly over \$12 million in debt. In the same email, [REDACTED] questioned Cohen, in sum and substance, about the fact that the financial statement did not list any assets associated with either the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account: “[w]e did not add any value for you[r] two operating entities – Michael D. Cohen & Associates POC [*sic*] and Essential Consultants LLC. Please advise whether or not these should be disclosed and what value.”

c. On or about October 6, 2017, Cohen called [REDACTED] by telephone—which is reflected on toll records for Cohen’s cellphone—and told [REDACTED] in sum and substance, not to include Essential Consultants or MDC&A in the September 2017 Financial Statement because they had no value.

d. On or about October 6, 2017, following the call with [REDACTED] Cohen, using the Cohen Account, responded to [REDACTED] email with the answer “[l]ooks good to me.” Cohen never directed [REDACTED] to make any changes to his cash position as listed in the September 2017 Financial Statement. Neither Essential Consultants nor MDC&A was listed on the September 2017 Financial Statement that was provided to Sterling.

19. Based on the foregoing, and from my review of bank records and emails sent by Cohen to Sterling, I know that the September 2017 Financial Statement made no mention whatsoever of assets that Cohen held in the Essential Consultants Account or the MDC&A Account. As of September 30, 2017—the date of the September 2017 Financial Statement—Cohen had

approximately \$673,729.95 in the Essential Consultants Account and \$248,619.28 in the MDC&A Account. As of October 6, 2017, the date when [REDACTED] asked Cohen about the two accounts, Cohen had approximately \$823,709.95 in the Essential Consultants Account and \$248,619.28 in the MDC&A Account.

Cohen Understated His Available Cash

20. In addition to withholding the existence of the Essential Consultants Account and the MDC&A Account from Sterling and Melrose, it appears that Cohen also substantially understated his available cash and cash equivalents in his financial disclosures. Specifically, I know from my review of the September 2017 Financial Statement that Cohen provided to Sterling that Cohen represented that he had \$1,250,000 in cash as of September 30, 2017. But, from my review of a summary of bank records that were scheduled by an FBI forensic accountant, I have learned that Cohen had over \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017. Specifically, from my review of the account schedule and bank records, I have learned the following:

a. Cohen has three checking and/or savings accounts at Capital One Bank, one of which is in his wife's name. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$1,105,680.35 in his savings account, and \$1,262,982.29 in total in the three accounts at Capital One Bank.

b. Cohen has three accounts at Morgan Stanley in his name. As of September 30, 2017, the combined total in cash and cash equivalents in those three accounts was \$1,270,600.41.

c. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$260,689.18 in an account at Signature Bank.

d. In addition to the Essential Consultants Account and MDC&A Account at First Republic, Cohen also had two joint checking accounts with Laura Cohen at First Republic. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$1,876,209.27 in total in his four accounts at First Republic.

e. Cohen has an account at Bethpage Credit Union with \$25,931.39 in it as of September 30, 2017.

f. As of September 30, 2017, Cohen had \$17,542.54 in accounts at Sterling.

g. Cohen has two accounts at TD Bank—one in his name and one held jointly with his wife—and the total balance across the two accounts as of September 30, 2017 was \$300,096.72.

h. In total, as of September 30, 2017, Cohen had at least \$5,014,051.80 in his accounts at Capital One Bank, Signature Bank, TD Bank, Bethpage Credit Union, First Republic, and Morgan Stanley.

21. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it appears that Cohen's representations to Sterling and Melrose that he did not have more than \$1,250,000 were false, and that Cohen withheld information regarding approximately \$5 million in funds from Sterling and Melrose in order to secure favorable terms in his renegotiation of his medallion loan. Based on my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, and my review of reports of interviews with Sterling Employee-1 and two Melrose employees, it is my understanding that that Sterling and Melrose would view Cohen's understating of his assets as material to its decision whether to renegotiate Cohen's medallion loans and on what terms, or approve of the transfer of those loans to

[REDACTED]

Cohen Had a Side Agreement With [REDACTED]

22. As set forth in detail below, it appears that during the course of Cohen's negotiations to sell his interest in taxi medallions and the associated debt to [REDACTED], Cohen not only misrepresented his financial position to Sterling, but also failed to disclose a side deal he had negotiated with [REDACTED] it appears that [REDACTED] agreed to pay an above-market price for Cohen's taxi cab medallions, and in exchange, Cohen agreed to pay [REDACTED] approximately

\$3.8 million in cash. Specifically, from my review of documents produced pursuant to a subpoena by Sterling, and reports prepared by law enforcement officers of interviews with Sterling Employee-1, as well as my participation in an interview with Sterling Employee-2, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about September 5, 2017, an executed term sheet was circulated by Sterling Employee-1 to Cohen and [REDACTED]. *See supra* ¶ 14(k). According to the term sheet, [REDACTED] would borrow \$20,000,000 from Sterling and Melrose, to be secured by the medallions that [REDACTED] was to acquire from Cohen. At a price of \$20 million for thirty-two taxi medallions, the proposed transaction valued each medallion as worth \$625,000. The term sheet also contemplated a \$1,265,913 pay-down of the principal balance of the loan. The term sheet made no mention of a \$3.8 million payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] or any other form of payment or financial transaction between the parties.

b. Additionally, an internal Sterling credit memorandum, dated October 4, 2017, describing the terms of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction and the new loan to [REDACTED] did not mention any payments from Cohen to [REDACTED], including a \$3.8 million payment. The memorandum also noted that the “loan amount of \$20MM indicates a \$625M purchase price per medallion” but “it is recognized that this is not in line with current market values.” Indeed, according to an internal Sterling memorandum dated February 5, 2018, in the month of January 2018, taxi medallions sold for amounts ranging from \$120,000 to \$372,000. According to Sterling Employee-1 and Sterling Employee-2, they were never told that [REDACTED] agreed to a purchase price of \$625,000 in exchange for a lump sum payment from Cohen, or that Cohen would make any payment to [REDACTED].

23. While Cohen and [REDACTED] did not disclose any payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] in communications with Sterling, it appears that such a payment was contemplated. Indeed, based on my review of records maintained by [REDACTED] and a report prepared by law enforcement agents of an interview with [REDACTED] I have learned the following, in substance and in part, regarding the proposed side-payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

a. On or about September 19, 2017, [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for Cohen entitled, "Sale of NYC Medallion Entities and Debt Assumption" (the "[REDACTED] Memorandum"). The [REDACTED] Memorandum summarized the proposed transaction between Cohen and [REDACTED] in part, as follows: "Michael and Laura Cohen will transfer ownership of their 13 NYC medallion entities to a Buyer who will assume their bank indebtedness, upon the [Cohens'] paying down the debt portfolio of the 13 entities by \$500,000 and a cash payment to the Buyer of \$3,800,000."¹¹

b. According to [REDACTED] Cohen told him the parameters of the deal, including the payment of \$3,800,000 to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know where Cohen was going to obtain \$3,800,000 to pay [REDACTED]. As noted above, Cohen had more than \$5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents as of September 2017, but had only disclosed in his September 2017 Financial Statement that he had \$1.25 million in cash.

24. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling (as well as Melrose, the bank with the participating interest in the loans) and reports of interviews of representatives of Sterling (and Melrose), I have seen no evidence that Sterling, Melrose, or any other financial institution involved in the potential deal with Cohen and [REDACTED] was aware of the planned \$3.8 million side payment from Cohen to [REDACTED]

¹¹ The reference to thirteen medallions appears to be an error by [REDACTED] Cohen and his wife together owned sixteen corporations, which in turn owned 32 taxi medallions.

D. Probable Cause Regarding the Subject Accounts

25. As set forth above, since at least September 2015, if not earlier, Cohen has told Sterling that he has difficulty making payments on his medallion loans and, since at least October 2016, Cohen has been actively engaged in an attempt to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debts to [REDACTED]. In the course of doing so, Cohen has used the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account to engage in email communications regarding the terms of the transactions and the undisclosed side-payment with [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account, and [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account. Specifically, as described above, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Accounts have been used regarding the proposed Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction with Sterling:

a. Cohen has used the Cohen Account to, among other things, negotiate a pay-down of the principal amount of the loan, *see supra* ¶ 14(g), to send term sheets to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(j), to communicate with his accountant about the contents of financial statements, *see supra* ¶ 16, to send financial statements to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(i), (l), to check on the status of the transaction as of January 24, 2018, *see supra* ¶ 14(n), to negotiate a reduction of his debt with Sterling on or around January 31, 2018, *see supra* ¶ 14(o), to tell Sterling on February 1, 2018, he does not have the ability to pay more than \$1,250,000, *see supra* ¶ 14(p), and to communicate with individuals responsible for sources of payments to the Essential Consultants Account, *see supra* ¶ 15. In other words, from the communications described above, it appears likely that the Cohen Account will contain recent evidence of the Subject Offenses, including communications and potential misrepresentations to Sterling, and evidence indicating that statements made to Sterling are false or misleading.

b. [REDACTED] has used the [REDACTED] Account to communicate about the proposed taxi medallion transaction with Cohen, which appears to have been discussed as early

as October 2016. *See supra* ¶ 14(g).¹² Specifically, as described above, as early as May 2, 2017, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to inquire about the status of the transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(h). He used the [REDACTED] Account to exchange drafts of the proposed term sheet with Cohen, [REDACTED] and Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(j). The [REDACTED] Account was also used by [REDACTED] to send a personal financial statement for [REDACTED] to Sterling, *see supra* ¶ 14(l). The [REDACTED] Account was copied on emails from the [REDACTED] Account about the transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(i), and was listed on [REDACTED] financial statement as the contact email for [REDACTED], *see supra* ¶ 14(m). Additionally, based on my review of MDCPC Header Information, I know that on or about September 1, 2017—at or around the time the [REDACTED] and Cohen were negotiating a term sheet—[REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to send and receive eight emails from Cohen at the MDCPC Account.

c. [REDACTED] has used the [REDACTED] Account to communicate with Sterling employees, Cohen, and [REDACTED] about the proposed taxi medallion transaction since at least December 2016. *See supra* ¶¶ 14(g), 24(c). Specifically, on or about August 29, 2017, [REDACTED] told Sterling that he should be included on “all future e-mails” involving the proposed transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(j). Additionally, [REDACTED] was involved in making revisions to the parties’ term sheets, and he told Sterling on January 29, 2018 that [REDACTED] would not go forward with the planned transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(j), (n). Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that the [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence of the negotiations between Sterling and the parties, evidence of a payment from Cohen to [REDACTED] and the reasons for the collapse of the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction.

¹² For instance, from records provided by Sterling, I know that on or about December 2, 2016, [REDACTED] sent an email to a Sterling employee using the [REDACTED] Account. The email forwarded correspondence between [REDACTED] who was using the [REDACTED] Account, and an employee of Capital One regarding extending [REDACTED] loan with Capital One.

