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Psychological warfare - not a new factor in war it's importance greatly accentuated by conditions in modern
war and by new instruments.

Since war began psychological warfare has been used. A leader has always tried to win to his standard tribes or individuals or allied nations. Political devices have been used to woo support of potential enemies, to secure compliance by threats of military action and prevent military action when these devices have failed.

When you had professional armies you sought to influence those in command by such political or diplomatic action. But with nations in arms, with civilians in uniform, the emphasis of such warfare has changed.

But it is still true that if you can stampede the leaders, the fill objective may be more quickly achieved. You

Suchon File forfelle Lyshological Weeface Su 52 direct your propagands at the civilian population, at their national emotions, because by doing so you not only involve the leaders, you not only aim at destroying the force of the war machine, but the political or military group who runs that machine.

Psychological warfare not a new device. Practiced in every phase of history -- the war paint of barbarous tribes, the Trojan Horse, the Pheric elephants, the leaflets and wshipers used by Richelieu to destroy the morale of the besieged population of La Rochelle. At different times and different periods all of these devices have been used.

The element of surprise in military operations, which is psychological warfare translated into fields tactics, is achieved by artifice and strategem, by secrecy and rapidity of information, by mystifying and misleading the enemy. When you strike at the morale of a people or an army you strike at the deciding factor, because it is the strength of their will that determines the length of wars, the measure of resistance

and the day of final collapse.

We have this on both sides. In the first World

War effective use was made of social and idealogical warfare.

But then the Allies were the masters. They had organized

the warring nations that operated on three continens; they

had isolated Italy from the Triple Alliance; won over the

United States; secured the cooperation of Greece; forced the

acceptance of a blockade which produced the economic strangulation

of the enemy and they had used propaganda to accentuate racial,

ethnic and class differences. They distorted the motives and

methods of the enemy regime; destroyed the faith of the Central

European powers in the fighting services; produced peace over
tures which weakened and finally disrupted the enemy.

Between wars, the democracies had not prepared in for war psychological warfare because they had not prepared/physically or morally. But Hitler did prepare, and he changed the kind of political warfare. He said: "The place of the artillery

barrage as a preparation for infantry attack will, in the future, be taken by revolutionary propaganda. Its task is to break down the enemy physically before the armies begin to function at all." And under him the Germans developed a deliberate science and strategy of psychological warfare.

THE AIM AND THE INSTRUMENTS:

In this war of machines, the human element is, in the long run, more important than the machines themselves.

There must be the will to make the machines, to man the machines, and to pull the trigger. Psychological warfare is directed against that will. Its object is to destroy the morale of the enemy and to support the morale of our allies within enemy and enemy occupied countries.

One instrument is propaganda. This has more powerful instruments than ever before. The radio reaches the home, the

bomber drops leaflets on the cities. Secret communications enable reports to penetrate enemy countries.

But in fighting that kind of war, it is just as important to have intelligence as in fighting in the orthodox and traditional way. There must be known the psychology of the people; the elements of resistance; the degree of cooperation which you can count upon when your divisions go in there. You must know the morale effect of air attacks against that region. You must be able not only to know the ground but to prepare it and to mobilize cooperation.

The essence of rumoring is that you know what nobody else knows and that you want everybody to know that you know what they don't know. It is this human weakness that has to be exploited.

The ammunition of psychological warfare consists of ideas more powerful than those used by the enemy.

The Nazis have produced in Europe a large measure of

grudging acquiesence that grows on successive disappointments and through the comparative barrier of distance. You must combat that with the certainty of Allied victories. What we offer must be concrete; must be translated into individual experience; must be able to see some pattern of existence after the war.

This is a question of today and tomorrow and not of an indefinite future, because we have to arm the people of Europe with the conviction that our cause is their cause.