26. Additionally, it appears that Cohen set up the MDCPC Account to receive emails he was previously receiving at the Cohen Account. Specifically, based on my review of records maintained by AT&T, I have learned that on or about May 5, 2017, Cohen sent an email from the MDCPC Account to a blind copy list of recipients stating that “[d]ue to the overwhelming volume of phone calls and emails coming into my previous cellular number and e-mail address, I have elected to create for Clients Only the following. Kindly use this new information for all future contact and communications.” The signature line on the email listed “Essential Consultants LLC” and “Michael D. Cohen & Associates, PC,” as well as the MDCPC Account as the email address.¹³

27. In addition, based on my review of emails from the MDCPC Account produced pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants and the MDCPC Header Information, I have learned that Cohen has used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from the Cohen Account, to communicate with the [REDACTED] Account, and to send and receive emails from other email accounts about his political consulting business. Additionally, from my review of the MDCPC Header Information, it appears that since the [REDACTED] Cohen has continued to send and receive emails at the MDCPC Account that appear likely to be relevant to the commission of the Subject Offenses. For example, emails obtained pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, as well as the MDCPC Header Information have revealed the following:

- a. On approximately eight occasions in August and September 2017, while Cohen, [REDACTED] were communicating about a term sheet for the Cohen-[REDACTED] taxi

¹³ Based on my review of emails from the MDCPC Account obtained pursuant to subpoena, I have learned that Cohen has used the account to communicate with numerous individuals with whom he does not enjoy an attorney-client privilege, including some of the individuals described below. *See infra* ¶ 27.

medallion transaction, *see supra* ¶ 14(k), Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send or receive emails from [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account. For instance, on or about August 22, 2017, [REDACTED] used the [REDACTED] Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1 and copied Cohen on the email at the MDCPC Account. On the same day, Sterling Employee-1 responded to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] Account and Cohen at the MDCPC Account. On or about August 22, 2017, Cohen also used the MDCPC Account to send an email to Sterling Employee-1.

b. As noted above, on or about September 1, 2017, Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send or receive eight emails with the [REDACTED] Account.

c. Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from individuals who work at companies with whom it appears Cohen has a political consulting agreement. For example, beginning in April 2017—the same month when Cohen began receiving payments from AT&T, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(c)—Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from AT&T employees. These emails contain, among other things, invoices from Cohen to AT&T for consulting work by Cohen. Similarly, beginning in April 2017—which is also the month Cohen began receiving payments from Novartis for consulting work, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(d)—Cohen used the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from employees of Novartis. These emails concern, among other things, invoices from Cohen and requests for Novartis for Cohen's assistance on an initiative relating to drug pricing.

d. From my review of the MDCPC Header Information, I have learned that Cohen has continued to use the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails from individuals who work at companies with whom it appears Cohen had a political consulting agreement, such as Novartis and AT&T. For instance, on approximately six occasions between November 28, 2017 and January 30, 2018, the MDCPC Account was used to send and receive emails from accounts belonging to

individuals using @att.com email addresses. Similarly, on approximately seventeen occasions between December 1, 2017 and February 20, 2018, the MDCPC Account was used to send and receive emails from accounts belonging to individuals using @novartis.com email addresses. Since November 15, 2017, the MDCPC Account has also sent and received emails with individuals using the email domains @bta.kz, which I believe is the email domain used by employees of BTA Bank, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(d), 17(b), and @squirepb.com, which I believe is the email domain used by employees of the law firm Squire Patton Boggs—both of which Cohen appears to have a consulting relationship with, *see supra* ¶¶ 16(e), 17(e). Accordingly, it appears that Cohen continues to use the MDCPC Account to send and receive emails that will be relevant to whether he is maintaining a consulting business, what type of consulting work he is doing, and whether he is receiving money for that consulting work.

28. In addition to the foregoing, based on my review of the Pen Register Data, *see supra* ¶ 9, it appears that since the date of the last search warrant on the Cohen Account (*i.e.*, November 13, 2017), Cohen has continued to use the Cohen Account to communicate with the [REDACTED] Account, the [REDACTED] Account, and other email accounts that appear likely to be relevant to the commission of the Subject Offenses described above. For example, the Pen Register Data has revealed the following:

- a. Emails sent by the Cohen Account to the [REDACTED] Account on or about December 18, 2017 at 8:26 p.m., December 21, 2017 at 9:35 p.m., December 22, 2017 at 4:32 p.m., January 3, 2018 at 8:01 a.m., January 3, 2018 at 2:56 p.m., and January 4, 2018 at 3:31 p.m.
- b. An email sent by the Cohen Account to the [REDACTED] Account on or about January 25, 2018 at 8:55 p.m.

c. Emails from the Cohen Account to the email account [REDACTED] on or about December 1, 2017 at 2:14 p.m., December 29, 2017 at 10:20 p.m., January 2, 2018 at 3:52 p.m., January 2, 2018 at 5:44 p.m., and January 8, 2018 at 6:38 p.m. Based upon my review of emails contained in the Cohen Account, I have learned that the [REDACTED] email account belongs to [REDACTED] Cohen's accountant, through whom Cohen made misrepresentations to financial institutions, as discussed above.

d. Emails from the Cohen Account to email accounts belonging to Sterling employees, including Sterling Employee-1, on or about January 25, 2018 at 10:23 p.m., January 26, 2018 at 12:55 a.m., January 29, 2018 at 5:30 p.m., January 29, 2018 at 8:29 p.m., January 30, 2018 at 6:44 p.m.

e. An email sent from the Cohen Account to the email account clientservicenyc@firstrepublic.com on or about January 25, 2018 at 5:29 p.m. As stated above, First Republic is the bank at which the Essential Consultants Account is held.

f. Numerous emails sent from the Cohen Account to the email account [REDACTED] including emails on or about December 4, 2017 at 2:17 p.m. and January 29, 2018 at 5:43 p.m. Based upon the email address and domain name, as well as my review of reports of interviews and documents reflecting that Cohen's taxi medallions were leased and operated by [REDACTED], I believe that the [REDACTED] email address belongs to [REDACTED]

29. Based on my review of records maintained by Sterling, I know that Cohen used the Cohen Account to send and receive documents related to the Cohen-[REDACTED] transaction. Based on my training and experience, I know that Google allows users of e-mail accounts to easily save documents to file sharing and retention platforms such as Google Docs and Google Drive. I

also know, from my training and experience, that users of e-mail accounts often use instant messaging interfaces linked to their email accounts. Further, I have learned that the Providers maintain records of search and web histories associated with email accounts and, based on my training and experience, users of e-mail accounts use associated web search browsers associated with a subscriber's account to research topics they are e-mailing about. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that content information associated with the Subject Accounts will also contain evidence related to the Subject Offenses.

30. Thus, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that emails and other content information from the Subject Accounts will contain evidence of Cohen's efforts to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debt, and his misrepresentations and omissions to Sterling and Melrose in connection with these negotiations. Although Cohen appears to have communicated with [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] primarily through the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account, I know, based on my involvement in the investigation, that Cohen also used at least one other email account associated with his position at the Trump Organization. Thus, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that emails and other content information from the [REDACTED] Account, [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account since on or about October 1, 2016—the approximate date of when Cohen's efforts to sell his taxi medallions and the associated debt began—will reflect communications with the Cohen Account, MDCPC Account, and possibly one or more additional accounts used by Cohen, and probable cause to believe that such emails will constitute evidence of Cohen's commission of the Subject Offenses, including the extent to which Cohen did or did not inform other individuals involved in the conduct described above—such as [REDACTED]—of his misstatements and omissions to financial institutions.

31. Temporal Limitation. This application seeks all emails and other requested content information specified in Attachments A, B, C, and D for the following periods:

a. For the Cohen Account, this application seeks all emails sent, created, or received between November 14, 2017, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, pursuant to the Prior Cohen Account Warrants, the SCO obtained and provided to the USAO emails from the Cohen Account that were sent, created, or received before November 14, 2017. This application also seeks other information specified above associated with the Cohen Account that was created between December 1, 2014 (the month when Cohen entered into the medallion loans with Sterling), and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive.

b. For the MDCPC Account, this application seeks all emails sent, created, or received between November 14, 2017, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, pursuant to a prior warrant, the SCO obtained and provided to the USAO emails from the MDCPC Account that were sent, created, or received before November 14, 2017.

c. For the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account, this application seeks emails and all other content information specified above sent, created, or received between October 1, 2016, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, October 2016 is the month in which Cohen began negotiating the taxi medallion sale with the [REDACTED]

d. For the [REDACTED] Account, this application seeks emails and all other content information specified above sent, created, or received between December 1, 2016, and the date of the proposed warrant, inclusive. As described above, December 2016 is the month in which [REDACTED] began representing the [REDACTED] in relation to the taxi medallion transaction.

E. Evidence, Fruits and Instrumentalities

32. Based upon the foregoing, I respectfully submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Google's servers associated with the Cohen Account will contain evidence,

fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, as more fully described in Section II of Attachment A to the proposed warrant for the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Cohen Account or MDCPC Account.

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling, Melrose, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Cohen Account and/or MDCPC Account and [REDACTED] relating to Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Cohen Account and MDCPC Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

33. Based upon the foregoing, I further submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Google's servers associated with the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who

communicated with the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling, Melrose, or other financial institution(s), regarding Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account were accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the [REDACTED] Account and [REDACTED] Account owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

34. Based upon the foregoing, I further submit there is probable cause to believe that information stored on Oath's servers associated with the [REDACTED] Account will contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of the Subject Offenses, including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the [REDACTED] Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the [REDACTED] Account about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the [REDACTED] Account and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling, Melrose, or other financial institution(s), regarding Cohen's finances; and

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution.

III. Review of the Information Obtained Pursuant to the Warrant

35. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not required for service of a search warrant issued under § 2703, or for the collection or production of responsive records. Accordingly, the warrant requested herein will be transmitted to the Providers, which shall be directed to produce a digital copy of any responsive records to law enforcement personnel within 30 days from the date of service. Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the

status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) will retain the records and review them for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses as specified in Section III of Attachments A, B and C to the proposed warrant.

36. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various methods to locate evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including but not limited to undertaking a cursory inspection of all emails within the Subject Account. This method is analogous to cursorily inspecting all the files in a file cabinet in an office to determine which paper evidence is subject to seizure. Although law enforcement personnel may use other methods as well, particularly including keyword searches, I know that keyword searches and similar methods are typically inadequate to detect all information subject to seizure. As an initial matter, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files commonly associated with emails, including attachments such as scanned documents, pictures, and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, keyword searches cannot be relied upon to capture all relevant communications in an account, as it is impossible to know in advance all of the unique words or phrases that investigative subjects will use in their communications, and consequently there are often many communications in an account that are relevant to an investigation but that do not contain any keywords that an agent is likely to search for.

37. Because Cohen and [REDACTED] are attorneys, the review of the content within the Subject Accounts will be conducted pursuant to established screening procedures to ensure that the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, including attorneys for the Government, collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable

privilege. When appropriate, the procedures will include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to review potentially privileged communications and determine which communications to release to the investigation and prosecution team.

IV. Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing Order

38. The existence and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation are not publicly known. As a result, premature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested warrants could alert Cohen that he is under investigation, causing him to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. In particular, based on my experience investigating white collar cases, including cases featuring documents such as agreements, drafts of agreements, notes of conversations, and other documentary evidence, premature disclosure of an investigation may cause the target of the investigation to attempt to destroy or conceal such evidence. In addition, as also set forth above, Cohen uses computers and electronic communications in furtherance of his activity and thus could easily delete, encrypt, or otherwise conceal such digital evidence from law enforcement were he to learn of the Government’s investigation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(3). Cohen also appears to have the financial means that would facilitate his flight from prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(2), (5).

39. Accordingly, there is reason to believe that, were the Providers to notify the subscriber or others of the existence of the warrant, the investigation would be seriously jeopardized. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), I therefore respectfully request that the Court direct the Providers not to notify any person of the existence of the warrant for a period of 180 days from issuance, subject to extension upon application to the Court, if necessary.

40. For similar reasons, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government be permitted without further order of this Court to provide copies of the warrant and affidavit as

need be to personnel assisting it in the investigation and prosecution of this matter, and to disclose those materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

V. Conclusion

41. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that the Court issue the warrants sought herein pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (for contents) and § 2703(c)(1)(A) (for records and other information), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.



United States Attorney's Office
Southern District of New York

Sworn to before me this
28th day of February, 2018

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gabriel W. Gorenstein', written over a faint circular official seal.

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Exhibit B

18 MAG 169 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@gmail.com,
[REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED] Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Google, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com, [REDACTED]@gmail.com, and [REDACTED] maintained at premises controlled by Google, Inc., contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachments A and B hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachments A and B hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachments A and B. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 7 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via

electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.


2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Feb 28, 2018
Date Issued

10:44 am
Time Issued


Gabriel W. Gorenstein
HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment A

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Subject Account") for the time period referenced below.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email) limited to items sent, received, or created between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud

the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial

institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Email Search Attachment B

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com and [REDACTED] (the "Subject Accounts") for the time period between October 1, 2016 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Accounts:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Accounts, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Accounts.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Accounts, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Accounts, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Accounts, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Accounts.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Accounts.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Accounts;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Accounts about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Accounts was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the Subject Accounts owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

18 MAG 2877

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@gmail.com,
[REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED], Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Google, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. Warrant. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com, [REDACTED]@gmail.com, and [REDACTED], maintained at premises controlled by Google, Inc., contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachments A and B hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachments A and B hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachments A and B. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 14 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via

electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.


2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

4-5-18
Date Issued

5:01 PM
Time Issued



HONORABLE HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment A

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Subject Account") for the time period referenced below.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email) limited to items sent, received, or created between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018, inclusive.

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and February 28, 2018, inclusive.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and February 28, 2018, inclusive.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and February 28, 2018, inclusive.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and February 28, 2018, inclusive.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits,

and instrumentalities of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Email Search Attachment B

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the “Provider”), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider’s possession, custody, or control associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com and [REDACTED] (the “Subject Accounts”) for the time period between October 1, 2016 and February 28, 2018, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider’s possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Accounts:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Accounts, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Accounts.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Accounts, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Accounts, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Accounts, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Accounts.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Accounts.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud

the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Accounts;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Accounts about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Accounts was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the Subject Accounts owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

AO 93 (SDNY Rev. 05/10) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))
Three Electronic Devices, See Attachment A)

18 MAG 2958 Case No.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Southern District of New York (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location): Three Electronic Devices, See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before 4-21-18 (not to exceed 14 days)

[] in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. [x] at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.

[x] Upon its return, this warrant and inventory should be filed under seal by the Clerk of the Court. [Signature] USMJ Initials

[x] I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) [x] for 30 days (not to exceed 30).

[] until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 4-7-18 1:58 PM

[Signature] Judge's signature

City and state: New York, NY

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title

Attachment A

I. Devices to be Searched

The devices to be searched (the “Subject Devices”) are described as:

- a. *Subject Device-1*: A black and red USB drive with a white label that says “Tracking #: 180208140208.”
- b. *Subject Device-2*: A silver DVD with a white label that reads “Cohen – 2018.03.07.”
- c. *Subject Device-3*: A white DVD labelled “2-28-18 Cohen SW Returns – Google and 1&1.”

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Devices

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, interpreters, and outside vendors or technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on the Subject Devices for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of one or more violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offense”), as listed below:





AO 106 (Rev. 06/09) Application for a Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the Southern District of New York

18 MAG 2958

In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address) Three Electronic Devices, See Attachment A

Case No.

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

~~A Device Containing the Results of Three Email Search Warrants, See Attachment A~~

Three Electronic Devices

located in the Southern District of New York, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDER.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- [x] evidence of a crime; [] contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; [] property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime; [] a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Table with 2 columns: Code Section, Offense Description. Row 1: 52 USC 30116(a)(1)(A), 30109 (d)(1)(A)(1) Illegal campaign contributions

The application is based on these facts:

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND RIDER.

- [x] Continued on the attached sheet. [x] Delayed notice of 30 days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days:) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.



Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: 4-7-2018

J. Henry B. Pitman Judge's signature

City and state: NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Hon. Henry B. Pitman, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of the United States Of America for a Search Warrant for Three Electronic Devices, USAO Reference No 2018R00127

TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

**Agent Affidavit in Support of
Application for a Search Warrant**

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:

Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern

District of New York ("USAO"), being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I. Introduction

A. Affiant



2. I make this Affidavit in support of an application pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the electronic devices specified below (the "Subject Devices") for the items and information described in Attachment A. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge; my review of documents and other evidence; my conversations with other law enforcement personnel; and my training, experience and advice received concerning the use of computers in criminal activity and the forensic analysis of

electronically stored information (“ESI”). Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

B. Prior Warrants and the Subject Devices

3. The USAO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) have been investigating, among other things, a scheme by Michael Cohen to defraud multiple banks. Cohen is an attorney who currently holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald Trump, and who previously served for over a decade as an executive in the Trump Organization, an international conglomerate with real estate and other holdings.

4. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Gmail Account”) sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017. This warrant, which is numbered 17-mj-00503, is attached as Exhibit A (the “First Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen iCloud Account”). This warrant, which is numbered, 17-mj-00570, is attached as Exhibit D (the “Cohen iCloud Warrant”).

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017. This warrant, which is numbered 17-mj-00855, is attached as Exhibit B (the “Second Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] the “Cohen MDCPC Account”) sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account¹ and November 13, 2017. This warrant, which is numbered 17-mj-00854, is attached as Exhibit C (the “First Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).

5. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office. As part of that referral, on or about February 8, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged emails and other content information obtained pursuant to the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and Cohen MDCPC Warrant. On or about March 7, 2018, the SCO provided the USAO with all non-privileged content obtained pursuant to the Cohen iCloud Warrant.² A filter team working with the SCO had previously reviewed the content produced pursuant to these warrants for privilege.

6. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained search warrants for emails in Cohen Gmail Account and Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or

¹ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.

² The SCO had previously provided a subset of this non-privileged content on or about February 2, 2018.

received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018. These warrants, which are both numbered 18 Mag. 1696, are attached as Exhibits E (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant”) and F (the “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”), respectively. The content produced pursuant to these warrants is being reviewed for privilege by an SDNY filter team.

7. The search warrants described above are referred to collectively herein as the “Prior Warrants.”

8. The returns of the Prior Warrants are presently contained on three electronic devices. In particular:

a. *Subject Device-1*: The non-privileged emails and content returned in response to the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, the Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and the First Cohen MDCPC Warrant are contained on Subject Device-1, which is particularly described as a black and red USB drive with a white label that says “Tracking #: 180208140208.”

b. *Subject Device-2*: The non-privileged content returned in response to the Cohen iCloud Warrant is contained on Subject Device-2, which is particularly described as one silver DVD with a white label that reads “Cohen – 2018.03.07.”

c. *Subject Device-3*: The content returned in response to the Third Cohen Gmail Warrant and the Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant is contained on Subject Device-3, which is particularly described as one white DVD labelled “2-28-18 Cohen SW Returns – Google and 1&1.”

9. The Subject Devices are presently located in the Southern District of New York.

C. The Subject Offenses

10. The affidavits in support of the Prior Warrants describe evidence of several different courses of conduct by Cohen, including, among other things, false statements to financial institutions relating to the purpose of an account he opened in the name of Essential Consultants

LLC and the nature of funds flowing into that account; false statements and fraudulent omissions by Cohen in connection with this attempt to refinance his debts with certain financial institutions; and activities undertaken by Cohen on behalf of certain foreign persons or foreign entities without having registered as a foreign agent. The Prior Warrants accordingly define the evidence to be seized by reference to subject offenses and specific categories of information related to these courses of conduct. The subject offenses in the Prior Warrants are summarized as follows:

<u>Exhibit</u>	<u>Warrant</u>	<u>Subject Offenses in Prior Warrant</u> ³
A	First Cohen Gmail Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”))
B	Second Cohen Gmail Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (FARA)
C	Cohen MDCPC Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (FARA)
D	Cohen iCloud Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 (false statement to financial institution), 1344 (bank fraud), 1956 (money laundering), 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 <i>et seq.</i> (FARA)
E	Third Cohen Gmail Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud)
F	Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant	18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries), 1014 (false statements to financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud)


11. Based on my participation in this investigation, including my review of documents obtained pursuant to subpoena and court order, my conversations with witnesses and review of reports of conversations with witnesses, and my review of publicly available information, I have


³ On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained a Rule 41 warrant, authorizing it to expand its search of the email returns for the warrants attached as Exhibits A-C (the First Cohen Gmail Warrant, Second Cohen Gmail Warrant, and First Cohen MDCPC Warrant) for additional offenses not authorized in the original warrants for those accounts. The below chart therefore lists *both* the subject offenses listed in the original warrants for these accounts and the subject offenses authorized in the February 28, 2018 warrant.

learned of evidence of an additional Subject Offense committed by Cohen, described below, which was not listed in the Prior Warrants.⁴

12. I am therefore requesting authority to expand the search of the returns of the Prior Warrants, as contained on the Subject Devices, for evidence related to the additional Subject Offense. As set forth below, in addition to the categories of evidence already described in the Prior Warrants, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Devices contain evidence of violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offense”).⁵


II. Probable Cause Regarding the Subject Offense

13. As set forth above, the USAO and the FBI have been investigating, among other things, a scheme by Michael Cohen to defraud multiple banks. During the course of this investigation, the USAO and FBI have obtained evidence that Cohen has also committed a criminal violation of the campaign finance laws by 




⁴ As set forth below, I base this application in part on my review of emails and text messages obtained pursuant to the Prior Warrants. Each of the cited emails or texts messages is either responsive to the applicable Prior Warrant and/or was discovered in plain view during a review of the emails or texts returned pursuant to the applicable Prior Warrant.

⁵ The Prior Warrants describe categories of information that likely encompass evidence of the additional Subject Offense. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, I am seeking explicit authorization to search the Subject Devices for evidence of the Subject Offense.















































28. Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that a search of the Subject Devices will reveal evidence, fruit and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including the following:



III. Procedures for Searching ESI

A. Review of ESI

29. Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, interpreters, and outside vendors or technical experts under government control) will review the ESI contained on the Subject Devices for information responsive to the warrant.

30. In conducting this review, law enforcement personnel may use various methods to locate evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offense, including but not limited to undertaking a cursory inspection of all emails, texts or files contained on the Subject Devices. This method is analogous to cursorily inspecting all the files in a file cabinet in an office to determine which paper evidence is subject to seizure. Although law enforcement personnel may use other methods as well, particularly including keyword searches, I know that keyword searches and similar methods are typically inadequate to detect all information subject to seizure. As an initial matter, keyword searches work only for text data, yet many types of files commonly associated with emails, including attachments such as scanned documents, pictures, and videos, do not store data as searchable text. Moreover, even as to text data, keyword searches cannot be relied upon to capture all relevant communications in an account, as it is impossible to know in advance all of the unique words or phrases that investigative subjects will use in their communications, and

consequently there are often many communications in an account that are relevant to an investigation but that do not contain any keywords that an agent is likely to search for.

IV. Conclusion and Ancillary Provisions


31. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request the court to issue a warrant to seize the items and information specified in Attachment A to this affidavit and to the Search and Seizure Warrant.

32. In light of the confidential nature of the continuing investigation, and for the reasons more fully set forth in the Accompanying Affidavit, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted herewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise.



Special Agent, USAO

Sworn to before me on
7th day of April, 2018


HON. HENRY B. PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Attachment A

I. Devices to be Searched

The devices to be searched (the "Subject Devices") are described as:

- a. *Subject Device-1*: A black and red USB drive with a white label that says "Tracking #: 180208140208."
- b. *Subject Device-2*: A silver DVD with a white label that reads "Cohen – 2018.03.07."
- c. *Subject Device-3*: A white DVD labelled "2-28-18 Cohen SW Returns – Google and 1&1."

II. Review of ESI on the Subject Devices

Law enforcement personnel (including, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, and depending on the nature of the ESI and the status of the investigation and related proceedings, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, interpreters, and outside vendors or technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the ESI contained on the Subject Devices for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of one or more violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Subject Offense"), as listed below:





Exhibit A

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

FILED

JUL 21 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

Clerk, U.S. District and
Bankruptcy Courts

In the Matter of the Search of)
(Briefly describe the property to be searched)
or identify the person by name and address))

INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE EMAIL)
ACCOUNT [REDACTED]@GMAIL.COM)

Case: 1:17-mj-00503
Assigned To : Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 7/18/2017
Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property described above, and that such search will reveal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before August 1, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
 in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)

for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: July 18, 2017 4:30 PM

Beryl A. Howell
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC

Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.: 17-mj-00503	Date and time warrant executed: 7/18/2017 8:18 PM	Copy of warrant and inventory left with: Google Legal Investigators Support
--------------------------	--	--

Inventory made in the presence of:

Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:

Digital Files: Letter 1150069
 1150069-20170719-1
 See Attachment A for list of
 Hash values for Production Files

FILED
JUL 21 2017
 Clark, U.S. District and
 Bankruptcy Courts

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.

Date: 7/20/2017



Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the Google Mail Account [REDACTED]@gmail.com that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Google, a company headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by Google

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of the Google (hereinafter “the Provider”), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided

during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
- g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
- h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
- i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
- j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user; and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers (“ESN”), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers (“MEIN”), Mobile Equipment Identifier (“MEID”), Mobile Identification Numbers (“MIN”), Subscriber Identity Modules (“SIM”), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number (“MSISDN”), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (“IMSI”), or International Mobile Equipment Identities (“IMEI”).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, involving Michael Dean Cohen and occurring on or after January 1, 2016, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Bo and Abe Realty, LLC;
- c. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an

- account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;
- d. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
 - e. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
 - f. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
 - g. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
 - h. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
 - i. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

Exhibit B

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)
INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE EMAIL
ACCOUNT [redacted]@GMAIL.COM

Case: 1:17-mj-00855
Assigned To : Chief Judge Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 11/13/2017
Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search
of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(Identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property
described above, and that such search will reveal (Identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before November 20, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the
property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory
as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose
property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)

for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 11/13/2017 at 4:50PM

Beryl A. Howell
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC

Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.</p>		
Date: _____	_____	
	<i>Executing officer's signature</i>	

	<i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the Google Mail Account [REDACTED]@gmail.com that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Google, a company headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by Google

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of the Google (hereinafter "the Provider"), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
- g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
- h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
- i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
- j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user; and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers (“ESN”), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers (“MEIN”), Mobile Equipment Identifier (“MEID”), Mobile Identification Numbers (“MIN”), Subscriber Identity Modules (“SIM”), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number (“MSISDN”), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (“IMSI”), or International Mobile Equipment Identities (“IMEI”).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, involving Michael Dean Cohen and occurring on or after **June 1, 2015**, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

- c. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- d. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- e. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
- f. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
- g. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
- h. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

III. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner consistent with professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and other operative privileges. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit C

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)

INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACCOUNT
WHICH IS STORED AT THE
PREMISES OF 1&1 INTERNET, INC.

Case: 1:17-mj-00854
Assigned To : Chief Judge Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 11/13/2017
Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search
of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property
described above, and that such search will reveal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before November 20, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the
property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory
as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose
property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)

for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: 11/13/2017 at 4:45 PM Beryl A. Howell
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
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Inventory made in the presence of :

Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.

Date: _____

Executing officer's signature

Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the email [REDACTED] [REDACTED] hat is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by 1&1 Internet, Inc. ("1&1"), an electronic communication and/or remote computing service provider headquartered in Sunnyvale, California.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by 1&1

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of the 1&1 (hereinafter "the Provider"), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
- g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
- h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
- i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
- j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user; and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers (“ESN”), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers (“MEIN”), Mobile Equipment Identifier (“MEID”), Mobile Identification Numbers (“MIN”), Subscriber Identity Modules (“SIM”), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number (“MSISDN”), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (“IMSI”), or International Mobile Equipment Identities (“IMEI”).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, involving Michael Dean Cohen, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

- c. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- d. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- e. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
- f. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
- g. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
- h. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

III. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner consistent with professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and other operative privileges. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit D

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District of Columbia

In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)
INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE APPLE ID
@GMAIL.COM THAT IS STORED AT
PREMISES CONTROLLED BY APPLE, INC.

) Case: 17-mj-00570
) Assigned To : Howell, Beryl A.
) Assign. Date : 8/7/2017
) Description: Search and Seizure Warrant

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search
of the following person or property located in the Northern District of California
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A.

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property
described above, and that such search will reveal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before August 21, 2017 (not to exceed 14 days)
in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the
property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory
as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to Hon. Beryl A. Howell
(United States Magistrate Judge)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose
property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)
for days (not to exceed 30) until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued: August 7, 2017 2:35 PM Beryl A. Howell
Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, DC Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of :		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:		
Certification		
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.		
Date: _____	_____ <i>Executing officer's signature</i>	
	_____ <i>Printed name and title</i>	

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant applies to information associated with the Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Apple, Inc. ("Apple"), a company headquartered at 1 Infinite Loop, Cupertino, CA 95014.

ATTACHMENT B

I. Information to be disclosed by Apple, Inc.

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of Apple, Inc. (hereinafter “the Provider”), regardless of whether such information is stored, held or maintained inside or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to the Provider, the Provider is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- a. The contents of all emails associated with the account, including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email;
- b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number);
- c. The types of service utilized;
- d. All records or other information stored at any time by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files;
- e. All records pertaining to communications between the Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken; and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided

during registration, all other user names associated with the account, all account names associated with the subscriber, methods of connecting;

- f. All search history or web history;
- g. All records indicating the services available to subscribers of the accounts;
- h. All usernames associated with or sharing a login IP address or browser cookie with the accounts;
- i. All cookies, including third-party cookies, associated with the user;
- j. All records that are associated with the machine cookies associated with the user; and
- k. All telephone or instrument numbers associated with the Account (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers (“ESN”), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers (“MEIN”), Mobile Equipment Identifier (“MEID”), Mobile Identification Numbers (“MIN”), Subscriber Identity Modules (“SIM”), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number (“MSISDN”), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (“IMSI”), or International Mobile Equipment Identities (“IMEI”).

II. Information to be Seized by the Government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent), and 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.* (Foreign Agents Registration Act), involving Michael Dean Cohen and occurring on or after January 1, 2016, including, for each account or identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- a. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC;
- b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Bo and Abe Realty, LLC;
- c. Communications, records, documents, and other files that false representations to a financial institution with relation to intended the purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an

account a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

- d. Records of any funds or benefits received by or offered to Michael Dean Cohen by, or on behalf of, any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- e. Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by Michael Dean Cohen to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals;
- f. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;
- g. Evidence indicating the account owner's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation;
- h. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s); and
- i. The identity of any person(s)—including records that help reveal the whereabouts of the person(s)—who communicated with the account about any matters relating to activities conducted by Michael Dean Cohen on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign principals.

Exhibit E

18 MAG 169 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Accounts
[REDACTED]@gmail.com,
[REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED] Maintained at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.,
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: Google, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. **Warrant.** Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant
provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable
cause to believe the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com, [REDACTED]@gmail.com, and
[REDACTED], maintained at premises controlled by Google, Inc., contain evidence,
fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachments A and B hereto. Accordingly,
the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date
of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachments A and B
hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV
of Attachments A and B. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order
on the Provider within 7 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via

electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.



2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Feb 28, 2018
Date Issued

10:44 am
Time Issued

HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment A

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Subject Account") for the time period referenced below.

~~A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another~~ appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email) limited to items sent, received, or created between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Account, limited to items sent, received, or created between December 1, 2014 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud

the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial

institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Email Search Attachment B

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to Google, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email accounts [REDACTED]@gmail.com and [REDACTED] (the "Subject Accounts") for the time period between October 1, 2016 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Accounts:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Accounts, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Accounts.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Accounts, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Accounts, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Accounts, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Search History.* All search history and/or web history associated with the Subject Accounts.

g. *Associated content.* All Google Docs, files maintained on Google Drive, and instant messages or Gchats associated with the Subject Accounts.

h. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Accounts;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of any person(s) -- including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) -- who communicated with the Subject Accounts about any matters relating to any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications between the Subject Accounts and others, including employees or representatives of Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, or other financial institution(s), regarding Michael D. Cohen's finances;

e. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

f. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Accounts was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

g. Evidence indicating the Subject Accounts owners' intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

Exhibit F

18 MAG 169 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of a Warrant for All
Content and Other Information
Associated with the Email Account
[REDACTED] maintained at
Premises Controlled by 1 & 1 Internet,
Inc., USAO Reference No.
2018R00127

SEARCH WARRANT AND NON-DISCLOSURE ORDER

TO: 1 & 1 Internet, Inc. ("Provider")

United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, the "Investigative Agencies")

1. **Warrant.** Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and § 2703(c)(1)(A), and the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Court hereby finds there is probable cause to believe the email account [REDACTED] maintained at premises controlled by 1 & 1 Internet, Inc., contains evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime, all as specified in Attachment D hereto. Accordingly, the Provider is hereby directed to provide to the Investigative Agencies, within 7 days of the date of service of this Warrant and Order, the records specified in Section II of Attachment D hereto, for subsequent review by law enforcement personnel as authorized in Sections III and IV of Attachment D. The Government is required to serve a copy of this Warrant and Order on the Provider within 14 days of the date of issuance. The Warrant and Order may be served via electronic transmission or any other means through which the Provider is capable of accepting service.


2. Non-Disclosure Order. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), the Court finds that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this warrant will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence or flight from prosecution, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Provider shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order to the listed subscriber or to any other person for a period of 180 days from the date of this Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court if necessary, except that Provider may disclose this Warrant and Order to an attorney for Provider for the purpose of receiving legal advice.

3. Sealing. It is further ordered that this Warrant and Order, and the Affidavit upon which it was issued, be filed under seal, except that the Government may without further order of this Court serve the Warrant and Order on the Provider; provide copies of the Affidavit or Warrant and Order as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

Feb 28, 2018
Date Issued

10:45 a.m.
Time Issued


HONORABLE GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

Email Search Attachment D

I. Subject Account and Execution of Warrant

This warrant is directed to 1 & 1 Internet, Inc. (the "Provider"), headquartered at 701 Lee Road, Suite 300, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania 19087, and applies to all content and other information within the Provider's possession, custody, or control associated with the email account [REDACTED] (the "Subject Account") for the time period between November 14, 2017 and the date of this warrant, inclusive.

A law enforcement officer will serve this warrant by transmitting it via email or another appropriate manner to the Provider. The Provider is directed to produce to the law enforcement officer an electronic copy of the information specified in Section II below. Upon receipt of the production, law enforcement personnel will review the information for items falling within the categories specified in Section III below.

II. Information to be Produced by the Provider

To the extent within the Provider's possession, custody, or control, the Provider is directed to produce the following information associated with the Subject Account:

a. *Email content.* All emails sent to or from, stored in draft form in, or otherwise associated with the Subject Account, including all message content, attachments, and header information (specifically including the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email).

b. *Address book information.* All address book, contact list, or similar information associated with the Subject Account.

c. *Subscriber and payment information.* All subscriber and payment information regarding the Subject Account, including but not limited to name, username, address, telephone

number, alternate email addresses, registration IP address, account creation date, account status, length of service, types of services utilized, means and source of payment, and payment history.

d. *Transactional records.* All transactional records associated with the Subject Account, including any IP logs or other records of session times and durations.

e. *Customer correspondence.* All correspondence with the subscriber or others associated with the Subject Account, including complaints, inquiries, or other contacts with support services and records of actions taken.

f. *Preserved or backup records.* Any preserved or backup copies of any of the foregoing categories of records, whether created in response to a preservation request issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) or otherwise.

III. Review of Information by the Government

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the Provider in order to locate any evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States), 1005 (false bank entries); 1014 (false statements to a financial institution), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1344 (bank fraud), including the following:

a. Communications, records, documents, and other files necessary to establish the identity of the person(s) who created or used the Subject Account;

b. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Sterling National Bank, Melrose Credit Union, and/or taxi medallions;

c. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving a plan, proposal, or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi

medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

d. Communications, records, documents, and other files involving Essential Consultants, LLC or Michael D. Cohen & Associates, including those which indicate the nature and purpose of payments made to or from Essential Consultants or Michael D. Cohen & Associates;

e. The identity of any person(s) – including records that reveal the whereabouts of the person(s) – who communicated with the Subject Account about any matters relating to Essential Consultants, LLC, or about any plan or proposal or agreement for Michael D. Cohen and/or entities associated with him to transfer any interest in taxi medallions, and any associated debts or liabilities, to others, including to [REDACTED] and/or entities associated with him;

f. Communications between the Subject Account and [REDACTED] relating to Michael D. Cohen's bank accounts, taxes, debts, and/or finances;

g. Communications, records, documents, and other files reflecting false representations to a financial institution with relation to the intended purpose of an account or loan at that financial institution; the nature of any business or entity associated with an account at a financial institution; the source of funds flowing into an account; or the purpose or nature of any financial transactions involving that financial institution;

h. Evidence indicating how and when the Subject Account was accessed or used, to determine the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner; and

i. Evidence indicating the Subject Account owner's intent as it relates to the Subject Offenses under investigation.

IV. Review Protocols

Review of the items described in this Attachment shall be conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner reasonably designed to protect any attorney-client or other applicable privilege. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated “filter team,” separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

18 MAG 2957

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re: Warrant and Order For Prospective
and Historical Location Information and
Pen Register Information for the
Cellphones Assigned Call Numbers
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED],
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

WARRANT AND ORDER

18 Mag. _____

**Warrant and Order
for Cellphone Location Information and Pen Register Information
and for Sealing and Non-Disclosure**

TO: AT&T (“Service Provider”), and any subsequent provider of service to the Target Cellphones specified below (“Subsequent Service Provider”)

United States Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“Investigative Agencies”)

Upon the Application and Agent Affidavit submitted by the Government in this matter:

I. Findings

The Court hereby finds:

1. The Target Cellphones (the “Target Cellphones”) that are the subject of this Order are assigned call numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], are subscribed to in the name of Michael Cohen (the “Subscriber”) and are currently serviced by the Service Provider.

2. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) and the applicable provisions of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government’s application sets forth probable cause to believe that the prospective and historical location information for the Target Cellphone will reveal evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of suspected violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (“the Subject Offense”).

3. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the Government’s application also sets forth specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the historical

location information and toll records for the Target Cellphone are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

4. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1), the Government has certified that the pen register information for the Target Cellphones is relevant to an ongoing investigation by the Investigating Agencies of Michael Cohen and others unknown in connection with suspected violations of the Subject Offense.

5. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of this Warrant and Order will result in destruction of or tampering with evidence, danger to the physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, and/or intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise will seriously jeopardize an ongoing investigation.

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 *et seq.*, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 *et seq.*, and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

II. Order to Service Provider

6. **Service Provider.** This Order shall apply to the Service Provider specified above, and to any subsequent provider of service to the Target Cellphones without need for further Order of this Court.

7. **Prospective Location Information.** The Service Provider shall provide to the Investigating Agencies on a prospective basis, for a period of 45 days from the date of this Order (or the date that the Target Cellphones are seized, whichever comes first), information concerning the location of the Target Cellphones (“Prospective Location Information”), including all available:

a. precision location information, including GPS data, E-911 Phase II data, and latitude-longitude data; and

b. cell site data, including any data reflecting (a) the cell towers and sectors thereof utilized in routing any phone, text, or data communication to or from the Target Cellphones, and (b) the approximate range of the target phone from the cell towers during the communication (including per-call measurement (“PCM”) or round-trip time (“RTT” or “NELOS”) data);

8. **Historical Location Information and Toll Records.** The Service Provider shall provide to the Investigating Agency all available historical cell site location information reflecting the cell towers and sectors thereof utilized in routing any phone, text, or data communication to or from the Target Cellphones, and the approximate range of the target phone from the cell towers during the communication (PCM/RTT or NELOS data), for the period from October 1, 2016 through the date of this Order, as well as all available toll records (including call detail, SMS detail, or data session detail records) for the communications.

PPD
through
November
8, 2016
and
January
1, 2018
to present

9. **Pen register with caller identification and/or trap and trace device.** The Service Provider shall provide to the Investigating Agencies, for a period of 60 days from the date of this order (or the date that the Target Cellphones are seized, whichever comes first), all dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information associated with each voice, text, or data communication transmitted to or from the Target Cellphones, including but not limited to:

- a. any unique identifiers associated with the phone, including ESN, MEIN, MSISDN, IMSI, IMEI, SIM, MIN, or MAC address;
- b. source and destination telephone numbers and/or Internet protocol (“IP”) addresses;¹

¹ The Service Provider is not required to provide post-cut-through dialed digits (“PCTDD”), or digits that are dialed after a telephone call from the Target Phone has been connected. If possible, the Service Provider will forward only pre-cut-through-dialed digits to the Investigative Agency. However, if the Service Provider’s technical capabilities require it to forward all dialed digits, including PCTDD, to the Investigative Agency, the Investigative Agency will only decode and

- c. date, time, and duration of the communication; and
- d. cell-site information as specified above.

10. **Technical Assistance.** The Service Provider shall furnish the Investigating Agency all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the disclosure of all of the foregoing information relating to the Target Cellphones unobtrusively and with the minimum interference to the service presently provided to the Subscriber.

11. **Non-Disclosure to Subscriber.** The Service Provider, including its affiliates, officers, employees, and agents, shall not disclose the existence of this Warrant and Order, or the underlying investigation, to the Subscriber or any other person, for a period of 180 days from the date of this Warrant and Order, subject to extension upon application to the Court, if necessary.

III. Additional Provisions

12. **Compensation for Costs.** The Investigating Agency shall compensate the Service Provider for reasonable expenses incurred in complying with the Warrant and this Order.

13. **Sealing.** This Warrant and Order, and the supporting Application and Agent Affidavit, shall be sealed until otherwise ordered by the Court, except that the Government may without further order of this Court: serve this Warrant and Order on the Service Provider; provide copies of the Warrant and Order or the supporting Application and Agent Affidavit as need be to

forward to the agents assigned to the investigation, the numbers that are dialed before the call is cut through.

personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.


Dated: New York, New York

4-7-18

Date Issued

1:58 PM

Time Issued


Shirley A. ...
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Southern District of New York

18 MAG 2957

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re: Warrant and Order For
Prospective and Historical Location
Information and Pen Register
Information for the Cellphones
Assigned Call Numbers [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED] USAO Reference
No. 2018R00127

APPLICATION

18 Mag. _____

**Application for Warrant and Order
for Cellphone Location and Pen Register Information**

The United States of America, by its attorney, Robert Khuzami, Attorney for the United States Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515, [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel, respectfully requests that the Court issue the accompanying proposed Warrants and Orders for prospective and historical location information and pen register information for two cellphones (the "Target Cellphones"). As grounds for this Application the Government relies on the following facts and authorities.

I. Introduction

1. I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. This Application is submitted in conjunction with the accompanying affidavit of a law enforcement agent ("Agent Affidavit"), to be sworn before this Court, and incorporated by reference herein. I make this Application based on information and belief, including the Agent Affidavit, my review of other documents in the case, and information received from investigative personnel.

2. The Investigating Agency, Target Cellphones, Subscriber, Target Subject(s), Service Provider, Subject Offenses, Successor Service Provider, and Successor Cellphones referenced in this Application are as specified in the Agent Affidavit.

II. Legal Authority

A. Prospective Location Information

3. The Government seeks to obtain both precision location information and cell site data for the Target Cellphones on a prospective basis (the “Prospective Location Information”) for a period of 45 days from the date of this order – the same period of time for which a warrant for a tracking device may be granted under Rule 41(e)(2)(C). It bears noting, however, that while the Prospective Location Information may permit “tracking” the user of the phone in the colloquial sense, this is not an application for a warrant for a “tracking device” as defined in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a)(2)(E) and 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). Those provisions only apply where an agent is seeking to physically install a tracking device on a given object. Instead, the Prospective Location Information will be obtained by requiring the Service Provider to provide the information.

4. The authority for this application is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1), which authorizes a court of competent jurisdiction to require any electronic communication service provider (which includes a cellular telephone service provider¹) to disclose any “record or other information pertaining to a subscriber” other than the “contents of communications,” when the government obtains, *inter alia*, a warrant under the procedures of Rule 41. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A).²

¹ *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (incorporating by cross-reference statutory definitions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2510); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining “electronic communication service” as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications”).

² Another provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), specifically, § 2703(c)(1)(B), enables the Government to compel an electronic communication service provider to disclose non-content information pertaining to a subscriber by obtaining an order issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d),

Because data concerning a subscriber's location, such as precision location information and cell site data, constitutes "information pertaining to a subscriber" that does not include the "contents of communications," that data is among the types of information available under § 2703(c)(1)(A).³ Further, as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3), this Court is a court of competent jurisdiction under the Stored Communications Act because it has jurisdiction over the Subject Offenses.

5. The Government's request for cell site data also implicates the pen register statute, because such data constitutes signaling information used by the Service Provider to route communications to and from the Target Cellphones. In order to collect such data, a valid pen register order is required.⁴ Accordingly, I hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3122 that such

instead of a warrant. Rather than requiring a showing of probable cause, a § 2703(d) order requires only a showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. However, given that continued monitoring of an individual's specific location through precision location information arguably implicates Fourth Amendment interests, *see United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment), the Government here seeks to obtain the Precision Location Information sought herein by a § 2703(c) warrant rather than a § 2703(d) order.

³ *See In re Application*, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459–60 & n. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Kaplan, J.) (cellphone location information falls within § 2703(c)(1)); *accord, e.g., United States v. Caraballo*, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 361 (D.Vt. 2013); *In re Order*, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); *In re Application*, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). *But see In re Application*, 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 574 (D.Md. 2011) (rejecting view that cellular location data falls within the scope of the SCA and finding that phone must be treated as "tracking device" for purposes of Rule 41 where used to collect location data); *In re Application*, 2009 WL 159187, at *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.13, 2009) (McMahon, J.) (same).

⁴ *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (prohibiting use of pen register or trap and trace device without an order under the pen register statute); 3127(3) & (4) (defining pen register and trap and trace device to include devices or processes that record, *inter alia*, signaling information). Although cell site data constitutes "signaling" information within the meaning of the pen register statute, a separate statute precludes the Government from relying "solely" on the authority provided by the pen register statute to ascertain a subscriber's location. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a). Here, the Government seeks to obtain such data pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) as well as the pen register statute, rather than "solely" under the latter statute. *See In re Application*, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 456–59.

signaling information is relevant to an ongoing investigation being conducted by the Investigating Agency into suspected violations of the Subject Offenses by the Target Subject(s).

B. Historical Location Information

6. The Government also seeks historical cell site data for the Target Cellphones for the period from October 1, 2016 to ~~the present~~ ^{through November 8, 2016 and January 1, 2018 to present} (the "Historical Location Information"). Because such data constitutes non-content information concerning a subscriber, the Court is authorized to order the Service Provider to provide this data pursuant to a warrant application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) or an application for an order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), I respectfully submit that the Agent Affidavit offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Historical Location Information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. Further, although a warrant for the Historical Location Information is not required, I respectfully submit that the same probable cause supporting the Government's request for a warrant to obtain the Prospective Location Information requested above also supports the issuance of a warrant under § 2703(c) for the Historical Location Information.⁵ In addition, the Government seeks toll records for the same

⁵ A warrant is not required to obtain historical cell site information. Individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site information because individuals voluntarily convey that information to third-party service providers. *See United States v. Graham*, 824 F.3d 421, 424-25 (4th Cir. 2016) (*en banc*); *United States v. Davis*, 785 F.3d 498, 511-13 (11th Cir. 2015) (*en banc*), *cert. denied*, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); *In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data*, 724 F.3d 600, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2013); *United States v. Guerrero*, 768 F.3d 351, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2014); *see also United States v. Pascual*, 502 F. App'x 75, 80 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2012), *cert. denied*, 134 S. Ct. 231 (2013) ("general principles" of third-party doctrine "point[]" toward this conclusion regarding cell-site records); *but see United States v. Ulbricht*, 858 F.3d 71, 97 n.29 (2d Cir. 2017) (declining to express its view as to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to historical cell site location information). Moreover, because historical cell site information does not enable law enforcement to conduct live monitoring of a person's location within private spaces such as "the interior of the [person's] home," it is not comparable to prospective precision location information, for which a warrant is arguably required. *See In re Application of U.S. for Order Directing Provider of Elec. Comm'n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov't*, 620 F.3d 304, 312-15 (3d Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to review

period as the Historical Location Information is requested, which the Government is also authorized to obtain pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2703(d).

C. Pen Register Information

7. Finally, the Government seeks an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-26 authorizing the use of a pen register on the Target Cellphones for a period of 60 days from the date of this order (or the date that the Target Cellphones are seized, whichever comes first). Specifically, the Government seeks an order directing the Service Provider to furnish any information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to operate, unobtrusively and with minimum disruption of service, a pen register and trap and trace device to capture all dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information associated with each call transmitted to or from the Target Cellphones, as specified further in the proposed Warrant and Order (the “Pen Register Information”).⁶

8. I hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3122 that the Pen Register Information is relevant to an ongoing investigation being conducted by the Investigating Agency into suspected violations of the Subject Offenses by the Target Subject(s).

the Sixth Circuit’s decision in *United States v. Carpenter*, 819 F.3d 880, 887-90 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding Government’s collection of business records containing historical cell site data did not constitute search under Fourth Amendment), *cert. granted*, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402), the Government, in an abundance of caution, requests a warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), upon articulation of probable cause as set forth in the Agent Affidavit.

⁶ The Government is also not seeking authorization to obtain post-cut-through dialed digits (“PCTDD”), or digits that are dialed after a telephone call from the Target Phone has been connected. Pursuant to the attached Order, if possible, the Provider will forward only pre-cut-through-dialed digits to the Investigating Agency. However, if the Provider’s technical capabilities require it to forward all dialed digits, including PCTDD, to the Investigating Agency, the Investigating Agency will only decode and forward to the agents assigned to the investigation the numbers that are dialed before the call is cut through.

D. Sealing and Non-Disclosure Order to Service Provider

9. When the Government obtains records or information under § 2703(c), it is not required to notify the subscriber or customer. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3). Additionally, the Government may obtain an order precluding the Provider from notifying the subscriber or any other third-party of the warrant or order obtained, for such period as the Court deems appropriate, where there is reason to believe that such notification will result in endangering the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with evidence, or intimidation of potential witnesses, or will otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

10. Further, 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) provides that an order directing installation of a pen register or trap and trace device shall direct the pertinent service provider “not to disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person unless or until otherwise ordered by the Court.”



11. Accordingly, as explained further in the Agent Affidavit, in light of the confidential nature of the continuing criminal investigation and the adverse consequences expected in the event of premature notification, the Government respectfully requests that the Court direct the Service Provider not to notify the Subscriber or any other person of the Warrant and Order sought herein for a period of 180 days, subject to extension upon application to the Court, if necessary.

12. For similar reasons, I respectfully request that the proposed Warrant and Order, this Application, and the accompanying Agent Affidavit, be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government be permitted without further order of this Court to serve this Warrant and Order on the Service Provider; provide copies of the Warrant and Order or the supporting Application and Agent Affidavit as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

III. Prior Requests

14. Except as may be set forth above, no prior request for the relief requested herein has been made.

Dated: New York, New York
April 7, 2018


Assistant United States Attorney
Tel.: (212) 637-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

18 MAG 2957

In re: Warrant and Order For Prospective
and Historical Location Information and
Pen Register Information for the
Cellphones Assigned Call Numbers
[redacted] and [redacted]
USAO Reference No. 2018R00127

AGENT AFFIDAVIT

18 Mag. _____

**Agent Affidavit in Support of Warrant and Order
for Cellphone Location and Pen Register Information**

STATE OF NEW YORK)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

Special Agent [redacted] of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, being duly sworn, deposes and states:

I. Introduction



2. **Requested Information.** I respectfully submit this Affidavit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and (c)(1)(A) and the applicable procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(d) & 2705; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3126, in support of a warrant and order for prospective location information, historical location information, toll records, and pen register

information, for the Target Cellphones identified below (collectively, the “Requested Information”).

3. **Basis for Knowledge.** This Affidavit is based upon my participation in the investigation, my examination of reports and records, and my conversations with other law enforcement agents and other individuals, as well as my training and experience. Because this Affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of obtaining the Requested Information, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of this investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated. In addition, unless otherwise indicated, statements by others referenced in this Affidavit were not necessarily made to me, but may have been provided to me by someone else to whom I have spoken or whose report I have read (and who in turn may have had either direct or indirect knowledge of the statement). Similarly, unless otherwise indicated, information in this Affidavit resulting from surveillance does not necessarily set forth my personal observations, but may have been provided to me by other law enforcement agents who observed the events, and to whom I have spoken or whose report I have read.

4. **Target Cellphones, Subscriber, Target Subject, and Service Provider.** The Target Cellphones referenced in this Affidavit are the cellphones assigned call numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. As further discussed below, the Target Cellphones are subscribed to in the name of Michael Cohen (the “Subscriber”). The Subscriber is believed to use the Target Cellphones and is a Target Subject of this investigation. AT&T is the Service Provider for the Target Cellphones.

5. **Precision Location Capability.** Cellphone service providers have technical capabilities that allow them to collect at least two kinds of information about the locations of the cellphones to which they provide service: (a) precision location information, also known as E-911 Phase II data, GPS data, or latitude-longitude data, and (b) cell site data, also known as “tower/face” or “tower/sector” information. Precision location information provides relatively precise location information about a cellphone, which a provider can typically collect either via GPS tracking technology built into the phone or by triangulating the device’s signal as received by the provider’s nearby cell towers. Cell site data, by contrast, reflects only the cell tower and sector thereof utilized in routing any communication to and from the cellphone, as well as the approximate range of the cellphone from the tower during the communication (sometimes referred to as “per-call measurement” (“PCM”) or “round-trip time” (“RTT” or “NELOS” data). Because cell towers are often a half-mile or more apart, even in urban areas, and can be ten or more miles apart in rural areas, cell site data is typically less precise than precision location information. Based on my training and experience, I know that the Service Provider has the technical ability to collect precision location information from any cellphone on its network, including by initiating a signal on the Service Provider’s network to determine the phone’s location. I further know that cell site data is routinely collected by the Service Provider in the course of routing calls placed to or from any cellphone on its network.¹

6. **Successor Service Provider.** Because it is possible that the Target Subject may change cellphone service provider during the course of this investigation, it is requested that the warrant

¹ Toll records are sometimes necessary or helpful in order to obtain or interpret historical cell site data and are therefore also requested herein.

and investigative order requested apply without need for further order to any Successor Service Provider who may provide service to the Target Cellphones during the time frames at issue herein.

II. Facts Establishing Probable Cause

7. Although I understand that probable cause is not necessary to obtain all of the Requested Information, I respectfully submit that probable cause exists to believe that the Requested Information will lead to evidence of the crime of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offense”), as well as the location of the Target Subject who is engaged in the Subject Offense.

Introduction

8. The USAO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) are investigating a criminal violation of the campaign finance laws by Michael Cohen, a lawyer who holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald J. Trump. As detailed below, there is probable cause to believe [REDACTED]



Prior Relevant Process

9. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Gmail Account”) sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the “First Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen iCloud Account” and the “Cohen iCloud Warrant”).

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the “Second Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] (the “Cohen MDCPC Account”) sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account² and November 13, 2017 (the “First Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).

10. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office.

11. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO sought and obtained search warrants for emails in Cohen Gmail Account and Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).

² Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.


12. The above-described warrants are referred to herein as the “Cohen Emails Warrants” and, with respect to the iCloud Warrant, the “Cohen iCloud Warrant.”

The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme














































28. I have reviewed records maintained by AT&T, from which I have learned, in substance and in part, that the Target Cellphones are still active. Based on my training and experience, my familiarity with this investigation, and the information set forth above, I therefore believe that the Requested Information will lead to evidence of the Subject Offense. Specifically, the Requested Information includes historical location data for the Target Cellphones, which may show where the Target Cellphones—and by extension Cohen—was on particular dates and times between October 1, 2016—— and the present. That location information can, among other things, be used to corroborate any 



29. Based on my training and experience, I also know that historical location information can be useful to establish a pattern of behavior by a particular individual, which assists law enforcement in tracking such an individual—and, thereby, locating his electronic devices. Along with the historical information, the prospective information will also lead to the present location of the Target Cellphones; law enforcement may then obtain evidence from the Target Cellphones, by subpoena or search warrant, including but not limited to



III. Request for Warrant and Order

30. Based on the foregoing I respectfully request that the Court require the Service Provider to provide the Requested Information as specified further in the Warrant and Order proposed herewith, including prospective precision location and cell site data for a period of 45 days from the date of this Order (or the date that the Target Cellphones are seized, whichever comes first), historical cell site data and toll records for the period from October 1, 2016 through the date of this ~~Order~~, and pen register information for a period of 60 days from the date of this Order.

WHP
November 8, 2018 and
January 1, 2018 to
present


31. **Nondisclosure.** The existence and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation are not publicly known. As a result, premature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested Warrant and Order could alert potential criminal targets that they are under investigation, causing them to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Provider be directed not to notify the subscriber or others of the existence of the Warrant and Order for a period of 180 days, and that the Warrant and

Order and all supporting papers be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, as specified in the Application submitted in conjunction with this Affidavit.



United States Attorney's Office
Southern District of New York

Sworn to before me this
7th day of April, 2018


HONORABLE HENRY PITMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN THE MATTER OF THE USE OF A CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TO LOCATE THE
CELLULAR DEVICES ASSIGNED CALL
NUMBERS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Case 18 MAG 2974

Filed Under Seal

**AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT**

I, [REDACTED] being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 to authorize law enforcement to employ an electronic investigative technique, which is described in Attachment B, to determine the location of the cellular devices assigned call numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (the "Target Cellular Devices"), which are described in Attachment A.

[REDACTED]

3. The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and experience, and information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested warrant and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter.

4. One purpose of applying for this warrant is to determine with precision the Target Cellular Devices' location. However, there is reason to believe the Target Cellular Devices are currently located somewhere within this district because the Target Cellular Devices' owner is known to spend most of his time in this district. Pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2), law enforcement may locate the Target Cellular Devices outside the district provided the device is within the district when the warrant is issued.

5. Based on the facts set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Subject Offense") has been committed, are being committed, and will be committed by Michael Cohen and others. There is also probable cause to believe that the location of the Target Cellular Devices will lead to evidence of the Subject Offense, as detailed below.


6. Because collecting the information authorized by this warrant may fall within the statutory definitions of a "pen register" or a "trap and trace device," *see* 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4), this warrant is designed to comply with the Pen Register Statute as well as Rule 41. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. This warrant therefore includes all the information required to be included in a pen register order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1).

PROBABLE CAUSE

Introduction

7. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("USAO") and the FBI are investigating a criminal violation of the campaign finance laws by Michael Cohen, a lawyer who holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald J. Trump. As detailed below, there is probable cause to believe that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



8. The Target Cellular Devices referenced in this Affidavit are the cellphones assigned call numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. As further discussed below, the Target Cellular Devices are subscribed to in the name of Michael Cohen (the “Subscriber”). The Subscriber is believed to use the Target Cellphones and is a Target Subject of this investigation. AT&T is the Service Provider for the Target Cellphones.

Prior Relevant Process

9. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel (“SCO”), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen Gmail Account”) sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the “First Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the “Cohen iCloud Account” and the “Cohen iCloud Warrant”).

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the “Second Cohen Gmail Warrant”).

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] (the “Cohen MDCPC Account”) sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account¹ and November 13, 2017 (the “First Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).

10. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office.

11. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained search warrants for emails in Cohen Gmail Account and Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).²

12. The above-described warrants are referred to herein as the “Cohen Emails Warrants” and, with respect to the iCloud Warrant, the “Cohen iCloud Warrant.”


The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme





¹ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.


² On or about February 28, 2018 and April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained Rule 41 search warrants authorizing the search of emails and content obtained pursuant to previously issued warrants for additional subject offenses.













































28. I have reviewed records maintained by AT&T, from which I have learned, in substance and in part, that the Target Cellular Devices are still active. Based on my training and experience, my familiarity with this investigation, and the information set forth above, I therefore believe that the requested data will lead to evidence of the Subject Offense. Specifically, information will lead to the present location of the Target Cellular Devices; law enforcement may then obtain evidence from the Target Cellular Devices, by subpoena or search warrant, including but not limited to







AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

32. Based on the foregoing, I request that the Court issue the proposed search warrant, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The proposed warrant also will function as a pen register order under 18 U.S.C. § 3123.

33. I further request, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3), that the Court authorize the officer executing the warrant to delay notice until 30 days from the end of the period of authorized surveillance. This delay is justified because there is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the warrant may have an adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705. Providing immediate notice to the subscriber or user of the Target Cellular Devices would seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation, as such a disclosure would give that person an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, and notify confederates. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1). There is reasonable necessity for the use of the technique described above, for the reasons set forth above. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).

34. I further request that the Court authorize execution of the warrant at any time of day or night, owing to the potential need to locate the Target Cellular Devices outside of daytime hours.

35. I further request that the Court order that all papers in support of this application, including the affidavit and search warrant, be sealed until further order of the Court. These documents discuss an ongoing criminal investigation that is neither public nor known to all of the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these documents because their premature disclosure may seriously jeopardize that investigation.

36. A search warrant may not be legally necessary to compel the investigative technique described herein. Nevertheless, I hereby submit this warrant application out of an abundance of caution.


Respectfully submitted,

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subscribed and sworn to before me *BY TELEPHONE*

On: *APRIL 8, 2018*

[Signature]
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN THE MATTER OF THE USE OF A CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TO LOCATE THE
CELLULAR DEVICES ASSIGNED CALL
NUMBERS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Case No. **18 MAG 2974**
Filed Under Seal

WARRANT AND ORDER OF AUTHORIZATION

TO: Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Other Authorized Personnel

I. Findings

The Court hereby finds:

1. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("Affidavit") and pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, there is probable cause to believe that violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Subject Offense") have been committed by Michael Cohen (the "Target Subject"), and that the Target Subject uses cellular devices assigned call numbers [REDACTED] the ("Target Cellular Devices"), which are described in Attachment A. Further, there is probable cause to believe that the location of the Target Cellular Device will constitute evidence of the Subject Offense. Specifically, there is probable cause to believe that the location of the Target Cellular Devices will constitute evidence of those criminal violations, including leading to the location of the Target Cellular Devices, on which there is probable cause to believe evidence of these offenses exist, as detailed below.

2. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1), the Government has certified that the pen register information for the Target Cellular Devices is relevant to an ongoing investigation by the

Investigating Agency of the Target Subject and others unknown in connection with suspected violations of the Subject Offense.

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 *et seq.*, and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

II. Warrant and Order of Authorization

3. **Warrant.** Law enforcement agents and other authorized law enforcement officials are hereby authorized to employ an electronic investigative technique, which is described in Attachment B, to determine the location of the Target Cellular Devices, which are described in Attachment A.

4. **Data Collection and Retention.** In the course of employing the technique, law enforcement agents and other authorized law enforcement officials (a) must make reasonable efforts to limit interference with cellular devices other than the Target Cellular Devices, (b) must promptly delete information collected from cellular devices other than the Target Cellular Devices once the Target Cellular Devices is located, and (c) are prohibited from using data acquired beyond that necessary to locate the Target Cellular Devices, absent further order of the Court.

5. **Delayed Notice.** Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3), the Court authorizes the officer executing the warrant to delay in notice until 30 days from the end of the period of authorized surveillance. This delay is justified because there is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the warrant may have an adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705. Providing immediate notice to the subscriber or user of the Target Cellular Devices would seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation, as such a disclosure would give that person an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, and notify confederates. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1). There is reasonable necessity

for the use of the technique described above, for the reasons set forth above. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).


6. **Time of Execution.** The Court authorizes execution of this Warrant at any time of day or night, owing to the potential need to locate the Target Cellular Devices outside of daytime hours.

7. **Sealing.** This Warrant and Order, and the supporting Agent Affidavit, shall be sealed until further order of the Court, except that the Government may without further order of this Court: provide copies of the Warrant and Order or the supporting Application and Agent Affidavit as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.


Dated: New York, New York

4-8-18
Date Issued

9:50 AM
Time Issued



UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Southern District of New York



ATTACHMENT A

This warrant authorizes the use of the electronic investigative technique described in Attachment B to identify the location of the cellular devices assigned phone numbers [REDACTED] [REDACTED] whose wireless provider is AT&T, and whose listed subscriber is Michael Cohen.

ATTACHMENT B

Pursuant to an investigation of Michael Cohen for a violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offense”), this Warrant authorizes the officers to whom it is directed to determine the location of the cellular devices identified in Attachment A by collecting and examining:



for a period of thirty days, during all times of day and night. This warrant does not authorize the interception of any telephone calls, text messages, other electronic communications, and this warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property. The Court finds reasonable necessity for the use of the technique authorized above. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN THE MATTER OF THE USE OF A CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TO LOCATE THE
CELLULAR DEVICES ASSIGNED CALL
NUMBERS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Case No. _____

Filed Under Seal

**AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT**

I, [REDACTED] being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 to authorize law enforcement to employ an electronic investigative technique, which is described in Attachment B, to determine the location of the cellular devices assigned call numbers [REDACTED] (the "Target Cellular Devices"), which are described in Attachment A.

3. The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and experience, and information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested warrant and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter.

4. One purpose of applying for this warrant is to determine with precision the Target Cellular Devices' location. However, there is reason to believe the Target Cellular Devices are currently located somewhere within this district because the Target Cellular Devices' owner is known to spend most of his time in this district. Pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2), law enforcement may locate the Target Cellular Devices outside the district provided the device is within the district when the warrant is issued.

5. Based on the facts set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Subject Offense") has been committed, are being committed, and will be committed by Michael Cohen and others. There is also probable cause to believe that the location of the Target Cellular Devices will lead to evidence of the Subject Offense, as detailed below.

6. Because collecting the information authorized by this warrant may fall within the statutory definitions of a "pen register" or a "trap and trace device," *see* 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4), this warrant is designed to comply with the Pen Register Statute as well as Rule 41. *See* 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. This warrant therefore includes all the information required to be included in a pen register order. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1).

PROBABLE CAUSE

Introduction

7. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("USAO") and the FBI are investigating a criminal violation of the campaign finance laws by Michael Cohen, a lawyer who holds himself out as the personal attorney for President Donald J. Trump. As detailed below, there is probable cause to believe [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8. The Target Cellular Devices referenced in this Affidavit are the cellphones assigned call numbers [REDACTED]. As further discussed below, the Target Cellular Devices are subscribed to in the name of Michael Cohen (the "Subscriber"). The Subscriber is believed to use the Target Cellphones and is a Target Subject of this investigation.

AT&T is the Service Provider for the Target Cellphones.

Prior Relevant Process

9. In connection with an investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Special Counsel ("SCO"), the FBI sought and obtained from the Honorable Beryl A. Howell, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, three search warrants for emails and other content information associated with two email accounts used by Cohen, and one search warrant for stored content associated with an iCloud account used by Cohen. Specifically:

a. On or about July 18, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen Gmail Account") sent or received between January 1, 2016 and July 18, 2017 (the "First Cohen Gmail Warrant").

b. On or about August 8, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for content stored in the iCloud account associated with Apple ID [REDACTED]@gmail.com (the "Cohen iCloud Account" and the "Cohen iCloud Warrant").

c. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the Cohen Gmail Account sent or received between June 1, 2015 and November 13, 2017 (the "Second Cohen Gmail Warrant").

d. On or about November 13, 2017, the FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for emails in the account [REDACTED] (the “Cohen MDCPC Account”) sent or received between the opening of the Cohen MDCPC Account¹ and November 13, 2017 (the “First Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).

10. The SCO has since referred certain aspects of its investigation into Cohen to the USAO, which is working with the FBI’s New York Field Office.

11. On or about February 28, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained search warrants for emails in Cohen Gmail Account and Cohen MDCPC Account, among other accounts, sent or received between November 14, 2017 and February 28, 2018 (the “Third Cohen Gmail Warrant” and “Second Cohen MDCPC Warrant”).²

12. The above-described warrants are referred to herein as the “Cohen Emails Warrants” and, with respect to the iCloud Warrant, the “Cohen iCloud Warrant.”


The Illegal Campaign Contribution Scheme




¹ Based on my review of this warrant and the affidavit in support of it, I know that the warrant did not specify a time period, but the affidavit indicated that, pursuant to court order, the service provider had provided non-content information for the Cohen MDCPC Account that indicated that the account contained emails from the approximate period of March 2017 through the date of the warrant.


² On or about February 28, 2018 and April 7, 2018, the USAO and FBI sought and obtained Rule 41 search warrants authorizing the search of emails and content obtained pursuant to previously issued warrants for additional subject offenses.





³ My attribution of certain telephone numbers to certain individuals as described in this affidavit is based on my review of the vCard (virtual contact file) and text messages obtained from Cohen's telephone pursuant to the iCloud Warrant.










































28. I have reviewed records maintained by AT&T, from which I have learned, in substance and in part, that the Target Cellular Devices are still active. Based on my training and experience, my familiarity with this investigation, and the information set forth above, I therefore believe that the requested data will lead to evidence of the Subject Offense. Specifically, information will lead to the present location of the Target Cellular Devices; law enforcement may then obtain evidence from the Target Cellular Devices, by subpoena or search warrant, including but not limited to







AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

32. Based on the foregoing, I request that the Court issue the proposed search warrant, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The proposed warrant also will function as a pen register order under 18 U.S.C. § 3123.


33. I further request, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3), that the Court authorize the officer executing the warrant to delay notice until 30 days from the end of the period of authorized surveillance. This delay is justified because there is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the warrant may have an adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705. Providing immediate notice to the subscriber or user of the Target Cellular Devices would seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation, as such a disclosure would give that person an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, and notify confederates. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1). There is reasonable necessity for the use of the technique described above, for the reasons set forth above. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).

34. I further request that the Court authorize execution of the warrant at any time of day or night, owing to the potential need to locate the Target Cellular Devices outside of daytime hours.

35. I further request that the Court order that all papers in support of this application, including the affidavit and search warrant, be sealed until further order of the Court. These documents discuss an ongoing criminal investigation that is neither public nor known to all of the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these documents because their premature disclosure may seriously jeopardize that investigation.

36. A search warrant may not be legally necessary to compel the investigative technique described herein. Nevertheless, I hereby submit this warrant application out of an abundance of caution.

Respectfully submitted,


Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subscribed and sworn to before me

On: April 8, 2018

S/HENRY PITMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN THE MATTER OF THE USE OF A CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TO LOCATE THE
CELLULAR DEVICES ASSIGNED CALL
NUMBERS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Case No. _____

Filed Under Seal

WARRANT AND ORDER OF AUTHORIZATION

TO: Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Other Authorized Personnel

I. Findings

The Court hereby finds:

1. Upon an affidavit of Special Agent [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("Affidavit") and pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, there is probable cause to believe that violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the "Subject Offense") have been committed by Michael Cohen (the "Target Subject"), and that the Target Subject uses cellular devices assigned call numbers [REDACTED] the ("Target Cellular Devices"), which are described in Attachment A. Further, there is probable cause to believe that the location of the Target Cellular Device will constitute evidence of the Subject Offense. Specifically, there is probable cause to believe that the location of the Target Cellular Devices will constitute evidence of those criminal violations, including leading to the location of the Target Cellular Devices, on which there is probable cause to believe evidence of these offenses exist, as detailed below.

2. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1), the Government has certified that the pen register information for the Target Cellular Devices is relevant to an ongoing investigation by the

Investigating Agency of the Target Subject and others unknown in connection with suspected violations of the Subject Offense.

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 *et seq.*, and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

II. Warrant and Order of Authorization

3. **Warrant.** Law enforcement agents and other authorized law enforcement officials are hereby authorized to employ an electronic investigative technique, which is described in Attachment B, to determine the location of the Target Cellular Devices, which are described in Attachment A.

4. **Data Collection and Retention.** In the course of employing the technique, law enforcement agents and other authorized law enforcement officials (a) must make reasonable efforts to limit interference with cellular devices other than the Target Cellular Devices, (b) must promptly delete information collected from cellular devices other than the Target Cellular Devices once the Target Cellular Devices is located, and (c) are prohibited from using data acquired beyond that necessary to locate the Target Cellular Devices, absent further order of the Court.

5. **Delayed Notice.** Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3), the Court authorizes the officer executing the warrant to delay in notice until 30 days from the end of the period of authorized surveillance. This delay is justified because there is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the warrant may have an adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705. Providing immediate notice to the subscriber or user of the Target Cellular Devices would seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation, as such a disclosure would give that person an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, and notify confederates. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1). There is reasonable necessity

for the use of the technique described above, for the reasons set forth above. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).

6. **Time of Execution.** The Court authorizes execution of this Warrant at any time of day or night, owing to the potential need to locate the Target Cellular Devices outside of daytime hours.

7. **Sealing.** This Warrant and Order, and the supporting Agent Affidavit, shall be ~~sealed until further order of the Court, except that the Government may without further order of~~ this Court: provide copies of the Warrant and Order or the supporting Application and Agent Affidavit as need be to personnel assisting the Government in the investigation and prosecution of this matter; and disclose these materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any prosecutions related to this matter.

Dated: New York, New York

4/8/18
Date Issued

9:50 AM
Time Issued

S/ HENRY PITMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Southern District of New York

ATTACHMENT A

This warrant authorizes the use of the electronic investigative technique described in Attachment B to identify the location of the cellular devices assigned phone numbers [REDACTED] [REDACTED] whose wireless provider is AT&T, and whose listed subscriber is Michael Cohen.

ATTACHMENT B

Pursuant to an investigation of Michael Cohen for a violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 30109(d)(1)(A)(1) (illegal campaign contributions) (the “Subject Offense”), this Warrant authorizes the officers to whom it is directed to determine the location of the cellular devices identified in Attachment A by collecting and examining:



for a period of thirty days, during all times of day and night. This warrant does not authorize the interception of any telephone calls, text messages, other electronic communications, and this warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property. The Court finds reasonable necessity for the use of the technique authorized above. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).